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Abstract.  
 
Prior to 1999, higher education in Libya was monopolized by the public sector and there 
was considerable public resistance to the establishment of private universities. The impetus 
for the private higher education policy was created by a number of pressures on public 
policy for higher education, which had been adopted by Gaddafi’s government for two 
decades. This study explores the efforts of Gaddafi’s regime to cope with this issue. It 
reviews the financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of the growth of 
private higher education in Libya and describes the strategy of the Gaddafi government for 
reforming the higher education system with a view to encouraging privatization. The thesis 
also analyses the case of a particular private university with the aim of providing insights 
into the managing and financing of a private higher education institution from which to 
make informed appraisals and assessments of the practice of private higher education in 
the country. In addition, it analyses the effects of the new financing policy for higher 
education in the Gaddafi period for the main stakeholders, namely students, academics and 
institutions themselves. The research contends that the policy shift had had a significant 
effect on quality just as it has introduced universities to risks through engagement with 
academic capitalism with its emphasis on marketization of university programmes and 
services. The thesis concludes with suggestions for some policy options that could help to 
mitigate the negative consequences of Gaddafi’s policy, taking in to account some 
developments since the February 2011 revolution which overthrew the Gaddafi regime.  
 
The 1999 Private Higher Educational Institutions Act opened the possibility of private 
universities being founded to increase the supply of quality graduates to increase the 
advantage of competitiveness. As with many countries, Libya is a very recent arrival to the 
world scene of rapidly growing private higher education. Reform in higher education 
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financing in Libya has been occasioned by both endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Internal pressures of a declining economy, rapid demographic growth and increased inter-
and intra-sectoral competition for scare financial resources, coupled with external neo-
liberal doctrines championed by global donors like the World Bank,  resulted in a new 
market-competitive policy of financing higher education. 
  
 In Libya the policy was to facilitate educational reform to produce quality graduates that 
could help transform Libya from a development economy to an industrialized and 
knowledge based economy for the primary purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of 
the Libyan economy. However, the policy of Gaddafi’s government to privatize higher 
education was ad hoc; it was carried out in a deteriorating environment and in response to 
the political desires of dictatorship rule. The thesis demonstrates how important the 
particular circumstances of any single country like Libya are in helping us to understand 
the development of private higher education. It shows how the previous government policy 
to reform financing higher education cannot relieve fiscal stress. Attention is drawn to the 
expansion in the number of private higher education institutions, the dramatic increase of 
enrolments in social science fields, and the many difficulties institutions had in coping with 
the circumstances in Libya during the phase of Gaddafi’s rule. Comprehensive reform of 
the role of the state in the financing and governance of higher education was proposed. The 
government's reform strategy involved accreditation bodies that were established later. 
These centres were questionable in terms of skills of staff members, administrative 
structure and their attestation and accreditation procedures. The implementation of the new 
policy was poor. 
Private universities offer a limited number of courses and the fees from students continue 
to be their major source of income. They are profit makers in a country that had been 
wedded to a culture of socialism for more than forty years. A number of college and 
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university students in Libya attend private institutions, for several reasons, one of which is 
that private universities are seen as easier than public universities. The number of students 
in private universities does not account for a significant proportion of university 
enrolments for there are more students in public than in private universities. Even so, 
private higher education plays an important role in the higher education sector. Private 
institutions do not provide professional training in fields relevant to employment 
opportunities but instead offer an education with its emphasis on the human sciences, 
qualification in which are unlikely to enable a graduate to obtain employment. Private 
higher education is expensive and costly to attend. Many private institutions are caught in a 
dilemma. They cannot achieve significant efficiency by reducing instructional costs 
without damage to the quality of their programmes, and they are reluctant to raise tuition 
fees and other charges because of the damaging effects on student recruitment. As long as 
public higher education is provided at low or no cost to the student and private higher 
education continues to be entirely self-supporting, the private sector will have a peripheral 
role to play in higher education in Libya.  This research was undertaken during the period 
when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown in a bloody revolution in 2011.  The thesis 
concentrates on the policy developments and problems during the Gaddafi years, but brief 
reference is made to relevant subsequent developments. 
 
 
5 
 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract ...….................................................................................................................2 
List of tables ...............................................................................................................12 
List of figures .............................................................................................................15 
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................17 
Definition of terms ..……...........................................................................................19 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................21 
 
Chapter One: Aims and Objectives of the Thesis and its Methodology. 
I. Aims and objectives ...............................................................................................23 
1.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................23 
1.2 The two historical phases .....................................................................................25 
1.3 The background of the moves towards a policy shift involving the private  
sector in higher education ....................................................................................26 
1.4 The motivation for this research ..........................................................................30 
1.5 The broad aims of the study .................................................................................31 
1.6 The importance of the study .................................................................................33 
1.7 Research methodology .........................................................................................34 
1.8 Qualitative research ..............................................................................................35 
1.9 Documentary sources ...........................................................................................39 
1.10 Photographic material .....................................................................................40 
1.11 Interviews ........................................................................................................41 
1.12 Two phases of fieldwork including interviews ...............................................49 
A. The first period of fieldwork in 2010 .....................................................................49 
6 
 
B. The post revolutionary fieldwork after fall of Gaddafi ...........................................52 
C. Comparing the two phases of interviews ................................................................55 
1.13 The guidelines employed regarding the interviews and ethical issues ............55 
1.14 The case study of Al-Refak University ...........................................................57 
1.15 Conclusions .....................................................................................................60 
 
Chapter Two: The funding of higher education -review of literature. 
2.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................61 
2.2 The development of the world attitudes towards financing policies for higher  
education ...............................................................................................................64 
2.3 The definition of the privatization of higher education ........................................66 
2.4 Higher education: the debate between the private and public sectors ..................76 
A. Arguments against privatization ...............................................................77 
B. Arguments in favour of private higher education .....................................82 
2.5 Actual policy options ............................................................................................86 
2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................88 
 
Chapter Three: Private higher education in Libya compared with other countries in 
the Arab world.  
3.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................90 
3.2 Higher education and its financing policy in the global context and the relative 
position of Libya  ...................................... ..........................................................90 
3.3   Factors affecting higher education finance policies and a comparison between  
Libya and other selected Arab countries ..............................................................94 
 
7 
 
3.4 The types of private higher education with reference to the case 
 of Libya ………………………………………………………………..........105 
3.4.1 Based on the purpose of private institutions of higher education there are three 
categories ........................................................................................................................106 
(a) Not-for-profit private institutions .......................................................................106 
(b) For-profit higher education institutions ..............................................................107 
(c) Religious higher education institutions ..............................................................109 
 3.4.2 Differences relating to the extent of the State’s involvement in higher  
education. …….………………….………………………………………………...112 
3.5 Private higher education in Libya and the Arab world with a special  
reference to Egypt……………….…………….......................................................113 
3.6 Conclusion.......................................................................................................119 
 
Chapter Four: The historical legacy: the early development of Libyan higher 
education and its financing policy.  
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................121   
4.2 Higher education and its financing policy during the monarchy (1952-1969) …...124 
4.2.1 Governance, administration, and finance .............................................................129 
4.2.2 Local finance ........................................................................................................135 
4.2.3 Foreign finance ....................................................................................................140 
4.3 Higher education policy in the republican phase and ‘The System of the  
Masses.’ ........................................................................................................................143 
4.3.1 The importance of the higher education sector in the nation agenda ..................144 
4.3.2 The size of public expenditure on Libyan higher education ...............................146 
4.3.3 The Libyan education system .............................................................................152 
8 
 
4.3.4 The philosophy of the Al-Fatah Revolution with reference to the development 
 of higher education in Libya ................................................................................153 
4.3.5 The impact of the political system on the financing of the higher education  
policy; management issues in Libyan universities ...............................................162 
4.4 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................170 
 
Chapter Five: The financial crisis and social pressures for change. 
5.1 Higher education in economic and social development plans: policies  
for  improving access and equity .........................................................................173 
5.2 The main forces of change towards privatization of higher education ................182  
5.3 (i)The impact of economic crises on the higher education financing policy……184 
(ii) Demographic pressures ..................................................................................188 
(iii) Graduate unemployment ...............................................................................193 
(iv) The failure of public higher education ..........................................................198 
5.4 Other challenges of isolation and corruption........................................................198 
5.5 New ideas and the ‘big change’ ...........................................................................201 
5.6 Changing the role of the state. What was it and how was it handled? ................206 
5.7 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................211 
 
Chapter Six: The implementation of the changes: role sharing in public and private 
higher education and its problems. 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ ….214 
6.2 The idea of privatisation in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green Book by  
Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi .......................................................................................214 
6.3 From state dominance to the privatization of higher education ...............................218 
9 
 
6.4 Policy solutions on privatization of public higher education ..............................221 
6.5 Policy solutions on the revenue side (cost covering) ..........................................224 
6.6 Strategic responses of private higher education across regions ..........................227 
6.6.1 Emergence of the private sector in higher education: universities,  
polytechnics and post-graduate courses .......................................................227 
6.6.2 The story of the development of private higher education in Libya ...............248 
6.6.3 The state intervention in the control of private higher 
 education. .................................................................................................................251 
6.6.4 Comprehensive Exam Policy (CEP) ................................................................260 
6.6.5 Programmes of study and courses offered by the private institutions  
of higher education ....................................................................................................263 
6.6.6 Admission policy and level of tuition fees in the private sector ......................266 
6.6.7 Employment prospects of graduates from institutions .....................................270 
6.6.8 Distribution of private higher education providers across regions.................278 
6.6.9 The ownership of institutions of private higher education ...............................280 
6.6.10 Academic faculties in private higher education ............................................282 
6.7 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................284 
 
Chapter Seven: A Case Study of Al-Refak University. 
7.1 The purpose of this field Study...........................................................................289 
7.2 The choice of Al-Refak university......................................................................290 
7.3 Al-Refak University in an historical context.......................................................291 
7.4 Conditions of acceptance for study at the university ..........................................293 
7.5 The objectives of the university...........................................................................295 
7.6 Management and governance .............................................................................295 
10 
 
7.6 The financing policy of the university ................................................................298 
7.7 Courses offered and trends in enrolment ............................................................302 
7.8 The quality of education provided by Al-Refak University ...............................312 
7.9 Academic faculties in Al-Refak University in comparisons with other private 
universities .........................................................................................................314 
7.10 The relationship between Al-Refak University and Quality Assurance and 
Accreditation (QAA) ..........................................................................................321 
7.11 Graduates from Al-Refak University and the world of work .......................332 
7.12 Lessons learned from the restructuring process ...........................................333 
7.13 Conclusion ....................................................................................................335 
 
Chapter Eight: summary, conclusions and recommendations: 
8.1.Introduction ........................................................................................................339 
8.2. Summary of research findings...........................................................................340 
A. Better regulation................................................................................... .......351 
B. Ensure international influences and standards are brought to bear……......351 
C. Encouragement of proper competition.........................................................352 
D. Intersectoral approaches ..............................................................................353 
E. Better geographical balance:........................................................................355 
F. Better subject mix:.......................................................................................355 
G. The importance of political leadership........................................................356 
H. Improvement for public higher education...................................................358 
8.3. Recommendations for future research..............................................................359 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter Nine:  Epilogue.  The revolution of 17th February, 2011 and its aftermath 
9.1  A quick view of the 17th February Revolution ………………………………..364 
9.2  The thesis and the revolution ………………………………………………….364 
9.3  The reopening of the whole debate about privatization ……………………….365 
9.4  A brief look at the situation of the post-revolution with reference to the  
difficulties facing the QAA and the new administration…………………..……….370 
9.5  Al-Refak University after the Revolution ……………………………………..377 
9.6 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………..379 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................384 
 
Appendixes . 
Appendix 1. A list of questions for the interviewees in pre the revolution, 
 Gaddafi’s stage ........................................................................................................401 
Appendix 2. A list of questions for the interviewees in post Gaddafi’s stage,  
after 17th of February 2011 revolution ….................................................................404 
Appendix 3. The list of interviewees in Gaddafi’s stage (the first field study) .......406 
Appendix 4. A list of the interviewees in the post Gaddafi’s phase in 2012 .......... 410 
Appendix 5. Photos of Afriqya University ..............................................................413  
Appendix 6. Eleven official resolutions to organize Al-Tasharoky Education’ ......415 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
List of tables: 
Table (1). The photographs in the first field study. (2010) ................................................40 
Table (2). The recordings in the first field study. (2010) ...................................................46 
Table (3). The details of recordings in the second field study. (2012) ...............................47 
Table (4). A comparison between two field studies in Libya (pre- and post- 17th 
 of February Revolution) ....................................................................................................54 
Table (5). differences between privatisation of public universities and 
 private universities............................................................................................................. 69 
Table (6). The public costs and monetary and non-monetary benefits of higher 
 education.............................................................................................................................78 
Table (7). The private costs and monetary and non-monetary benefits of higher  
education .............................................................................................................................85 
Table (8). The public expenditure on education in Libya ...................................................95 
Table (9). Population and enrolment profile for Libya .......................................................97 
Table (10). A selection of Arab countries, their populations and the number of  
Private universities established in each of the countries ..................................................116 
Table (11). Libya and Egypt: a comparison .....................................................................118 
Table (12). Number of higher education students in the Libyan University  
between  1955/1956 and 1967/1968 .................................................................................127 
Table (13). Total public expenditure, expenditure on education, and public expenditure 
 on education as a percentage of total public expenditure. 1952-53 to 1968-69 ..............131 
Table (14). (The yearly government stipends for Libyan higher education  
students.(1955/1956 to 1967/1968) .................................................................................137 
Table (15). Staff salaries in the years 1955 and 1968. (£L) ............................................139 
13 
 
Table (16). Some of the local and foreign finance on Libyan higher education  
institutions, 1961-1985 ..................................................................................................141  
Table  (17).The higher education institutions in Libya, their establishment date,  
and the number of their faculties after 1969 ..................................................................147 
Table (18). Yearly allocations to the education sector in Libya (1986-2003) ...............179  
Table (19). The number of graduates from arts/humanities departments compared  
with those from science departments. (2001-2004) ....................................................   181 
Table (20).The Libyan population in 1984, 1995 and 2006………................................189 
 Table (21). Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) ...........................................................190  
Table (22). The distribution of students between the public universities in  
Libya, 2002-2003 ...........................................................................................................191 
Table (23). Total expenditure on higher education per capita 1996 ..............................192  
Table (24): The University graduates for the years 2001-2004 .....................................197  
Table (25).The differences between methods of privatizing higher education .............221  
Table (26). A number of faculties in public universities that are privatized  
by the Government .........................................................................................................223 
Table (27). The differences between public universities and private ones ....................234 
Table (28). The accredited programmes and the year of accreditation in private  
universities .....................................................................................................................258 
Table (29). The number of private university graduates who work in some of the 
state institutions .............................................................................................................272 
Table (30). The number of students who attend the comprehensive examination  
in June, 2010 ..................................................................................................................275 
Table (31). The geographical distribution of public and private institutions  
of higher education, Libya, 2004/2003 ..........................................................................279 
14 
 
Table (32). The legal bills in Al-Refak University and their articles ........................294 
Table (33) the level of tuition fees in selected private universities in Libya 2010 ...298 
Table (34). An estimated of the total income for Al-Refak University from  
tuition fees in D.L. 2008-2010 ..................................................................................299 
Table (35). An estimated variable costs for Al-Refak University, 2010 ...................301 
Table (36). The number of students in the accredited private universities  
in Libya 2009/2010 ...................................................................................................304 
Table (37). Comparison in the number of students between Al-Refak Univesity  
and Al-Fatah university 2009/2010 ...........................................................................305 
Table (38). The distribution of students between the departments  
at Al-Refak University.2010 .....................................................................................305 
Table (39). The number of grduates from Al-Refak University, 2009/2010 ............310 
Table (40): Academic staff in a private and in a public higher education  
institution ..................................................................................................................315 
Table (41). The distribution of faculty members between departments according  
to their degree status, 2010 ......................................................................................317   
Table (42). The number of departments that have teaching staff from different  
disciplines, 2010 ......................................................................................................319 
Table (43). The distribution of the accreditation costs in Al-Refak  
University, 2008 ......................................................................................................326 
Table (44).The date of accredited departments in private universities in Libya…..327  
Table (45). The distribution of the Al-Refak University graduates between  
petroleum institutions in Libya. (2010) ..................................................................331 
Table  (46). Areas of concern in private universities in Libya ...............................349 
 
 
15 
 
List of figures: 
Figure (1).  Reasons why governments seek alternative resources to fund tertiary  
education .....................................................................................................................92 
Figure (2). Paths to finance higher education .............................................................93  
Figure (3). The development of the enrolment in the Libyan University 
 (1968-69 – 1971-72) ................................................................................................157 
Figure (4). The development of the staff members in the Libyan University 
 (1968-69 – 1970-71) ...............................................................................................157  
Figure (5). Compare the number of universities established in the 1970s  
and 1980s ..................................................................................................................160  
Figure (6). The distribution of the universities on the map of Libya ........................160  
Figure (7). The growth in the number of university students from  
1980 – 2009 ...............................................................................................................162 
Figure (8). The structure of the Al-Fatah University. (Garyounis University  
has the same structure) ..............................................................................................170 
Figure (9). The oil reve..nues 1970-1982 ..................................................................186  
Figure (10). The expenditure on education 1970-1982 .............................................187 
Figure (11). The oil revenues 1983-1994 ..................................................................187 
Figure (12). The expenditure on education 1983-1994 .............................................188 
Figure(13).     Methods of privatizing higher education institutions in Libya ..........219 
Figure (14).  The Higher Education System in Libya ...............................................233 
Figure (15). The number of private and public universities in Libya, 2006 .............238 
Figure (16). The number of students in private and public universities, 2006 .........239 
Figure (17). Private higher education and its relationship with related state  
institutions ................................................................................................................289 
16 
 
Figure (18). A comparison  in the distribution of the students between the humanities  
and the sciences in the public universities ….................................................................307 
Figure (19). A comparison  in the distribution of the students between the humanities  
 and the sciences in Al-Refak university ........................................................................307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
List of Acronyms  
• ACE  American Council of Education.  
• CCP  The Communist Party of China 
• CEP  Comprehensive Exam Policy. 
• CIES  The Council on International Exchange of Scholars,  
• CSHE  Centre for Studies in Higher Education.  
• DE  Diversified Economics.  
• ERF  The Economic Research Forum. 
• FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization. 
• GCC  The Gulf Cooperation Council.  
• GHRF  Global Human Resources Forum.  
• GNP    Gross National Production. 
• GPC  The “General People Congress”.  
• GPCHE  General People’s Committee for Higher Education of Libya. 
• GSE  General Secondary Education GSE.  
• GSEC  The General Secondary Education Certificate. 
• HCPHE High Committee for Private Higher Education. 
• ICAO  The International Civil Aviation Organization.  
• ICHI  International Conference of Higher Education 
• ICTs  Information and Communication Technologies.  
• IIE  Institute of International Education.  
• ILO  International Labour Organization.  
• ITU   The International Telecommunication Union. 
• LLC  Limited Liability Company. 
• LNAID The Libyan National Authority for Information and Documentation. 
18 
 
• MOP  Mixed Oil Producers.  
• NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
• NCPE  National Committee of Private Education.  
• NCPU  National Committee for Private Universities. 
• NOC  National Oil Corporation. 
• OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
• PHEA  Private Higher Education Administration.. 
• PP  Primary Producers. 
• QAA  Quality Assurance and Accreditation.  
• SAP  Systems, Applications and Products in Data  Processing. 
• SSE  Secondary School Enrolment.  
• TNC  The Transitional National Council.  
• TSE  Technical Secondary Education. 
• UCCs  University Competence Centres. 
• UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization.  
• WB  The World Bank.  
• WHO  World Health Organization. 
• WMO  The World Meteorological Organization. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Definition of terms 
There are some terms that will need to be defined as they all appear in this study. They are 
as follows: 
1. El-Fatah Revolution: this was the revolution led by a group of young officers in 1969. 
Its leader was 27 years old and he was called Colonel “Muammer Al-Gaddafi and he was 
overthrown in the 17th of February Revolution. The Al-Fatah Revolution aimed to 
overthrow the monarchy in Libya and establish a republican system.  
2. The General People's Committee (GPC): is a concept which was propounded by 
Gaddafi. The concept was presented in his theory which was called “the Third Universal 
Theory” in his “Green Book”. The GPC was defined by him as a council to include 
secretaries for economic activities. Although it appears to be similar to the cabinet, the way 
in which it elects its members is different. In the former the prime minister is chosen by the 
people through the election while the members of the GPC are chosen through what 
Gaddafi called the Basic People’s Congress (BPC) and General People’s Congress (GPC). 
3. Revolutionary Command Council (RCC): it was established after officers seized power 
on September 1, 1969. The RCC includes the free officers who were involved in Al-Fatah 
Revolution, headed by Muammar Al-Gaddafi. It aimed to implement a socioeconomic and 
political revolution in Libya.  
4. The Green Book: al-Kitāb al-Aḫḍar) is a short book setting out the political philosophy 
of the former Libyan leader, Muammer Gaddafi. The book was first published in 1975. It 
was "intended to be required reading for all Libyans”. It is a book which has three 
volumes: the first chapter is concerned with political problems, second chapter with 
economic problems and the third chapter with social problems. These were presented by 
Gaddafi who thought that they provide the best solutions for all the problems of the world.   
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5. Al-Refak University: it is a university was established in 2003 in Tripoli and it was run 
privately. 
6. The ‘Third Universal Theory’: it is a concept used by Al-Gaddafi to refer to a theory that 
is neither capitalism nor communism. It is the socialism as explained by him in his “Green 
Book”.    
7. The ‘System of Masses’: it is a concept that was introduced by Gaddafi in his `Green 
Book` and was a system that contained many of ideas (e.g. the people’s power). It was the 
political system in Libya during the Gaddafi regime.    
8. The General People’s Committee for Higher Education of Libya (GPCHE). This was the 
title of the Ministry of Higher Education.  
9. People’s Power’: The idea and the establishment of Popular Congresses (municipalities / 
popular ‘Shbiat’). 
10. People’s Congress: There were two kinds of People’s Congress, Basic People’s 
Congress and General People’s Congress. The former was a place where Libyan people 
met to discuss matters concerning their society and where they made appropriate decisions 
and the latter was a place in which decisions were made and implemented according to the 
country’s needs and circumstances. 
11. Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky or Al-Ahli Education: this was a theory introduced by 
Gaddafi that meant that educational institutions should be regulated by people.  
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Chapter one: Aims and objectives of the thesis and its methodology. 
 
1.   Aims and objectives: 
1.1 Introduction:  
Financing higher education policy has come into sharp focus in both developed and 
developing countries since the 1980s and 1990s because of several factors, and in 
particular the phenomenon of the dramatic increase in student numbers. The main focus 
has been on reforming financing policy for higher education in order to make it suitable to 
meet new challenges, such as larger numbers of students and demographic changes, the 
reappraisal of the social and economic role of higher education and the internationalization 
of higher education. A number of conferences have been held  (e.g. New Perspectives on 
Global Higher Education Challenges in Washington in 1998 organised by the Institute of 
International Education [IIE] and the Council on International Exchange of Scholars 
[CIES], Financing Mechanism of Higher Education and Lifelong Learning organised by 
Global Human Resources Forum [GHRF] in Seoul in 2006, 2007 and 2008, Global Higher 
Education: Current Trends, Future Perspectives in 2009 in Malaysia at the Global Higher 
Education Forum, Higher Education Internationalization and Globalization in 2007 at the 
Centre for Studies in Higher Education [CSHE] on the Berkeley Campus at the University 
of California and Towards an Arab Space for Higher Education: International Challenges 
and Societal Responsibilities in 2009 in Cairo).   
 
All these conferences and studies have dealt with the reform of the financing policies for 
higher education which has been under considerable pressure since the 1980s. The 
fundamental financial problems faced by institutions of higher education are worldwide 
and stem from common concerns. The first of these is the high and increasing unit cost 
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per-student of higher education. The second force greatly exacerbating the financial 
problems of tertiary educational institutions and ministries in many countries is the need 
for increasing enrolments, particularly where high birth rates are coupled with rapidly 
increasing numbers of young people finishing secondary school with legitimate aspirations 
for someertiary education. The third component is the effect of globalization. Higher 
education is increasingly being viewed as a private commodity that is commercial and 
saleable. With the emergence of cross-border education and the prevalence of open and 
distance learning, higher education is now an export commodity and a tradable service in 
the global economy. This burgeoning situation has become prevalent in many countries 
including that of Libya. 
However, there has been an absence of academic study of the development of higher 
education in Libya.  Local conferences, where scholars, professors, educators and 
policymakers have mostly focused on issues relating to the role of higher education in the 
country and the relationship between higher education outputs and the labour market, show 
that this has become a lively source of debate within Libya.  Libya is classified as one of 
the developing countries. Since independence, economic and social policies have 
concentrated on developing human resources. It is felt that these resources play a leading 
and important role in the effort to raise national productive capacity. In addition, the 
development of human resources is seen as a means of promoting and maintaining a 
peaceful and stable society. Libyan leaders, then, stress the important of investment in 
education. One way to accomplish this is by expanding higher education to increase 
educational attainment levels within Libyan society. Moreover, in the period of Gaddafi’s 
rule, those people, the decision makers, on many official occasions especially, referred to 
the importance of financing higher education and the urgent need to undertake the 
necessary research associated with it.  
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1.2 The two historical phases: 
Before the recent revolution, Libyan higher education and its financing policy passed 
through two different phases. First, let us examine the phase of monarchy (1952-1969) or 
the period before Gaddafi’s regime. Although this thesis will be looking primarily at the 
issues of private higher education in the Gaddafi period, it is also necessary to analyse the 
pre-Gaddafi period (1955-1969), considering that the beginning of higher education was in 
1955 when the first university was founded in Benghazi and completely funded by the 
state. It is, in fact, considered to be the roots of Libya’s financing policy for higher 
education. 
 
The second phase was that of “the Masses System” (1969-2011) or the ‘Gaddafi Period’. 
This phase of extreme authoritarian rule witnessed very considerable economic progress 
and the growth of wealth based upon the discovery of oil in Libya in 1961 and its 
subsequent exploitation. This initially helped the Libyan government finance and expand 
higher education without concern about the availability of funds. This was accompanied by 
an ideology, based upon the Green Book, which stressed a form of popular socialist 
ideology and which inspired a political system that completely opposed the private sector 
and privatization. 
 
This second phase saw Libya become isolated from the international community for a ten 
year period, particularly in terms of its relations with western countries like the USA and 
the UK (over e.g. the Lockerbie issue). In reaction then Libyan political leaders adopted a 
policy that arrested any dealings with most western countries including the USA.  At that 
time, the Secretary of General People's Committee for Education ‘Ahmed Ibrahim’ 
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(Education Minister) imposed during the second half of 1980s, a policy to stop teaching 
the English language and which called for the Arabization of the curriculum in all 
institutions including universities1. The state also decided that no more students would be 
sent to study abroad2. 
 
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, in contrast to the earlier period of Gaddafi’s rule, 
Libya experienced a period of political and social instability and a drastic economic 
decline which affected its policy for financing higher education. In the mid 1980s the price 
of oil fell from $27 to $10 per barrel which led to reduced funding allocated to higher 
education. As a result, Libya faced severe financial constraints which resulted in a serious 
decline in the quality of higher education whilst, at the same time, its population grew and 
demand for higher education increased.  Following this Gaddafi himself was responsible 
for a major shift in policy towards privatisation (discussed below) which brought about a 
considerable state of upheaval in higher education. 
 
 
 
1.3 The background of the moves towards a policy shift involving the private sector in 
higher education: 
The Libyan state achieved great expansion in terms of the number of students and 
institutions (universities and colleges) for a period of half a century. By 2011 there were 
thirteen universities and ten higher learning institutes, including the Academy of Graduate 
                                                 
1
 He was appointed by Gaddafi to be the Minister of Education. He was seen by Gaddafi as the right person 
to support him in his aggressive policy towards foreign countries especially the UK and the USA. This policy 
was used by the Gaddafi regime as a weapon against these countries as a consequence of the UK and USA 
attack on Libya in April 1984.          
2
 One reason was that Gaddafi’s Libyan government was scared of its European adversaries and fearful that 
they would influence Libyans studying abroad to be anti the Gaddafi regime. 
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Studies, which specialized in post-graduate studies (private institutions and the Open 
University are not included in the above). Nearly a quarter of a million students are 
enrolled in higher education.  
 
The origin of this expansion dates back to 1955, the year of the first establishment of the 
Libyan university in Bengasi, with its funding coming entirely from the public sector. At 
that time Libya had a lack of financial resources, but the discovery of oil in 1961 and its 
burgeoning revenues helped the Libyan government to establish and expand higher 
education institutions without any financial constraints. In the 1970s all Libyan students 
who completed their secondary education were allowed to enrol in state universities. Fees 
were not charged and generous allowances and living expenses as well as accommodation 
were provided for all students. In the 1980s, however, the government withdrew this 
provision. 
 
Although Libya has sufficient oil resources to make it a significantly rich country with a 
comparatively small population (6,733,620 July 2012 est.), its policy for financing higher 
education began to founder in the 1980s.  A sudden relative decline in oil revenues was 
accompanied by other difficulties such as a rapid growth in population, a significant 
increase in tertiary student numbers, an absence of the right proportion of enrolments in the 
different fields of study required to meet the priorities of national development the problem 
of providing adequate equipment for higher education institutions and the spread of 
administrative corruption in the public sector. Moreover, in the case of Libya the financing 
of its higher education policy was affected by particular elements related to the political 
ideology of the Gaddafi regime which had published the three volumes of his ‘Green 
Book’ that stressed its socialist ideology adapted to Libya. 
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Notwithstanding this, in the period 1995-2005, Gaddafi, through a number of his meetings 
with the Secretaries of the General People's Committees (Ministers), determined to reform 
higher education policy. As a result, many Libyan leaders, policymakers and scholars felt 
that there was a need to restructure the higher education policy. There was no introduction 
of the idea of cost sharing or privatization until the beginning of the 21st century when a 
series of state committees were held by Libyan leaders and Colonel Mummer Al-Gaddafi, 
“the leader of El-Fatah revolution”, to reform the higher education policy and the other 
sectors as well. This call for change had come about due to the negative consequences of 
the previous policy adopted by the state over almost forty years: overcrowding in the 
universities, deterioration in the conditions of study, poor distribution of students between 
the disciplines and fields of study, the lack of a relationship between the higher education 
system and economic activities, the emergence of the educated unemployed, and the low 
internal efficiency of many of the colleges. These outcomes suggested that financing 
higher education through the public sector was no longer feasible and it was felt that 
challenges and difficulties, both locally and internationally, needed urgent consideration.  
The new trend re-considered the idea of privatization and private sector beliefs which had 
been overturned according to the ideology of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the ‘Green 
Book’.  As Libya resolved the Lockerbie dispute and then renounced unconventional 
weapons, and as the United Nations suspended its sanctions in April 1999, Libya began to 
introduce socioeconomic reforms aimed at liberalization. Eight months later Gaddafi 
declared the public sector a failure and in Jan 2000 made this statement: 
 
“….the system is finished. I have to step in today to stop this wheel from spinning in a rut 
and wasting fuel.”, accusing Members of the GPC of deliberately wasting the country’s 
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resources, saying, “You’re holding onto obsolete methods order to justify wasting oil.” 
(Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p217 & p218). 
 
As a result, in June 2003, the Secretary-General of the People's Committee, the Prime 
Minister, Dr. Shokri Ghanem, announced a comprehensive plan for the  privatisation of 
state-owned institutions and listed a number of  state-owned enterprises targeted for either 
privatisation or liquidation. These included companies in the minerals, oil, chemicals and 
banking sectors, truck and bus manufacturers, makers of textiles and shoes, aviation 
companies, and state-owned farms. (Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p218). 
 
The higher education sector was not excluded and here policy had three main aims: the 
distribution of oil wealth between Libyan citizens; the reduction of state intervention; and 
the lessening of dependence by universities and other institutions on the public sector. 
These institutions should be transformed and owned by individuals who would regulate 
them themselves. This reform was viewed as an “urgent issue” and the Libyan authorities 
paid particular attention to it, despite opposition from some officials as well as from many 
other Libyans. This trend towards change was a result of accumulations and failures after 
over forty years of experiment. Gaddafi and his regime were under tremendous pressure 
from inside and outside as could be seen by his speeches.(Speeches to public and General 
People Committee “Cabinet” on state TV, 2006 & 2007). Before he was overthrown, he 
referred on many occasions specifically to matters relating to higher education, but these 
efforts of Gaddafi’s government to reform the financing policy for higher education have 
been to some extent curtailed or frozen for some reason since the February 2011 
Revolution. Programmes and projects initiated and implemented before the revolution 
were now  seen as questionable, misused by the state authorities, and a source of 
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corruption that and had not served the nation’s interests. Therefore, the trend in general 
was to abolish, if possible, any policy set by Gaddafi’s government.      
 
1.4. The motivation for this research:       
The focus on the state policies on human resources of Libya, especially education policies, 
first arose from my interest in the broader issues associated with development. Such 
policies have a link with political economy which is very interesting. The idea for this 
research was inspired when Gaddafi's government started to reform its overall economy at 
the beginning of the twenty first century as a result of many pressures which also involved 
the reform of higher education (as discussed above).  
 
Many countries have struggled to improve their higher education sectors to reinforce their 
economies locally and internationally. One way to achieve this has been through the 
encouragement of the private sector to play a significant role in higher education and 
consequently private higher education has grown rapidly since 1999. However, it has 
raised many challenges and critical issues that need to be analysed.  So Libya is not unique, 
although the implementation of privatisation presents many unusual features.  There is, 
though, a lack of research, resources and related materials that deal with this aspect in the 
country. My interest in this began in 2000, a year after its implementation. At that time I 
was teaching in one of the private higher education institutions called "Al-Afak Institution 
for Financial and Administrative Sciences"..  For the six years I have spent as a lecturer at 
Al-Fatah University I observed the importance of this topic, and my interest was confirmed  
when I came here to the UK and read books and consulted research about private higher 
education. It was therefore instructive to see how Libya sought to implement its policy to 
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privatize its higher education sector and at the same time to identify the main pressures that 
have led to its existence.  
 
The lack of data about Libya has been the most challenging aspect of this research and 
there was a time when I considered it an impossible aspiration. But subsequent to many 
fruitful discussions with my colleagues at the university, I was encouraged to start the 
project in 2005. It was difficult in the Gaddafi period to answer very important questions: 
Why did Libya need to privatize higher education? Had Gaddafi’s regime a real intention 
to improve higher education? If so, why was Libya facing financial difficulties in this area 
when the regime had acquired massive wealth from oil?  The new, more open political 
climate prevailing in Libya after 2011 meant that that was easier to address these issues, 
although the instability of the general political situation soon presented other serious 
problems. 
 
Given the above motivations, this study attempts to contribute to the literature on the state 
policies and political economy in Libya as one of a number of developing economies. In 
particular it seeks to contribute directly to the debate on its higher education policies and 
on ways to improve the elements of its state policy in higher education.  
 
1.5. The broad aims of the study: 
This study aims to examine the policies towards higher education, especially its financing, 
during the period of Gaddafi’s rule in Libya. There is some evaluation and discussion of 
the previous policies that have occurred before the fifty years of Gaddafi period, since the 
historical context is clearly important. The changes under Gaddafi took place in a context 
of very rapid social, economic and political change. The policy of privatization was a new 
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and sudden one, but there were trends in the earlier period that were important. Also, the 
study aims to show the disadvantages of the government policy to privatise higher 
education in Libya where there had been a dictatorship regime for more than forty years. 
The international context is also important in that it shows pressures to meet demand that 
were not unique to Libya and the general recognition internationally that purely public 
funding of higher education was difficult. But it should be borne in mind that these 
international developments are not the real focus of the study. 
 
So, my aims are: to evaluate the Libyan experimentation in financing the policy for higher 
education, to examine past policy changes as a result of rapid economic, social and 
political developments in the country, to answer some important questions about the idea 
of privatization in higher education and how this idea has been introduced in to the Libyan 
tertiary system. Many specific questions will be considered, What kind of universities are 
these private universities? Are they profit-makers or non profit-makers? How was this idea 
defined in the ideology based on the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green Book by 
Colonel Gaddafi which was completely against individual property ownership and the idea 
of privatization? Are these universities targeting only those students who can afford to pay 
fees? Does the government support them? Who runs these universities and who owns 
them?      
 
In summary, this study has four interlinking objectives: first, to look at the historical 
context that formed the foundation for the financing policy for the higher education 
process; second, to examine the different pressures that led to the policy of privatization 
and private higher education; third, to consider the implementation process of the policy of 
private higher education and the response of Libyan society (private sector) through an 
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analysis of data collected from its reality; fourth, to consider the consequences of the 
policy in order to answer the primary question: ‘What was the reality of private higher 
education in Libya under the Gaddafi regime? The latter part of the study will consider 
briefly the developments after the February revolution of 2011 which overthrew Gaddafi 
and aim to establish the attitude of the post-Gaddafi government towards private higher 
education. Finally, the study will seek ways of improving higher education policy by 
suggesting alternatives for its financing that are commensurate with the reality of Libya 
today.  
 
1.6. The importance of the study: 
The study, which is the first serious academic study of these developments during periods 
of considerable political upheaval, is important for the following reasons:  
1. Higher education is of tremendous importance in the development of the country and its 
financing policy is considered to be a significant aspect worthy of further research and 
study. 
2. Despite national efforts, Libya has had problems retaining the investment and increase 
of financing resources provided by the state for education, to cope with its current 
conditions amid fears for the future.                       
3.The interest of educational experts, university professors, and policymakers, particularly, 
Libyans, indicate a need for such a study not only to show  the problems facing Libyan 
higher education and their possible solutions, but also to evaluate the Libyan experiment in 
its financing policy for higher education and by explaining new trends towards its 
implementation. 
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4. There is a lack of extensive, informed study of the higher education financing policy in 
Libya and the few studies that have been undertaken are incompetent and lacking in 
academic rigour. 
5. This thesis will contribute to literature and knowledge in Libya and will help its policy 
makers, but it will also be of interest to scholars and academics both inside and outside the 
country, who are interested more generally in the development of higher education. 
6. Although the main focus of the study is on improving Libyan higher education, it will 
also touch on the broader concerns of political scientists, especially those interested in 
policy implementation and those concerned with policy making during regime-change.  It 
raises issues of public policy and the interaction of ideas in policy practice (for example, 
how the authoritarian Gaddafi regime had changed the policy despite its ideology). The 
direction taken during the latter period of Gaddafi’s regime was towards the 
encouragement of the private sector to play its role in higher education; but the policy 
implementation was problematical.   These issues make this thesis important.  
 
1.7. Research methodology:  
This study is an assessment and evaluation of private higher education in Libya, 
specifically on private universities and one that it is largely exploratory in nature.  Data 
from other countries are used to facilitate and develop the explanation of the ideas. Studies 
on private higher education generally refer to internal and external pressures, but this study 
is concerned almost exclusively with the internal forces that led to the privatization of 
higher education. External forces have played an important role in many countries where 
there is not only a process of interaction with foreign colleges but also networking and a 
process of reshaping their internal higher education structure through the integration of 
internationalization into the development of higher education. In a more general sense, 
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internationalization supports the integration of many countries into the global economic 
community. However, in the case of Libya there was no strong political support for the 
internationalization of the higher education sector in the country. Gaddafi was always 
unwelcoming to western policies and his regime inclined to nationalization rather than to 
internationalization. The latter was seen as a western strategy of invasion and on the credit 
side of insisting that students remained in Libya to study, the savings to the economy were 
its justification.  This study of both external and internal forces has found that over a long 
period of time, the internal pressures were clearly more important than the external ones in 
the reform of the financing policy for higher education in Libya.  Hence the research 
emphasis is on official decisions, resolutions, and interviews within Libya, as a means of 
improving our understanding of the phenomenon of privatisation and its development in 
higher education.  In the light of this context, this section will discuss and explain the 
research methodology employed. The section explains the types of data sources and the 
challenges of undertaking the research. It outlines the problems of the fieldwork and the 
problems and the advantages associated with the interviews. It also explains the interview 
guide and the management of ethical issues. 
 
1.8. Qualitative Research  
In studying the financing policy for higher education it is difficult to apply the quantitative 
method to understand the phenomenon of private higher education in Libya, especially in 
the light of the limited data available. But this does not negate the importance of 
quantitative research in obtaining concrete information on the phenomenon. Although this 
study is based mainly on qualitative data, quantitative data are utilized on some occasions, 
such as the pressures that led to private higher education and its growth in Libya. Data sets 
are used to compare the situation at different times of Libyan higher education with that of 
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other countries and also to illustrate the nature of the economic and social changes which 
meant that policy change was seen as necessary.  
 
As has already been mentioned, there is a lack of research about the private higher 
education in Libya; however it was possible to gain numerical data and information (e.g. 
the number of private universities, students and staff members and there are other related 
numbers like tuition fees). They were taken from different sources and different places. 
Some of the data was collected directly from the institutions (private universities and other 
public establishments) that I visited during my field study. Books, magazines, articles and 
statistical books that were issued by the government were also good sources of providing 
information. They cover the targeted period from 1999-2011. Some of the resources were 
published by authors who work at big universities, such as Tripoli (previously Al-Fatah) 
and Benghazi (previously Garyounes). Other important materials were sets by government 
institutions and state authorities. They are reports, booklets, work papers, conference and 
workshop papers and bullents. All these sources related to the private universities and they 
have reliable data and information for the research subject. These numbers have been 
calculated to give a clear picture about some important issues. It was not easy to collect 
data for the research subject I have to visit many places to get the information and collect 
related materials. Below is a list of places I visited: 
1.The General People Committee for Higher Education GPCHE. 
2. Private Higher Education Administration (PHEA). 
3.Quality Assurance and Accreditation QAA. 
4.Al-Refak University. 
5.Afriqeya University. 
6.Al-Hadera University. 
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7.Trables (Tripoli) University.  
8. The People’s Court.  
9.National Oil Corporation (NOC). 
10.The Libyan National Authority for Information and Documentation (LNAID) 
11.National Committee for Private Universities (NCPU). 
12. The General Administration of Tax. 
13.The Press Institution. 
14.Al-Gehad Libyans Centre. 
15.General Company of Electricity.  
  
Since the thesis will primarily be concerned with asking the questions ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ 
developments in Libya took place in the context of the reform and implementation of the 
financing policy and its progress, the research method will be predominantly qualitative.  
Qualitative research is defined as “…a research strategy that usually emphasizes words 
rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.” (Bryman, A, 2004, p266). 
It involves obtaining information through analysis of documentary material, open-ended 
interviews, participation, observation, and focus groups and then producing an overarching 
judgement of an analytical kind. In-depth case studies may also be employed to illustrate 
broader issues through the study of the particular. Qualitative approaches engage research 
questions through inductive reasoning and grounded theory. Creswell, J (1994) refers to 
qualitative research as a process of understanding based on a distinct methodological 
tradition that explores social problems in a natural setting. This thesis is concerned first 
with describing and analysing in an historical context the evolution of higher education in 
Libya since the Second World War and then analysing the policy making, policy objectives 
and policy implementation in the latter years of the Gaddafi regime. Qualitative methods 
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are appropriate for this thesis because they are suited for investigating a process that 
involves power relations in the policy process. In this context the attitudes, perceptions and 
views of participants in the policy process regarding the policy of privatization and in 
private higher education and its implementation are also important in understanding how 
policy developed the way it did. 
 
A process of primary and secondary data collection was employed. The secondary data 
collection considered the literature on privatization and private higher education in other 
countries and also literature on higher education and economic development in Libya. As 
the nature of this study is about process, the primary data was collected predominantly 
through the critical analysis of texts, including policy documents, internal memos. In 
addition to the study of documentary evidence, a number of in-depth interviews with key 
people, including influential people, owners of private universities and a number of people 
who are seen as important contributors to the subject were undertaken. The aim has been to 
examine in detail their views on the idea of cost sharing in higher education and private 
higher education, the challenges and obstacles identified in the implementation of the 
policy, and their attitudes and perceptions towards other issues related to private higher 
education.  
 
An important part of qualitative research is the use of triangulation of data.  Triangulation 
“… entails using more than one method or source of data in the study.” (Bryman, A, 2004, 
p275). It is defined as “…a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence 
among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a 
study.” (Creswell, J and Miller, D. 2000.126). These authors also view triangulation as 
protocols used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations. Yin (1994) suggested using 
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multiple sources of evidence as the way to ensure validity. Triangulation approaches 
generally involve the use of sources of data from different sources. By using multiple 
sources of evidence: survey instruments, interviews and documents, this study gains 
insight into the analysis of a phenomenon as complex a topic as the state policy to privatize 
higher education in Libya and adds robustness to it. Triangulation is used so that 
conclusions can only be drawn if a variety of sources agree on a point of view. This is 
particularly important in the cases of qualitative interviews where one individual’s 
perceptions may be distorting reality and at best will offer only a partial view. 
 
1.9. Documentary sources 
Documentary sources may be divided into three categories:  
1. Secondary sources published by Libyan scholars who are interested in higher education 
matters. These include research, articles and books but are not specialist sources dealing 
with private higher education     
2. Official sources are issued by the government to administrate and to organize private 
higher education. These include official documents and decisions outlined in newspapers, 
recorded speeches, archives and the media. The official decisions are found in the state 
magazine named “Higher Education Magazine” issued by the General People’s Committee 
for Higher education.  
 
To provide information for research the thesis relies on different documentary sources. 
They include newspapers, government reports, magazines and records of speeches. 
Newspapers were published by government to cover general issues including issues related 
to the research topic. Magazines were issued by government (Ministry of Higher 
Education) and they were specialized in higher education.  Newspapers, government 
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reports and magazines were very critical of evaluating private universities, but meanwhile 
they were very cautious in criticizing the government policy. These materials to some 
extent distort reality and suppress opposing views and they have therefore to be treated 
with caution. The problem was that the available materials provided by government were 
not organized well and they were not put at where should be. It was very hard to collect all 
these sources (Newspapers, state reports, official decisions and magazines) and I have to 
go to many places costing me more time and efforts  
 
3. The writer’s observations at meetings, which utilised his research skills and experience 
acquired at MSc level, provide records and photos as independent sources: these can be 
very important as people’s demeanor can often provide more information than the spoken 
word.  
 
1.10. Photographic material  
The photos, such as those of Afriqya University taken in October 2010 and which show the 
poor standards within that institution, are seen as important data for the research and 
provide visual documents and descriptions of facilities, equipment and teaching conditions 
that describe in general terms, the poor circumstances under which the majority of private 
universities operate. The table 1 gives details of the photographs and of the recordings: 
Table (1): The photographs in the first field study. (2010) 
Number 
of photos 
The place Notices 
11 Afriqya University Afriqya University in Tripoli  
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1.11. Interviews:  
Interviews with key policy actors and private universities’ owners have sought to reveal 
the evolving power relations, the perceptions of actors, and to what extent their views are 
consistent and compatible with the desire of the Libyan government to privatize its higher 
education, all of which form components of the policy implementation and its process. 
 
Richards describes interviews as “one of the major tools in qualitative research.” (Richard, 
D, 1996, p199). The interviews were based on ‘elite interviewing’ as advocated by 
Burnham, P. et al (2008, p231): ".....elite interviewing is a key research technique which is 
often the most effective way to obtain information about decision makers and decision-
making processes." Also, Leech (in Burnham, P et al, 2008, p231) said that "Elite 
interviewing can be used whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about 
the topic in hand". 
  
Interviews have many uses and purposes. Obviously they are used to gain information 
about events and procedures based upon the knowledge and recollections of the 
interviewees. There are a number of advantages and problems of using interviews for the 
collection of data.  In Libya where there is a considerable lack of data related to 
privatization and private higher education, interviews are important sources of 
supplementary information. According to Richard, D (1996, p200 & p201) the interview 
technique helps the researcher, first, by interpreting documents or reports identified by the 
personalities involved in the relevant decisions and by assessing the outcome of events. In 
Libya under the dictatorship of Gaddafi interviews in some cases helped balance any 
problems due to the distortion of official documents. Second, it provides the researcher 
with materials, documents and other sources of data that may not yet be available, and 
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third, it helps to establish a network with both people and institutions that are relevant to 
the subject.  
 
However, interviews are more than getting answers to questions: they involve studying the 
physical demeanour of interviewees which can offer unexpected information about the 
subject being discussed. Sometimes an interview-based field study explores unforeseen 
aspects and circumstances that provide more research data and aid the analysis of the 
phenomenon. Choosing the right time to ask a question is very important in order to elicit 
relevant answers from the interviewees. Sometimes it is useful if the interviewer introduces 
humour to encourage an interviewee to talk more freely and to make him or her feel 
comfortable during the interview.               
 
However, despite the above advantages, there are a number of well-known problems with 
relying on interviews. Some key interviewees may refuse to participate in interviews and 
thus render the technique useless and not be truly representative of a sample. Another 
problem could be related to reliability which may affect the interpretation of an event. Can 
the interview actually be remembering clearly? This is especially the case when relying on 
research interviews as sources of data. Yet another problem is related to the interviewee 
who sometimes gives contradictory observations and opinions in different interviews, 
although this can sometimes be the fault of an interviewer trying to force his interviewee 
down a certain avenue. It is also worth noting that some interviewees do not have a 
profound knowledge of the subject, or that it is very limited. What the writer would like to 
add here is that from his experience of the interviews conducted, there are some key 
interviewees when asked to evaluate the privatization of higher education in Libya, refer to 
the UK as an example by stating that it has many private universities.  In fact, the UK has 
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only two. The vast majority of United Kingdom universities are government financed, with 
only two private universities, the University of Buckingham and the BPP, where the 
government does not subsidize the tuition fees. Other interviewees when asked to justify 
the privatization of higher education gave answers that were affected by the cultural, social 
and political background in Libya rather than from what was happening in the world.  
Some interviewees, even those in high positions, have no knowledge of the arguments for 
and against the privatization of higher education and this is true of the Libyan population 
as a whole.         
 
In this particular research in a Libya under the rule of a dictatorship (during the first phase 
of interviews) and where free information was severely limited, there were many 
additional problems. Interviewees could not always be relied upon to answer frankly. A 
sufficient number of interviews was undertaken, however, and involved high status Libyan 
figures for whom questions were formulated in such a way as to avoid any possible 
repercussions with Gaddafi's government.  
 
So, interviews are not always perfect and are certainly not always very reliable for facts or 
figures. However, interviews are very useful for giving an insight into interviewees’ 
thoughts and attitudes and their subjective perceptions and recollections of events and the 
policy process.  
 
Nevertheless the interviews have played an important role in researching the thesis. As was 
mentioned earlier, this is a first time to conduct PhD research about this aspect in Libya 
where there is a lack of information and data about the phenomena of private higher 
education. Therefore, the role of interviews is combination of a number of elements:  
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1. they are intended to provide background information,  
2. to explore issues where no other sources were available,  
3. to enable researchers to be closer to the events and issues, while those looking 
‘from the outside in' may fail to gain the important particular information, 
4. to probe for the story behind published material,  
5. interviews can offer unexpected information about the subject being discussed. 
In each interviewee, the interviewer has been told that the use of his/her words is 
confidential and impartial and that the given information is for an objective academic 
purpose based on real facts and will not be used to cause any inconvenience. They were 
also told that their statements will contribute significantly to the topic. They were happy to 
conduct interviews and they were happy to be recorded and used their names.    
It should be mentioned that because the recorded interviews were long and contained much 
detail, only the truly salient points and observations were transcribed. In order to preserve 
confidence and impartiality the interviewers were informed that I am going to record the 
interview and to use their names for quotation marks in the thesis. 
 
The selection of respondents is a particularly difficult and challenging aspect of fieldwork. 
The process raises questions such as ‘Who is the right interviewee?’ and ‘Why is the 
person right’? These questions are necessary to prevent bias and improve the reliability of 
obtained information. A major challenge was identifying key interviewees and gaining 
access to those of high standing, such as the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education.  
 
Regarding interviews, four key points have to be covered according to Burnham, P et al 
(2008, p231): decide who you want to see, get access and arrange the interview, conduct 
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the interview and analyse the results. Below is an outline of the steps taken to implement 
this:- 
(1) Permission was granted by the Libyan authorities to allow access and to arrange the 
interviews as well as permission to record them. The recordings have been saved on the 
writer’s computer. 
(2) Four categories of persons were interviewed: 
- Those who have an effect on private higher education policy.  
- The owners of the private universities. 
- People who work at the lower level of the administrative structure. 
- Employees who have graduated from private universities. 
 
Interviews covered a wide diversity of people from those who worked at high level (e.g. 
the Minister) to ordinary people who worked at the bottom. Interviewees included 
politicians, officials, leading academics, teachers, students, private universities owners, 
employees and ordinary junior academics (see appendix 1). It was easier to meet ‘normal’ 
people (e.g. employees and administrators) than those people at the high position. I was 
able to conduct more than an interview with employees often with no arrangements, 
whereas I had to make appointments to meet a director, manager and minister. Employees 
and administrators at low positions offer data and tend to be more helpful than those at the 
top. However, they all provide the thesis useful data, information and giving me a diversity 
of points of views from those who support the private higher education and those who 
against the policy.       
 
About one hundred and twenty five recordings were made and most interviewees were 
willing to cooperate. The two tables below give details of the recordings: 
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Table (2): The recordings in the first field study. (2010) 
Number The place Notices 
4 Afriqya University Afriqya University/ Tripoli 
40 Al-Refak University 20 of them were with the owner, 4 
with students, the rest with the 
employees. 
5 QAA Director of QAA, Director of QAA of 
Higher Education and a Doctor who 
works in the quality department. 
9 Government institutions. Private university graduates who work 
in government institutions. 
1 The Syndicate of Faculty 
Members. 
The Secretary. 
1 Director of Private Higher 
Education Administration. 
Dr. Abdullatif M. Latif 
1 Deputy to the Dean of 
Naser University. 
Dr. Al-Hadi Swieyh. 
1 Tripoli Planning Council Mr. Nader 
1 General Authority for 
Information. 
Mr. Fergany Eyad 
9 The Administration of 
Tax/ Tripoli 
The Director, responsible for affairs of 
law and some employees who have 
degrees from private universities  
13 Tripoli University The owner, the General Registrar and 
a faculty member  
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3 Hannibal University  The owner 
 
Table (3): The details of recordings in the second field study. (2012) 
Number The place Notices 
3 Al-Refak 
University. 
Mrs. Basma Almadani, The Director of 
Administrative and Financial Affairs. 
3 Al-Refak 
University. 
Student in accredited and un- accredited 
department.  
4 QAA. -The Director, the Director of QAA of Higher 
Education, the Director of  QAA of pre-Higher 
Education and the Director of Administrative 
and Financial affairs. 
3 Tripoli University. Director of Administrative and Financial Affairs 
in the Faculty of Engineering and Director of 
Financial Affairs in the Faculty of Pharmacy.  
12 Administration of 
Higher Education. 
The Director, some employees and others who 
come to discuss problems. 
3 The Ministry of 
Higher Education. 
The Minister and the Deputy of Higher 
Education. 
4 The Ministry of 
Education. 
The Minister, the Deputy and his secretary. 
1 National 
Corporation for Oil 
The Director of Administrative and Financial 
Affairs. 
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The interviews I used followed the format of being semi-structured questions.  The 
characteristics of the interview questions were as follows: 
(1) They were open-ended questions to give the interviewee the chance to answer his 
or her question in more detail and to respond to further probing. Questions differed 
slightly depending on the type of response. 
(2) They contained a variety of subjects: 
• They included questions which were specifically related to state policy of higher 
education as a whole. 
• Questions related to matters in private higher education. 
• Questions concerning the political ideology of the Gaddafi regime. 
• The answers of the interviewees were used to explain the matters and issues of 
private higher education in Libya and to highlight some of the contradictions between 
the policy and its application (e.g. the idea of private higher education and its reality). 
(3) They were short and simple to understand. 
 
As I have mentioned, the data and information are not published in an organized way 
and when I was in Libya doing my field study in 2010 I visited more than fifteen 
institutions. The answers of the interview questions in a despotic regime like Gaddafi’s do 
not seem to give the entire story, however I was able to get much useful answers and 
details for some reasons:   
1. Interview questions were open.  
2. Prior to each of my interview I introduce myself to the interviewee and showed 
him/her my official permeation to conduct the interview. 
3. I have relationships with some of the interviewees, so they felt free and relax to 
talk.    
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4. Interviewees were happy to criticize private universities but not to criticize the 
political system. 
5. An important point here that Gaddafi’s regime became less power than before as it 
had been in the power for forty years. His eight sons and a daughter became power 
figures and they played an important role effecting Gaddafi’s regime policy. There 
was in some way a free space to talk frankly about the government policy.            
       
It should mentioned that the problem was that the distance between places that I visited 
was very long and I have to take more than two transportations to get there and sometimes 
I have to walk because there is no transport between some of them3. for example the 
Higher Education Office was located in the city centre while the Ministry of Higher 
Education was located outside of Tripoli and the distance between the National Committee 
of Private Universities and the Ministry was very far. It means that I had to spend all day to 
get some information and sometimes in traffic jam circumstances the task became very 
hard.           
 
1.12. Two Phases of Fieldwork including Interviews:  
There were two distinct phases in my field work which need to be discussed because of the 
very different political circumstances of the two periods.  These differences particular 
affected the interviews.  
 
A. The first period of Fieldwork in 2010: 
Field work started in October 2010 when I went to Libya and spent three months there. I 
visited some of the state institutions and a number of the private universities in the capital 
                                                 
3
 Libya lacks buses, trains and the internet considerably. In addition the institutions are distributed randomly 
that makes the trip for everyone to get there very difficult.  
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city, Tripoli. The field study is limited to this city as it has the largest number of such 
institutions and would be likely to have at least one of the best of the private higher 
education institutions. I was able to meet the two key actors – one in charge of private 
education and one who is responsible for private higher education4. In addition, I 
conducted interviews with the owners of some private universities in order to obtain their 
views on the policy process. There were also several interviews with other important 
people in the city of Tripoli that provided me with a supplementary perspective on the 
subject.  
 
For this period twenty one leading questions as listed in appendix 3 were prepared and 
were accepted by the supervisors. They were set up in a way that help the writer: to 
develop the notions and the ideas about the phenomenon of private higher education in 
Libya, to understand the perceptions of the interviewees about the subject and to identify 
the similarities or the differences of the phenomenon between Libya and the other 
countries. 
 
The following were interviewed during this first phase of fieldwork: 
• My MSc supervisor, Professor Farhat Shernana. He was a rector of Garyounis 
University (the second largest university in Libya) from 1980-1985 and then 
an economic minister from 1968-1990. At present he is retired.  
• Dr. Suleiman Ghoja who was in charge of private higher education in Libya. 
Then he worked at the National Centre for Education Planning (NCEP).  
• Eng. Mohammed Shafter the General Secretary for the Syndicate of Faculty 
Members of Alfatah University.  
                                                 
4
 Private education is a level of pre higher education which includes primary and secondary education. While 
the second one refers to undergraduate level.  
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• Mr. Mohammed Al-Tomy the General Director of Tax Administration in 
Tripoli. 
• Dr. Elhadi Al-Swayh the General Secretary of Naser University. 
• Dr. Mohammed Al-Kaber the General Secretary of QAA. 
• Dr. Hussin Margen the Director of QAA of Higher Education institutes.    
• Dr. Abd-Al Majid Hussain who specialized on matters of quality in education 
at all levels. Ten employees. 
• Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife the Director of the Administration of Private Higher 
Education.  
• Al-Ferjani Eyad the Head of Administration Matters in the General Authority 
Information department. 
• The head of the Planning Council in Tripoli.   
• Mrs. Mohiba Franka who is the owner of Al-Refak University. 
• Dr. Al-Mabrouk Abo Shena the owner of Afriqya University. 
• Dr. Al-Mehdi Mohammed the owner of Tripoli University.  
• Fortunately when I was in Al-Refak University doing my field study, I met 
Prof. Robert Schofield who is a British academic specializing in the area of 
quality matters and accreditation in higher education.  He came with a 
delegation from QAA to have a meeting with the president of the university 
and the chiefs of the scientific departments and others responsible for 
university matters. I conducted and recorded an interview with him. 
• Mr. Nader who work at Tripoli Planning Council,  Mr. Fergany Eyad in 
General Authority for Information, Sabah Algdeery at Tax Administration 
and Mrs. Fateme Al-Abani who work at People’s Solicitor Administration.    
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• Private university graduates. They all provided useful information about some 
issues relating to private higher education and its relationship with the 
government.  
 
These interviews took place in the last three months of 2010, and were carefully designed 
and carried out. Most were quickly transcribed and stored. Three planned interviews, 
unfortunately, failed to take place. The Dean of Al-Fateh University, Tripoli, Dr. 
Abd.Alkarem Al-Akremi, refused to participate on the grounds that he was not interested 
in the research subject.  I clarified the main points and the importance of the interview but 
he again refused and said, "...I am busy....it is better to go to the National Committee for 
Private Universities..."  Dr. Shokri Ghanem, who has been Prime Minister for three years, 
was unfortunately abroad for a week attending a conference. The third was the Minister of 
Education (Dr. Abd-Alkaber Al-Fakhri) who was ‘very busy’, although he did pass a 
message via his secretary advising me to go to the National Committee for Private 
Universities which would represent his view on the subject. 
 
 
 
B. The post revolutionary fieldwork after fall of Gaddafi.  
After the February Revolution of 2011 I again went to Libya to do a further field study in 
January 2012. It was short and Libya had just entered a new era after 42 years of 
dictatorship. There was no doubt that such a tremendous change would have influenced the 
previous government’s policy to privatise higher education and it was important to cover 
issues raised by the revolution. I prepared a list of twelve  interview questions (as listed in 
Appendix 4) that would shed light on these issues in an attempt to analyse the views of the 
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temporary government on the idea of privatization and private higher education and to 
establish to what extent private higher education has been influenced by the revolution.  
Twelve more questions were formulated to cover the issues raised by recent events in 
Libya since the 17th of February 2011 (e.g. the role of private higher education in the 
future, and aspects of unaccredited private universities and their graduates). More details of 
these are shown in the epilogue at the appendix.1.  
 
The big challenge was how to arrange interviews under such difficult circumstances. The 
government had just taken control of the country but there were still pockets of resistance. 
It is also worth mentioning that in Libya, at least in most of the twenty five places that I 
visited, the Internet is rarely used and this is due to the fact that many employees lack 
computer skills.  In the offices of the Administration of Private Higher Education, for 
instance, the majority of the staff do not utilise emails or have the ability to use the 
Internet. 
 
In this second phase of the fieldwork I interviewed the following people: 
• The Deputy Minister of Higher education, Prof. Fathi R. Akkari.  Initially I tried to 
meet the Minister of Higher education, but his Secretary Dr. Abd-Almageed 
Husseen, prevented this by stating that: “....it is not necessary...it is not important 
and there is no need for such this work these days. The current government is 
temporary and the country is still in chaos...”  But I persevered and attempted to 
convince him that the research was essential, especially at this stage of chaos and 
instability, and that it would provide an important link with the development of 
privatization and private higher education in Libya. The present policy has entered a 
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new stage and there is no doubt it will be open to as yet unexamined influences. At 
last I was allowed to meet the Minister and he answered the interview questions.     
• The Minister of Education Mr. Suleiman Al-Sweahli and the Deputy Minister of 
Education Dr. Suleiman M. Khoja.   
• Dr. Abdullatif M. Latif who in charge of private higher education. He is a Director 
of the Private Higher Education Administration.  
• Dr. Mohammed Alkaber the General Director of the QAA. 
• Dr. Hussin Margen the Director of QAA of Higher Education Institutes.  
• Mr. Mustafa Al-Kheshr the Director of Administration for the Quality and 
Accreditation of the Pre-University Education Institution. He was involved in a 
committee of accreditation. 
• Mr. Aref Al-Alawe the Director of the Management of Administrational and 
Financial Affairs at QQA.  
• Mrs. Basma Al-Madani who is the Director of the Managerial and Financial Affairs 
in Al-Refak University. She is also the daughter of the owner of the university. Mrs. 
Saeda who in charge for the QAA department of Al-Refak University. 
• I left a request asking to meet the Prime Minister Dr. Abd-Alrahim Alkeap but his 
secretary called me by phone and told me to go to the Minister of Higher 
Education.   
All these contributors provide very important information and significant research 
data. 
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C. Comparing the two phases of interviews: 
 
  Table (4): A comparison between two field studies in Libya (pre- and post- 17th of 
February 2011 Revolution).    
Title/ Subject Pre 17th of February Revolution Post 17th of February Revolution 
Access to minister or vice 
minister 
Difficult. Easy. 
Talking politically on the 
issues of private higher 
education. 
People very cautious to involve 
themselves in such issues or to 
refer directly to the role of the 
political system. 
People frankly criticise the role 
of the political system on the 
policy. 
The comments of some 
interviewees. 
Some interviewees gave 
comments supporting the 
previous Gaddafi political 
regime. 
These comments are reversed 
and the interviewees show in 
their reappraisals support for the 
current change. 
 Stability. Stable. The system of higher 
Education never experienced 
any disputes since 1955. 
Unstable: There have been a  
large number of strikes and 
disputes.    
 
1.13. The guidelines employed regarding the interviews and ethical issues: 
Interviews were mostly face to face.  All interviews were recorded and notes were taken 
where necessary.  Some of the interviews and some of the written sources are in Arabic, 
the official language of Libya, and these have been translated in to English.  All the 
interviews were conducted by the researcher with local assistance that helped in identifying 
and locating the right people and places in Tripoli.  An official letter of permission was 
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carried by the researcher and showed to the interviewees before each interview; some of 
them were interested in examining it and some asked for a copy, due, no doubt, to their 
apprehension about the rules associated with security and political matters. Others 
displayed no fear whatsoever and readily agreed to be interviewed and those who initially 
refused to be recorded eventually gave their consent when convinced that the study was to 
be one with its main focus on the improvement of the higher education sector which would 
possibly constitute a service to the public. Most of the interviewees whose comments were 
used as quotes or narratives gave their full consent and were happy to have their names 
mentioned. 
 
Post revolution the field study proved to be much easier than before, though full security 
and stability had not been achieved at the time. The country was still witnessing strikes and 
protests: on the occasion I went to meet the Minister of Higher Education on the 3rd 
January, 2012, for instance, I found a group of protestors assembled in front of the building 
and another protest I observed comprised workers from the Company for Engineering 
Industries that was controlled by the General Secretary for the Work Force. On 9th January 
2011 the Cabinet establishment was blocked all day by employees demanding wages that 
had not been paid for seven months.  Despite such obstructions, progress was made.  
Official letters of permission were always carried but were largely unused and even the 
minister and vice-minister were readily accessible and cooperative as long as appointments 
had been made. Such accessibility is attributable to the fact that those who have accepted 
responsibility in the new government try to avoid confrontation with citizens who have had 
negative experiences over a period of some 42 years under Gaddafi’s dictatorship.  
 
Below are some critical points I would like to add with regard to some interviews: 
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1. To conduct some interviews I had to make more than one appointment and on occasions 
I had to wait all day before being able to conduct an interview. 
2. Some high status interviewees displayed an unwelcoming attitude although not overtly: 
their responses indicated perhaps apprehension, even jealousy, and the information they 
gave was limited or evasive.  
3. There were problems with some employees who were in occupations for which they 
were not qualified or competent. 
 
It should be borne in mind that the writer has used only the important and relevant points 
from the recordings, some of which are used as references and allow conclusions to be 
made.  Such observations are important components in developing an analysis of the 
Libyan higher education financing policy by providing extensive data that beforehand had 
not been available. As it has been mentioned earlier that the interviews are good sources of 
data, the researcher has chosen different types of people (e.g. seniors, important political 
figures, employees and students). This has helped provide a reprehensive section of people 
concerned with higher education who were able to speak from a range of different 
viewpoints. The material of interview was based on a Sony record with ability of recording 
more than 150 hours. The latter was an important element to save all information from the 
interviewees with no worries. 
     
1.14. The case study of Al-Refak University 
This thesis is concerned to analyse the developments of higher education in Libya policy 
with respect to the role of the privatisation.  However, it has been considered beneficial as 
part of this research to undertake some in-depth study of one university in the form of a 
case study.  
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Stake (in (Bryman, A, 2004, p48) writes that “…a case study is concerned with the 
complexity and particular nature of the case in question”. It is a method of empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used (Yin, R, 1994). Stake, R, (1995) identifies some types of case 
study applications: descriptive, explanatory and exploratory; and these will be used in this 
study.  
 
Al-Refak University has been chosen as a case study for the following reasons: 
1. It is located in the capital city of Libya (Tripoli) where I live. 
2. It is the only university during the Gaddafi period that gained accreditation from QAA in 
Tripoli. 
3. It has been established since 1999 the year of the introduction of private higher 
education. 
4. I have a good relationship with the owner of the university and its staff.  
5. It has a good archive that helps the writer to get adequate data. 
6. It has more number of students than other private universities.  
It should be noted that the writer uses one university as a case study because: 
1. There are only four private universities in Libya that are accredited by QAA. The others 
have not been accredited yet.    
2. It seems to me it is the perfect example to give a standard of measurement in private 
higher education. 
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3. The other private universities have similar trends and features comparable with Al-
Refak University and any analysis and evaluation of this university as a model would apply 
to others. 
 
It should be mentioned that Al-Refak University as a case study was useful to me. There is 
a lack of data related to the research topic in Libya, but the university has provided me 
reasonable data and information. Dealing with the university as a case study and doing a 
practical research was very helpful in improving my research skills. In my point of view, 
there is a difference between theories or literature in private higher education policies and 
practical process. The detailed knowledge on the grass roots supplemented some general 
factors and helped explain how things really were developing. It was good to get a level of 
detail. 
    
I have been to the university many times. It was a good experience to me. Such a special 
experience has -to some extent- provided some lessons I have learnt. It is clear that the 
university has made a good progress gaining accreditation certificate and being at a good 
position in the capital city (Tripoli) and is therefore supposedly towards the better end of 
the scale. However I discovered that there were still some important matters that needed to 
be addressed: quality, relevance, financing, efficiency, and governance. Despite the fact 
that its graduates have difficulty in finding interesting and well-paid jobs and its quality is 
believed to be poor, people are still sending their children to study there as well as to other 
private universities. People who do that seem to be looking for a means of buying degrees 
only which do not correspond to any real qualification or knowledge.   
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1.15. Conclusions 
As Burnham, P et al (2008, p232) state:  “…the key guideline [in research methods] must 
be not to base any piece of work entirely on elite interviewing.” This is consistent with the 
principle of triangulation, which Bryman (in Burnham, P et al (2008, p232)), “…entails 
using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena.”  
Accordingly, the writer has primarily based the research upon various written materials, 
such as publications, official documents, working papers, official decisions, magazines, 
archives, observations at meetings, recorded speeches, photos, newspapers, catalogues and 
the media as described above.  The elite interviews have been used to support the data 
collected and to gain some additional insights both regarding information and regarding the 
subjective perceptions of various actors in policy.  All this research develops and goes on 
from my MSc research centred on the Economics of Education in Libya over the period 
1965-1995.  After this, I have worked for six years as a lecturer at Tripoli University 
(previously Al-Fatah), the largest university in Libya, and have contributed to more than 
12 local conferences, forums and symposiums dealing with human resources and higher 
education. I believe that this experience and knowledge applied to the present thesis will 
result in a conscientious and worthwhile body of research.    
 
Utilising all the research findings, the writer hopes: 
- to build a proper study of private higher education in Libya; 
- to make a new contribution in this field locally and internationally; 
- to provide an accurate, comprehensive, and integrated picture of the higher 
education financing policy in Libya and to offer a base for future extensive studies in 
the field of financing higher education in the country. 
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Chapter two: The funding of higher education (review of literature). 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
Higher education is becoming increasingly important in modern societies as an active 
component in shaping public policy, developing the intellectual talent of the world, 
improving economic opportunity and leading pioneering research in fields such as health 
care, biotechnology, computer and information systems, manufacturing technology, the 
physical sciences and in the social sciences. Higher education today is becoming integrated 
into society as a leader in education and innovation. Education in general, and higher 
education in particular, are becoming one of the world’s largest economic activities. It is 
assumed to be the way to social esteem, higher paid and better jobs, wider life options, 
intellectual stimulation and a rewarding and vocational career structure. 
 
Despite the clear importance of higher education for both economic and social 
development, the sector has raised several issues, such as the cost of higher education and 
its financing policy. Much has been said and discussed about the cost and financing of 
higher education and many questions have been asked: for instance, how will higher 
education be financed?  How much of a nation’s total resources, whether physical or 
human, ought to be, or can be, devoted to higher education? Who will pay for higher 
education? What ought higher education to cost per student or per degree? How ought the 
costs of higher education to be shared between the public and private sectors? What quality 
of education will be supplied and in which disciplines and institutions? All these issues 
have been presented in depth in several authoritative reports, by, for instance, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank (WB), the 
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International Conference of Higher Education (ICHI), and the American Council of 
Education. 
 
Some of the questions often raised are whether post-secondary education should be 
publicly funded or should its cost be divided between a government, a student, a parent, 
and other primary beneficiaries. There are many policies which have been introduced and 
adopted by governments and planners to control resources that are devoted to education in 
general and tertiary education in particular. These policies, which are designed to achieve 
and obtain various goals, appear to differ considerably according to circumstances and 
conditions in each country. 
 
The size of tertiary education was limited in most parts of the globe until the 1960s after 
which there was a change towards a reassessment of financing policies for higher 
education and many governments across the world became increasingly focused on 
establishing strategies for the financing of their higher education. The 1990s saw the 
emergence of mass and universal access to higher education (Altbach, P, (a), 1999), and 
according to Johnstone, B (2003, p403) and (Barnett, R, 1992) its expansion has continued 
into the twenty first century. Now many higher education matters are debated by policy 
makers, different academic faculties and official authorities such as economists and 
politicians. One such area for consideration is, of course, the financing of higher education 
and this has become an important issue around the globe. Higher education is both 
necessary and desirable, but it is expensive and faces competition for funding from other 
public and social sectors with equally justifiable claims.  
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There is evidence that in many countries, especially in developing regions, governments 
can no longer continue to finance and increase spending on tertiary education. 
Consequently the worldwide attitude towards higher education finance has changed and 
governments have been forced to reform and reconsider their policies. Internal pressures of 
declining economies, rapid demographic growth and increased competition for scarce 
financial resources from different sectors, coupled with external neo-liberal doctrines 
championed by global donors like the World Bank, have resulted in a new market-
competitive policy in financing higher education. As a result higher education has faced 
many changes in its methods, management, and its financing. Altbatch, P, (a) (1999, p110) 
explains that various countries have undergone substantial changes in relation to public 
spending. The role of the state in financing both public services in general and tertiary 
education in particular began to change after the Second World War, and an associated 
policy of high taxes to pay for these public services started to break down in the 1980s. 
During that period, attitudes around post-secondary education changed and it became 
“private is good”. The reason was not only that public expenditure in many countries, if 
not all, had not been able to meet the increasing social demands for tertiary education, but 
also as Walford (in Lee, M, 2008, p188) observes: “For countries to be competitive in the 
global market, neo-liberal ideology posits that there should be a shrinking of the welfare 
state and cutbacks in social expenditure. This view implies drastic cutbacks in public 
spending and the privatization of public services such as health, education, housing, and 
transportation. The underlying ideology of privatization is based on the argument that the 
public sector is wasteful, inefficient, and unproductive, while the private sector is deemed 
to be more efficient, effective, and responsive to rapid changes in the global economy.” 
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Moreover, according to Ziderman, A and Albreach, D (1995): “Pressure to reform the 
financing of higher education has mounted in virtually every part of the world. The 
problems compelling changes have been developing for decades, but the economic 
stringency of the 1980s has exacerbated the need for reform, bringing many institutions to 
the brink of collapse. The crisis confronting higher education systems is not simply 
financial. There are justified concerns about quality, relevance, equity and specific mission 
of institutions, in many countries, developing and developed, and all these issues need to 
be addressed. However, it is clear that putting the financial structure of higher education on 
to a more solid footing is essential before many of these other problems can be resolved.”  
 
This chapter will attempt to outline three different approaches related to a financing policy 
for higher education, private division and its role in higher education. Firstly it will 
introduce, briefly, when and how the studies of higher education have developed. 
Secondly, it will highlight the definition of privatization and determine the difference 
between the concept of privatization of higher education and the concept of private higher 
education. Thirdly, it will introduce various points of view and the arguments that have 
been adopted by scholars and those who are interested in this aspect of privatizing higher 
education. 
 
 
2.2 The development of the world attitude towards financing policies for higher 
education: 
Higher education is a very important sector in developed and developing societies. It has 
four dominant purposes and roles. First, is that it provides the means and tools which are 
used by individuals or governments to solve a large number of problems. Second, is that 
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higher education provides training for a research career. Third, is that higher education 
creates an efficient management structure for the provision of teachers. And finally, higher 
education is a catalyst or agent in enabling life changes to be made. (Spitzberg, J, 1980), 
(Barnett, R 1992) and (Teichler in Burgen, A, 1996, p. 96). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of higher education, it was largely neglected as a subject 
of academic study until the mid-twentieth century. (Altbach, P and Engberg, D, 2001, p2). 
The feeling of many people from the end of the Second World War till the 1980s, even of 
those who were educated, had been that higher education in both the developed and in the 
developing countries could only be a public responsibility and that it should be provided 
and subsidized by the state. Before 1980, the dominant view was that higher education 
provided a service for the `public good` and that it had a considerable role to fulfil in 
society by equipping individuals with the advanced knowledge and skills required for 
economic and social development. The consensus was that a society should meet its own 
costs and is thus defined as a public benefit that would serve a society as a whole and not 
just its individuals. This is the dominant concept with obvious interconnections. Firstly as 
Enders, J and Jongbloed, B (2007, p10) point out, the dominant role of the state in 
elementary and secondary education has been a well-established tradition and has led the 
state to expand its role in higher education as well. The second explanation, which seems 
to confirm the previous point, is that education in general and higher education in 
particular, has played a significant role in building nation-states and their economies. The 
third explanation has an economical foundation related to capital market imperfections. 
The latter implies that investments in higher education involve risks for the private sector 
because it is uncertain about its ability to bear the cost of higher education and achieve its 
gains. Higher education remains a public asset in many countries but there is a move 
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towards implementing tertiary education as a private concept with the benefits accruing 
largely to individuals. It seems that higher education for the public good can no longer to 
be a feasible policy in the light of current challenges (e.g. a growing demand for higher 
education and an unwillingness of the state to fund the increased costs of tertiary 
education. (Altbach, P, (a) (c), 1999, p111 & Altbach, P & Levy, D, 2005). This has led to 
a variety of responses in many countries. Some of them have encouraged the private sector 
to play its role in the higher education system (e.g. in Latin American and East Asia 
countries where private higher education institutions have grown rapidly). Other countries 
have not established private higher education but instead have introduces market 
mechanisms in financing higher education, by the introduction of tuition fees and by 
adopting the idea of cost sharing and increasing autonomy in financing and instituting 
policies.  
 
2.3 The definition of privatization in higher education.  
The term privatization is often used in economic literature meaning, in general, the 
deliberate movement of the state’s role in the economy towards private ownership and a 
free market economy. Le Grand and Robinson (in Mok, K and Wat, K 1998, p256) refers 
that privatization is closely associated with a reduction in state activities, especially a 
reduction in state provision, and in state subsidy and regulation.  
 
A common element in privatization is a movement away from dependence on the state for 
funding towards private funding. Regarding higher education, this had been the major 
trend throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s as is described by contributors (in 
Altbach. P (b), 1999, p113) who point out that higher education systems have been 
transferred from public control to private control, from democratization in higher education 
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to other varied concepts, such as ‘marketization’, ‘commercialization’, ‘and ‘privatization’. 
This movement has also been a significant feature of the World Bank`s agenda and its 
economic reform policies that are seen as important elements and an effective measure for 
every economic sector including that of higher education in order to improve efficiency 
and to easy financial crises.  
 
Psacharopoulos, G (N.D, p1) and Mok, K & Wat, K (1998) point out, there are broad 
views regarding such a concept because of overlapping and interlocking in terms of 
privatized tertiary education with the private and public higher education institutions being 
neither purely private nor purely public.  In spite of this, the literature on the financing of 
higher education provides us with several definitions for the concept of the privatization of 
tertiary education.  
 
Johnston, B (2003) has defined it as a process or tendency of colleges and universities 
(both private and public) to take on characteristics of, or operational norms associated 
with, private enterprises. Kwiek, M (2003) and Sanyal, B (1998, p30) define it as 
“transformation of ownership and control from the state sector to the private sector be it 
individual, organization, enterprise or community.” Molly N. Lee (in Altbach, P (b) 1999, 
p144) defines privatization as one of the alternative means of financing higher education 
which “means a reduction in the level of state provision, and a corresponding 
encouragement of the expansion of private provision.” These definitions seem to share two 
main features: the move away from dependence on the state for funding higher education 
and the involvement of the private sector in higher education. 
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It should be noted that the privatization of higher education means and refers not only to 
the private sector, to individuals, to non-government or public agencies and other private 
forms, and not only has meaning in the private sector, but has also emerged  in public 
institutions. The latter can also have a private programme or a privately run activity. This 
phenomenon, called ‘privatization’ by Altbach, P (d),(1999, p1) of public institutions 
makes public and private institutions appear more and more similar. The size of the private 
sector and the level of reduction in the state in higher education vary between countries. 
Public and private sectors coexist in most societies to different extents and in varying 
forms. In some Latin American countries, for example, private higher education is a 
growing phenomenon leading to what has been called the ‘mass private sector’. In contrast, 
the private sector in some societies in Asia has been limited and is known as the 
‘peripheral private sector’. The table (5) below may be give some differences between 
privatisation of public universities and private universities. 
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Table (5) differences between privatisation of public universities and private universities. 
Privatisation of public university Private universities 
It founded by government, however the 
market forces play important roles  
Founded by people and individuals   
It still serves a clear public mission as 
determined by the faculty or the state. 
It serves private interests of students, 
clients and owners. 
It is publicly owned and it can be altered 
or even closed by government. 
The owner/s is/are a person or people 
who found the university.   
Still Free   charge tuition fees  
Salaries of employees and staff members 
are paid by government   
Salaries of employees and staff members 
are paid by owners of universities.  
High degree of autonomy, however 
universities are still under high state 
control. 
Controls limited to those over any other 
businesses 
Privatised public universities and they are 
non-profit: clear public 
Private for-profit 
The source of Revenue comes from state 
and government allocations. 
All private revenue mainly from tuition 
fees. 
 
Quasi-privatized public higher education has taken various forms that are found in 
different countries as a package of policies:  
1. greater cost recovery through the introduction of cost sharing and student fees or 
the raising of student fees from the nominal levels charged at present in most 
countries; 
2. privatization of services in public institutions; 
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3. delayed cost recovery through a system of student loans;  
4. a broader diversification of revenue sources, particularly that of selling services to 
industry; 
5. public-financed privatization;  
6. corporatization of universities and the public–private partnership that refers to 
cooperative ventures between the state and private businesses;  
7. The encouragement of public higher education institutions to lessen their 
dependence on state funds, to be more ‘entrepreneurial’ and competitive, and to 
demonstrate efficient professional management.    
 
Privatization programmes of various sorts have a number of different goals:  
1. to enhance higher education institutions process; 
2. to increase competition between providers of higher education;  
3. to raise revenue for the government; 
4. to improve economic efficiency; 
5. to decrease state influence in universities.  
 
Privatisation in higher education seems to have different meaning, in some countries (e.g. 
USA) it is more about market orientation and push students and their parents for cost 
sharing and to pay tuition fees. Governments seem to alter their public universities 
deliberately to be private universities or alike. Although privatization leads to increased 
private participation and strengthened markets, it does not necessarily shrink the overall 
size of the public sector. In Libya privatization of public universities means self-steering 
administration where there were no tuition fees and cost sharing ideas. Public universities 
are free of charge. The government during Gaddafi’s period had implemented a policy for 
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privatising some faculties in Al-Fatah University.  The government estimated the cost of 
each student in a year and then the university get its allocations according to the number of 
students. The university according to this policy was given autonomy and it operated like a 
business. However, the focus of the thesis is the private higher education rather than 
privatization of public universities. 
 
Privatization in higher education has been seen a proper policy that is designed by 
policymakers trying to push for self-steering and accountable entities. In some countries 
the policy is proposed to improve higher education institutions. African countries, for 
example have been recommended by the World Bank to liberalize their higher education 
systems and to privatize their institutions. The World found that these institutions are 
highly subsidized by the state, overstaffed, offer outmoded curricula, and produce large 
numbers of graduates with minimal relevance to the prevailing labour market needs. 
(Munene, I & Otieno, W. 2007, p464). The World Bank indeed produced emphatic policy 
prescriptions which recommended a move towards a free market and privatization in 
economic activities including that of higher education.  
 
In central and eastern European countries the rise in the role of private tertiary education 
has been mainly the result of widespread and explicit commitment to the virtues of the free 
market after a long period of dominance by centralised state planning. This commitment 
has frequently been strengthened by the difficulties experienced in various sectors of these 
societies by public institutions trying to adapt to the new situation during the early stages 
of their transition from communism. (Crnković, B Požega, Ž. (N.D), G.Sivalingam, 2006, 
p12 &p13, Quddus, M and Rashid, S. (2000) & Altbach, P (a), 1999). 
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Nowadays private institutions of higher education have spread widely in many Asian and 
Latin American countries where the number of students who attend private universities and 
colleges amount to more than those in the USA or in European countries. In Asian states, 
such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia upwards of 80 per cent 
of students attend private institutions. And in Latin America at least 50 per cent of all 
students are enrolled in such institutions whereas in Western countries it is only five per 
cent, the exception being the United States with 20 per cent.  (Altbach, P (c), 1999).   
       
Researchers have pointed to some general reasons for interest in market solutions to the 
problems of higher education:  
1. The public sector has not been able to meet the increasing demand for higher education. 
There are many universities, especially in developing countries that are able to absorb only 
a small fraction of the students seeking admission. (Varghese,N, (a) 2004, p12, Kapur, D 
and Crowley, M, 2008, p16 and Altbach, P (a), 1999, p311).  
 
2. As state institutions of higher education have required more funds, so a government has 
no longer been able to finance the cost and at the same time the public sector has had to 
diversify its funding sources from non-governmental revenues. Instead, public funding has 
declined in most countries and governments today have been curbing government spending 
in higher education and in their welfare provision with cutbacks in social expenditure as a 
whole. The more dominant reason for the decline in higher education support has been the 
multiple pressures on government itself, consisting of a much broader demand for social 
services, law enforcement, infrastructure improvements, public amenities and the 
exigencies of national emergencies. (Lee, M, 2008, Altbach, P (a), 1999, p314, Ali, H, 
N.D, p266, and Teferra, D & Altbach, P, 2004, p32,) 
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3. The public sector has been criticized by analysts and authors saying that it is    wasteful, 
inefficient, and unproductive. Public trust in government has declined in recent years. The 
result is declining confidence in the non-profit sector and rising confidence in the for-profit 
sector. (Varghese, N, (b)2004, p12, Mok, K, 2003, p203, p213).  
 
4. It is acknowledged that public institutions of higher education are not able to be more 
effective in responding to the rapid changes in the global economy. Globalization 
contributes both to the increasing demand for tertiary education and to the inadequate 
government revenue to support it. In light of globalization, governments today feel the 
effects (e.g. the revolution in technological communication and the development in the 
globalization of higher education) as theories of ‘new governance’ and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) have proposed a need to change their roles from 
centralization to self governance and from nationalization to marketization which can take 
four models. These are the market model, the participatory state model, the flexible 
government model and the deregulated government model. (Nguyen, H,  N.D, p73; Mok, 
K, 2000, Ali, H  N.D, p265; Pierre and Peters in Mok, K, 2005, p358 and p359 and Mok, J, 
2002) 
 
A significant change is in the way that higher education has increasingly become perceived 
as a benefit for the individual rather than for the society as a whole and this has encouraged 
policymakers to consider the privatisation of higher education. 
    
As already noted when discussed privatization in general, we can find competing and 
different objectives in these various policies. In some cases the goal is to shift costs from 
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government to students by the introduction of fees, for example. Here the issue can be 
portrayed as one of equity: those who will get the later economic benefits of a higher 
education should pay for it rather than be subsidised by the general public. On the other 
hand the desire to see universities operate along business lines to maximise profit is an 
issue of efficiency. As a result, varieties of models for privatization at this level of 
education have existed and reflect its meaning in different rhetorical constructions and 
ideological concepts.       
 
In Western European countries, such as the UK, the state is the main resource provider and 
the existence of private institutions remains minimal in most higher education systems. 
Privatization, though, is seen as a means of increasing competition between universities 
which would lead to value for money, but it does not mean that the institutions are owned 
by companies or individuals. Instead, privatization seeks to diversify the financial 
resources by selling services and increasing tuition fees, by earning funds from 
consultations, by selling intellectual property of various kinds, by licensing, by renting out 
university property, by university and industry collaborations that produce income, and by 
encouraging competition between higher education institutions as a way of improving 
efficiency. In contrast, privatization in other countries (e.g. USA, Latin American countries 
and in some countries in Eastern Europe) where private institutions of higher education are 
well established, means that higher education institutions are owned by non-public 
organizations, individuals or families who fund these institutions through personal wealth. 
These establishments rely mostly on tuition fees and the contribution of students and 
families to the cost of higher education. (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A 2001, p364 & p365).  
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It should be noted that despite this diversity of such a concept of higher education 
privatization its definitions are slightly different in different systems, but they all share the 
common ideas that: 
 
1. Autonomy, according to state regulation of ‘privatization’ in the literature is one of the 
most far-reaching trends in higher education today. It means that both public and private 
higher education institutions have been given self-government and self-determination by a 
state, relatively, to regulate themselves as a way to seek a more efficient use of available 
resources. In public universities in many countries, governments have shifted certain 
financial responsibilities to more local control and their policies have been moved from 
centralization to decentralization of authority. This means that individuals and citizens 
have become more involved in the regulation of higher education as in the case of private 
universities where governments allow them to be self-administrating institutions.    
2. Cost reduction which means a decrease in the cost per student. It has a package of 
policies including an increase in class sizes and teaching loads, deferring maintenance 
costs and dropping low-priority programmes. It also includes other strategies such as 
substituting lower-cost part-time faculties for higher-cost full-time faculties and a 
concentration on low-cost popular fields, such as law, economics and business studies that 
would appear to exist more in private universities than in public higher education 
institutions. 
3. Revenue generation where public and private higher education institutions have been 
asked to reduce their dependence on government funds and instead to generate revenue 
from alternative sources, such as tuition fees and auxiliary charges so that a proportion of 
the cost is shared by students, through an income from consulting, by university and 
industry collaboration to produce income and through other forms that transform 
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institutions’ teaching, research and service activities and thereby compete with private 
enterprises in the larger economic marketplace.     
 
2.4 Higher education: the debate between the private and the public sectors. 
Globally, higher education has varying forms in regard to the division in tertiary education 
between the public and private sectors. While some countries could have their higher 
education controlled, managed and financed publicly as the dominant sector, the private 
sector in other regions could be the dominant one. Geiger (in Geiger, R, 1988, p.700) 
classified higher education as having three basic structural patterns of public-private 
differentiation: mass private and restricted public sectors, parallel public and private 
sectors, and comprehensive public and peripheral private sectors. According to the 
relationship between a state and its higher education institutions, the provision of tertiary 
education could be divided between two main models of higher education. The first model 
is the public-control model. It means that the government or the state is essentially 
responsible for the regulation of its higher education institutions. 
 
Second is the state-supervising model which means that academic professors have 
considerable powers, the institutional administrators have modest powers and the state 
accepts a modest role. The institutions in this model regulate themselves through their staff 
and their senior professors who control the institutions and design their policies. (Arnove, 
R and Torres, C, 2007, ps. 185 & 186). Below are two points of view that argue for and 
against the privatization of higher education.   
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A. Arguments against privatization.  
Higher education is the subject of controversial debate with very different points of view 
and arguments on how higher education should be managed and financed: “In the past, the 
belief system surrounding the public interest has been that public entities (and actors) must 
be kept separate from the private domain, and that the public interest is best served by 
preventing conflict of interest” (Varghese,N, (b) 2004, p5 and Rhoades, G and Slaughter, 
S, 1997). However, following the Second World War, the financing policies of tertiary 
education have been at the centre of debate as to whether the public or the private sector 
should be the preferred system. Although the global trend has been more and more in 
favour of privatization of higher education there is still a strong feeling for public higher 
education.  
 
The notion of state responsibility and public finance revolves around these arguments: 
Firstly, Cemmell (in Lee, M, 2008, p. 193) argues that “The idea that higher education is a 
public good has strong support among educators and the academy. The non-rivals nature of 
public good implies that one person’s use of the good does not limit that of another, and its 
non-excludable character holds that a person cannot be prevented from using the good. 
According to this definition higher education is a public good because it is freely available 
(if there is no scarcity) and consumption by one person does not impair the interest of 
others”.  
 
Secondly, it is argued that the private sector in its cost-sharing forms may make students, 
particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, unable to enrol in higher education 
and that higher education provision should be managed and financed publicly because of 
its social gains that benefit a society as a whole. A cost-benefit analysis on higher 
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education includes data that gives a broad overview about the costs and benefits of tertiary 
education for both the individual student and for society as a whole. Table 5 shows that 
post-secondary education imparts positive advantages that influence a society as a whole 
more than its individual students. The social rates of return for higher education can be 
calculated on the monetary external effects, such as economic growth and increased tax 
payments from graduates. (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, ps 40 & 41). These findings have been 
found by recent studies in developed countries. They ranged between 6 per cent and 15 per 
cent: Blonbal et al (in Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p42). Table 6 also shows that higher 
education imparts non-monetary benefits which justify full public subsidies for tertiary 
education. 
  
Table (6). The Public Costs and Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits of Higher 
Education 
 
Operating costs of programmes 
 
Student support 
Costs Forgone national production related to 
students 
 
Higher national productivity 
 
Higher tax revenues 
 
Greater flexibility in labour force 
 
Higher consumption 
Monetary and Economic Benefits Reduce reliance on government financial 
support 
 
National and regional development 
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Increased consumption 
 Increased potential for transformation 
from low-skill industrial to knowledge-
based economy 
 Greater social cohesion, appreciation of 
social diversity and cultural heritage 
 
Higher social mobility 
 
Lower crime rates 
Non-monetary and Social Benefits More donations and charity work 
 Increased capacity to adapt to new 
technologies 
 Democratic participation; increased 
consensus; perception that the society is 
based on fairness and opportunities for all 
citizens 
 Nation-building and development of 
leadership 
 
Improved health 
 
Improved elementary and secondary 
education 
Source: 1.World Bank (in Vossensteyn, H,  2004, p41). 2. Institute of Higher Education Policy (IHEP) (in 
Steier, F, 2003, p. 81). 
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Tertiary education not only makes an overall contribution to economic growth, but also has 
broad economic, fiscal, and labour market effects. Both these influences have been 
explained and listed by Steier, F (2003, p76): 
1. He points out that higher education enables and furthers the development and 
diffusion of technological innovations that increase the economic productivity. 
2.  Productivity is also improved by higher skills and qualitative enhancements which 
are gained by a labour force which is a product of tertiary education and which has 
acquired the necessary skills in utilising new technologies. 
3. The development and diffusion of technological innovations contribute 
substantially to the progress within economic sectors, such as agriculture, industry, 
health, and in environmental concerns. 
4. The higher education sector also contributes to an increase in workforce flexibility 
that is increasingly seen as a crucial factor in economic development in the context 
of ‘knowledge’ economies.  
5. The contributions made by an innovative higher education system are essential for 
transformation and growth throughout an economy. 
6. Several studies from OECD states, the United States and Canada reveal that there is 
a positive correlation between developed participation in higher education and 
reduced reliance on government financial support for medical and welfare services, 
such as housing, food stamps and unemployment. (Steier, F, 2003, p76).  
 
An imperfect capital market has led to uncertainty about future roles likely to be faced by 
students eligible to enter higher education institutions, such as universities, and it is argued 
that they may face risks caused by the imperfections of the capital market and such 
students are doubtful as to whether they will be able to graduate with a guaranteed job in 
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the future. As a result, some students hesitate about making a decision and are 
apprehensive about applying for education loans through private banks. There is, therefore, 
a need for government intervention either by guaranteeing bank loans or by offering loans 
themselves, in order to compensate for the imperfections in the capital market.  By so 
doing, they may help to prevent an underinvestment in education. (Oosterbeek. Barr in 
Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p42). For example: “Most industrial countries subsidise, to a greater 
or lesser extent, non-compulsory education and in particular higher education. One of the 
justifications for this policy is capital market imperfections which prevent agents from 
borrowing against future human capital income. Subsidies to higher education are therefore 
intended to provide equality of chances to all agents, no matter what their family wealth 
is.” (Peñalosa, C and K Wälde, 2000, p702). 
  
Also, equality of achievement among various classes in society is an important aim in the 
government agenda and its economic and social development plans. This would appear to 
be more evidence to support the idea that tertiary education should be publicly managed 
and financed rather than through the private sector. It has been suggested by some 
educationalists that equity concerns, for instance, redistributions between rich and poor, 
justify full public or government subsidies. They state that: “From a lifetime equity 
position, public subsidies to students seem unfair because they will probably belong to the 
future group of above-average earners. However, at the moment of attendance it may be 
argued that public subsidies are needed to equalize entrance opportunities for potential 
students from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Otherwise, students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds may not enter higher education.” (Barr [in Vossensteyn, H] 
and Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p. 42). In addition, others believe that “…charging higher fees 
can create ‘irreparable socioeconomic inequities between the poor and rich’ because the 
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poor cannot afford such high fees. Furthermore, even in situations where public subsidies 
are provided to promote equity, these can be ‘perverse’ because they simply transfer 
income from poor to rich, as children from the middle and high income groups are heavily 
over-represented in higher education. To overcome this inequity, the shift is towards a 
cost-recovery policy accompanied by scholarships or loans for the needy.” (Woodhall and 
Tilak (in Lee, M,  2008, p. 192). Moreover, UNESCO (in Lee, M, 2008, p. 193) argues that 
higher education opportunity and access should not be an ‘affordable’ activity but should 
be based on ability and merit in order to conform to human rights. Another study reveals 
that in some instances public higher education is better than the private provision. For 
example, James and Benjamin (in Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005, p. 362) illustrate that 
the student-teacher ratio and the student-staff ratio in the public higher education 
institutions in four Asian countries (Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) were 
lower than in the private ones. In Japan the ratio was only eight-to-one in public tertiary 
education and twenty-six-to-one in the private sector. In the other three countries the ratios 
were found to be three times those of public institutions in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
and more than double in Thailand, indicating that the quality of education in public higher 
education is higher than in the private universities and colleges. 
 
B. Arguments in favour of private higher education: 
The provision of private higher education is becoming a major economic and political 
trend in the world today and transcends political ideologies. It appears that there is a major 
consensus about the role of the market and its function in improving efficiency in higher 
education institutions and it has been agreed that commercial involvement is more 
effective in promoting different institutional types of programmes and activities. 
Autonomy, de-regulation and market forces are considered the best way to promote 
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diversity through privatisation and are the main reasons for introducing market 
mechanisms into this provision. Geiger (in Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p365) 
hypothesizes that:  
 
“When resources are tight, the market is a much more powerful force for the 
differentiation of higher education institutions and functions than centralized policy and 
control.”       
 
Advocates of private higher education strongly believe that post-secondary education 
should be deregulated and financed by the private sector as one of the cost-sharing forms. 
Their advocacy is supported by several major reasons: their economic analysis and 
economic theory present an explanation in terms of both efficiency and quality. There is a 
strong belief that private provision is able to improve quality and efficiency in higher 
education institutions better than that of the public sector and that it creates greater 
competition and increases differentiation in the tertiary education system, all of which lead 
to a reduction in cost. It has been argued by some authors that “It is commonly argued that 
private higher education institutions are inherently more efficient than public ones because 
of strong incentives to minimize costs and to use resources efficiently. The private sector is 
held to be more responsive to the changing demands of customers and markets. 
Competition brings down costs and improves the quality of service.” (Lee, M, 2008, p192). 
In addition, Vossensteyn, H, (2004, p. 40) argues that public finance resources, in most 
countries, are not only scarce, but also limited and that they rely on restricted sources 
which make their ability to generate income from other activities extremely difficult. Also, 
Lee, M (2008, p190), Woodhall (in Lee, M, 2008, p192), Patrinos, World Bank, Sanyal, 
and Balan (in Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005) discuss the point that the public sector 
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may not be able to create differentiation in distributing funding. As a result, it seems 
difficult to meet the challenges, particularly apropos growth demand for higher education. 
In contrast, deregulation and providing higher education institutions with greater autonomy 
will lead to increased differentiation and create greater competition that is more likely to 
improve both quality and efficiency. And a focus on efficiency may lead to a decrease in 
costs, achieve useful progress, and provide well-considered academic opportunities for 
both institutions and students. Some believe that when higher education students pay a part 
of their educational costs they will make more informed choices and some studies indicate 
that tertiary education imparts monetary and non-monetary benefits not only for society but 
for students, known as ‘private returners’ or ‘benefits’ (See table 7).  
 
For example, a recent OECD study revealed that graduates of universities or colleges earn 
more than those individuals who have had only secondary schooling. (Vossensteyn, H, 
2004, p.40). Similarly, it has been found by Psacharapoulos (in Atuahene, 2008, p. 408) 
that individuals who have received a higher level of schooling earn more than those who 
have not. So, if students benefit from higher education it is only fair that they should 
contribute to the costs of tertiary education. This also justifies a shift towards the private 
sector in academic education. (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p.40). 
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Table (7). The Private Costs and Monetary and Non-monetary Benefits of Higher 
Education 
Costs Tuition, fees and study Materials 
 Forgone earnings 
 
Higher productivity and thus higher net 
earnings 
Monetary and economic Benefits Better employment opportunities  
 Higher savings 
 Personal and professional mobility 
 Increased educational opportunities and 
education  enrichment 
 Improved working conditions 
 Higher personal status 
 Greater job satisfaction 
 Healthier lifestyle; longer life expectancy 
Non-monetary and social Benefits Improved decision-making in spending 
 More hobbies and rewarding leisure activities 
 Improvement in personal status or in personal 
development 
 Improved quality of life for self and family 
Source: World Bank (in Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p. 41). 2. Institute of Higher Education Policy (IHEP) (in 
Steier,F, 2003, p. 81)   
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2.5 Actual Policy Options:  
The debate between the two sides, state versus markets, has intensified in recent years. So, 
how valid are the arguments and the counter arguments?  It should be noted that all 
arguments against the role of the state cannot necessarily be considered as being in favour 
of markets in higher education and that some of those arguments assume the level of 
efficiency of the state sector is high. 
 
While it may be possible to marshal enough evidence to argue for either side, there are 
some aspects that stand out very clearly in favour of a dominant role by the state in higher 
education, and these are rarely questioned.  For example, even those who oppose public 
subsidization of higher education recognise that it produces a number of external economic 
effects and although all the social benefits cannot be identified and measured accurately, 
there is still a consensus that they are substantial. The other aspects widely shared are: 
public good (and quasi-public good in the case of higher education) the nature of the 
education provided, merit good nature, social investment nature of education, market 
imperfections, and economies of scale.  Further, many arguments made against public 
subsidization do not receive unqualified support either from theoretical or empirical 
evidence. The case against public subsidies in education in recent years is based on the 
premise that governments in developing countries do not have adequate resources at their 
disposal, and that the scope for restructuring public budgets with an increase in substantial 
subsidies for education is rather limited. Some research also exists that shows that 
education expenditure is affected by military expenditure, indicating a clear trade-off 
between public expenditure on defence and education. Patterns of public expenditure in 
developing countries also show that governments are not starved of resources but that they 
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lack a political will and a sense of priorities, especially in the case of sectors like 
education. 
 
It has to be recognized that many of those who argue for increased cost recovery in higher 
education do not oppose public subsidization per se; on the other hand, since there is 
limited scope for increased public spending, it may be argued that additional resources can 
be mobilised through a variety of other measures. They also recognise that public subsidies 
can increase efficiency. Hence the real need is to raise resources by the state through tax or 
non-tax revenues. 
 
As it is explained market failures consumer ignorance, technical economies of scale, 
externalities in production and in consumption, public good and inherent imperfections in 
capital and insurance markets, they all justify for the government intervention. In the case 
of higher education, it seems that externalities and imperfections in capital and insurance 
markets are relevant. Hence governments have to subsidise education. Governments 
subsidise education, not just for efficiency, but also for reasons of equity, and various other 
social and political objectives.  
 
There is no doubt that the role of the private sector in higher education is important. In 
many countries private universities are a good option and often situations and facilities are 
provided that make private universities better than public ones. However, some countries, 
Libya is an example, lack the necessary conditions to privatize higher education because it 
would be premature to encourage the private sector to play its role in higher education 
under the particular prevailing circumstances. There has, though, been significant 
developments in private higher education institutions as will be explained in the following 
chapters.  
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2.6 Conclusion: 
Higher education was limited until the 1960s and 1970s. The diversification of post-
secondary mass education has brought with it significant changes not only in how its 
institutions should be financed and managed by governments and policymakers, but also in 
how policies should be designed appropriately taking into account both the scarcity of 
available resources and the high cost of higher education. The latter is now expensive, both 
in terms of the government budget and the increasingly direct cost to individual students 
and their families. As a result, financing higher education has become problematic since 
the 1980s and is an important issue that should be addressed. As higher education moved 
from the periphery to the centre of government affairs, the concept of the state role in 
higher education has changed and possible alternatives are being examined.  
 
Problems and challenges, especially in developing countries, become acute if the pressure 
for academic and institutional expansion comes into conflict with scarce and limited 
resources. Higher education systems in many countries are under considerable financial 
pressure and face serious financial problems. The declining capacity of public higher 
education institutions with an attendant burgeoning demand from students for access to 
them, and the retrenchment of public services combined with other factors, has forced 
governments to seek new ways to solve their difficulties. Many, but not all, hold the view 
that students, parents, and the other main beneficiaries should contribute to the costs of 
higher education and there are diverse arguments for and against.   
 
Although, there is a clear trend towards privatisation and private higher education, the 
nation state and the public sector are still powerful actors in shaping the higher education 
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policies in terms of both management and financing. Financing higher education is an issue 
that will result in prolonged debate in most countries concerned with centralized and 
decentralized frameworks, concerned with the relative importance of the public and the 
private and concerned with the role of government and the autonomy of the university. 
Whatever the arguments, both public and private sectors are important. If there is no way 
to avoid the existence of the private sector alongside the public sector in higher education 
then it is necessary, therefore, that some form of coordination should be found between 
them. 
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Chapter three: Private higher education in Libya compared with other countries in 
the Arab world.  
 
3.1 Introduction: 
One of the important features of the 1990s was the move away from dependence on the 
state for funding higher education. The reliance on market forces for development, the 
decline of centrally-planned economies, and the fiscal incapacity of the state to finance 
education adequately have persuasively encouraged the privatization of higher education. 
“Private higher education is one of the most dynamic and fastest growing segments of 
post-secondary education at the turn of the 21st century”. (Altbach, P (b), 1999, p1). It has 
appeared almost everywhere and the reasons that have led to the phenomenon of private 
higher education and the types of private universities are numerous. This section seeks to 
put Libya in the context of the rest of the world in general and of the Arab states in 
particular.  
 
 
 
 
3.2 Higher education and its financing policy in the global context and the relative 
position of Libya: 
 
The World Bank (in Vossenteyn, H, 2004) reported that investment in the knowledge 
economy is considered an important issue by leading world economists who suggest that 
expanding tertiary education would appear to be the only way to improve educational 
attainment levels within societies. However, higher education is universally recognized as 
a considerable investment in human capital, which contributes to socioeconomic 
development by developing both individuals and societies as a whole. The expansion of 
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higher education is costly, and would require increased investment and more efficient use 
of generally limited and scarce existing resources. In Libya, up to 1999, the higher 
education sector was completely financed by the state. In European countries, public 
expenditure on higher education is estimated to be 80% of the cost and the allocation of 
financial resources is even larger in developing countries. In contrast, higher education 
institutes in the USA, for instance, are financed by private resources where the private 
sector seems to be a dominant division in the tertiary education system (Barr, N, 1993) 
&(Varghese, N (b), 2004, p30). 
 
Higher education in the modern world has developed dramatically in terms of the number 
of students, curricula, management of the systems, pedagogical practices, cultural and 
political influences on higher education, and knowledge production and dissemination 
research and teaching. There are four reasons that could be attributed to this expansion: 
The first is the necessity of a degree from tertiary educational institutes for personal 
economic success. Secondly, as universities and other institutions of tertiary education 
have expanded they have acquired the main responsibility for equipping individuals with 
the advanced knowledge and skills required for economic progress in the increasingly 
complex and technological-based economies of the twenty first century, known as the 
“information age”. Thirdly, university education is increasingly seen as a necessity in the 
overall advancement of a modern society. Finally, universities are instrumental in enabling 
social mobility which can be associated with demographic change. (Altbach, P, (a), 1999, 
p107-p108; Barr, N, 2004, p265).  In most countries, the growth of universities and other 
higher education institutes has attained and acquired large and intricate governmental and 
administrative structures. They require major expenditures of both public and, often, 
private finance. It is a global market with commercial investments of more than $2 trillion, 
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including public and private spending on all forms of education; it enrols more than 80 
million students worldwide and employs 3.5 million people. It has been stated that 
“….mass higher education becomes the international norm at the end of the 20th century. 
Most countries have large academic systems that educate a growing number of young 
people and which require substantial resources.” (Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, P16). 
(Altbach, P, (a)1999, p.107). 
 
 In Libya with 69,849 of the age cohort in 1995, the higher education system is not as large 
as in some Arab countries, such as Egypt where about 1,015,220 students were enrolled in 
higher education institutions in 1996. But it is clear that financing policies for higher 
education are being reformed in a number of countries. From 1990 to 1999, the global 
agenda had placed an emphasis on the reform policies of financing and the management of 
higher education systems (Cheung, B, 2004, p.1), and an important reason was that the 
decade of the 1990s has seen the emergence of mass and universal access in many parts of 
the world. (Altbach, P (b), 1999). In Libya, free higher education has made the institutions 
overcrowded particularly in the main cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. The real challenge for 
the Libyan government under Gaddafi was maintaining public finance for higher 
education. Harman (in Cheung, B, 2004, p1) points out that many governments have faced 
the problem of maintaining public funding levels for higher education, and that 
governments (Libya being no exception) seek financing alternatives for many reasons as 
are illustrated by Figure (1) below. (Cheung, B, 2004, pp 2-4) and (Johnston in Cheung, B, 
2004).  
 
 Figure (1). Reasons why governments seek alternative resources to fund tertiary 
education. 
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Cheung, B (2004, p 5-6) provides several alternatives for governments to finance the 
institutions of post secondary education as shown by figure (2). Unfortunately, the 
available alternative resources to finance higher education institutions in Libya have been 
extremely limited and state finance has been the only funding for approximately five 
decades. The absence of other resources has prevented Libyan higher education from 
benefiting from a more flexible financial mechanism and has created considerable pressure 
on the government funds.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The substantial extent of higher education enrolment. 
 
The problem of maintaining public funding levels for higher 
education. 
 
Fiscal pressure education. Constant rise in unit cost. 
increasing demand from other sectors. 
resolving rigidities & inefficiencies in the public 
sector.  
 
Ascendance of market orientations. 
Demand for greater accountability. 
 
Demand for greater quality and 
efficiency. 
 
Meeting rapidly changing development needs. 
Increasing government control. 
Shift of financial responsibility. 
Figure (2). Paths to finance higher education 
 
Public finance. 
Financing agencies 
Subsidized loans 
Student grants & voucher 
Self-generated funds. 
Tuition fees. 
External Aid. 
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The reform of the financing policy for higher education has faced two universal dilemmas. 
The first was the high and still rising, unit cost per-student in higher education; the second 
was the increasing demand for places in educational institutions, particularly where high 
birth rates were coupled with both rapidly increasing numbers of young people finishing 
secondary school with legitimate aspirations for some higher education, and the growing 
number in the population of those aged 15-24. (Johnstone, D, 2003). These dilemmas, as 
we can see from the experience of other countries, are accompanied by other elements and 
it is important to undertake an analysis of all relevant factors and put them into a global 
context when examining the case of Libya. 
 
3.3 Factors affecting higher education finance policies and a comparison between 
Libya and other selected Arab countries: 
There are several factors which could influence the higher education financing policy: 
 
• Economic situation:  
The prevalent economic situation of the country is one of the factors affecting a higher 
education finance policy. A considerable amount of the allocated funding will, of course, 
depend on the available fiscal resources which themselves reflect the income of the nation 
and differences in a nation’s GDP will result in disparities in the size of its budget set aside 
for higher education. Available data shows that the expenditure per student in universities 
in advanced countries (e.g. Harvard and Yale) is much higher than the expenditure in 
universities in developing countries (e.g. the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzani). (See 
Haddad, W et al, 1990 and Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008). In Libya, despite the scarcity 
of related data, the situation is similar. Data presented in table (8) shows that the public 
expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP in Libya is 2.7% which is less than 
the percentage in developed countries where the GDP is higher. 
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Table (8). The public expenditure on education in Libya. 
Current GDP billion 
US$ 
Year Public expenditure on education as % 
of GDP 
23.5 1985 2.5 
27.3 1995 2.8 
33.4 1999 3.0 
38.8 2002-2005 2.7 
UN, Human Development Report 2007/8, P278. 
 
Another related element here is inflation. Especially high or unpredictable rates are 
regarded as having an adverse effect on financial resources devoted to higher education 
institutions. Inflation makes it difficult for a government to fund or plan long-term because 
of inefficiencies in the market and can be forced to reduce its resources and seek finance 
for higher education institutions elsewhere.5 An example is Uganda. Throughout the 1980s 
and the 1990s, the Ugandan government faced serious economic difficulties that had 
affected considerably its financing higher education policy.  The university had deep 
financial problems and the government was not able to provide adequate financial support. 
The staff salaries were very low and they were forced to find another source of income. 
The situation was on the verge of collapse. The government was advised to reform its 
higher education financing policy by charging students and by the introduction of the 
                                                 
5In China for example, it has been said by some authors that because of inflation that aggravated public 
financing of higher education in China in 1988, the government was unable to cover all the expenses of its 
universities. Only two-thirds of higher education institutions’ costs were covered through state allocations. At 
most universities, 50 per cent of the total budget was collected and came from alternative sources. From 
1988, students in most Chinese universities and colleges started to share the cost of higher education and 
tuition fees with the government. They paid 43 US$ per academic year to newly enrolled students, which 
accounted for about 8.6% of the unit recurrent cost. (Johnson, (in Wang, X, 2001, p. 208)). 
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principle of cost-sharing. (Kajubi, W. S, 1992 & Morrissey, O. and Rudaheranwa, N, 
1998). 
 
In the case of Libya, an oil producing country, the financing policy for higher education 
has faced difficulties caused by economic factors. These difficulties could be attributed to 
several reasons, for instance, the policy of free higher education and the inefficiency of the 
administration in the education sector (details in Chapter Five). A high dependence upon 
oil revenues precipitated a critical situation once the price of oil fell.   
 
• Human population growth (Demographic factors): 
Population growth is, of course, a critical factor in determining a financing policy for 
higher education. As the number of students at basic and secondary education level 
increases so is a long-term potential demand for higher education created. UNESCO (in 
Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008) reported that “In 1991, the global higher education 
student population was 68 million. By 2004 it had nearly doubled to 132 million and is 
projected to reach 150 million by 2025.”  In the Arab world over three million students 
were in higher education in 1996, 81% of them at undergraduate level (Bashshur, M, 2004, 
p16). The increasing numbers of eligible students has led to a corresponding demand for 
higher education and this is reflected in the sustained deployment of substantial public 
funds in this sector, making it increasingly difficult to compete for additional public 
resources. At the same time, poor macroeconomic conditions have constrained the growth 
of the public budget putting huge pressures on the institutions of higher education and the 
financial resources for these establishments. This has led to uncertainty and uneasiness in a 
number of areas of society: in the higher education system, among prospective students 
and their parents, in the political arena, in industry and the business world (the main 
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financial supporters of universities as well as being the beneficiaries of higher education). 
These factors helped pave the way to structural reforms and the establishment of new 
institutions, for instance, private institutions, distance universities, open universities, 
weekend universities, and evening courses …etc. 
 
Clearly the size of a population influences the number of students who enter higher 
education and therefore the fiscal resources and funding devoted to these institutions 
becomes a problem as tertiary education enrolments increase. Many universities have been 
unable to meet the demand for places because of the large number of students applying for 
a finite number of places. In Malaysia, Mexico, India, Bangladesh and Kenya (see 
Wilkinson, R and Yussof, I, 2005, p.364 and Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, p.16), the 
governments have tried to modify their higher education policies by allowing the 
introduction of private institutions. Libya, too, followed this pattern as the population and 
the number of university students increased in the years 1984-2006. See table (9). 
Table (9). Population and enrolment profile for Libya. 
Years  Population  University Students  
1984 3,231,059 36,600 
1995 4,389,739 144,412 
2006 5,298,152 300,966* 
Source: Behear, 1999, p106 and General Authority for Information Statistic Book, 2008, p140 & p49. *2008-
2009 
 
• Political factors: 
The relationship between politics and the policy for financing higher education is 
important, especially the political factor that influences that policy. In fact, “...each society 
produces its own system of education with its own structures, system of financing, and 
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administrative rules of operation.” (Mialaret in Sayegh, R, 1994, p22).  For example, the 
political ideology in the USA focuses on the idea that central government action should be 
reduced, as does the very strong federal system in that country. In contrast, although some 
socialist or communist countries have moved toward decentralized higher education, they 
still rely on the state. In China, at the time of its leader Mao Zedong (1949-1976), 
education provision was strictly controlled by the government under the leadership of the 
Ministry of Education of the State Council. The CCP regarded education as a means of 
indoctrinating people with socialist ideas and it implemented a nationalization policy 
which included education. This policy gave the central government relatively tight control 
over education funding and the state provided free education for all Chinese citizens. 
(China National Institute of Educational Research and Yao in Mok, K & Wat, K, 1998, p. 
258). 
 
In times of political conflict and in the absence of stability, an essential requirement for a 
nation’s development, there might be negative consequences not only for higher education 
provision, but also for entire economic sectors. Many countries, particularly developing 
ones, have had their tertiary education institutions and systems lost or even destroyed 
because of political and military coups and the consequential instability. From 1975 to 
1997 a number of African countries lost university-level institutions as a result of political 
turmoil which has made it extremely difficult to re-establish, especially in the poorer 
countries. (Tefferra, D & Altbach, P, 2004, p22; and Addison, T et al, n.d).  The recurrent 
crises faced by Argentina as a result of the continuing interruptions to its democratic 
government led to the collapse of the Argentine university model between 1966 and 1983, 
with the loss of many talented people and a serious decline in the quality of higher 
education.(Wit, H et al, 2005, p72) 
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In Libya, the political system has changed three times in fifty years. After Libya gained its 
independence in December 1950, King Idris became king. The established monarchy was 
replaced in 1969 by the Republican system with young military commanders guided by 
Colonel Al-Gaddafi. And in 2011, the time of this study, the Al-Gaddafi regime came to an 
end and a new political system installed which, unfortunately, has yet to achieve stability. 
During the Al-Fatah Revolution era where socialism was the dominant political ideology 
and in the earlier period during monarchical rule, 1952-1969, the state and its public sector 
units had the responsibility for leading the country. However, state monopoly declined 
from 1999 because the public sector had been criticized for its inefficiency and inability to 
satisfy the growing social demand for higher education and this led to a major re-thinking 
of policy concerning higher education. But this was brought about by authoritarian decree, 
reflecting the political dominance of Gaddafi and his family.  
 
• Cultural factors: 
Culture is another important factor that influences the financing policy for higher 
education. In contrast to economic and political factors, cultural ones are rather elastic and 
hard to assess. Dominant cultural values can change a good deal, but generally at a slower 
pace than political or economic ones. Cultural factors both act as a brake upon privatisation 
forces or else equally they can encourage them. In some countries private institutions have 
high prestige, but elsewhere can be seen as an easy option. This in some extent will lead 
the governments to rely more on private sector to play its role in higher education or in 
other instances to decrease the government’s favour in private higher education sector and 
keep the role of state is dominant. There is no doubt that private universities have become 
important for many countries, however, culture is more likely to be a serious obstacle in 
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the face of the efforts towards the policy. In countries like USA or Japan, where people 
have high level of awareness, private universities are strong and successful. While in other 
countries (e.g. Libya) where the social relationship and politics form the culture of society, 
private universities are weak and questionable.      
 
• Internationalisation6: 
According to Knight and De Wit (in De Wit, H, 1999, p.14) the globalization that could be 
seen as most relevant and appropriate in the discussion on the international dimension of 
the higher education sector, is as follows: 
1. Globalization as the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, people, values, 
ideas…across borders. Globalization affects each country in a different way due to 
that nation’s individual history, tradition, culture, and priorities.  
2. Internationalisation of higher education is one of the ways a country responds to the 
impact of globalization, yet respects the individuality of the nation. 
How the internationalisation of higher education affects the policy of higher education 
within countries throughout the world has become a central issue in the growth of higher 
education in the twenty-first century. The new realities facing the higher education sector, 
both domestically and globally, are presenting changes, introducing new trends and posing 
different challenges for internationalisation. Governments, to enhance their global 
competitiveness, have tried very hard to internationalise their higher education institutions. 
In the quest for internationalisation, those institutions, their academics and their students 
are under tremendous pressure to compete with the global research-led universities.  At the 
same time the internationalisation of curricula and the promotion of international academic 
                                                 
6The concept of internationalisation has been described in different ways by some authors: as “..one of the 
important features of contemporary universities”; as “…a pressure no-one who teaches can be unaware of”; 
as “..a major theme for the next decade”; as “…one of the most important trends of the last decade if not of 
the past half century.” ( Smith et al, Halliday, Davies, Teichler, and Altbach (in de Wit, 2002, n.p).  
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exchanges have become an increasingly important trend in many countries. Since higher 
education reforms were started in the mid-1980s, higher education in many countries has 
undergone significant changes, not only by an increase in the numbers of students and the 
founding of higher education institutions, but by a rapid increase in the number of students 
who have studied outside their own countries. Since the late 1990s the number of students 
studying abroad has risen dramatically. It rose from 1, 75 million in 1999, to roughly 2 
million in 2000, and then to about 2.5 million in 2006 and it is projected to reach 8 million 
by 2025. (Altbach, P, 2004, p1 and Kapur, D and Crowley, M, 2008, p21).   UNESCO 
(2009) reported that “…more than 2.8 million students were enrolled in higher education 
institutions outside their countries of citizenship in 2007”. It seems to be that the general 
trend has been from south to the north, from developing (poor) world to developed (rich) 
countries. The large majority of them are from developing nations and newly developed 
countries, with 55 per cent from Asia, and in particular from India, China, South Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan. The large host countries (global receiver of foreign students) are the 
USA, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, and Japan. (Altbach, P, 2004, p. 2 and Kapur, 
D and Crowley, M, 2008, p. 21). 
 
The important questions in relation to internalisation are:  
(i)  What factors forced or encouraged students to study abroad?  
(ii) Why have governments sent or allowed their students to study in higher education 
institutions in foreign countries, rather than in their own institutions? 
(iii) How are the higher education policies designed by the policy makers taking into 
account the influence of internationalization and globalization? 
(iv) How do students returning to their home countries have an influence upon their native 
institutions and ideas? 
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Students, whether sent by governments or by their families, prefer to study outside their 
own countries for many reasons, as Altbach, P points out (2004, p3): 
1. In many developing countries, local higher education institutions are unable to enroll all 
domestic students because of the limited capacity of its universities.7 However, Libya is 
not among these countries. The government has not sent students to study abroad for more 
than a decade. During the 1980s and the 1990s Libya experienced extremely difficult 
political and social circumstances including the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. 8 
And then when the sanctions were lifted the country found itself with a serious shortage of 
skilled and highly qualified people. This resulted in a decision being made to send students 
to study at foreign universities especially in advanced countries, and in 2008 there were 
8,160 Libyan students studying abroad, about half of them at PhD level. (General People 
Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education, the first issue, 2008).  
2. Many students require highly specialized teaching and research facilities which do not 
exist in their own countries. In Libya this has been particularly marked, e.g. astronomical 
physics, genetic engineering, zoology, and this lack is particularly evident at postgraduate 
and professional levels.  
3. The quality of education required at master’s degree level and PhD research level is 
unavailable in some developing countries. And even in those countries that offer these 
levels in their higher education institutions, an inferior academic standard is provided when 
compared with that of advanced countries and they find themselves unable to compete 
internationally.  In Libya, although the government has offered courses at all levels of 
                                                 
7
 For example, in Malaysia, “…it is estimated that each year, more than 20,000 students have to pursue their 
university education overseas. In 1995, about 50,600 students were enrolled at degree level overseas, of 
which 39.5% were government-sponsored students.” (Malaysia in Wilkinson, R & Yussof, I, 2005,  p.364  ). 
 
8
 Intervention in Uganda (1979) and in Chad (1979-87). (Allan, J, 1982, p378).  After the murder of a British 
policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, outside the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984, the United Kingdom 
severed all diplomatic relations with Libya. In 1986 economic sanctions were imposed on Libya by the 
United States after the Gaddafi regime was implicated in the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque 
frequented by American military personnel. The UN imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992–93 after it was 
implicated in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.  
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higher education in different fields, many students prefer to study in advanced countries. 
They feel that the prestige of a degree from a foreign university, especially a degree from 
an American institution, is greater than one from a local institution. In the UK there were 
3000 Libyan students registered at different levels in 2010 and in the academic year 2008-
09 the government had sent 7,516 students to study abroad at postgraduate level and 644 
students to study at undergraduate level. (Libyan Embassy in the UK, 2011)& (General 
People Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of higher education, 2008,  The first 
issue, p8).          
 4. “Social and political forces also push students out of their home countries...., students 
study abroad to escape political or other repression at home or to experience academic 
freedom...” Altbach, P (2004, p4). Libya is categorized thus although it is difficult to 
obtain evidence. But it is widely acknowledged that many Libyans had chosen to study and 
work abroad to escape the dictatorship of the Gaddafi regime.9 
Highly developed countries and the willingness of their employers to offer excellent 
opportunities with high salaries for well qualified foreigners in many fields, is a great 
incentive for Libyan students to study abroad.   
 
The movement of students and the sale of higher education services have contributed 
significantly to the economies of many countries, especially in developed states. OECD (in 
Kritz, M, 2006, p. 15). This is not true in Libya, though, when it was deemed necessary for 
the good health of the hard currency of the Libyan economy, to withdraw opportunities for 
students to study abroad. Consequently, Libya has suffered a shortage of highly qualified 
                                                 
9
 Anecdotal evidence is provided by my friend who is resident in the UK and works in the NHS. He narrated 
his experience when he was in Libya in the 1980s. He said “I studied at the medicine faculty in 1985. In the 
faculty there was a "Revolutionary Committee Office" and its function was to report anything said against 
Gaddafi or his ideology....it had an effective power over the institution, its professors and the dean of the 
faculty.....we studied in an atmosphere of fear and instability,....we were not confident with each other....it 
was very sad...". (A conversation in 2008).  
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labour and experienced people. The writer, in attendance at his university’s graduation 
ceremony in 2000 remembers clearly the Director of Academy of Graduate Studies stating 
publicly that: 
“….there is no need to study abroad...Libya has the ability to do so...."  
 His justifications were to save the hard currency for the nation’s economy and to stop 
providing data and information about Libya for foreign countries. 
     
• The Brain Drain: 
Increasing the supply of ‘human capital’ for the benefit of the state is considered an 
important goal of a higher education policy, but this goal can be rendered pointless if the 
human capital emigrates. Carrington et al (1999) point out that “…among the countries in 
Asia and the Pacific, the biggest source is the Philippines, with 730,000 migrants. Of these, 
the great majority have a tertiary education. The second largest stock of migrants is from 
China (400,000), which is split almost equally between the secondary and tertiary 
educational groups. Both India and Korea have seen more than 300,000 people migrate to 
the United States. It is striking that more than 75 percent of Indian immigrants have a 
tertiary education, compared with only 53 percent of Korean immigrants. The biggest 
migratory flows from Africa to the United States are from Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa, 
with more than 60 per cent of immigrants from those three countries having a tertiary 
education”. It was very difficult to obtain related data for Libya, but most Libyans 
recognise that significant numbers of highly qualified migrants leave Libya for many 
reasons.10 As a consequence, scarce public expenditure on higher education may be lost 
                                                 
10
 Some reasons relate to financial matters, others belong to political factors and some are attributed to the 
working conditions and the intrusive administrative situation. Anecdotal evidence from a Libyan doctor who 
works at the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital spoke of his experience: “I migrated to the UK 
because the Libyan government did not deal with us equally and fairly... I worked there for three years and 
my salary was very low..., the work conditions were very bad...and the administrators and the managers did 
not respect us.....”            
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and the increasing number of those leaving has seriously affected financial resources in 
undeveloped states, including that of Libya. The developed countries have been the 
beneficiaries. 
    
3.4 The types of private higher education with reference to the case of Libya:    
 
Most countries have established private institutions of higher education. There are different 
types which may be divided into three main categories as follows: according to the size 
and importance of the private sector, according to the ultimate purpose of the institution or 
according to the role of the state in higher education. The question is: into which category 
or categories do the private universities in Libya fall? In the analysis below the various 
types of private universities are reviewed by authors and scholars and then an attempt is 
made to classify and categorise private universities accordingly.  
 
Geiger (in Altbach, P 1999 (d), p154 and Tilak, J, 2008, p116 & p117) has identified three 
categories of private institutions of higher education according to size: first, ‘mass private 
and restricted public sectors’ which he defines as ‘…one in which public higher education 
is restricted in size and selective in intake, with the result that the majority of the students 
in higher education are enrolled in the private sector.’ This pattern is exemplified best by 
Japan and South Korea. This private sector model can be expanded to accommodate a 
rapid increase in the demand for higher education. The second category is when the public 
and private sectors are running parallel with each other. This pattern results from the need 
to guarantee a significant degree of cultural pluralism within a non-hierarchical system. 
The existence of national degrees requires that each university provides education of 
equivalent value but in order to achieve meaningful equality and to satisfy different 
cultural groups, private institutions have to possess resources comparable to public ones. In 
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Belgium and the Netherlands, this has resulted in full state funding for private universities. 
And although geographically and culturally far removed, Chile and Hong Kong have both 
evolved along quite similar lines. The third category comprises a comprehensive or 
dominant public sector with a peripheral private sector mostly supported by state funds. 
The latter, according to Geiger, R (1988) are left to take up the tasks that are neglected by 
the state especially non-university post-secondary education such as vocational education 
and training for commerce and private industry.            
 
None of the above three types is found in Libyan private higher education. The number of 
private higher education institutions that has largely exceeded the number of public higher 
education absorbs only a small fraction of the students because such establishments are 
small. The majority of students are enrolled in the few public higher education institutions 
and universities which have a large number of places available and the Libyan government 
does not support private higher education which offers courses similar to those of public 
universities. These courses are specialised in low cost studies and they do not offer 
vocational and training programmes.         
 
 
3.4.1 Based on the purpose of private institutions of higher education there are three 
categories:  
(a). Not-for-profit private institutions: - 
Along with institutions that are public or controlled by a state, there are private colleges 
and universities that are not allowed to earn a profit. These institutions are owned and 
sponsored by trusts and non-profit agencies which have a high level of autonomy (e.g. 
religious organizations or groups, scientific societies, visionary public leaders, and others 
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that have legal authority to own and manage them). They depend heavily on endowments 
and fees collected from the students and their families.11  
This practice and tradition suits a donor culture in a highly established and successful 
economic system such as that of the USA with its critical mass of private sector 
philanthropy coupled with an accommodating and favourable tax system that makes the 
availability of a non-profit making system of higher education possible. 
In some countries, the idea of profit-making by such institutions is anathema to their 
ideologies (e.g. in Egypt and Argentina: Fielden, J and Cheng, K, 2009, p35). In Libya, 
although the idea of making a profit in higher education institutions is unacceptable to 
most citizens, there is no non-profit higher education institution in the country. 
 
(b). For-profit higher education institutions:  
This phenomenon has emerged as a result of the idea that the privatization of higher 
education was possible: ‘The legitimacy of private for-profit institutions was attained in the 
1990s due to the involvement of publicly traded corporations that own and run multi-
campus universities, and these corporations traded the stocks and shares of educational 
institutions.’ (Ruch in Varghese, N [a], 2004, p8).  
 
Earning a profit from education generally is without question a major phenomenon 
worldwide, but higher education for profit is not yet accepted culturally or legally in some 
countries, even though such institutions are a burgeoning commodity in most developing 
countries according to Altbach (in Al-Lamki, S, 2006). The growing student demand for 
                                                 
11
 In the USA (which has an historically well-established private higher education system) the vast majority 
of its 3,600 colleges and universities are non-profit making. Examples include the private Ivy League 
universities such as, Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Berkley, some of which are considered the best in the 
world and feature at the top of the global academic hierarchy. These prestigious private universities are 
highly selective and all have large endowment funds. Harvard itself has endowments measured in billions of 
dollars (Altbach, P (a), 1999, p312 and, Levine, A, N.D). 
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higher education and the inability of the government to accommodate this demand and 
provide the necessary overall support and funding has resulted in the creation of ‘for-
profits’ higher educational institutions.12  However, in other countries, such as Malaysia, 
for-profit and non-profit higher education institutions legally look more and more similar 
and there is no clear differentiation between them. (Enders, J & Jongbloed, B, 2007, p444). 
Higher education for profit enterprises can operate locally and across national boundaries. 
Because local institutions, particularly in developing countries, cannot meet the high 
demand for tertiary education, an opportunity is created for industrialized nations to 
sponsor academic institutions that are imaginative and often profitable. They often 
specialize in areas that might be in high demand, such as computing science, 
administration and management and finance. The majority of these are small vocationally-
oriented institutions which mostly offer limited majors and short term programmes and 
courses of two years or less leading to certificates. They tend to focus on programmes 
linked directly to the job market, because they are driven more by the markets than by 
academic aspiration. In the United States, there are six large companies that make a profit 
from activities within the higher education sector.13  
 
                                                 
12
 In the Philippines the government has allowed ‘for-profit’ universities for a long time in its higher 
education system. 
13
 They are: the Apollo Group (Phoenix), Career Education Corporation, Corinthian Colleges, DeVry, 
Education Management Corporation and Laureate Universities international. The University of Phoenix and 
Career Education Corporation in the United States constitute good examples of companies that make 
considerable profits and receive the highest revenues from their activities in higher education. Their profits 
reached US$1,340 million in the University of Phoenix and US$1,189 million in the Career Education 
Corporation. The University of Phoenix is the largest private university owned by Whitney International and 
the Apollo Group. It has a big share of the revenue within the country compared with the others, such as 
Kaplan and Corinthian Colleges and it has joined the ranks of for-profit higher education. This institution, 
which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, offers academic programs in high demand areas that do not 
require much investment in facilities. It has got 126 campuses in the United States and its activities are run by 
34 offices situated in a number of cities across the country. (Fielden, J and Cheng, K, 2009, p35), (Levine, A, 
N.D) and (Altbach (b), 1999).  
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In some countries private higher education institutions that make profits have become a 
major source of problems for their public authorities. In some African countries (e.g. South 
Africa) ‘…the private for-profit sector has come under scrutiny because of perceived 
problems of low quality offerings.’ (Teferra, D & Altbach, P 2004, p23) This effectively 
identifies the lack of full-time qualified teachers as an important contributor to poor 
quality. Political expectations had been quite different and this has provoked severe 
criticism and tension within the system. Significantly, these institutions did not respond to 
economic needs because their study programmes tended to concentrate on areas with low 
running costs and low investment, such as the social sciences, commerce and law, in 
contrast areas such as architecture and engineering, despite the government's political 
decision to give them priority, play only a minor role. 
 
Higher education enterprises without support from the public sector and based essentially 
on a business model, make profits by charging their clients and students high tuition fees, 
by specializing in short term courses, by using low cost facilities and by hiring part-time 
teaching staff.  
 
For-profit higher education has a specific mission and role in higher education. It has 
identified and secured a strategic niche and developed a distinctive character very different 
from the traditional state colleges and universities, (Altbach, P and Levy, D, 2005).  
 
(c) Religious higher education institutions: 
This type of institution has long been under private initiative and control; the first wave of 
privatization of higher education was religious, such as at the University of Santo Tomaso 
in the Philippines, the Universidad Javeriana in Colombia, the Universidad Católica 
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Pontifícia of Chile and the Al-Azhar University in Egypt. In other countries these kinds of 
institutions have been established only after the establishment of so-called secular 
universities.14 (Levy In Munene, I & Otieno, W, 2008), (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, 
p366 and p367) and (Levy, D, 2007, p205). 
 
The religious higher education institutions, in general, have long been involved in 
establishing and supporting academic institutions to produce locally the educated 
manpower necessary for state governance and the Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic 
Church founded many of the earliest tertiary education institutions (known as European 
medieval universities) in Europe, Latin America and Asia. Most modern universities today 
seem to be designed according to the Western model, even in places where there are 
powerful indigenous traditions of advanced learning (e.g. Chile and India), either imposed 
by a colonial master or adopted freely after careful study as in Japan and Libya.  
 
The oldest religious higher education institution is the Al-Azhar University established as 
an Islamic institution in Egypt in 988 A.D. Protestant religious organizations have also 
been involved in higher education and established the first academic institution in the 
United States. Christian organizations founded many of the early universities in Asian 
countries, Korea, China and Japan, and were usually associated with the Catholic Church, 
for instance, the University of Santo Tomaso was established in the Philippines in 1611 
during Spanish rule (1565 to 1898). A major motivation was to establish Christianity 
among local elites and ultimately to convert people to Christianity.  
 
                                                 
14
 In Kenya the first private university was non-religious, then two religious universities were founded later. 
In this country and in some other African countries religious institutions outnumber the secular academic 
institutions. Fourteen of the eighteen Kenyan private universities are religious. Fifteen of Nigeria’s twenty-
four are religious. Levy (In Munene, I & Otieno, W, 2008), (Teixeira, P and Amaral, A, 2001, p366 and 
p367) and (Levy, D, 2007, p205). 
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Another goal was also to educate church personnel: Hindu organizations in India, Shinto 
and Buddhist groups in Japan, Buddhists in Thailand, and Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and elsewhere, and all have been active in establishing higher education institutions. 
(Za'rour, G, 1988, p1), (Varghese, N,(a) 2004, p8), (Levy, D, 2007,  p205) and (Teixeira, P 
and Amaral, A, 2001, p366 and p367)  
 
Religious higher education institutions in general are characterised as establishments that 
do not charge students for their study, do not intend to make a profit and are concerned 
with exerting a great sense of social responsibility. The demonstrable religious faith in 
these universities is a vital factor if they are to ensure their continuous financial support. 
The Ugandan Islamic University is an example which had its budget financed by the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). This was fixed at a particular amount and 
has been unchanged for a decade, despite rapid expansion. (Banya, K. 2001). 
 
The question is: in which of the above types are the private higher education institutions in 
Libya classified? In fact, there are no religious institutions in the country. The institutions 
which are legally permitted to earn a profit could be in those institutions that are ‘for-
profit’ makers and that are self-financing. The former has been the main reason for 
expanding the number of private universities on a large scale and now the number exceeds 
the number of state universities, producing, as later chapters will show, problems of 
quality. . However, private higher education has created a number of major problems for 
the Libyan government because of its poor quality.   
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3.4.2 Differences relating to the extent of the State’s involvement in higher education. 
Private higher education institutions are of two types: the private institutions which are 
supported by the state or are dependent private institutions and those that are self–funded 
or independent private institutions.     
 
In some countries, private higher education institutions depend on the same state funds as 
public universities and colleges. They receive government support for various purposes, 
such as a government’s desire to encourage the private sector to be more active in post-
secondary education or when substantial government funding is allocated to support 
students from poor families or from disadvantaged backgrounds and thereby provide 
‘equality of opportunity’.  
 
On the other hand, private higher education institutions in other countries operate with 
considerable autonomy, largely because private institutions typically receive little, if any, 
public funds. India has both kinds of institutions and its government has financed more 
than 2000 private institutions of higher education and a large number of their students have 
received grant aid from the state. These institutions are called “private aided”, whereas 
those private universities and colleges that do not rely upon state support are described as 
“self-financing” institutions.15 (Altbach, P (b), 1999). In Libya there is only one kind of 
institution. The private universities are self-financed and they do not get any support from 
the state. The owners of these universities usually argue that, although the government 
wants to set up private higher education, it does not give any support to their universities.    
                                                 
15
 In addition to India there are other countries, such as the United States, Japan, The Philippines, which 
make support available to private post-secondary institutions. (Altbach, P (a), 1999).   
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The dependent universities and colleges are non-profit making and are under strict 
government control in contrast to the independent private profit-making institutions which 
are allowed to be almost completely free from government control.      
 
3.5 Private higher education in Libya and the Arab world with a special reference 
to Egypt: 
Over the last two decades there has been a significant change in the financing of higher 
education in many countries. This is evident in the withdrawal of student and institutional 
support in real terms by, for instance, considerable increases in tuition fees in all types of 
institutions. This emphasizes the view that it is the students who are the primary 
beneficiaries of higher education and this has resulted in policies that reduce the proportion 
of higher education costs borne by governments. Universities in most countries were 
dependent on public funding for their growth and expansion. The economic crisis and the 
resulting financial squeeze, as well as the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, 
generally reduced the efficacy of the public sector to provide continued and adequate 
financing support for an expanding higher education sector. Countries adopted varying 
strategies to cope with the situation, one of which has been the encouragement and 
promotion of private universities. In a number of countries, where no legal provision for 
the operation of private higher education institutions existed, laws were introduced in 
favour of establishing private universities and this strategy is being mirrored in Libya and 
in other Arab countries.  
 
Many Arab governments have given the private sector greater opportunities to play a role 
in higher education. The number of private universities in the Arab World reached 115 in 
2008. (The Twenty-Fourth Report of the Investment Climate in Arab Countries, in Sabry, 
M, 2009, p11).  One important difference between the shift that had occurred in Arab 
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countries and that of Libya is that in the latter, the speed of the change had increased 
because the Libyan government had been in a hurry to privatize the higher education 
sector. A comparison between other Arab countries and Libya reveals some important 
features and shows the rapid growth in the number of private universities established in 
Libya. . 
 
In trying to put Libya into the context of the rest of the Arab world it is essential to 
recognize contrasting features such as size of population, wealth, culture and tradition, and 
form of government. The private higher education policy is certainly one of the areas in 
which such contrasts are evident. In the following analysis a comparison will be made 
between Libya and other Arab countries, referring in particular, to three Arab states 
displaying different conditions and with differing experiences: 
 
Dwindling public resources and changes in demographics comprise two of the six basic 
forces spurring the spread of private higher education. (Crnković, B. & Požega, Ž. N.D, 
p127). They are the most important factors that have enabled the rapid growth of private 
higher education in many Arab countries. Variations below reveal examples of sharp 
contrasts between Libya and other Arab States. Libya is a rich country with a small 
population and has a large number of private universities whereas some Arab countries 
with large populations and limited financial resources understandably have only a small 
number of private universities. In this analysis the selected countries vary greatly in 
circumstance and status: Egypt and Tunisia are classified under ‘Diversified Economics’ 
(DE) and Libya and Saudi Arabia under ‘Mixed Oil Producers’ (MOP) and ‘Gulf 
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Cooperation Council’ (GCC) because they are basically oil producing countries. 16  These 
three countries have enormous populations compared with Libya, especially Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. The table below shows the wide variations in the populations in the sample. 
Libya, as can be seen, is a thinly populated, oil-rich country of six million inhabitants 
which gives it an advantage over Tunisia and Egypt, countries which do not have such 
financial resources, and possibly even an advantage over Saudi Arabia. But even so, Libya 
is no more effective than these countries in its financing policy for higher education. The 
Libyan government made a decision to reform higher education policy and in 1999 issued 
an official resolution to set up private higher education. In Egypt, the government had 
formulated a law in 1992 which allowed private universities to be established and Saudi 
Arabia followed by granting permission in 1999. Ironically, the growth of the private 
universities in Libya has been more rapid than in these countries and even more rapid than 
in a number of other Arab countries. Libya, with its allocated wealth, has the largest 
number of private universities in the Arab world even though some countries, such as 
Egypt, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia have larger populations. Table 10 below compares the 
populations in a selection of Arab states with the number of private universities in each of 
the countries. (Bashshur, M, 2004). 
  
                                                 
16
 Arab countries have been classified in four broad categories: Mixed Oil Producers (MOP) includes 
Algeria, Libya, Iraq; the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; Diversified Economics (DE) includes Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia; and Primary Producers (PP) includes Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti 
and Yemen. (The Economic Research Forum [ERF] in Ali, A, 2002, p4) 
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Table (10). A selection of Arab countries, their populations and the number of private 
universities established in each of the countries. 
Country Number of private 
universities 
Population 
(,000). 
Population / 
number of private 
universities 
Egypt 6 79,537 13,256 
Jordan 10 6,453 645 
Lebanon 18 4,227 235 
Kuwait 2 3,051 1,526 
Oman 1 2,767 2,767 
U .A .E 5 4,732 946 
Morocco 1 32,381 32,381 
Tunisia 14 10,664 762 
Libya 50 6,530 131 
Sudan 1 41,230 41,230 
Yemen 8 24,475 3,059 
Total 116 
  
This table has been compiled using the research data from (Bashshur, M. 2004, p92) and from data from the 
last update of the United Nations Statistics Division.  
 
Libya has by far the greatest number of private universities. The number of people in one 
private university is about 131 in Libya, 13,256 in Egypt 645 in Jordan and 946 in U .A .E.  
It must be realized that the statistics which show Libya to be well endowed with private 
universities considering its comparatively small population, does not necessarily mean that 
the level of the higher education provided is of a high standard. Indeed, the educational 
status of Libyan private universities is highly questionable and an analysis of these 
institutions is given in Chapter Six. It should be noted that the expansion of private 
universities in Libya has been horizontal while in the rest of the Arab states, it has been 
vertical. This means that the number of faculties is greater and that they specialise in 
different disciplines.  To illustrate this: in Egypt, six private universities include 39 
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faculties of which 29 are in practical fields and science, and in Jordan there are 54 faculties 
in ten private universities. In contrast each private university in Libya embraces a 
maximum of eight faculties most of which favour the humanities.  
  
So does Libya really need this number of universities in the private higher education 
sector? Or more importantly, does Libya actually need a private sector in higher education 
at all in the light of its many advantages associated with the availability of its financial 
resources? Chapters Seven and Eight explore these questions and give an answer to the 
related question of why Gaddafi’s government allowed the establishment of private 
universities in the first place. The attitude of the present government is also examined.  
 
Table 11 below provides a comparison between Libya and Egypt to illustrate the 
significant disparities within the provision of their higher education.  
Source: this table has been compiled using the research data on Egypt from Bashshur, M. 2004. (*Until 2003. 
Data from (Bashshur, M. 2004, p92). and on Libya from different materials. 
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Table (11). Libya and Egypt: a comparison. 
 Libya Egypt 
The type of procedure/ 
government action. 
Resolution which could be 
cancelled easier than if it were a 
law. It is issued by the General 
People Committee (Cabinet). 
Law which is more difficult to change 
or cancel. It is issued by Parliament and 
it is a part of the constitution. 
The date of the Law or 
Resolution. 
1999 1992 
The number of private 
universities.* 
50 6 
The type of private 
university. 
Profit makers: they are completely 
independent of foreign 
institutions. 
Profit makers: many 
of them are in association with 
European or American institutions 
Student profile. The majority of students are 
Libyan. 
They enrol a large number from abroad 
but mainly from Arab countries. 
University profile Only four are recognised by the 
government 
All of them are recognised by the 
government 
The category of private 
university. 
They specialize in humanitarian 
sciences and are essentially copies 
of the state universities. 
Some of the private universities 
specialise in science and technology, for 
example Misr for Science and 
Technology, 1st October for Modern 
Sciences. 
The campus or physical 
area of university 
Small  Extensive 
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Unlike Egypt, where market forces were left to play guided by a quasi-liberal policy that 
was based on total laissez faire, the emergence of private higher education in Libya has 
been fuelled more by political forces than other pressures (e.g. population growth and the 
inefficiency of the public sector).  Most likely for political reasons the Libyan government 
was behind the large number of universities that were opened without adequate preparation 
or sufficient resources to ensure their success. The 1980s and 1990s were a very critical 
time for Gaddafi's regime: there was the decline in oil revenues, the political crises that 
arose between Gaddafi and European countries and with the USA and the internal social 
problems associated with unemployment and the deterioration of living standards in Libya. 
All this made Gaddafi and his government adopt inappropriate policies with the intention 
of reducing the heavy social and political pressures by encouraging the private sector to 
play its role in higher education. It was an attempt to hide the failures of his system and his 
ideology that were based on what he called the “Third Universal Theory" or "Green Book". 
Unlike Egypt where the privatization of public universities meant charging students fees, 
in Libya, it meant that the government paid the cost for every student to attend university. 
 
Even so, it must be emphasised that there were other factors that resulted in higher 
education in Libya being privatized and these are discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
3.6 Conclusion: 
This chapter has focused on addressing and examining the development of private higher 
education and its related issues in the Arab world by comparing higher education in Libya 
with that of other Arab nations.  The rapid and dynamic expansion of general education has 
produced an ever-increasing demand for higher education unmatched by supply. This 
discrepancy has yielded a growing number of secondary school graduates with no 
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opportunity for higher education in the Arab world. In response to this situation, seen by 
many as a national dilemma, many Arab governments, including that of Libya, have 
solicited the active participation of the private sector in higher education. But the pattern in 
the Arab world has not been uniform since each state has been affected by a range of 
Demographic, economic, political and international factors. In some Arab countries the 
emergence of private institutions has been referred to as the ‘Age of Openness’ although in 
the case of Libya private higher education probably emerged for political reasons because 
the Gaddafi  regime was inundated with dilemmas and problems.  So severe were these 
problems that Gaddafi found it necessary to relinquish one of the main pillars of his theory 
within the ‘Green Book’, the ‘Third Universal Theory’, in which the idea of privatisation 
was absolutely rejected. However, after a late start Libya developed the largest number of 
private educational institutions established specifically to satisfy the public’s demand for 
greater provision of higher education, but it has to be realised that they were opened 
without adequate preparation or sufficient resources to ensure their success.  
 
The comparison between Libya and some other Arab countries, in particular, Egypt, 
reveals some significant differences: the thinly populated, wealthy Libya has a large 
number of private universities whereas Egypt, with its much larger population but limited 
financial resources, has few such institutions. 
 
The following chapter will examine the financing policy for higher education in Libya by 
tracing its development during the years of the pre-revolution monarchy and throughout 
the subsequent years of the Gaddafi regime. 
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Chapter four: The historical legacy: the early development of Libyan higher 
education and its financing policy.  
 
4.1 Introduction: 
 
Libya is located on the North African continent and stretches along the north-east coast of 
the continent between Tunisia and Algeria in the west, Egypt in the east, and Niger, Chad 
and the Sudan in the south. Its population of approximately 6.5 million people lives mainly 
in the north of the country. It has a Mediterranean Sea coastline of about 1900 kilometres. 
Libya is a large country with an area of about 1.8 million square kilometres (1,775,500 
km2), seven times the size of the United Kingdom, making it the fourth largest country on 
the Africa continent. It was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1551 to 1911 when 
it was occupied by Italian colonists. Then, from 1942 to independence on December, 24 
1951, it was under the administration of the French and British. Since its independence 
Libya has been given different names. Under the monarchy, it was initially known as the 
United Libyan Kingdom, and later as the Kingdom of Libya. When the Monarchy was 
abolished in 1969 the state was named the Libyan Arab Republic and then the name was 
again changed to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya after the ‘Declaration of 
the Establishment of the People’s Authority’ in 1976-1977. The term ‘Great’ was added 
after 1986 when the USA and the UK bombed Tripoli and Benghazi.  (Otman, W and 
Kalberg, E, 2007) and ( Metz, H, 1989), and then the name has no longer been used since 
the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule.        
 
Libya, as have many countries, has suffered from problems and difficulties. During the 
Ottoman Empire, there was no provision of higher education. However, Libyans went 
abroad to study in Asitana in Istanbul, at the al-Azhar Institute in Egypt and at the al-
Zaituna Mosque in Tunisia, but it was for the elite and only for those whose families were 
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able to support them financially. (Obeidi, A, 2001, p37) Libya suffered in two world wars 
(the First and Second World Wars) which destroyed its infrastructure. Before the discovery 
of its oil Libya was an extremely poor country. The population numbered just over two-
and-half million people. Most people lived on the threshold of poverty, untouched by 
education: “…more than 90 per cent of the population were illiterate and only a handful of 
Libyans had been given an opportunity to study at a university or to qualify for a 
recognized profession.” (‘The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ in 
El- Fathaly et al, 1977, p13). Until the commercial production of oil in 1959, Libya was 
ranked very near the bottom of the international development scale, regardless of the 
indicators employed. Indeed, in the words of Benjamin Higgins, it was the: 
 
“…prototype of a poor country… the bulk of people live at a subsistence level… no 
sources of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural expansion is severely 
limited by climate conditions, where capital formation is zero, where there is no supply of 
skilled labour and no indigenous entrepreneurship … Libya is at the bottom of the range in 
income and resources.” ( El- Fathaly et al, 1977, p1). 
 
During colonial rule by Italy there were no possibilities of establishing higher education 
institutions. The sector was neglected and the colonial aim was to convert Libya to 
virtually an Italian province and about 110,000 settlers entered the country in 1940 during 
the Second World War. The education policies adopted by the government were designed 
to benefit the settlers and not the Libyan population.  Another factor in preventing the 
establishment of universities was the conflict between Libyan fighters and Italian troops 
which destroyed even the basic institutions, such as houses and schools and there was little 
effort to rebuild them. Religious education was the only type of education available to 
123 
 
Libyans and this was financed by private effort and local charity. There were no 
institutions of higher education and Libyans who wanted to continue their study had to 
travel to Egypt, Italy or a limited number of other countries. As has been said, the 
infrastructure of Libya had been damaged significantly during the Second World War. 
(Lulat, Y, 2005, p150). 
 
On December 24, 1951, Libya became independent but the situation remained in turmoil: 
severe economic problems, poor management of the available resources, and regional 
conflict of interests that hampered the establishment of higher education institutions. 
Education in Libya was in a very serious condition. There were no colleges and 
approximately fourteen Libyans university students from the whole country had graduated 
and these from foreign universities, such as, Egypt and other European countries. (El- 
Fathaly et al, 1977, p13). Consequently, education was declared to be the most important 
of the country’s social needs and development in education was seen as an essential 
element in improving the economic conditions of the country. 
 
Since independence Libyan higher education has experienced much change and 
development. Earlier, during the phase of the monarchy, 1950-1969, the first university 
had been founded under difficult economic, social, and political circumstances. Between 
the years 1961-1969, the period that witnessed the discovery of oil, Libya was transformed 
into one of the richest nations on earth. In 1969 the monarchy had been abolished by a 
small group of military officers led by a then 27 year-old army officer, Muammer Al-
Gaddafi, who immediately became commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman 
of the Revolutionary Command Council. And then, in 2011, after another revolution, Libya 
entered a new phase abolishing the 42 years of Gaddafi's rule. Although, there is a lack of 
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data available, particularly for the period 1952-1969, this chapter will try to explain the 
development of higher education and its financing policy from 1955 to 2011 by examining 
the phase of the monarchy, and then the ‘System of the Masses’, (Gaddafi period). It is an 
attempt to review the initial features for this sector and its historical development; to 
clarify some of the economic and political conditions that shaped its policy with reference 
to some of the difficulties faced during two different periods 
 
4.2   Higher education and its financing policy during the monarchy, 1952-1969. 
After protracted political and diplomatic efforts that began in 1945, Libya achieved its 
independence in 1951 (Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 2007, p3). The Libyan government 
faced considerable difficulties that hampered its attempts to establish a higher education 
system because of the situation it had inherited and which made a shift in policy direction 
problematical. In addition to administrative and financial difficulties, there were other 
internal challenges, such as the high rate of illiteracy (81.1 %) and the large number of 
people engaged in the agriculture sector (70%). (Kubbah (in Otman, W and Karlberg, E, 
2007, p98 and El-Fathaly et al, 1977, p21). Basically, higher education had not been the 
first priority on the government agenda because it had to develop primary and secondary 
education as well as other essential social services.  
 
The establishment of a university, therefore, became an elusive goal. International 
missions17 reported that there were no financial or social possibilities that would allow the 
state to build its own university and that Libya would need a long time (ten years at least) 
to be able to establish a university. But it would be possible to devote financial resources to 
the financing of study abroad. (Elfiki, A, 1982). 
                                                 
17
 During the period 1952-1954 international missions that included experts and specialists, such as Roger 
Tourneau, Higgins, and the UNESCO mission were sent by the UN to study economic and social problems in 
Libya. 
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Despite all the observations exposing such significant obstacles, the government 
determined to press ahead. It felt that there was a serious lack of trained manpower with 
the skills needed for economic and social development, so the government started to 
consider seriously the establishment of a university. According to Elfiki, A (1982), two 
possible patterns for establishing a university were studied in 1952. The first pattern was 
presented by a team of professors from the University of Nevada who suggested Libya 
should adopt the American pattern. The second plan, which was accepted by the Libyan 
government, came from Egypt which has a system similar to the British. It was seen to be 
more suitable to the circumstances in Libyan society. Four years later the efforts finally 
bore fruit and the project materialized. On October the 11th, 1955, when the plan for the 
Libyan university was completed the Libyan Prime Minister made the following statement: 
 
“The government directed its great concern to education originally because education is 
considered to be fundamental to national advancement. The country cannot realize its 
great educational and cultural hopes unless it completes its efforts to establish a 
university. This university will be the light to spread the sciences, arts, and literature. It 
will be an effective power in spreading education and social and economic 
reconstruction”.  Accordingly, the government issued its decision to establish the Faculty 
of Arts and Education in the Manar Palace in Benghazi, to be the first nucleus of the 
university…..   ( El. Fiki, A, 1982, p181). 
 
About two months later, the king of Libya, Muhammad Idris al-Senussi, released his royal 
decree to create a university to be known as the Libyan University. The first article of law 
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was issued on December 15th, 1955 and had been prepared by a team of Libyan and 
Egyptian experts. In the official gazette of the Ministry of Justice it declared that: 
 
“A university is to be established under the name of the ‘Libyan University’ and it begins 
by the establishment of the ‘Faculty of Arts and Education’ in Benghazi. The Cabinet of 
Ministers will decide which other faculties will be established, and their locations. 
Institutions, under the Faculty of Arts and Education, or other faculties, which will be 
established in the future, may be connected with these faculty departments or may be 
considered to be departments within it.” (the Official Gazette of Ministry of Justice in El. 
Fiki, A, 1982, pp 182 & 183). 
 
After this, higher education in Libya expanded gradually. From 1957 to 1967 seven 
faculties were established, two of them being more ‘practical’ than the others. However, 
the university’s objectives were training teachers for intermediate and secondary education 
and for training employees for various government jobs. It is noted that the science 
faculties (practical studies) were located in Tripoli, whereas, the arts faculties (theoretical 
studies) were located in Benghazi, which meant that the Libyan government decided to 
make scientific disciplines (e.g. science and engineering) studied close to Tripoli, the 
‘industrial centre of the country’, and those specializing in the humanities and social 
disciplines close to Benghazi, 'the spiritual focus' of the country. (Qubain, F, 1979, p 416 
and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 463). The number of higher education students increased from 34 
students in 1956 to 2,522 in the academic year 1967/1968, just a year before the Al-Fatah 
Revolution. See Table 12.    
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Table (12). Number of higher education students in the Libyan University between 
1955/1956 and 1967/1968.  
Years  Faculties    Total 
 Arts Economic and 
Commerce 
Science Law Advance College 
of Technology 
 
1955/56 34 - - - - 34 
56/57 67 - - - - 67 
57/58 90 34 32 - - 156 
58/59 178 112 52 - - 342 
59/60 227 242 77 - - 546 
60/61 303 310 115 - - 728 
61/62 383 383 152 - 50 968 
62/63 333 423 168 72 80 1076 
63/64 404 420 178 132 105 1239 
64/65 527 536 250 190 179 1682 
65/66 - - - - - 1891 
67/68 - - - - - 2522 
Resource: Qubain ,F, 1979, p 419 &  El- Fathaly et al, 1977,p14. – N/V. 
 
The growth in the number of higher education students has several explanations:  
1) Since independence Libya had experienced some sort of stability. This had 
facilitated the building of its system of higher education and led to serious 
consideration of the establishment of a university and other institutions.  
2) After independence, the Libyan government realized there was a severe shortage of 
an educated labour force with the skills needed by the new phase of post-
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independence and made every effort to establish institutions that would fulfil this 
vital role in the society. 
3) The government allowed all Libyan students who had completed twelve years of 
elementary and secondary schooling, and who had received the secondary school 
certificate, to enter the university.  This was considered a basic right for all 
Libyans. 
4) The state was concerned about the pre-university stage of education in which there 
were two main levels: primary and secondary and in which the number of pupils 
had risen from 402 in 1951/1952 to 12,320 in 1960/1961. (Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 428). 
5) The achievement of a unitary state in 1963 and the development of a strong sense 
of national unity had helped the Libyan government to widen the scope of 
education. (Sayigh, Y, 1978, pp 432 and 433). 
6) The discovery of oil at the end of the 1950s had achieved substantial financial 
resources for the Libyan economy and the wealth brought about through oil 
eliminated the obstacle to education: educational facilities greatly expanded in rural 
and remote areas, students at all levels increased to a very impressive number, more 
colleges were founded in the University of Libya and more vocational school and 
training centres were established. (El- Fathaly et al, 1977,p13) and (Allan, J, 1981, 
p159). 
 
During the period 1961-1969 18 the first five year plan was prepared by the Ministry of 
Planning. It covered the years from 1963-1968. The total yearly allocations amounted to 
about £L324.9 million devoted to eleven sectors. However the percentage of allocations to 
the education sector was 13.2 per cent, although the actual figure was only 8.7 per cent. In 
                                                 
18
 Libya changed dramatically and became a rich country and was freed from its dependence on alien capital 
with its attendant and military responsibilities. 
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fact, the education sector as well as the other sectors in the social infrastructure, e.g. health 
and social affairs, was in second place after the physical infrastructure, e.g. public works, 
transport, municipalities, housing. While in the former the percentage of allocations was 
25.6 per cent, in the latter it was 42.8 per cent. Even in the second plan (1969-1971) the 
social infrastructure came second in percentile terms (17%) compared with that of the 
physical infrastructure (49%).   
 
Through its budget the Libyan government strongly concentrated on investing in the social 
and physical infrastructure. Although, the education sector was in second place the 
government had shown its concern toward the sector. One of the seven major objectives in 
the plan that aimed to secure the optimum utilisation of the country’s resources and its 
security was the continuation of the public sector investment in education as well as in 
health, communications and housing in order to consolidate the basic elements for rapid 
economic growth.  (Allan, J, 1981, pps79, 80 and 81 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 445).   
 
 
 
4.2.1 Governance, Administration, and Finance. 
During the phase of the monarchy there were two main powers responsible for the 
university system: the Minister of Education and the Rector, who was appointed by royal 
decree at the nomination of the board of governors and the recommendation of the Minister 
of Education. The Libyan University was managed by the government which was 
responsible for setting down its general policies and the administration of its affairs. It 
decided that from the beginning the Libyan University would be a publicly regulated 
institution and state funds were transferred from the governmental budget to the 
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university’s budget which was considered a part of the Ministry of Education budget. 
Table 13 (below) shows that the public expenditure on education as a percentage of total 
public expenditure increased from 9.6 per cent in 1952-53, to 21 per cent in 1960-61, and 
then to 24 per cent in 1968-69 (Qubain ,F, 1979, p417). There is no doubt that oil revenues 
were a significant factor for such an increase.   
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Table (13). Total public expenditure, expenditure on education, and public expenditure on 
education as a percentage of total public expenditure. 1952-53 to1968-69. 
Year Total public expenditure (1) Expenditure on education. £1000 (2) (1) as % of (2) 
1952-53 6,229 599 9.6 
1953-54 7,870 926 11.8 
1954-55 8,797 1,177 13.4 
1955-56 9,816 1,216 12.3 
1956-57 9,174 1,441 15.7 
1957-58 10,123 1,800 17.7 
1958-59 12,373 2,100 17.8 
1959-60 13,381 2,700 20.0 
1960-61 12,140 2,549 21.0 
1961-62 18,000 3,900 21.6 
1962-63 19,561 4,800 24.6 
1963-64 43,437 9,113 21.0 
1964-65 53,251 11,130 20.9 
1965-66 79,035 17,890 22.5 
1966-67 85,965 19,996 23.0 
1967-68 101,000 20,812 20.6 
1968-69 170,000 41,245 24.0 
Resource: Minister of Education and Zarugh (in Elfiki, A, 1982, p136). 
 
 
The monarchy did not last long and had only 17 years of life during which the policy for 
higher education had been controlled for 14 years from 1955 to 1969.  It seems to have 
been too short a period of time for the higher education sector to examine its policy and it 
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is possible to highlight information to confirm this.  The monarchical era experienced two 
different phases: the period from 1952 to1961, prior to the oil boom when the financial 
resources were very limited, and the period from 1962 to 1969 after the discovery of oil 
when financial resources became available. It has to be realized that during the period of 
the monarchy Libya had no indigenous government structure or experience in self-
government, that there was no training at any level, that only limited information was 
available, that there was insufficient and qualitatively inadequate staffing and that there 
was a lack of experience and weakness in management in the Libyan government. Given 
the lack of scientific experts and of university personnel, the financing policy for higher 
education at these times seems unclear with many of its decisions having been made under 
foreign institutions’ guidance and influence. It had been influenced by the UN and its 
agencies, particularly by UNESCO and by professors who were working at Egyptian 
universities. Higher education institutions in Libya were under the supervision of the 
Minister of Education who became directly responsible for directing higher education 
policy as well as for the overall education policy for all other sectors of education in the 
country.  Three laws were founded during the monarchy regime: the ‘Law for Establishing 
the University’, issued in 1955; the ‘Educational Law’ of 1965; and the ‘University Law, 
No. 20/1968’. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp128 & 133). 
  
The structure and management of higher education in light of the three laws: 
With the implementation of the first university law, the Libyan government established the 
first University Council. This was given the legal authority to own or dispose of property, 
as well as to accept financial contributions and assistance unless these violated the original 
objectives of the university. Both the university and faculty councils were controlled by the 
Minister of Education. The minister considered the first step towards the appointment of 
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the Director of the University and his suggestion was passed to the Cabinet of Ministers for 
approval, after which the king issued a decree for the director’s appointment. It seems to be 
that there had been a sort of centralization in the administration of higher education and its 
relationship with the education ministry and the other ministries in the Libyan government. 
All university decisions, actions, and appointments of administrators (e.g. General 
Secretary, Dean of Faculties, and Vice-Dean) had to be approved by the Minister of 
Education, who was in charge of the Cabinet and without whose verification such 
decisions would be ineffective. The main aim of this hierarchy was to avoid subjecting the 
university to any political activity19. The financial functions for which the University 
Council was accountable were in administering its investment and expenditure, preparing 
budgetary projects and financial accounts, supervising and administering the accounts and 
stores, collecting monies due to the university and for maintaining the building and 
furniture. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp184 and 187). 
 
After the discovery of oil in 1959, the Libyan economy witnessed a radical change.  Oil 
resources improved the economic conditions in the state and eased the funding difficulties 
in the education sector which had expanded at all levels. This led the Libyan government 
to enact a law in 1965 that dealt with new trends and redefined the objectives of public 
education. With the introduction of this new law the Director of the University and the 
Deans of Faculties had more of a contribution to make in decisions not only at the higher 
education level but also at pre-university levels as well. The Supreme Council of 
Education, which included the Director of the University and the Deans of Faculties, was 
established at the Ministry of Education. One of its duties was to get advice about the 
annual funding provided by the government for the University. (Elfiki, A, 1982, p131).     
                                                 
19
 The government wanted the university to away from any political crises and make it under control of the 
government.   
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After frequent meetings with the Vice-president and Deans of Faculties, a new University 
Law, No.20, was established in April 1968. The introduction of this law had improved the 
administration of higher education by creating more flexibility and less centralization. It 
was stated by El-Mahdawy (in Elfiki, A, 1982, p 237) that: 
 
“….. the new law was a considerable improvement over the old one.”   
 
The ‘President’ of the University was used as a title according to this law instead of the 
‘Director’. He was given a wider legal authority to regulate the University and its faculties 
and his decisions and actions did not need to be approved by the Minister of Education.   
El_Mahdawy (in Elfiki, A, 1982, p 237) stated that:  
 
“….. the new law made the Minister of Education only an honorary authority; therefore, 
the decisions of the University Council are to be applied without additional approval.”     
 
 In addition, the Minister of Education, under the supervision of the Cabinet, had the right 
to regulate this higher education institution without being subject to approval by royal 
decree as it was before. Both the university and faculty councils were controlled by the 
Minister of Education. Through this change the Libyan government aimed to keep the 
University autonomous and to achieve its objectives easily without interference.      
 
Since the establishment of the Libyan University, higher education institutions had been 
financed through two main sources: local resources and foreign resources. 
 
135 
 
4.2.2 Local Libyan finance.  
During the period from 1955 to 1961 before the advent of oil wealth, domestic financial 
resources were limited. Mainly, these resources, according to J.A.Allan (1981, p22), came 
from an inevitable dependence on Western interests, whether in minor contributions 
collected from rents from the United States of America and British bases or through 
amounts paid by foreign oil companies to the Libyan government for contracts and 
agreements made for the development of the petroleum industry.  
 
Basically, the general financing policy for education before oil had been characterised by 
an uncertainty and instability about the availability of funds and financial resources: “It 
was determined on a year-by-year basis, and often firm commitments came too late for the 
year in question to benefit from them. These lags in commitment seriously affected the 
execution of projects owing to shortages in planning and execution personnel and 
institutional and bureaucratic factors.” (Sayigh, Y, 1978, p 431).   
        
Despite the financial difficulties and the limitation of available funds, Libyan higher 
education was free. It was heavily regulated by the government. In fact, the idea of 
privatization had emerged at the pre-university level and in other sectors (e.g. commerce 
and construction) but not yet at the tertiary education level. It seems to have been too early 
to think of privatization during the period between 1955 and 1969 because higher 
education was very limited and even elsewhere in the world this sector had only been seen 
as ‘a private good’ rather than ‘a public good’ until 1980 (Altbach, P (b), 1999, p110). In 
Libya, the private sector had been legalized to play its role in higher education since the 
early years of the 21st century as a result of the previous policy and this will be explained 
later. The higher education sector was regulated by the government and it had, as Qubain, 
136 
 
F (1979, ps 418, 422 and 425) points out, two ways of being financed: firstly, on some 
occasions the Libyan government had sent some students to study abroad at their own 
expense or on scholarships, including those who were awarded scholarships from the UN 
and its agencies, and were sent abroad under the terms of a legal pre-condition. Those 
opting to study abroad had two options: they either had to work for the state for a period 
equal to at least twice the length of their studies abroad after completion, or they had to 
refund the costs of their study.   
 
Secondly, the Libyan government admitted students to study at its local university for free 
as a basic right, provided there was space and provided the student had completed twelve 
years of elementary and secondary education and had received the secondary certificate of 
achievement. However, the International Bank Mission commented that free higher 
education was wasteful and could not be justified by considerations either of economy or 
equity. Not only did the government not charge tuition fees or any other fees, but students 
were also given generous maintenance allowances of about twenty Libyan pounds a 
month, a substantial sum, as well as being given books and educational materials free of 
cost. 
 
The prevailing conditions during the decade of the1950s had been really hard. On the one 
hand, the financial resources in Libya were very limited and most of its income was 
generated from foreign aid (e.g. the UN and its agencies, and military bases) and these 
were uncertain and unstable. On the other hand, the Libyan government was burdened with 
extra cost by providing free study at Libyan University and by offering its students 
monthly stipends plus free books and free other educational materials, all of which had 
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increased continually. Table 14 summarises some of the government’s financial 
commitments on higher education institutions. 
 
Table (14). The yearly government stipends for Libyan higher education students.          
(1955/1956 to 1967/1968).  
Year Yearly payment (students* 
£L20 * 12 months) £L 
1955/56 8,160 
56/57 16,080 
57/58 37,440 
58/59 82,080 
59/60 131,040 
60/61 174,720 
61/62 232,320 
62/63 258,240 
63/64 297,360 
64/65 307,680 
65/66 453,840 
67/68 605,280 
Total 2,604,240 
Source: research, adapted from Qubain, F, 1979, p 419 and El- Fathaly et al, 1977, p14. 
 
It seems that the main purpose of this policy was to encourage as many students as possible 
to enter the university. The economic situation changed after independence and new 
education institutions appeared as a result of radical changes in the economic and social 
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structure of the state especially after the discovery of oil. This situation made it imperative 
to recruit trained scientific personnel. 
 
With regard to the faculty staff, they were drawn from foreign countries because there 
were no qualified university lecturers in Libya when the Libyan University was founded in 
1955. The Minister of Education appointed foreign faculty members who were able to 
meet two conditions:  good qualifications and with at least ten years of experience. Those 
who were accepted by the Ministry of Education were contracted to avoid any engagement 
in political or commercial activities, any participation in the management of any 
commercial, financial, or industrial institutions and any job that could be at variance with 
their duties and performance. The foreign faculty members had to sign a one or two-year 
renewable contract with the Ministry of Education which paid them high salaries. The 
scale of salaries of faculty members ranged from £L 720 to £L 4000 see Table 15. 
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Table (15). Staff salaries in the years 1955 and 1968. (£L) 
Rank Professor  Associate 
Professor 
Assistant 
Professor 
Lecturer Assistant 
Lecturer 
1955 1,200 – 1,800 -- 1,000-1,300 720-1,080 -- 
1968 3,200 – 4,000 2,700-3,500 2,100-2,800 1,600-2,200 -- 
                    Source: research, adapted from Elfiki, A,1982, p374.  
 
 
The economic difficulties and the limited financial resources did not continue for long. 
From the beginning, revenue from petroleum exports increased rapidly, growing more than 
fifteen-fold from $40 million in 1962 to $625 million in 1967. Within eight years of its 
first shipment, Libya was the world’s fourth largest exporter of crude oil, a rate of 
expansion previously unknown anywhere in the industry’s history. In the process Libya 
moved from a stagnant to an exploding economy, from a capital-deficit state to a capital-
surplus state, from an aid recipient to an aid extender. The oil royalties supported other 
financial resources, such as taxes, customs duties and income from other national sources 
and became the main source for financing the education sector and other state services. 
(Ghanem, S, 1988, pps11-22). This wealth provided the government with enormous 
financial power. Since then, the Libyan economy has become heavily dependent on oil 
revenues and this has freed the Libyan economy from its former dependence on foreign 
based aid. This has been illustrated by El- Fathaly et al (1977, p35) showing that oil 
revenue contributions towards total revenues jumped rapidly and enormously from 7.8 per 
cent in 1962 to 76.5 per cent in 1968. This increase in wealth provided the Libyan 
government with the ability to go ahead with expanding the higher education sector. It was 
noted by Otman, W and Karlberg, E (2007, p99) that in the Libyan budget of 1967/1968 
the allocation for education reached 20.6 per cent of the annual expenditure of 101,000,000 
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Libyan pounds.  There was little constraint or uncertainty concerning the availability of 
funds and finance. “The increase in oil revenue and its ratio to total revenue, accompanied 
by an unfortunate decrease in other sectors of the economy… …promoted over the first 
few years of this development the idea that oil is the key to the dynamic character of the 
Libyan economy and its vitality for the development of the region.” (El-Fathaly et al, 1977, 
p16).  
      
The monarchical era immediately after the discovery of oil prepared the first economic and 
social development plan to cover the period from 1963 to 1968 with a budget which 
amounted to 298.2 million Libyan pounds. One of its aims was expansion in education. 
This was followed by the second plan from 1969 to 1974 with an allocation of 1,149 
million Libyan pounds. There was great concern within the state about education in general 
and higher education in particular. The Libyan government’s budget was strongly 
orientated towards investment in the education sector. During those two periods, the actual 
outlay on education rose from 8.7 per cent in the first plan to 10.10 per cent in the second 
plan. Unfortunately, the latter only had five months of life, instead of five years. It was 
cancelled and ignored by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which took over 
after September 1969. (Allan, J, 1981, p92 and Sayigh, Y, 1978, p445).   
 
4.2.3 Foreign finance.  
Early independence prior to oil wealth, 1951 to 1961, brought an increase in external 
funding for higher education. Before that its institutions depended on foreign finance to a 
large extent and such support was handled by a number of agencies for overseas aid, such 
as the United Nations (UN), the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and even 
from other Arab countries like Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. About 68.7 million Libyan 
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pounds came to Libya as capital flows, which permitted the government to expand its 
public finance not only for higher education but also for other sectors. The UN and its 
executive agency, UNESCO, provided the Libyan government special assistance to finance 
two projects: the first was the establishment of the College of Advanced Technology in 
Tripoli, the capital city of Libya. The total cost amounted to $3,110,961 over six years. The 
UN paid $1,054,000 which was to be used for the provision of equipment, appointment of 
teaching staff and of fellowships. The second project was the establishment of the Radio 
and Telecommunications Institute at a total cost of $1,206,960. The UN paid $523,600 
over a five-year period which was to be used to provide technical equipment and teaching 
staff. In addition to UNESCO, there were other agencies that contributed directly or 
indirectly to the training of manpower in Libya: ILO, FAO, ICAO, WHO, WMO, and ITU. 
All of them had a technical assistance programme of one kind or another and they received 
contributions of £5,499,200 from 1952/53 through to 1959/60. From 1952 to 1958 the 
USA had contributed about $11,600,000 as assistance to almost every facet of education in 
Libya (see Table 16). The staff members at the faculties in the Libyan University were 
from different nationalities. A few professors were from the USA and the UK, the rest 
were from Arab states, particularly Egypt, and all received their salaries from their 
respective governments. (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418, 420, 423, 425, 427 and 428 and Sayigh, 
Y, 1978, pp 425 and 426).   
 
 
Table (16). Some of the local and foreign finance on Libyan higher education institutions, 
1985-1961. 
Type of finance Local finance Foreign finance 
No fees charged to students Borne by the - 
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Government 
A stipend payment of £L20 a 
month 
£L2,604,240* - 
Contribution for the College of 
Advance Technology. 
$2,056,961 $1,054,000 
Contribution for the Radio and 
Telecommunications Institute. 
$683,360 $523,600 
Technical assistance from the 
UN and its agencies 
- $5,499,200 
USA assistance for education 
sector 
- $11,000,000 
USA aids (building campus ) - $600,000 
Capital expenditure allocations 
for building and equipment 
from the Inter.Bank Mission 
- £500,000 
Source: research, adapted from (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 420, 423, 425, 427 and 428), from Table 12. 
 
A number of Libyan students studied in foreign countries because local universities were 
unable to offer certain specializations. Between 1951-1961 over 100 fellowships and 
scholarships were granted by the UN to Libyan students for study abroad. This meant two 
things: firstly, the Libyan higher education financing policy was being supported by 
foreign resources, and secondly, that the policy had introduced the internationalization of 
higher education in Libya since its beginning. During the period 1951-1958 there were 
about 108 students who studied at undergraduate level and graduated from foreign 
universities. Most of them graduated in the humanities. Only six students graduated in 
engineering, medicine, and pharmacy. Approximately 60% of Libyan students studied in 
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Egypt, particularly at the University of Alexandria. There were several reasons attributed 
to this: geographical proximity; similarity of language and culture, the low cost of living in 
Egypt and a fairly large number of scholarships in the form of free tuition and a monthly 
stipend available to Libyan students at Egyptian universities. The Egyptian authorities 
provided the Libyan University continuous aid over several years until it was able to 
support itself.   The USA, the UK, and Italy were also destinations for Libyan higher 
education students. In 1959 there were 44, 20, and 20 students respectively who studied at 
universities in those three countries. (Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418, 426, 427 and 428). 
 
4.3 Higher education policy in the republican phase and ‘The System of the Masses.’ 
On the first of September 1969, the monarchy was overthrown by a group of army officers, 
the ‘Free Officers’ headed by Colonel Mummar Al-Gaddafi. The previous regime 
disappeared but had left behind a reasonable foundation and the main pillars for further 
development of higher education institutions. At the end of the monarchy there was just 
one university with seven faculties and 3001 students and a simple design structure for 
higher education. But the new regime faced early challenges.  Firstly, there were a large 
number of Italians who still remained in the country so the government decided to expel 
them. Secondly, the return to their own countries of most of the European and American 
professionals, technicians and teachers led to a shortage of skilled labour and of a skilled 
work force. Thirdly, university education in Libya suffered from shortcomings, such as a 
lack of adequate facilities, and its management and national faculty members, to a large 
degree, moved on to the national universities in the Mashreq and the necessary 
replacements for Libya were slow, inadequate and undertaken in an inappropriate setting. 
Finally, the drop-out rate in adult education in the year 1970/1971 was high as was the rate 
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of unemployment among the labour force as well as the rate of illiteracy in society. 
(Sayigh, Y, 1978, p434, p463 and p464).       
 
After the 1969 Revolution higher education witnessed many changes because the sector 
was seen as an important factor towards improving economic and social conditions. 
Gaddafi had drawn his ideas from the three volumes of the ‘The Green Book’ on this sector 
and he introduced his philosophy to restructure the state institutions in a way that fitted in 
with these ideas. His unique approach to the traditional concept of the ruling system led 
him to establish the idea of the ‘State of the Masses’ which he believed had been the result 
of political and historical development in Libya over the two stages of monarchy and 
republic. According to him this development had led at the end to the establishment of the 
‘System of the Masses’ which is the political system whereby Libyan people regulate 
themselves by themselves through the establishment of a people’s congress and committee 
as well as through unions and professional syndicates. 
 
The institutions of higher education are considered to be the first to have practised his 
philosophy. This chapter will try to highlight the development of higher education after 
1969 and the role of the Al-Fatah Revolution in this sector.  
     
4.3.1 The importance of higher education in the national agenda. 
Given the importance of higher education for economic and social development, Libya has 
attempted to improve its human resources through investment in the education sector at all 
levels. Gaddafi, who was the head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), insisted 
that education at all levels is a right as well as a duty for all Libyans and no one has the 
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right to prevent any citizen from receiving education.20 This concept added a new pressure 
to promote higher education. So, free education has been offered by the state and more 
schools and higher education institutions have been founded. Basically the oil revenue 
helped the revolutionary government to achieve this. Libyan higher education then 
witnessed rapid development although issues of quality were neglected. The RCC made 
important changes in an attempt to improve human resources in Libya. It stressed 
vocational and technical training in order to equip these areas with the necessary skills and 
competencies needed by economic and social development projects. The Council also 
worked to create a balanced distribution of higher education institutions as well as schools 
in various areas of the country in order to provide education for as many people as 
possible. There was a particular focus on the scientific disciplines because of their 
significance to the economy. There was also an increase in the provision of girls’ education 
and girls were encouraged to continue their education at the higher education level. This 
contributed towards reducing the general level of illiteracy amongst people of all social 
and economic levels.  
 
The population in Libya has grown rapidly for almost four and half decades. According to 
World Bank (2007) the number rose from 1.994 million in 1970 to 6.420 million in 2009. 
The percentage of the population aged 15-24 was between 21.1 per cent and 24.3 per cent 
during the period from 1990 to 2005. This means that a large number of the Libyan 
population was in the higher education age group. In 1969 when Gaddafi came to power, 
the rate of literacy was 28 per cent and almost 3,000 students were enrolled at the only 
university, the Libyan University, and in one or two other higher education institutions. By 
the end of the twentieth century these figures had improved considerably to reach a literacy 
                                                 
20
 He released this declaration on the 11th December, 1969, in article 14 of the Constitutional Proclamation of 
the El-Fatah Revolution which emphasises the improvement of the physical, mental, and moral welfare of 
youth. (Secretariat of Information in Allan, J, 1981, p230; and Elfiki, 1982, p137). 
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rate of 97.0 per cent. In the period 1995-2005 the percentage of literacy among Libya’s 
youth reached 98 per cent and in adults (aged 15 and above) about 84.2 per cent. Believing 
in the importance of higher education, the Al-Fatah regime had determined to expand the 
Libyan higher education system to absorb the increasing number of students. The state had 
not only adopted an open-door policy, but it also guaranteed employment for graduates. 
This policy, though, became a problem for the government by placing significant pressure 
on the system of higher education. Expansion could not be halted because public demand 
was immense and in Libya, as in many countries, access was guaranteed to those who had 
passed the secondary school examinations. Higher education institutions had to 
accommodate more students without the necessary financial resources. Expansion 
continued or even accelerated because government policy remained committed to 
increased access. The number of students in universities was, in fact, more than the places 
available and most of them were enrolled in the human sciences. The result was an 
overcrowding in the universities and deterioration in the conditions of study. In 2008/09 
about 340,156 higher education students were enrolled in twenty three institutions, thirteen 
universities and ten higher learning institutes including the Academy of Graduate Studies 
which specialized in post-graduate studies. Private institutions and the Open University are 
not included in the above. Table 17 shows these institutions and the dates of their 
founding. (Ham, A, 2002, p 31  and Metz, H, 1987, p114; UN, 2007/08, p 270; & General 
People’s Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education, the first issue, 
2008, p 8). 
 
4.3.2 The size of public expenditure on Libyan higher education. 
In the case of Libya, during the expansionary period after 1950s its financing policy for 
higher education remained heavily reliant upon local Libyan resources and essentially from 
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oil revenues, although there was some financial support represented by the technical and 
technological assistance from foreign organisations. At national level, Libyan higher 
education has been mainly sponsored by the state. Since 1969, the budget was divided into 
an annual administrative expenses budget, an annual development expenditures budget, 
and a special expenditures budget. The financing of higher education consisted largely of 
public funding based on budget allocations and a distribution formula loosely arranged 
according to many considerations (e.g. the size of finance resources and the number of 
faculty members and number of higher education institutions). The state adopted an open-
door policy and students paid no fees with the exception of those enrolled in The Open 
University and the Academy of Graduate Studies. These were the only institutions within the 
public sector that relied to some extent on tuition fees paid by students. Other public 
institutions of higher education relied entirely on the national budget. Higher education’s 
rank in the priorities of economic and social development plans had fluctuated up and 
down from time to time. It seems to be that higher education in Libyan society has 
generally been seen as a 'public good' rather than a ‘private good’ and the impact of higher 
education on Libyan society and its role in fostering economic development are seen to 
justify the state’s expenditure.  
Table (17).The higher education institutions in Libya, their establishment date, and the 
number of their faculties after 1969. 
University Location Its establishment date Number of faculties 
Al-Fatah University Tripoli 1973 11 
University Of  Al-Fatah 
For Medical Science 
Tripoli 1986 4 
Al-Arab Medical Benghazi 1984 4 
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University 
Bright Star University 
Of Technology 
Ajdabiya 1981 5 departments 
Sebha  University Sabha 1983 9 
Tahaddi University Sirt 1989 12 
7th  of April University Zawihyah 1988 6 
Omar Elmukhtar 
University 
Al-Bayda 1985 5 
Nasser University Alkhums 1986 6 
University Of Al-Jabal 
Al-Gharbi 
Gharyan 1991 7 
University Of Darnah Darnah 1995 6 
Al-Asmariya University Zlitin 1997 7 
7th  of October 
University/ 
Musrata 1984 14 
Academy of Graduate 
Studies 
Tripoli 1988 - 
Higher Institute of Civil 
Aviation 
Sabah n/a - 
National Institute of 
Administration 
Tripoli n/a - 
National Posts And 
Telecommunications 
Institute 
Tripoli n/a - 
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Higher Institute of 
Financial and 
Management sciences 
Gergaresh n/a - 
Higher Institute of 
Electronics 
Bani walid n/a - 
Advanced Institute for 
General Vocations/ 
Musrata n/a - 
Centre for Higher 
Mechanical 
Occupations 
Janzore 1989 - 
Centre for Higher 
Industrial Technology  
 
Engila 1984 - 
Higher Institute of 
Mechanical and 
Electrical Engineering 
Hun n/a - 
Higher Institute of 
Technology 
Brack n/a - 
Source: research, adapted from Lulat, Y, 2005, p152; & Libyan University Directory, Libyan Universities 
and Colleges. (-) Not available. 
 
Historically, the University of Al-Fatah, Tripoli, and the Garyounise University21 have 
received their allocation from the government. In the period from 1974 to 1979 the 
                                                 
21
 It is a public university. It is located in Benghazi, the second largest city in the country. It was founded on 
1955 as the University of Libya. 
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expenditure in terms of both administration and development on the University of Al-Fatah 
rose from more than DL 6.5 million (more thanUS$19. 7 million) to DL 16. 5 million (US$ 
49 million) and from more than DL10 million (more than US$ 30.3) to more than DL 29 
million (almost US$ 88 million) for the Garyounise University. Between 1976 and 1980 
the development and administrative allocations for both universities were much higher 
than at the pre-university levels of elementary and secondary education. This high financial 
allotment could be attributed to several reasons: special equipment and apparatus required 
by the faculties, such as laboratories, especially for the faculties of medicine, engineering, 
and pharmacy; monthly allowances for Libyan students; the large number of non-Libyan 
faculty members whose salaries were higher than those of the Libyans and who were 
provided with other advantages, such as a two-month vacation annually with free travel 
allowances and two months’ salary as a furniture allowance on arrival at the institution, as 
well as free transport to and from the institution and free medical services. Libyan higher 
education has depended considerably on foreign faculty members for a long time. From the 
first university in 1955 until at least the end of the 1960s there were no Libyan university 
lecturers; all were from abroad, especially from Egypt. In the 1990s the state started to 
practise what it called a ‘policy of Libyanization’. (Muftah, A, 1982, pp 38 and 39 and 
Qubain, F, 1979, pp 418), However, according to the General Authority for Information (in 
its Statistics Book, 2007, p136) a large number of foreign teaching staff remained at 
Libyan universities in 2007-2008. With a total of 5,983 teaching staff, 1,700 (28.4 %) of 
them were from outside the country.  
  
During the period 1999-2001 public expenditure on the tertiary level of education as a 
percentage of all levels was much higher than on primary and secondary education. 
Expenditure on the former was 68%, whereas on pre-university levels it was 17.8% and 
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14.2% respectively. Similarly, in the period 2002-2005 public expenditure on higher 
education as a percentage of total public expenditure on education was much higher than 
that at primary and secondary levels. In higher education it was 69% and at other levels 
12% and 19% respectively. (UN, Annex 4, 2004, p239 and UN, Human Development 
Report, 2007/08, p 266). 
  
In the last years of the Gaddafi regime, higher education in Libya benefited from foreign 
institutions. Since its positive re-engagement with the international community following 
renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, the General People’s Committee for Higher 
Education of Libya (GPCHE) signed agreements with many foreign higher education 
institutions and international organisations to get educational, technical and technological 
assistance. After 2007, the GPCHE sent a delegation22 to University College London 
(UCL) to discuss quality assurance issues and the potential for collaboration.  
 
On August 24th, 2008, the GPCHE announced its partnership with SAP Middle East and 
North Africa LLC to develop eleven University Competence Centres (UCCs) across the 
country. Dr. Abdolkhabir Alfahkry, Secretary-General of the GPCHE and Higher 
Education Minister, stated that: 
 
 “The Libyan General People’s Committee for Higher Education is proud to be in 
partnership with technology partners such as SAP and UNESCO to introduce a nationwide 
                                                 
22
 The delegation included six people who held a meeting in March 2007 with Julia Abbott, Senior Executive 
Officer (Academic and International), Professor Vince Emery (Pro-Provost for South Asia and the Middle 
East), Jason Clarke, Deputy Director of Academic Services and Everard Whitehouse of the British Council. 
The Libyan delegation included Dr Suleiman Mahmoud Khoja (Director of the Higher Education Private 
Sector); Dr Mohamed Mahmud Ben Ahmedia (President of the 7th October University); Dr Attia E A 
Elfeituri (President of Garyounise University); Dr Idris H Mabruk Elabedi (Manager of the Libyan Centre for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education); and Adel Ali Sennosi and Hamad Ahmed Abdelwahed Saleh, both 
of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (University College London, 1999-2009).  
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ICT-based educational program that will empower our students with essential ICT skills. 
Education is what will ultimately fuel the Libyan economy and ensure opportunities for all. 
The development of key ICT skills through programs such as UCC not only enhances 
Libya’s competitiveness, but lays the groundwork for long-term economic success.” (SAP 
AG, 2007). 
 
Such projects and collaboration with foreign universities and related international 
organizations had led to an increase in the expenditure on Libyan higher education. Gibril 
Eljrushi, Dean of the Engineering Faculty at the 7th October University in Musrata, stated 
in 2009 that the General People’s Committee had set aside a budget of $72 million to 
finance a project to use information and communications technologies to reform the higher 
education and scientific research system, to establish local area networks in 149 faculties 
on various university campuses and institutes, and to include a wide area network forming 
the Libyan Higher Education and Research Network. (Sawahel, W, 2009).   
 
4.3.3 The Libyan education system.  
Until 1982 The Libyan education model, known as the 9-3 system, comprised nine years of 
primary education for children aged from six to fifteen years and three years of secondary 
schooling for students aged 15 to 18 years.  In 1969 there was a lack of Libyan teachers 
who were qualified to teach in the primary and secondary schools and a lack of qualified 
accountants and managers to work in the state institutions. Most of these jobs were covered 
by expatriate personnel from Arab countries and in particular, from Egypt. Therefore, the 
RCC established commercial, agricultural, and teaching institutions in the Libyan 
education system as an attempt to cover this shortage. 
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At the beginning of the 1980s the General People’s Congress (GPC) called for the re-
structuring and reform of the educational system under what became known as the New 
Educational Structure Plan. According to this plan, the state replaced the secondary schools 
by specialized training institutes whose curricula would be integrated with those of the 
universities and technical institutions. (Metz,1989, pp 110 & 113 and Otman, W and 
Karlberg, E, 2007, p 380). 
 
In the 1990s the education system was restructured to comprise four levels: pre-school 
children from four to six years of age; primary education for pupils from six to fifteen 
years of age; intermediate education for students from fifteen to eighteen years of age; and 
higher education which covered all post-secondary education leading to the award of 
certificates, diplomas and degrees. These included universities, institutes of higher 
education and technical centres. Study at these institutions would take between three years 
at institutes and technical centres and up to six academic years for some university degree 
courses. While technical centres, for example, the Petroleum Training and Qualifying 
institute, Tripoli, award professional diplomas, universities and higher institutes award a 
Baccalaureate, a Master’s degree, or a Doctorate depending on the level of study at the 
particular university or institute of higher education. (Elzatini, S, 2008, pp 132 & 133).  
 
4.3.4 The philosophy of the Al-Fatah Revolution with reference to the development 
of higher education in Libya. 
In September 1969 a communiqué read on Radio Benghazi announced the end, without 
bloodshed, of the Libyan monarchy and the birth of a republic. The message of "…victory 
of the Al Fatah Revolution, in the name of freedom, social justice and unity" was read by a 
young army officer, Gaddafi. The Free Officers Movement claimed credit for carrying out 
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the coup and designated itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In its initial 
proclamations, it declared that:  
 
“ ...the country is to be a free and sovereign state called the Libyan Arab Republic, which 
will proceed, with the help of God, in the path of freedom, unity, and social justice, 
guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of 
honourable work. (Metz, H, 1989, p 42).   
 
Metz, H, (1989, p 42) further commented that the rule of the Turks and Italians and the 
‘reactionary’ regime just overthrown were to be condemned as the ‘dark ages’. The Libyan 
people were called upon to move forward as ‘free brothers’ without fear to a new age of 
prosperity, equality, and honour. For an oppressed people, a ray of true hope flickered at 
the end of what must have been for many a long tunnel of despair and frustration. Several 
important points made in the RCC’s constitutional declaration in December 1969 were that 
public ownership was to be the foundation of social development and sufficiency of 
production, that non-exploitive private ownership was to be safeguarded and not 
expropriated except according to law, that inheritance was to be a right governed by the 
Islamic Sharia, that freedom of opinion was guaranteed, and that education at all levels and 
medical care were the right of all Libyans to be free of charge and to be provided by the 
State. (Metz, H, 1989, p176). 
 
Al-Fatah Revolution led to a radical change in Libya politically, economically, and 
socially. As mentioned previously, Gaddafi introduced his new political system starting 
with the RCC’s declaration on September 1st , 1969, that Libya is now a free country and 
sovereign state called the ‘Libyan Arab Republic’ instead of the ‘Kingdom of Libya’. In 
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1969 the RCC moved vigorously to institute domestic reforms and affirmed that the 
country’s identity was a part of the ‘Arab Nation’ and its state religion was Islam. It 
abolished parliamentary institutions, all legislative functions being assumed by the RCC, 
and continued the prohibition of political parties which had been in effect since 1952. The 
new regime categorically rejected both communism and capitalism in both domestic and 
international matters.23  
 
Following the Revolution, Libya embarked on a policy of implementing rapid socio-
economic development plans. These development plans embodied a conscious policy for 
the expansion of higher education opportunities in the country. The Al-Fatah Revolution 
stressed the need to make education services available to villages and remote areas by 
providing mobile classrooms and continued the expansion of university education as well 
as allowing study missions abroad. 
 
In 1972 all university faculties in Libya in the three zones Tripoli, Benghazi, and El-Bayda 
were under the administration of the Libyan University and the University Council. At that 
time and due to various reasons, the University Council, which was the body responsible 
for regulating these faculties, began to think about the possibility of establishing another 
university. These reasons emerged in a memorandum. They were: 
1. The rapid increase in the student and faculty numbers. Between 1968/69 and 
1971/72 enrolment in the Libyan University increased from 2,804 to 5,069 
                                                 
23
 Capitalism is representative of the western regime and communism is representative of the eastern regime. 
According to Gaddafi both systems had failed: the focus of Communism was on the collective whole and 
forgot the individual, while Capitalism elevated the individual without consideration of the collective whole. 
He composed a ‘third universal theory’ to correct the short-comings of both ideologies.  In a series of essays 
in his ‘Green Book’, Qaddafi spells out a vision for what he termed the ‘Third Way’, or the alternative to 
Capitalism and Communism. 
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students.  The number of faculty members rose from 277 in 1968/69 to 344 in 
1970/71. See figures 3 and 4. 
2. Some difficulties were related to the centralization issue compounded by the great 
distance between Benghazi and Tripoli. 
 
A memorandum which was presented at the University Council meeting held in 
November, 1972, suggested that the establishment of two universities should be 
considered; one in Benghazi, and the other in Tripoli. According to the memorandum this 
idea was suggested as a result of several reasons: the long distance between Benghazi, 
Tripoli and El-Bayda, which made it difficult to manage the properties and their faculties 
from one administrative centre; the cost of communication and transportation; the 
increasing number of higher education students; and the economic development which 
required the establishment of another university. (Elfiki, A, 1982, pp 273 and 274). 
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In 1973, a decision was taken to establish two campuses: the first in Benghazi which was 
to include the faculties of Arts, Commerce and Education, Law and Medicine, and the 
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second in Tripoli, which was to include the faculties of Science, Agriculture, Engineering, 
and Education. It was also agreed to add two more faculties, a faculty of Medicine in 
Tripoli and a faculty of Education in El-Bayda. The two universities had witnessed even 
further expansion in terms of the number of both students and faculties. In 1974 three more 
faculties were established at Benghazi University. They were the faculties of Science, 
Engineering, and Dentistry. In 1975 the Faculty of Agriculture was founded in El-Bayda. 
In Tripoli University, in addition to the faculties of Science, Agriculture, Engineering, 
Education, Minerals and Petroleum Engineering, five more faculties were added during the 
period from 1973 to 1979. These were the faculties of Medicine (1973), Pharmacology 
(1975), Veterinary Medicine (1976), Education (1976, located in Sebha, south Tripoli), and 
the Faculty of Nuclear Engineering (1979). After the expansion, the number of Libyan and 
non-Libyan students increased on both campuses. In Benghazi University (Garyounise 
University) the number rose from 1,848 in 1968-69 to 11,721 in 1980-1981. In Tripoli 
University (Al-Fatah University), it increased from 1,154 to 9,656 in the same period. 
(Elfiki, A, 1982, pp 366-369). 
 
It should be noted that during the 1970s Libya witnessed a marked expansion in the 
number of faculties and that during the 1980s it witnessed not only an increasing number 
of faculties, but also an increasing number of universities. As the figure 5 illustrates some 
nine universities have been established in different areas as can be seen in figure 6. This 
development can be attributed to several fundamental reasons: the discovery of oil resulted 
in the establishment of the Faculty of Petroleum and Mining Engineering; the wealth 
generated by the revenue from oil; the re-structuring and reform of the educational system 
in 1980 under what has been known as the ‘New Educational Structure Plan’; and the 
implementation of the ‘People’s Power’ idea and the establishment of Popular Congresses 
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(municipalities / popular ‘Shbiat’) which gave Libyan people in each district the 
opportunity to establish a university.  
 
Consequently, with the growth of the universities the number of enrolled students 
increased rapidly from 1990 onwards. It increased from 20, 445 in 1980/81 to 54,391 in 
1989/1990, and then to 269, 302 in 1999/2000. See figure 7. The fundamental reasons for 
this growth were:   
1. The high demographic growth over the past few decades; 
2. The increase in the secondary education students who passed the GSEC 
examinations and qualified for a university education; 
3. The democratic policy of education in Libya that offered free access to higher 
education institutions; 
4.  The discovery of oil and its important role in accelerating the process of economic 
development calling for a more expert and qualified workforce and an increased 
need for an educated and trained population to carry out the demanding socio-
economic development programmes; 
5. Attractive employment opportunities provided by the international oil companies 
and multinational companies which provided strong incentives for students to 
complete higher education. 
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6. The improvement in Libyan society’s attitude towards women and freedom for 
women to study at universities. Libyan law stresses that women must be regarded 
as equal to men, and that they are expected to play a constructive and profoundly 
important role in shaping the life of the country. Government officials emphasize 
not only the equality of the sexes but also the desirability that women should 
participate in the social and political world of men, areas from which they have 
been traditionally excluded. Through the period from 1970 to the early 1980s the 
female enrolment as a percentage of total student enrolment increased dramatically 
from 9% to 20%, and then in the next few years to 24% (Metz, 1989, p114). 
UNESCO (in UN, 2006) reported that Libya was among those Arab countries 
which had the highest enrolment rate of women in higher education with more than 
50% of all women had enrolled in its institutions of higher education.  
7. The dominance of the idea in Libyan families that universities are the only way to 
secure their children’s future. (Al-Nouri, Q, 1995)  
8. The establishment of universities in the remote areas (e.g. Musrata, Sirt , Al-
Zawya, and Sabha).   
 
It is worth mentioning that the higher education system had been controlled by the new 
political system, the Masses System, for four decades. For forty years, higher education 
had been regulated under an administration which was strikingly different from that of the 
previous regime. Its ideas came mainly from the philosophy of the ‘Third Universal 
Theory’ of the Green Book by Gaddafi, which combined socialist and Islamic theories and 
rejected parliamentary democracy and political parties. Through its intervention the system 
had not only shaped the size of Libyan higher education, but had influenced its structure, 
administration, financing policy, trends and shape of the internationalization of higher 
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education, and even the name of its institutions regardless of whether they were public or 
private. The following section will highlight the influence of Al-Gaddafi’s philosophy on 
the higher education financing policy. 
 
 
4.3.5 The impact of the political system on financing the higher education policy, 
management issues in Libyan universities. 
 
Since 1969, the impact of politics on the financing of the higher education policy in Libya 
has been obvious. It is not in terms of how much has been allocated to higher education 
institutions, but in its management structure and the deployment of authority among people 
who work in the system. The process over the last forty years has been to transfer authority 
and power from the Ministry, which was the highest power in the state, over and above 
both the Ministry of Education and the University Council, to the People’s Committee that 
represents the people. The new regime had shifted the previous policy of the monarchy 
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phase because Al-Gaddafi believed that it did not serve the Libyan people and it did not 
meet their ambitions and aspirations. 
              
In the monarchical era, the Libyan government, when it became responsible for running its 
education affairs, stressed that the education system should reflect Muslim and Arab 
character and that its philosophy should be conceived in the light of the main outlines 
adopted by most Arab states. In Libya as a kingdom the higher education policy was 
influenced by the legislation enacted by the Government and approved by the King's royal 
decree. In its management structure, the power and authority come from the top down or 
from the King to the Cabinet and then to the Ministry of Education. Although, the 
University Council was given more authority and legal autonomy to regulate the university 
and its faculties, there were some issues and affairs that had to be approved by the Ministry 
of Education and the Cabinet and then confirmed by Royal decree. 
 
After 1969, Libya became the Libyan Arabic Republic and the RCC took several actions, 
such as nationalizing foreign companies and establishing public-owned enterprises to 
restructure the economy. “In the spring of 1972, a new political, administrative and 
legislative system was introduced as part of the People’s Revolution, which established a 
socialist state, to be governed only by the people. After the Declaration of the People’s 
Authority in 1977, Libya became a ‘State of the Mass’ or a Jamahiriya”. (Ahmad, N and 
Gao, S, 2004, p.366). The RCC determines higher education and its financing policy and 
has imposed a set of procedures and changes. These procedures and changes have been 
merged to accommodate the institutions of higher education and their functions with the 
purposes and ambitions of the philosophy of the El-Fatah Revolution. 
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There had been a major national debate to determine the best political and constitutional 
arrangements for the realisation of popular power. In 1973 Gaddafi, in his five points 
speech in Zuwarah, West Tripoli, proclaimed the ‘Cultural Revolution’. He called for a 
popular uprising to set up People's Committees in all government departments, industries, 
schools and universities. His calls for administrative revolution resulted in mass marches 
on all government establishments. (Metz, H, 1989, p 211) 
 
In December 1976, Gaddafi called on the People's Committees to go further by initiating 
action to articulate the popular will, instead of merely approving and supervising plans by 
the various ministries. In fact the executive system comprising the RCC and the Council of 
Ministers continued to operate into 1977. On March 2nd, 1977, Gaddafi proclaimed the 
‘Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority’ and he renamed the Libyan 
Arab Republic ‘The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ or as it has been 
translated by American scholar Lisa Anderson ‘peopledom’ or the ‘state of the masses’. By 
this proclamation Gaddafi wanted to establish the concept of democracy and practise it 
directly through the people who could govern themselves free of any constraints, 
especially from those of the modern bureaucratic state.  The main element in the practice 
of direct democracy was the ‘People’s Congress’, the first nucleus and the centrepiece of 
the new political system, which in the end comprised the ‘General People Congress’ 
(GPC). The GPC replaced the RCC as the supreme instrument of government. One of its 
roles was to appoint the ‘General People’s Committee’ to replace the Council of Ministers 
and its members now called Secretaries rather than Ministers, e.g., the ‘Secretary of Higher 
Education’ instead of the ‘Minister of Higher Education’.  (Metz, H, 1989, p 47). 
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The idea of democracy through the establishment of popular congresses and popular 
committees was explained by Gaddafi. He made the point, “Democracy has but one 
method and one theory” (in Efiki, A, 1982, pp 284 &185), meaning that real democracy 
and real people's power could only be achieved through elements contained in the theories 
in his ‘Green Book’. These were the People's Congresses and People's Committees. 
Political systems that act on behalf of their people in decision-making through parliaments 
were, in this view, non-democratic. The idea of the people's congresses meant that 
everybody had the right to participate in decision-making and in order to achieve that, 
Libya was divided into districts. Each area would have its own congress called the ‘basic 
people's congress’. The individuals in the basic people's congresses would choose their 
people's committees to replace the government. These committees were to be responsible 
for the administration of the public utilities in its district and responsible to the basic 
popular congress. In these conferences, individuals would make different decisions 
concerning their area. And then the popular committees would consider the resolutions and 
supervise and implement them. In this way a 'true democracy', a 'direct democracy' where 
all individuals participate in these decisions would be achieved. The ‘Green Book’ defines 
‘democracy’ as ‘the supervision of the government by the people’ but this would come to 
an end and be replaced by the right definition: ‘Democracy is the supervision of the people 
by the people’. (Gaddafi, M (a), 1975).  
The basic People's Congress included different socioeconomic classes, such as, doctors, 
engineers, farmers, workers and lawyers. These different sections would have their own 
syndicates and unions. Finally all decisions of the basic people's congresses, syndicates, 
and unions were to be considered in the General People's Congress which would meet in 
an annual ordinary session, usually for about two weeks in November or December. 
However, not everyone was satisfied with these changes. They criticised the government 
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because it did not use the correct criteria when appointing people to be responsible for 
universities and their departments.   
After the division of the Libyan University in August 1973 into two campuses, the 
University of Benghazi and the University of Tripoli, their faculties were the first to put 
into practice Gaddafi’s ideas. The General People’s Committee had been established on 
each campus to confirm the real division of the university into two separate universities. 
All higher education institutions operating in Tripoli became part of Al-Fatah University, 
and all higher education institutions operating in Benghazi became part of Garyounise 
University. After that, a series of meetings were held in some of the faculties at both 
universities to explain the concept of the General People’s Committee and its 
responsibilities. On April 28th, 1973, a meeting was held at the Faculty of Law in 
Benghazi, which is considered to have been the first institution in Libya to establish a 
popular committee. On May 3rd, 1973, another meeting was held at the Faculty of 
Engineering in Tripoli which had followed suit and then on May 7th, 1973, Gaddafi met 
faculty members, students and administrators from the Faculty of Arts and from the 
Faculty of Medicine. This was followed by many other meetings in other faculties. (Elfiki, 
A, 1982, pp 298, 290 and 291). As a result of these meetings the concept of a popular 
committee became clearly understood and these committees were established in all 
faculties at the two universities. Members were chosen from faculty members, students, 
administrators and employees.  
Since then the General People’s Committee (GPC) became dominant, it replaced the 
University Council in each university and the title of President of the University changed 
to the title of  Secretary of the General People’s Committee and each faculty was 
represented by the Secretary of General People Committee instead of the Dean of Faculty. 
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Figure 8 shows the new university structure. These committees were established by Law 
no.78, 1973, giving extensive local government powers. On January 1, 1975, Law no.1, 
1975, transferred the authority and functions of the university and the faculties’ councils to 
the People’s Committees at the same levels. It stated that: 
 
“The popular committees in the universities take the duties and responsibilities given to the 
university council in the laws and regulations. The chairman of the committee takes the 
responsibilities given to the President of the University. The Secretary of the Committee 
takes the responsibilities of the vice-president. The popular committees in the faculties take 
the responsibilities of the faculty councils. The chairmen of the popular committees in the 
faculty take the responsibilities of the deans of the faculties. The secretaries of the popular 
committees of the faculties take the responsibilities of vice-deans”. (Elfiki, A, 1982, p295). 
 
By this structure the committee of universities and faculties became responsible for 
regulating the institutions, laying down the broad lines of their financing policy of which 
the following are representative: 
1. Administer investments and expenditures of university capital. 
2. Approve the budget project and the final account to the university. 
3. Supervise the maintenance of university buildings and the establishment of new 
buildings. 
4. Decide on systems concerning different allowances and financial aid. 
5. Prepare the projects of financial and administrative regulations. (Elfiki, 1982, pp 
301 and 302).   
 
168 
 
In April, 1976, the name of the university in both campuses was changed to reflect the 
political nature of the new system. Benghazi University was renamed the Garyounise 
University, which refers to the military garrison from which Colonel Gaddafi first led 
vanguard forces to start the revolution.  Tripoli University changed to Al-Fatah University 
to refer to ‘Al-Fatah Revolution’. Naming the universities by using names having political 
significance and reflecting the support of the policy by the prevailing system, the ‘System 
of the Masses’, was obvious not only in the state universities, but also in the private ones. 
There were a number of universities which were named in way that referred to a political 
meaning or a political event. For example, the Seventh of April University in Musrata 
(West Tripoli) referred to a ‘Students’ Revolution’ that emerged in 1976 against the ideas 
of capitalism and communism. Also, Tahaddi University in Sirt (West Tripoli) referred to 
the decade during the 1980s when the relationship between Libya, the USA and the UK 
was at its worst. At that time Libya was blocked economically and politically. However, 
the Libyan leader wanted to show that by changing the names, Libya was not affected.   
 
On January 15th, 2008, the General People’s Committee’s (Council of Ministers) decision 
No.22, 2008, was issued, giving the universities’ popular committees extensive local 
government powers. They were to assume responsibility for policies in all institutions and 
in all sections of local government, both initiating plans and putting them into action. The 
decision included sixty three articles that covered the universities, their faculties and the 
institutes of higher education. Twenty-nine of them were to deal with the administrative 
responsibilities of the universities of the popular committees. The latter, as has been 
mentioned earlier, were to be headed by the named Secretary of the General People’s 
Committee, but that named secretary and his or her assistants would have to meet four 
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conditions, according to articles 8 and 11. The first are scientific and the fourth is political, 
as follows: 
1. To be the holder of a degree this should be of a higher level than that associated with the 
status of an Associate Professor. 
2. To have had working experience in the field of university teaching. 
3. To be deployed in scientific activities at university level. 
4. He or she has to be a believer in the philosophy of Al-Fatah Revolution. 
 
Articles 2 and 10 of the GPC’s decision dealt with financial affairs. According to the 
former the universities would have to become more autonomous: 
 
 “For each university, there should be a designated person and an independent, separate 
budget. The latter should be from public charity and from the university fixed and mobile 
income to comprise the overall budget (general budget). It will also include the generation 
of income from the services it provides, from Non-Government Organizations’ (NGO) 
subsidies and from the raised funding which come to a university from non-conditional 
gifts or recommendations with the only condition that these should not be contradictory to 
the main purpose of the establishment.” (GPC, Article 2, 2008, p2).     
 
Article 10 of the GPC’s decision has two points, the first point and the fourth point, that 
give a university the right to manage and regulate its own affairs. They are as follows: 
 
“…and by the university administrative body and its governance of its affairs, especially 
the following: 
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1. Management of university funds invested and disposed of in accordance with the 
legislation. 
2. Approval of the budget and final accounts to be forwarded to the concerned 
authorities.”  (GPC, Article 10, 2008, p 6).     
 
Figure 8. The Structure of the Al-Fatah University. (Garyounise University has the same 
structure). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion: 
 
To conclude, the above discussion has explained the development of higher education and 
its financing policy in Libya since 1955 when the first university was founded. For almost 
a decade since 1950, Libya experienced a period of tremendous economic, financial and 
social difficulties as has been noted by experts, such as Roger Tourneau, Higgins, and the 
UNESCO Mission that was sent by the UN to study economic and social problems in 
Libya during the period 1952-1954, i.e. before the establishment of the Libyan University.  
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Despite difficulties the Libyan authorities were determined to found a national university. 
It was felt by the government that there was a need to establish a local institution of higher 
education to provide an educated and qualified workforce and trained manpower. This 
growth has been accelerated by a number of economic and social factors, e.g. an increase 
in the number of students and faculty members, the discovery of oil, as well as other 
elements. 
 
Prior to the advent of revenue from oil over the period 1951 to 1961, the financing of 
Libyan higher education had been heavily dependent on foreign aid. This overseas aid had 
come from various sources, such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies like 
UNESCO ILO, FAO, ICAO, WHO, WMO, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, and even from Arab countries like Egypt, the Sudan, and Tunisia. But after the 
discovery of oil Libya became independent of foreign assistance. From being a stagnant 
economy it became a burgeoning economy, a capital-surplus state rather than a capital-
deficient state, and an aid extender rather than an aid recipient. 
 
Politically, the funding of higher education in Libya has been through two different phases. 
The first was under the rule of the monarchy from 1952-1969. The second was under Al-
Fatah Revolution, the ‘System of the Masses’ from 1969 to the fall of Gaddafi. In the 
former, the higher education system was regulated by the Ministry of Education. All its 
decisions and actions had to be passed to the Cabinet of Ministers for discussion, and then 
the King would issue a royal decree of approval. After 1969, when the monarchy ended, 
Libyan higher education entered a new stage called the ‘System of the Masses’. The new 
political system appeared to be completely opposite to that of the previous government and 
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made changes in the management structure of higher education in a way that fitted with the 
philosophy of the new regime. Gaddafi had introduced his ideas to restructure the higher 
education system. He transferred authority from the government to the people. Libyan 
higher education institutions were now regulated by ‘People’s Committees’. The President 
of the University became the ‘Secretary of the General People’s Committee’ and each 
faculty would be represented by the Secretary of the General People’s Committee instead 
of by the Dean of Faculty. Their members would consist of people who worked at these 
institutions, e.g. faculty members, students, and employees. These members would be 
elected through a direct election where the people sit together in a popular congress to 
choose the members according to specific requirements and conditions. The committees 
were given extensive legal authority and local state powers to regulate the institutions of 
higher education. However, this system was abolished subsequent to the February 
Revolution and has raised a number of issues related to private higher education. So, 
whether private institutions will survive or not is a matter to be determined in the future. 
These issues will be covered in epilogue at the end of the thesis.   
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Chapter five: The financial crisis and social pressures for change. 
5.1 Higher education in economic and social development plans: policies for 
improving access and equity. 
This chapter will examine more analytically the pressures leading to the expansion of 
higher education during the period briefly outlined in the previous chapter. When, in 1965, 
oil was discovered in Libya it became a rich country. This wealth provided the Libyan 
government and the policy makers in the education sectors with the ability to go ahead 
with expanding higher education. “The increase in oil revenue and its ratio to total revenue, 
accompanied by an unfortunate decrease in other sectors of the economy, promoted over 
the first few years of this development the idea that oil is the key to the dynamic character 
of the Libyan economy and its vitality for the development of the region.” (El-Fathaly et 
al, 1977; p16). 
 
This discovery and exploitation of oil was to have a major effect upon the funding of 
Libyan higher education. There had been six plans for social and economic development. 
Two of them were formulated during the Monarchy phase and the others were founded 
after the Al-Fatah Revolution in 1969. The first ever five-year plan in Libya existed 
between 1963 and 1968.  Its allocation reached 169 million dinars and then it was 
increased to about M.D.480 with the growth of the oil revenues. As the situation in Libya 
was difficult, a large percentage of these allocations were spent on the main services and 
the establishment of an infrastructure for the national economy including the construction 
of municipal facilities such as lighting, water networks, roads, houses, schools and 
hospitals. It was felt that it was important to give priority to the pre-tertiary level of 
education rather than to the higher level because at that time one of the major weaknesses 
was the high rate of illiteracy. (Central Bank of Libya, N.D). 
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The second plan covered the years from 1968 to 1974 with an increased allocation of 
M.D.1149. Despite its ambitious goals to develop the Libyan economy, it lasted only for 
five months instead of five years. It was ignored and then cancelled by the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) which took over after September 1969. (Central Bank of Libya, 
N.D). 
 
All development plans that were founded after 1969 were aimed at achieving a set of 
strategic goals, including reducing the reliance on oil and the diversification of income 
resources through more consideration of the main productive economic sectors, such as, 
agriculture, industry and energy, and thereby achieving self-sufficiency. To meet the 
ambitious development plans the government felt that it was important to increase the 
number of higher education students to provide qualified labour. The state listed a number 
of strategic objectives that should be achieved through these social and economic plans. 
These objectives were: 
 
1. Expansion of higher education to absorb the increasing number of students. 
2. Improvement in the quality of higher education graduates to fulfil the needs of 
social and economic development plans. 
3. Ensuring that higher education institutions are distributed fairly between urban and 
rural areas.    
 
Of course there could sometimes be tension between these objectives with different 
motives leading to them. 
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With regard to the first objective the Gaddafi government declared that education at all 
levels is a basic right for all Libyan citizens. Gaddafi in his “Green Book” says that “the 
acknowledgment [of this] is a nature right for everybody”.  In the light of this concept 
education became not only a basic right but also the government guaranteed to make 
education, including higher education, free. Accordingly, higher education was 
characterized as being free of charge and public responsibility. As a result enrolment in the 
public universities grew dramatically from 8,220 students in 1972/1973 to 165,561 
students in 2007/2008.   
 
The quality of education has also been a concern in the plans. Emphasis was to be given to 
vocational training at the higher education level and more concern given to  developing a 
long term plan for the educational sector that could achieve the goals of the social and 
economic development plans. About 109 higher education institutes and centres were 
founded during the period from 1985 to1990. These specialized in different areas, such as 
mechanics, electrics, electronics, computing and building and construction. In 1982 the 
state enacted what is called the “New Educational Structure”. School curricula were 
restructured in favour of technical subjects in a way that students at these schools could 
choose the undergraduate major from an early stage. It meant that graduates were prepared 
vocationally and academically so they could continue their studies in universities or enter 
the market work force. In 1986, as result of the lack of qualified teachers, of technical 
equipment and of suitable buildings, this structure was abandoned and all types of 
secondary education schools were closed except for those teaching the basic sciences. In 
1995 Gaddafi held a meeting with the General People’s Committee for Education and 
Scientific Research in Sirt to emphasize his desire for the structure. Secondary education 
was reorganized and special technical committees were founded under the supervision of 
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the National Centre for Training and Educational Research to avoid the earlier problems.24 
(Otman, W. & Karlberg, E, 2007 and Alhawat, A., et al, 2004).25    
 
The other concern in the plans was to ensure there was a balance in the establishment of 
higher education institutions across the country. Until 1973 there were two universities, 
one in Tripoli and one in Benghazi. As the number of students increased, the government 
established seven more universities in the rural areas to avoid the overcrowding in the 
universities in those two main cities. Moreover, some of these universities developed 
faculties outside their cities or towns. The Al-Fatah University in Tripoli, for example, 
opened branches in Al-Azizeya in the south west, in Al-Zawya in the west and in Musrata 
in the east.  
 
The economic and social transformation plans starting with the three-year plan 1973 -1975 
and then the 1981-1985 plan, were designed to implement a suitable strategy for the 
Libyan economy as planned by the coup in 1969 for the public sector to dominate and 
regulate economic activities. The private sector in higher education was not involved in 
those plans. All financial allocations for the education sector were distributed entirely to 
the state universities. The political system of Gaddafi’s regime initially completely rejected 
the idea of the private sector (see Chapter Six).   
   
During the 1970s higher education in Libya was very limited and had just the two 
universities, Al-Fatah University in Tripoli and the other, Garyounise University in 
                                                 
24
 The previous problems included the lack of qualified teachers, technical equipment, etc., as mentioned 
earlier. 
25
 After the February Revolution the post-Gaddafi government had intended to abandon this policy because 
the Higher Education Minister stated that this type of education was not suitable and would not serve the 
Libyan economy effectively.25 (Interview The Deputy Minister of Higher education, Prof. Fathi R. Akkari, 
January 2012). 
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Benghazi, with a combined total of 4,100 students. (General Authority for Information, 
Statistical Book, 2002, p77). Policy planners in the three year plan and in the plan of 1976-
1980 had obviously given priority to the completion of these higher education institutions 
and by 1974 six faculties had been established in both universities. The 1976-1980 plan 
aimed to complete the establishment of these faculties: Education, Engineering, Science 
and Agriculture. Two lecture theatres were planned as were laboratories, facilities for 
public administration and the provision of a library housing academic materials. In 
Garyounise University the plan aimed to achieve the following:        
1. Complete the Faculty of Arabic Language and Islamic Studies. 
2. Establish more buildings for the faculties of Science, Engineering, Medicine and 
Agriculture able to accommodate 5,400 students and to be completed by the end of 
the designated period of the plan. Accommodation for 5,330 students to be made 
available in both cities. 
3. Build other facilities to serve students.  
 
At that time the state’s targets through this plan were to expand the capacity of the 
universities to increase the complement of students from 13,517 to 25,470 and to increase 
the numbers in practical studies more than in theoretical studies. Therefore, more faculties 
were added in both universities, whilst at the same time the current capacity of some 
colleges had been expanded to absorb greater numbers of students. To achieve the strategic 
goals of the 1976-1980 plan, the government devoted M.D.470, 430,000 to the education 
sector, 49% of which has been allocated to the universities of Al-Fatah and Garyounise. 
Four years later, three industrial institutes of higher education were opened. And in 1980 
the number of university students and those in practical - i.e. scientific departments - had 
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risen to a figure of 19,315, about 5,798 short of the target proposed by the policy makers in 
1976. (Planning Ministry. (N.D) and General People’s Committee for Planning, (N.D)). 
 
By 1980 the 1981-1985 plan had been formed and this aimed to complete some of the 
enterprises that had not been achieved in the previous plan. These projects were divided 
into three types: under performance, non-realization of the committee of tenders, and faults 
in study and design. The government had planned to reach a group of strategic objectives 
that included higher education opportunities for all Libyan citizens through Open 
University programmes and to increase admissions in technical and scientific studies at the 
universities in order to meet the requirements of the ambitious development plan. To 
achieve this aim, the government spent M.D. 697,000 of the allocated sum of M.D. 
825,300. It was the first time since 1957 that such an effort had been made to establish 
three more universities and to complete three vocational higher education institutions. All 
these establishments, with exception of one university, were located away from the two 
main cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. These institutions were designed to specialize in three 
different areas: electronic, electrical and technical. It was felt that its main concerns were: 
first, to avoid overcrowded cities such as Tripoli and Benghazi; second, to offer higher 
education opportunities for all Libyan citizens especially those who lived in rural and 
remote areas; and third, to create industrial and vocational training institutions within 
higher education that would help train the manpower urgently needed by the enterprises in 
social and economic development. It is ironical that, on the one hand, emphasis in the 
higher education policy had to be given to vocational education but, on the other hand, the 
entry requirement (i.e. level of attainment) for students to study at these institutions was a 
mark of less than 65%. It meant that students who achieved high grades enrolled in 
universities and others who scored low grades were directed towards vocational education. 
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The anomaly here is that although the policy makers emphasized the essential nature of 
vocational education and placed importance on the recruitment of high-quality applicants, 
it was students who held low qualifications from secondary education that were admitted 
to study at these institutions. (Al-Swyah et al, 1995). In fact, vocational education is not 
respected by Libyan society because it perceives this type of education as being of low 
class. This is compounded by the fact that even highly qualified university graduates were, 
and are, uncertain about their abilities and jobs for the future.        
 
No plans like the three previous ones have been produced since 1985.  In the following 
years the allocations from the development budget to the education sector had been 
devoted incrementally year by year instead of in an overall prescribed allocation. This was 
because the achievements of the previous plans were below the government’s expectations. 
In 2004 the new Prime Minster, Dr. Shokri Ghanem, had intended to implement a five-year 
plan as before, instead of an annual allocation, by claiming that the financial resources 
should be distributed according to the size of the enterprises because this would serve 
economical growth and that it should not be based on population figures. (Embark, S, Al-
Jamahiriya Newspaper, 8th of December 2004, p13). However, subsequent plans continue 
to be designed on a yearly period. Previous plans had failed to achieve their goals and 
Gaddafi’s government was disappointed because of these failures. In available references 
and sources most development plan allocations are devoted to the education sector as a 
whole see table 18. It is to be noted that the dip in financial expenditure 1995-97 was partly 
because of the reduction of oil revenues.   
Table (18). Yearly allocations to the education sector in Libya (1986-2003). 
Year  1986 90/91 91/92 92/93 1994 1995 1995 1997 1999 2000 
Allocations  130 125.5 129.0 148.0 135.0 82.0 72.0 99.0 130.4 324.0 
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Year  2001 2002 2003        
Allocations  216.1 738.8 381.5        
Source: Alhawat, A. 1990 and Central Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin. 2001, Vol.No 41 and 2004, 
Vol.No 44;, Research and Statistics Department.  
 
It is very difficult to get precise information of how much higher education cost the Libyan 
government, but the sources show the efforts of the planners in all development plans 
aspiring towards further development of the system. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed rapid 
expansion in the number of universities and of other higher education institutions. Seven 
more universities and 19 higher education centres for industrial and vocational studies 
were founded in different places. And then the number increased from 22 in 1995 to 62 in 
2002 which included a variety of vocational fields. Again, the government was more 
concerned with developing a long term plan for the educational sector that would achieve 
the goals of the development plans and meet the manpower requirements of the economy 
for a specific technical work force. In the 1990s the General People’s Committee for 
Education (GPCE, Ministry of Education) adopted a series of procedures and decisions to 
increase the number of enrolments in these institutions. This sought to increase the 
percentage of young people who were projected to go to the higher vocational education 
centres from 15% to 60% by 2000 and had a future target of 70% for 2010. Unfortunately, 
two obstacles damaged the policy targets: the negative attitude of Libyan society toward 
this type of education and the fact that institutions enrolled students who had graduated 
from secondary schools with low standards of achievement. (Aljaly, A, 2006).  
 
Indeed statistics show that the goal to raise the numbers more in practical studies than in 
theoretical ones was unsuccessful, as was the other aim to improve the percentage of 
enrolments in vocational institutions. In universities the majority of students still preferred 
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human studies.26  And this led to a surfeit of graduates from the latter compared with the 
number of science graduates. As can be seen from table 19 this imbalance caused the 
problem of ‘educated unemployment’ (as it will be explained later). A report in 2002 
submitted by a team of Libyan experts on vocational education after a wide evaluation 
concluded that most of these establishments needed to reconsider their curricula, their 
structure, their finance and their departments. 
Table (19). The number of graduates from arts/humanities departments compared with 
those from science departments. (2001-2004).       
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 
Humanities  19,254 21,728 23,400 25,472 
Science  12,640 13,942 15,238 16,538 
The difference 6,614 7,786 8,162 8,934 
  Source: (Al-Magory, A. 2005, p74).    
 
In 2004 the public chancellor, Dr. Abd- Alsalame Al-gelalee, who was in charge of 
education at all levels described the education situation in Libya after about four decades 
as a  disaster and painful. He stated disappointedly: 
 
“........Its development plans and public policy were faulty in that graduates cannot find 
jobs, not with this education system......yes, it is true that the market labour in Libya was 
not able to offer jobs for many graduates, and the question here is why the results of 
education were not accepted by the labour market?  ..... during the last three decades, the 
total costs and expenses in the education sector were more than three billion Libyan 
dinars. In the previous four years alone the costs exceeded one and half billion, however, 
                                                 
26
 Human studies include all literature and theoretical sciences such as sociology, education, business 
management, historical studies and languages. Others like engineering, computing, medicine and pharmacy 
are called practical sciences. Libyan students prefer to go for the former rather than the latter as they consider 
these disciplines to be easier options.    
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the standards were very low and were not achieved as were proposed by policy 
makers.....” (Jawhar, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22nd of June 2009, p11). 
 
5.2 The main forces of change towards the privatization of higher education  
As has been explained earlier, the major trend in most countries, whether developing or 
developed, has been the privatization of higher education and Libya is not excluded. It 
seems there is consensus among authors and scholars that the first and foremost reason 
why governments favour the privatization of their higher education systems is that their 
financial constraints prevent the funding of post-secondary educational institutions. But the 
question is: did Libya face the same challenges and take the same direction?  
 
In Libya at the end of the 1990s economic, demographic, inter- and intra-sectoral 
competition, as well as a shift in ideological thinking, all account for the policy shift in 
higher education financing. Previous policy failure to achieve some of, if not most of its 
goals, as proposed by the policy makers, is undoubtedly the most rational explanation for 
the reconsideration of the financing policy. Up until 1985, Libya’s economy performed 
remarkably well with a Gross Domestic Production (GDP) sufficient to cover development 
and recurrent expenditures. Economic decline began in earnest after 1985, catapulted by 
the oil price shocks that considerably slowed down economic production leading to capital 
destruction and the stagnation of joint productivity in both labour and capital. This dismal 
economic performance resulted in insufficient resource-based revenues being available to 
finance social services including education. Along with the decline in macro-economic 
performance came rapid population growth. Libya is among countries world-wide that 
have had a very high growth rate in population. For many decades after independence the 
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population growth rate was around 2% (Planning Ministry, (N.D) p55). These changes in 
demographic numbers translated into increased demand for higher education.  
 
The country’s nine public universities and seven accredited private ones had by the first 
decade of the twenty first century an enrolment capacity of  326,453 students, 92 % of 
whom are enrolled in public institutions (Alseny, N. 2004, in Al-Aowar, M 2006 and 
General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2008, p43). So the pressure to expand 
higher education, coupled with economic decline, has had a powerful impetus in policy 
reform. Increased inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral competition for diminishing national 
resources has also catalyzed policy reform. Education is just one of the sectors that call for 
continuous state funding in the last few decades and it has claimed a large share of the 
national budget to the detriment of other vital sectors. The Libyan government allocated 
381.3 million LD of the development expenditure to education in 2003, representing over 
14 % of the entire national budget (Central Bank of Libya, 2004, Economic Bulletin, p27). 
In 2001, university education received 108, 097 million LD from the development budget. 
These stark economic realities were accompanied by a general shift in ideological thinking 
about the role of government in financing higher education, as well as new conceptions of 
the role of university in national development. Neo-liberal ideology-the de-emphasis or 
rejection of government intervention in economy and the belief in progress through free-
market approaches – during this period steadily gained currency within Libya’s national 
development thinking, courtesy of the World Bank proposals for higher education in many 
developing countries, especially regarding its criticisms of the perceived  ‘failure’ of state 
universities in Africa nad the growing unrest about the desirability of the public provision 
model which we examined in earlier introductory chapters. A combination of internal and 
external factors has, therefore, provided the drive for policy reform in higher education 
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financing in order to sustain and develop the system for an ever increasing population. 
Critical questions remain, though, as to what kind of policy has been adopted and with 
what consequences to the values inherent in higher education aspirations in Libya. 
  
The following section will highlight the main forces that led to the policy makers 
reconsidering their financing policy for higher education. These forces indicate the 
difficulties that faced the Libyan government during the Gaddafi regime. So, the section 
below covers the period from 1969 till 2010. 
 
(i) The impact of economic crises on the higher education financing policy. 
The dependence of the Libyan economy on one commodity - i.e. crude oil - represented a 
great problem once the price suddenly fell. The crude oil exports represent more than 90% 
of total exports. The oil and natural gas extraction sector contributed about 27% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which means that it ranked first in terms of importance for 
creating Libya’s GDP. The Libyan government distributed the oil revenues according to 
three different types of expenditure: steering (called the steering budget), development 
(called the development budget) and security and defence. 
 
The steering budget included the expenses of universities and other higher education 
institutions, salaries and wages and other general expenses. The development budget 
includes the expenditure on the infrastructure for higher education, such as buildings, 
laboratories, libraries, communications and roads. The following analysis will focus on the 
latter because it reflects the government strategy on the importance of the higher education 
system. The development of higher education depends largely on this type of expenditure 
and the state policy was to direct a large proportion of the oil revenues to the development 
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enterprises. The law in Libya allowed the government to allocate 70% of oil revenues to 
social and economic development and this resulted in a strong relationship between 
development costs and oil revenues. In Libya there have been two important periods that 
could explain how much the education sector has been affected by oil revenues through the 
development allocations.  The first period was during the 1970s when the Gross Domestic 
Product for oil was rising. The development expenditure grew from 6.6million LD in 1970 
to 216.7 in 1980, more than twenty-eight times in just eleven years. Starting in 1970, when 
an amount of 6.6 million LD was spent, this rose more than four times to 26.1 million LD 
in 1971 and increased even further to 31.6 million LD in 1972. Thereafter it increased 
steadily throughout the 1970s, with the exception of ‘76, ‘77, ‘78, and reached a peak of 
182 million LD in 1982 when the oil price soared to US$ 40 per barrel occasioned by the 
Iranian revolution and the Iraqi-Iranian War.  The figures (9), (10), (11) and (12) provide a 
comprehensive picture of the relationship between the GDP for oil and the Actual 
Development Expenditure on Education. (Ben-Saeed,B, 2005; Behear, J. 1999; and Otman, 
W. & Karlberg, E., 2007, p97).      
 
The second period comprises the years from 1980 to the middle 1990s when the GDP for 
oil was decreasing. These years were very difficult for the Libyan government. Firstly, 
Libya had sanctions imposed by the USA and in 1992 the UN also imposed sanctions, 
causing increased privation and mounting discontent in Libya because it had failed to 
cooperate in the investigation of the two terrorist bombing attacks, the 1988 Pan Am flight 
103 which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the UTA flight 772 which exploded 
over Niger. These sanctions isolated Libya economically and politically until 1999 when 
the UN suspended its sanctions. (Central Bank of Libya, Human Development Report in 
Libya, 1999) and (John, B. 2008). Secondly, the reduction in the state income from oil in 
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the mid-1980s was a factor for two reasons; the price was less than US $9 per barrel (the 
lowest level ever) and the significantly reduced production from Libyan oilfields due to the 
departure of the US oil companies. As a result of that the GDP declined from M.D. 6564 in 
1980 to M.D 3380 in 1995 which led to a sharp decrease in actual development 
expenditure on education from M.D. 227.76 to M.D. 52.5 in the same period. The figures 
below show that the trend line of the two variables is generally downwards. However, this 
did not affect the number of higher education students who qualified during these years. It 
meant that in spite of the decline in revenue, the government continued to increase the 
number of higher education students from 19,315 in 1980/81, 32,770 in 1984/85, 50,471 in 
1989/90 and then to 70,525  in 1991/92. (Alhawat, A. 1993). The simple reason for this 
was that higher education remained free, so those students were not required to pay tuition 
fees.    
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(ii) Demographic pressures 
In chapters two and three I discussed how demographic pressures had been a force 
generally to reform the financing of higher education. Thus, the size of population can 
influence not only the number of students who enter higher institutions, like universities, 
but also by the allocations which are devoted to these institutions. And, of course, 
burgeoning tertiary education enrolments puts pressure on fiscal resources. 
 
The question raised in this respect is: has the demographic growth been an effective factor 
in establishing private higher education in Libya as well as in the other countries?  In 
Libya, the annual rate of growth has been almost the highest in the world. In the 1970s and 
1980s the annual rate reached 5%. Although it declined from 4.21% in 1984 to 2.86% in 
1995 and to 1.83 in 2006, the major trend in the population of Libya according to the 
censuses taken increased significantly, as is shown in Table 20 below. The reasons for this 
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growth could be attributed to the improvement in the quality of life with higher incomes 
and the existence of a government that guarantees to provide continual education, constant 
health care and other social services. By the first decade of the twenty-first century almost 
50% of the population in Libya was below fifteen years of age and this classified Libyan 
society as a young society. (Al-Gaddafi, S. 2002, and Almagory, A, 2005).  
 
Table (20).The Libyan population in 1984, 1995 and 2006 
 Year 1984 1995 2006 
No. of population 3,231,059 4,389,739 5,323,919 
Source:  General Authority for Information, Statistical  Book, 2007. 
 
The growth in population led to an increase in the number of pupils in primary and 
secondary education and of students in higher education. Since the 1969 coup the number 
of students in secondary education at both general secondary education (GSE) and 
technical secondary education (TSE) had expanded rapidly. In the former, which is 
considered the main source of candidates for university education, the number increased 
from 8,304 in 1969-1970 to 234,023 in 2007-2008 (see Table 21), with, of course, a 
corresponding increase in the numbers of students leaving secondary schools with 
qualifications. The National Centre for Education Planning and Training refers to this in 
some of its studies by stating that the number of such students increased sixteen times in 
less than three decades. It grew from 2,898 in 1973 to 31,411 in 1995 (in Ben-Saeed, B, 
2005, p85).  The case of Libya differs from that of Bangladesh, Kenya or Malaysia where 
large numbers of students, although well qualified, fail to enter public sector institutions 
because their current university systems are unable to meet the increasing demand for 
tertiary education locally. Whereas in Libya the simplest response to the demand has been 
an increase in the number of enrolments in public universities, leading to the creation of 
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‘mega-universities’ comparable to the National University of Mexico and the University of 
Buenos Aires (see Kapur, D and Crowley, M. 2008, p16). As pupils pour out of elementary 
schools, they become the potential clientele for secondary schools and a similar process 
repeats itself at the higher educational level. In Libya this took place after 1969, with 
tertiary enrolments rising from 5,198 students in 1970-1971 to 300,966 in 2008-2009. 
Those students are distributed throughout 14 public universities. (The National Centre for 
Education and Training Planning, 2005, p43 and General Authority for Information, 
Statistics Book, 2009.). 
Table (21). Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) 
Academic Year Secondary School Enrolment (SSE) 
1969-1970 8,304 
1990-1991 113,683 
1995-1996 278,114 
1998-1999 211,070 
2002-2003 257,006 
2007-2008 234,023 
Source: Alhawat, A. et al, 2004, p153. Al-Fatah University, Bulletin of Higher Education, 2006. Number 11 
and General Authority for Information, Statistical Book, 2007, p11. 
 
Table 22 demonstrates that the distribution of students between these universities is very 
uneven and mostly concentrated in the two wealthiest and most populated regions, with a 
very heavy concentration in the two principal cities of Tripoli, where the Al-Fatah 
University is situated and in Benghazi, where Garyounise University is located.       
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Table (22).Distribution of students between the public universities in Libya, 2002-2003. 
University Students number 
Al-Fatah  71,580 
Garyounise 34,483 
Al-Tahadi 16,116 
Omar Al-Muktar 14,747 
Al-Mergeb 13,923 
The Seventh of April 10,344 
Sebha 8,703 
General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2003. 
 
 
This uneven distribution made the faculties in these institutions overcrowded. Indeed, by 
2007 Al-Fatah University, the top university in the national rankings, had risen to 102,046 
students enrolled, with most of them studying in inconvenient class rooms and lecture 
theatres (General People’s Committee for Higher Education, Bulletin of Higher Education; 
the first issue, 2008). In the Faculty of Medicine, because of the limited capacity of the 
lecture theatre, students had to either sit on the floor or bring their own chairs. This 
situation was revealed in a Newspaper in 2003 and 2004 when it was reported that: 
 
“...the number that can be absorbed by theatres is 600 students but there are 1,979 
students in year two and 1,300 students in year three....” A student in this faculty 
disappointedly complained: “Can you believe that students have been forced to bring 
chairs from outside or even from their homes to sit on during lectures? Is this logical? 
Where have the budgets that are allocated to universities gone? In the summer time 
medical students do their final examinations in a tent built in a car park. The weather is 
hot and the surroundings bad. And in the Faculty of Economics there aren’t any computing 
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laboratories and there’s an inadequate library....”. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya 
Newspapers, 7th and 8th of March 2003, p6, 11th and 12th of June 2004, p10 and 25th and 
26th of June 2004, p9).        
 
Similarly, Al-Tear made a criticism of the Libyan government (in Ben-Saeed, B, 2005, 
p47) by pointing out that although many public universities had been established most had 
very poor facilities and suffered from serious overcrowding: in 2001-2002, for instance, 
the Faculty of Medicine at Al-Fatah University had 7,375 students who had to share a very 
small autopsy room with just two dead bodies for study. And at the same university in the 
Faculty of Dentistry there were about 5,000 students sharing just 35 examination chairs.  
 
Many began to question how a relatively wealthy country like Libya which had the means 
to solve some, if not all of these difficulties, found itself in this situation, especially insofar 
as it has a vast income from its export of oil and gas. However, the total expenditure on 
higher education per capita was less than not only all other oil producing countries but also 
other countries classified as diversified economies, such as Jordan and Lebanon. (see Table 
23). And the country has a population of only 5,323,991. (General Authority for 
information, Statistical Book, 2009). The author’s experience during this period was that 
many Libyans were disappointed and critical of the state’s failure to achieve its social and 
economic goals or to build better infrastructure.     
 
Table (23). Total expenditure on higher education per head of the population 1996.  
Country  The expenditure. (US$)  
Tunisia  26.83 
Jordan 44.15 
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Libya 29.78 
Oman 39.41 
Lebanon 89.67 
United Arab Emirates 68.27 
Qatar 122.60 
Source: Fergany, N. 2000.  
 
Typical of these comments was a short statement by Professor Salah Al-Myhob, A staff 
member in the Academy of Higher Studies and Economic Research, who declared that: 
“Libya is a special case”. In comparison with some Arab countries, such as Jordan and 
Tunisia, Libya seems to be better. Despite the fact that Jordan, for instance, is not as rich as 
Libya and has a larger population, its higher education provision seems to be more 
effective and efficient. The larger population in Jordan has led to a corresponding pressure 
in the demand for post-secondary education. Its response was to establish a private sector 
in Jordan’s higher education which was founded in just eight years before the 
establishment of private higher education in Libya. In 1991 the first private university in 
Jordan was established.  
 
(iii)Graduate Unemployment 
 
According to the Human Development Report of 1999, the Libyan government had 
adopted an ‘open-door’ policy for work opportunities and a guarantee of jobs since the 
1970s. The percentage of the workers in both services and manufacturing sectors reached 
84.6% in 1984 and then receded to 66.19% by 1995. But the problem of unemployment 
had become more obvious by the beginning of the 21st century. It is very difficult to obtain 
data about unemployment in Libya in the previous three decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s because there is very little published research related to unemployment. As Otman, 
194 
 
W. & Karlbeg (2007, p95) point out: “It is difficult to get precise unemployment figures 
for Libya.” In the 1970s circumstances in Libya were still ambiguous. Gaddafi had come 
into power, had started to practise the ideology of socialism and at this time had produced 
his three volumes of the ‘Green Book.’ In the light of this ideology outlined in the ‘Green 
Book’, Libyans had supposedly become a power controlling themselves by themselves. So, 
it became very controversial to say that there was unemployment in Libya. The reason, I 
think, is that since the Al-Fatah revolution the state had adopted an ‘open-door’ policy for 
work opportunities and had guaranteed jobs since the 1970s. It was an automatic guarantee 
of a public sector job for not only university graduates but also for all Libyan citizens. (Al-
Ghazal, M, 2006). It was seen as a national goal and one of the vital achievements of the 
1969 Revolution. The following anecdote provides an insight into evidence associated with 
this sensitive issue: “A student in the 1990s prepared his proposal about unemployment in 
Libya and at a seminar two doctors from the Department of Economics showed a sense of 
caution about further discussion of the proposal..... At the end one of them asked him: 
‘Suppose there is unemployment in Libya can you say that there is?’ He answered: ‘Not I, 
but the thesis will say that.’ The potential supervisor finished the discussion by saying that 
they could not be supervisors of such a topic....”. (Incident event happened with Author in 
Jun 2005).                
 
The Economic Research Forum (ERF), in Ali, A. 2002, p24 reported that unemployment 
had reached between 25 and 30 per cent. However, the leader of the Al-Fatah Revolution, 
‘Mummer Al-Gaddafi’ himself, had emphasised in his speeches at several events that there 
was no unemployment in Libya. For example, at a meeting on the 25th of December in 
2004, with members of the Bab Al-Aziziya Popular Congress he emphasized that:  
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‘We cannot say that Libyan adults are not employed.....because there is no unemployment 
in Libya and the evidence for that, as I told you, is that there are about two million foreign 
people working in Libya. If we wanted to swap them with Libyans we wouldn’t be able to 
find enough Libyan citizens to cover.....so, it is impossible that Libya has unemployment if 
it has a two million foreign work force.’. (Al-Hemali, J, Al-Jamahurya Newspaper, 24th 
and 25th of December 2004, p5).  
 
This was what the leader said in his speech at that time. However, our sources have 
revealed that unemployment actually rose to at a high rate in the Libyan economy, and this 
becomes clear when some of the references, published in 2001 and subsequently, include 
data about the phenomenon since 1995, just a year after Mummer Al-Gaddafi’s speech. 
Our first source is Dr. Shokri Ghanem, appointed Prime Minister by Al-Gaddafi in 2003, a 
year before Al-Gaddafi’s speech. Ghanem stated that:  
 
“The first of my priorities is to tackle the question of unemployment. Strange as it may 
seem in a country with a viable economy, and a population of less than six million, we 
have over 250,000 Libyans looking for jobs.” (Shell Exploration and Production, An 
exclusive Interview with Dr. Shokri Ghanem was conducted by ‘Shell Exploration and 
Production, September 2003).   
 
Also, the Libyan National Authority for Information and Documentation shows that the 
percentage of unemployment increased from 1.4% in 1995 to 7.7% in 2001. In 2004 a 
survey was made by a national newspaper (Belal, A, Al-Shames Newspaper, 2004, p10), to 
find out whether there was unemployment in the country or not and concluded that 
unemployment in Libya was a considerable phenomenon which had caused tragic social 
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problems for many people. Part of the problem was evidently that graduates from 
universities were still looking for jobs. Most had qualifications that did not suite the jobs 
available and this was why the Gaddafi Libyan government became more inclined towards 
vocational education.  
 
A number of Libyan researchers, authors and experts undertook studies27 about 
unemployment in the state and criticized the higher education system as being wasteful, 
inefficient, and unproductive. They claimed that it was unable to respond to the changing 
demands of customers and markets. This led university graduates, as Aljaly, A (2006) 
reports, to find themselves unemployed. On the one hand, there was an enormous need to 
raise the level of education in response to the country's development requirements, while, 
on the other hand, graduate unemployment was on the increase and the type of training 
provided failed to make graduates sufficiently capable of creating self-employment 
opportunities for themselves. In Almagory (2005), in his study about the relationship 
between the output of the higher education system and the labour market in Libya, argued 
that there were a large number of university graduates available but that the labour market 
had absorbed only a small fraction of those seeking jobs. He revealed that the presence of 
such unemployment could be attributed to the distribution of the students at universities 
where students had opted for departments in the humanities rather than in those of the 
practical sciences. See Table 24. He concluded that the public higher education system is 
responsible for the number of unemployed graduates. Not everyone, however, shares this 
                                                 
27
 The problem has not only been the concern of local studies and in addition to the ERF data mentioned 
earlier about unemployment in Libya there are other findings which investigated the phenomenon of 
unemployment in the Arab world. These references point out that in many Arab countries, and Libya is not 
excluded, the collapse of growth resulted in a serious unemployment crisis which reached dangerous levels, 
exceeding 25 per cent of the labour force, and only partially addressed by an expanding informal market 
which, because of its low productivity, and therefore, low income-generating capacity, is a symptom of a 
distorted economy rather than a window of opportunity for addressing poverty and unemployment in the 
region. Ali and Elbadawi in Elbadawi, I. (2005) and The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2002 2003 in 
Al-Hamad, A, (2003) p27. 
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view. An inspector general, Dr. Abd-Alsalame Al-gelalee, argued that this kind of 
unemployment was caused by faulty development plans and public policies not the 
education system (Al-Hemali, J, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22th of January, No, 4333, 
2003, p9). The policy makers in Libya had not planned social and economic enterprises 
properly and this led to a misallocation of resources. Whatever the reasons unemployment 
in Libya, especially among graduates, had been a serious dilemma that seems to be 
perceived by leaders, policy makers and even by Libyan society generally since 2000, as a 
threat to internal stability. The focus of different media, such as newspaper articles, 
journals and local TV programmes has exposed the situation to the public. It has been the 
subject of a number of research studies and investigations which reflect the growing 
concern of policymakers by providing different analyses and explanations.       
Table (24): The University graduates for the years 2001-2004. 
Year Humanities and Social Sciences Practical Sciences 
2001 19,254 12,640 
2002 21,728 13,942 
2003 23,400 15,238 
2004 25,472 16,538 
                         Source: Asharif, in Almagory, A, 2005, p67. 
Another, more recent study, in 2008, scrutinized data back to 1973 and illustrated the fact 
that unemployment in Libya had increased from 3.61% in 1973, to 3.68% in 1984, to 
11.66% in 1995 and then to 16.8% in 2002. According to this study the rate of 
unemployment had reached no less than 10%. One of the reasons given as to why there is 
unemployment is that the output of the Libyan higher education institutions had not 
fulfilled the needs of the labour market or the requirements of the economic and social 
development plans. (General Planning Council Institution, 2008, p7).   
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(iv) The failure of public higher education. 
As was discussed earlier in this thesis, for 45 years after independence the higher education 
sector had traditionally been under the supervision of the government. From 1955, the year 
of the establishment of the first university, to 1999, the beginning of private higher 
education, all Libyan institutions of higher education had been public. After independence 
universities were seen by the Libyan government as a means of achieving national goals 
and an excellent tool with which to improve Libyan society economically, socially and 
politically. But despite the large sums invested, public higher education has failed to play 
its role in the Libyan economy and has faced many difficulties as shown in a report 
prepared by the Higher Education Committee (National Committee for Private 
Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya, 2009, PHEA). The Report 
included 18 points of criticism which provided a comprehensive view and which evaluated 
state universities and colleges. Some of these points are as follows: 
1- Lack of balance in the number of students studying disciplines in specialized high 
schools. Most had enrolled in social sciences and the consequence was a lack of 
available places in universities to absorb them. 
2- Lack of appropriate curriculums and a lack of development of these curriculums in 
line with scientific and technical development. 
3- The instability of universities and their structure. 
4- No match between the output of higher education and the needs of the labour 
market. 
5- Absence of alternative other financial resources to fund the higher education 
institutions.   
 
5.3 Other Challenges of isolation and corruption. 
   
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has been a real challenge facing 
higher education in Libya since the early part of the twenty first century when the 
country’s relationship with foreign countries was re-established. Online registration by 
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students, online access to course outlines and materials and online examinations are all 
examples of the application of ICTs which could be used by administrators for better 
planning, for the setting of standards, for effecting change and for the monitoring of results 
of the essential functions of universities. ICTs is a crucial tool for increasing access to 
higher education and for ensuring high quality and standards in higher education but there 
are obstacles in the way.  The period from 1985 to 1990 was an extremely difficult period 
for Libya when it was isolated politically and economically from most other countries in 
the world. As a result the Libyan economy deteriorated including higher education 
programmes, policies and strategies. To compound this, in the 1980s the Minister of 
Education, Ahmed Ibrahim, took an official decision that the English Language was to be 
excluded from education at all levels and the emphasis was to be given to the Arabic 
language and Koranic education. For Libya this has proved to be a fundamental and 
disastrous mistake which set Libya back in terms of educational quality by two 
generations. (Otman, W & Karlberg, E. 2007, p110). It is a tragedy because this decision 
has been the reason for illiteracy in English in the vast majority of Libyans and many of 
those who have recently been funded for study in the U.K have experienced really serious 
difficulties with the English Language. This problem affects both those who study at home 
universities in Libya and in other foreign countries.        
  
Corruption was another problem. Huge financial allocations were spent on the education 
sector in Libya over more than three decades, but the achievements were far lower than 
had been expected by policy makers and even by Libyan society as a whole. Many people 
have criticised state policy for failing to invest enough in the education sector, but the 
government has spent more than three billion on the development of education for the last 
three decades, and the amount in the four years between 2000 and 2004 exceeded a billion 
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and a half. In the 2003 report in Al-Jamahiriya, a publication widely viewed as the 
mouthpiece of the Basic People’s Congress, the shortages in universities is strongly 
criticised:  
 
“….in the Department of Dentistry of the Medical Technician Faculty there are no 
laboratory materials and lecturers ask students to buy the materials themselves.....the 
Medical Sciences Faculty in the Seventh April University is located in west Tripoli, and 
there, specifically in Dentistry and Pharmacy, there hasn’t been a laboratory for four 
years ........” (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspapers, 14th January, p12, and 20th April, 
p11, 2003). 
 
It is tragic that, although the state devoted a large amount of its financial resources to fund 
a development enterprise inside a province, these public funds were wasted because of 
administrative corruption. Corruption in Libya had reached dangerous levels. This concern 
was expressed by a man during a public meeting held with Al-Gaddafi and the secretaries 
of the General People’s Committee (Ministers). He pointed at the secretaries and told 
Gaddafi that those were the people responsible for corruption in the country and that they 
had wasted the country’s resources and stolen its oil wealth. He stated that: 
 
“...oh, the revolution leader those people who set in front of you have never told you the 
truth about how many Libyans are suffering in their lives....some people are poor.....some 
people are homeless.... we need your urgent intervention to step the ministers down.......”. 
(Belal, A, Al-Shames Newspaper, 16th of February 2009, p3). 
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Several years before that, Gaddafi himself had emphasized that the current policy was no 
longer to continue. At the General People’s Congress in Sirte, in January, 2000, he accused 
members of the GPC of deliberately wasting the country’s oil wealth, saying “You are 
holding onto obsolete methods in order to justify wasting oil.” (Otman, W & Karlberg, E, 
2007, p218). In a study published by Gaddafi’s son in 2000 he stated that, according to the 
‘People’s Board for Follow-up’, corruption in Libya may be categorized under two 
phenomena: the phenomenon of forgery, mediation, favouritism, bribery and exploitation 
of jobs for private interests and the phenomenon of carelessness, lack of seriousness and 
negligence whilst performing duties. The failure of the officials responsible for applying 
the laws is the first and foremost reason that contributed to wide-spread corruption and this 
was coupled with the failure of those officials to supervise their subordinates in order to 
keep order and discipline. He also provided a number of examples of administrative 
corruption as cited in the Board’s reports, and these included a large number of cases of 
administrative incompetence displayed in several administrative decisions that were issued 
in violation of state laws. He further cited examples of the misdistribution of work and the 
deployment of unsuitable employees for certain posts.  
 
5.4 New ideas and the ‘big change’: 
 
By the early twenty first century, i.e. during the final decade of Gaddafi’s rule, it had 
become generally clear that the nationalized and centralized system of government in 
Libya could no longer survive. The collapse of centrally planned and bureaucratically 
managed economic systems which had informed the policies of Libya for decades had 
resulted in a lack of direction for a number of years.  Because of the absence of a clear 
vision, of increasing population pressure and of rising social demands, the country failed to 
adopt appropriate adjustment policies for growth and institutional reforms. Its strategies 
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continued to rely upon physical capital accumulation, while neglecting the need for human 
and institutional development with greater access to the rest of the world. Hence soon after 
the beginning of the new century we find that the social and economic pressures we have 
been discussing are filtered by policy shifts of some considerable extent. The nation’s then 
political leadership had abruptly come to the conclusion that the current drift could not be 
allowed to continue. A public statement from Gaddafi himself at the General People’s 
Congress in Sirte in 2000, is witness to this:  “....the system is finished. I have to step in 
today to stop this wheel from spinning in a rut and wasting fuel.” He blamed the members 
of the GPC (Ministers) of deliberately wasting the country’s resources. (Otman, W 
&Karberg, E, 2008, 217).   
 
In fact, this was not his only speech sharply criticizing the public sector of the country and 
he attended many meetings to express his evaluation of previous stages. On 1st May, 2003, 
in a scientific conference held on the ‘Libyan Economy and the Avoidance of Oil 
Revenues; future perspective’, he said that “.... the Libyan economy has failed to achieve 
its goals as were designed in the last social and development plans. The country still 
depends heavily on its oil. The latter has not made any improvement in the economy in 
terms of diversifying resources and in reducing its reliance on oil revenues. Consequently 
most production enterprises and industries have collapsed as a result of shortages in 
financial resources and mismanagement and the situation in general has become worse…” 
His attention focused more on the role of higher education institutions in the Libyan 
economy and he showed that the universities controlled by the public sector were 
inefficient. He continued his argument by saying that the government had spent its money 
for nothing and that the country’s oil revenues and human resources had been wasted. 
Referring to higher education he stated that “.....even in education it is a problem. In 
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Garyounise University, for example, it was found that the largest number of students was 
to be found in literature and the smallest number in engineering which means that even 
students in Libya favour useless studies....” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 1st 
of May 2003, p4 & p5). He advised a reform of the financing policy for higher education 
and proposed an immediate move to the private sector and thereby to privatise higher 
education.  
 
In June 2003 he gave a speech at the General People Congress (GPC) and again he seems 
disappointed and unsatisfied by the situation in Libya as he stated that: 
 
 “I have nothing to add to my speeches of the last forty years...I have spoken to you many 
times....  I would like to say something:  I am not satisfied with the present situation in 
Libya ....and I’m not responsible for all of it..... don’t believe those28 who tell you that this 
is according to the guidance of the Leader of the Revolution....you consider that everything 
was false from the first day of the 1969 Revolution - it means that even those people who 
believe that they were revolutionaries were not genuine, including the Members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)29 who were free officers and who became 
treacherous as did the Members of the Revolutionary Committees who cheated us and who 
were never revolutionaries....” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 13th and 14th of 
June 2003, p4-p7). 
He continued: 
“Today ideologically we have to end the public sector ....the latter needs highly educated 
people who have a high sense of nationhood, good manners and who are greatly 
                                                 
28
 He meant those who came later and established political units that were called “Revolutionary 
Committees”. They were founded in all state institutions, organizations and companies. These units were 
used by supporters of Al-Gaddafi to achieve personal interest at the expense of the public’s interest.   
29
 He meant his colleagues who were with him in the coup in 1969 but who later became his opponents. 
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concerned about poor people...... in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe 
countries collapsed because they relied on the public sector....” (Al-Dahesh, A, Al-
Jamahiriya Newspaper, 13th and 14th of June 2003, p4-p7). 
  
It should be noted here that the Members of the RCC had vanished as a social group since 
the 1980s. Some were imprisoned; others left the country, while revolutionary committees 
seemed to have a much reduced influence during the 1990s.  On the 24th of December, 
2010, the office of the Revolutionary Committees announced on the local channel, ‘Al-
Jamahiriya’, that these committees were going to be re-established in higher education 
institutions. 
 
Through his speeches Gaddafi had shown a genuine desire to end the current policy at the 
time and to introduce an alternative policy to be adopted in the country. He sometimes 
referred to it as `the people’s socialism` and sometimes as `the people’s capitalism`. To 
consolidate his decisions he appointed Dr. Shokri Ghanem in June, 2003, to practise the 
new policy.30  It should be noticed here that it was unusual in Libya to appoint an outsider 
like Dr. Shokri Ghanem to such a position because governmental high places had been 
devoted to those who were familiar with Gaddafi’s theories, philosophy, ideas and 
outlooks as portrayed in his three volumes of the ‘Green Book’. But this time it was 
different because it seems that Dr. Ghanem had never supported Al-Gaddafi’s regime nor 
Gaddafi himself.  In June, 2003, at the meeting with the Members of the General People’s 
Congress criticising the public sector, Gaddafi’s said:  
 
                                                 
30
 At that time he was the Secretary of the General People’s Committee for Economy and Trade (Minister) 
and then, almost five months later he became the Secretary of the General People’s Committee (Prime 
Minister) in November, 2003. 
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 “…you get used to being led by somebody from the Revolutionary Committee Office.... but 
this time this person (he means Dr. Ghanem) came from outside… I called him to Libya to 
guide us in a new direction and to practise the new policy......” (Al-Dahesh, Al-Jamahiriya 
Newspaper, 6th of June 2003, p4). 
 
The reason why Gaddafi had chosen him31 was because the current members had been 
responsible for failures in the public sector, so Gaddafi felt disappointed and stated that 
“…we have tried all of you and none of you has been successful, Ghanem has massive 
experience which could be useful for the next stage..” Ghanem was an experienced 
petroleum economist credited with liberalizing the Libyan economy and accelerating the 
opening of the country to international petroleum investment. When he became a Prime 
Minister he stated that: 
 
“For a number of decades the Libyan economy has been completely controlled by the 
State. What we are trying to do today, after belatedly discovering that the State cannot give 
everything to everyone and that the performance of the public administration is not up to 
the level of our expectations, is to invite more people to participate in the economic 
process. As a result, we have decided to open Libya’s doors to the private sector and we 
are offering incentives to people to participate in this economic programme.....” (Shell 
Exploration and Production, An exclusive Interview with Dr. Shokri Ghanem was 
conducted by ‘Shell Exploration and Production, September 2003). 
 
The period 2003 to 2006 brought a trend of sorts in privatisation although some private 
higher education institutions had been established in the late 1990s. In fact, Gaddafi had 
                                                 
31
 Another important factor that helped Dr. Shokri Ghanem achieve such a position was that he helped 
Gaddafi’s son, Saife Al-Islam, when he was studying for his MSc in Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) in IMADEC University in Vienna.       
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now called for the privatisation of the economic sectors in his speeches and favoured 
privatization justifying it by his philosophy in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green 
Book’. His new ideology, ‘Neo-liberalism’, was posited by him and recommended that 
there should be a shrinking of the welfare state and cutbacks in social expenditure. This 
view implies drastic cutbacks in public spending and countenanced the privatization of 
public services such as health, education, housing, and transport. The underlying ideology 
of privatization was based on the argument that the public sector is wasteful, inefficient, 
and unproductive, while the private sector is deemed to be more efficient, effective, and 
responsive to rapid changes locally and globally. However, this argument was imposed not 
to justify the importance of the private sector in higher education but to expose the failure 
of higher education under state control. This policy stemmed entirely from his theory in the 
‘Green Book’. Gaddafi since he came to the power had declared public control policy. His 
strategy was meant to stem the private sector development. He was very interested to 
socialism and opponent in capitalism and communism.   After some forty years of his 
regime, Gaddafi was disappointed with the previous policy but he never criticised himself. 
He blamed those people in charge of the higher education sector. Policy change of this 
extent could only come about if approved by Gaddafi, 
 
5.5 Changing the role of the state. What was it and how is it handled now? 
 
Until the late 1970s Libya’s economy operated in both the public and private sector. The 
latter fulfilled a significant role in the economy before the appearance of the ‘Green Book’. 
In volume two of Gaddafi’s ‘Green Book’ dealing with the private sector, rent was a form 
of ‘exploitation’ that should be abolished. All laws were passed to expand the role of the 
state at the expense of the private sector role which was seen as part of the ‘Capitalist’ 
system. Libyan workers took control of a large number of companies, turning them into 
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state-run enterprises. Retail and wholesale trading operations could, in theory, purchase 
whatever they needed at low prices. The government established about 230 centralized 
state-run supermarkets in various parts of the country. These stores were controlled by 
what were called the ‘local people’s committees’. In his thinking Gaddafi aimed to 
promote equity which he equated with socialism. Because of his unique conception of the 
character of the state, his distrust of the private sector, and his abhorrence of the profit 
motive, he maintained that it is only through massive state intervention that economic 
independence and equity can be attained. Thus, the state had taken control of virtually all 
economic domains since Gaddafi came to power. 
 
The period from 1976 to the beginning of the 1990s was longest period of time that the 
idea of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ was in practice. It became very difficult for the 
political system in Libya to continue practising Gaddafi’s principles and ideas and the 
1990s exposed the imperfection of the Gaddafi theory. It had failed to achieve many of its 
objectives. It failed, for example, to abolish the role of the private sector when the state-run 
supermarkets had closed down and private commercial transaction had again started to 
flourish throughout the country. It thus became evident through its many failures that the 
then current state policy based on the ideas of the ‘Green Book’ could not continue in the 
future. Realizing that the socio-political context had changed after the democratization 
project had started four decades previously. Gaddafi openly declared that the 
‘democratization’ of higher education should go hand in hand with Libya’s political 
development. Announcing that the government was prepared to adopt a decentralization 
policy in the higher-education sector, he promised that the state would gradually devolve 
powers to higher education in four major aspects: personnel management, academic 
freedom, finance, and curriculum. On many occasions Gaddafi made public speeches and 
208 
 
held several meeting with the policy makers and others from different classes to confirm 
his desire for the change. His call to privatise higher education was not, he said, contrary to 
his thinking. According to him universities should be established on the base of profit-
participation partnerships and should not be allowed to be owned by individuals.       
 
The policy since the Revolution of 1969 had been in trouble. It had been hoped to develop 
Libyan society from its underdeveloped stage to an advanced stage of development and to 
improve the quality and standard of living of its people. The previous policy had failed to 
achieve its goals and its efforts had not borne fruit owing to many administrative and 
internal problems. Gaddafi had stated that: 
 
“...education and health care have been controlled by the public sector for decades... do 
you feel satisfied with both sectors?...every year you criticize education and health by 
saying that they are unsuccessful and useless.....it means that when the state regulates, 
these sectors fail...... this is the result given in the proclamation of the People’s Authority 
in 1977 and shows that  up to now, the state, the public sector and public administrative 
have failed to control the education and health sectors, so they have to be controlled by 
people ...”. (Belal, A, Al-Shmes Newspaper, 16th of February 2009, p2-p4).                 
 
In spite of this some argued that the public sector should retain its role in the economic 
sectors. The secretary of General Planning Council (Minister of Planning) stated that: 
 
“I am not among those who are asking the state to forsake its role ....the state has to have 
a main role in economic activities.........”. (Al-Hemali, J, A-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 6th of 
April, 2004, p11). 
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The newspaper did not go into further details of this speech but it exposed the difficulties 
facing the Libyan government and motivated Gaddafi to make many speeches publicly 
emphasizing the need for change. He proclaimed a new policy for the future that had three 
main elements:  
1. A decision to cease public control over certain sectors in the country;  
2. That oil revenues should be distributed between Libyan families;  
3. That social services, especially education and health care, were to be regulated by 
people (the public sector and the state would no longer finance and be responsible for these 
sectors).    
 
By making these decisions Gaddafi had aimed to achieve several goals.  Firstly, equity, 
because he felt that the country’s oil belonged to all Libyans without any exceptions and 
that everyone had a basic right to have his or her share from its revenues and that these had 
to be shared equally between all the people. It is unfair, he said, that some people are rich 
and others are poor. By saying this he hoped to relieve the pressure exerted on the 
government by Libyan society. He suggested that if people receive their money and curtail 
the role of the public sector and the government, they would make better spending and 
investment decisions on all social services, including higher education based on their 
abilities, interests, and aims. However, the current government had made a massive 
investment in the sector of higher education by establishing new buildings on all campuses 
across the country. This meant that the role of the state was still dominant and to stem 
public sector spending in the country would be difficult.      
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 In higher education specifically, which is the main concern of this thesis, there have been 
two long-standing major arguments supporting the Libyan government’s subsidization of 
higher education: social returns and positive results from higher education and 
considerations of equity. In the former, as is evident, higher education imparts substantial 
monetary and non-monetary benefits for both society and students. The major difficulty, 
though, is in measuring precisely the extent of the benefits. Not all can be measured 
according to a single scale, if, indeed, they can be measured at all. Nevertheless, analyses 
of rates of return based on only the monetary costs and benefits of education provide a 
baseline estimate of the pure economic value of education.  But these studies seem to be 
extremely lacking in an evaluation of private rates of returns. Therefore, it seems to be 
difficult to decide whether the cost of higher education should be paid by Libyan students 
and their families or whether to justify the continued use of full public subsidies. And this 
is the reason why some of these justifications (e.g. personal benefits from higher education 
and capital market weaknesses) have not been presented widely in the arguments 
associated with the financing of higher education in the country. In spite of this 
inconclusive debate, if all previous studies in Libya are examined it will be found that they 
have appraised the important role that higher education exerts in the Libyan economy. 
Effectively it has given society more benefits than it has its individuals and thus justifies its 
100% funding from the government. Since 1969, the financing of public higher education 
has been guided by equity considerations, namely that all Libyans, poor and rich alike 
should have the same equal opportunity to pursue higher education and accordingly 
university education is free for all with the full cost borne by the state. It is also argued that 
public subsidies are needed to equalize entrance opportunities for potential students from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds otherwise students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
might be prevented from entering higher education. 
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From the middle of the 1990s the trend changed. It became clear that Gaddafi’s suggestion 
was to introduce not the idea of cost-sharing as in many countries, but to distribute oil 
revenues among Libyans so that the entire financial costs of higher education would be 
borne by the students and their families. He had never before referred to the experience of 
other countries regarding the introduction of cost-sharing. And this might explain the lack 
of studies and research on the financing of higher education in Libya.   
 
The policy makers’ arguments were based upon efficiency, consideration and choice. The 
first is defined as ways in which higher education institutions become responsive to the 
demands of their customers without state intervention. The notion of cost transformation 
from state to students and their families revolves around the argument that public funds are 
wasted, that state control is inefficient and that when students have to pay their own 
educational costs, they make more informed choices. There is a general consensus in Libya 
today that privatization is seen to be more efficient than public control because of strong 
incentives to minimize costs and use resources efficiently. It is argued that private higher 
education is more responsive to the changing demands of customers and markets. 
Privatization leads to competition which brings down costs and improves the quality of 
service. The private higher education sector is commonly looked upon as being flexible 
and responsive to the rapidly changing demands of students and the labour market and can 
offer a diversity of educational programmes in which to create a broadening of social 
participation in higher education.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Since the establishment of the first university in Libya, the government had been the sole 
provider of higher education at university level. It had established one university in 1955 
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and then the number grew to about 14 universities over a period of 55 years. As indicated 
above, student enrolment increased rapidly, so that by the end of the Gaddafi period public 
universities, on average, had an annual student enrolment of about a quarter of a million. 
There were several factors that could be attributed to this development of higher education. 
The majority of them were internal factors and these include the need to achieve a body of 
trained human resources to enable the country to meet its requirements in social and 
economic development plans, the population growth combined with the strong social 
demand for higher education (as people recognised its high economic and social returns) 
and the need for equitable access to higher education.  Regarding the latter, the government 
was not only concerned with giving equal opportunities to men and women, but it was 
equally concerned with the need to balance the opportunities between the people who live 
in urban and those who live in rural areas.  
 
All of these objectives were the concern of the Al-Fatah Revolution since the beginning 
and according to Gaddafi, were in line with the aims of his ‘Green Book’’. Initially he 
considered the policy of state control as explained in the ‘Green Book’, to be the best way 
to achieve the objectives not only for the higher education sector but also for the other 
economic sectors.  
    
Even so, despite the advances made during this period, Libya faced several challenges and 
difficulties. Although there was a rapid increase in enrolment in higher education, the 
benefits to economic development were not as substantial as hoped because the increase 
occurred mainly in the disciplines of arts and humanities, which are not widely believed to 
be as critical to economic development as the disciplines of science and technology. This 
trend led to the problem of graduate unemployment. Overcrowding in public universities 
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had a damaging effect on the quality of their students.  The government spent a huge 
amount of money on higher education with results far below those expected and this, of 
course, raised the question of whether the public sector was competent enough to regulate 
institutions of tertiary education.  
 
It has to be said that forty years of unattained objectives were enough to justify the claim 
that the policy for higher education was by the end of the century in trouble. In this respect 
the changed policy towards education was part of a more general reassessment by Gaddafi 
and other policy makers of the merits of state-run enterprise. By the start of the present 
century universities and other higher education institutions were being criticized by many 
Libyans. And the policy makers and Gaddafi himself felt unsatisfied about the previous 
policy. They had spoken in disillusioned terms about the failures of the state to control the 
higher education sector and that it had clearly failed to meet the requirements of its 
developmental aspirations. These difficulties had forced policy makers to reform the policy 
for higher education and the government had thereby taken an important step to encourage 
the private sector to play its role in higher education. These changes came about quite 
suddenly and had to be justified by a reinterpretation of the precepts laid down in the 
‘Green Book’. A further characteristic of Libyan higher education during this period was 
its relative isolation from many international developments. 
 
In the next chapter the landscape of private higher education in Libya will be presented and 
will highlight issues of establishment and growth, enrolment, courses, teaching staff and of 
financing. 
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Chapter six: The implementation of the changes: role sharing in public and private 
higher education with its problems. 
6.1 Introduction.  
The previous chapter examined the factors driving the shift away from public sector 
dominance. This chapter attempts to analyze the phenomenon of the growth of the private 
sector and its expansion in the state.  
 
The argument around the emergence of the private sector in playing its role in higher 
education in Libya is different from the way it has been presented by many authors and 
scholars, so this is a good opportunity to examine the argument. This chapter will attempt 
to provide information and insight into the operation of the private sector in Libyan higher 
education. The first section discusses the transition from a state sponsored system of higher 
education to private higher education institutions. Section two makes a distinction between 
privatization and private higher education. The third section deals with the growth and 
expansion of private higher education in Libya and section four highlights the ownership 
patterns and orientation of private higher education institutions. Section five is devoted to a 
discussion on the programmes of study and courses offered by the private institutions and 
section six discusses teacher and student profiles followed by an examination of the quality 
of education provided within these institutions. The role of private higher education related 
to the matter of unemployment will also be analysed in this chapter. The final section will 
analyse the sources of the financing of private institutions and come to a conclusion. 
 
6.2 The idea of privatisation in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the Green Book by 
Colonel Muammar Al Gaddafi. 
The original Green Book of Gaddafi, as we have seen was deeply hostile to capitalism and 
the concept of the private economy. However, there are some sections or nuances of his 
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thought that contained ideas that could be seen as not entirely opposed to the later 
emphasis on privatization. Basically privatization in education was explained by Gaddafi 
through a concept called the ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky’ or ‘Free Education’ which was to 
be practised first at the pre-university level and then at the pre-secondary level. In his 
Green Book Gaddafi explains ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoky’ when he writes that: 
 
“...compulsory education and organized and systematic education in reality is compulsory 
ignorance of the masses...” 
 
   “….all the prevailing methods of education in the world must be destroyed by the 
international culture revolution because this will liberalize the human mentality from 
intolerance and stagnation and resurrect classical humanity and understanding…” 
 
“.....the countries that determine educational paths through their official curriculums, 
force people to follow those paths and officially determine the knowledge and subjects that 
are gained and studied; these countries are among those that practice arbitrariness 
against their citizens...”. (Gaddafi, M (b), 1975, p52).      
 
According to him participation in ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tsharoky’ education means “..the 
participation of members of a community in providing educational services for those who 
wish to obtain an investigation of the principle of freedom of education and to ease the 
burden born by the public treasury. Provided that these individuals are qualified 
educationally and practically and that the institutions are subjected to the laws and 
regulations in the Great Jamahiriya...” (Gaddafi, M (b), 1975, p51)    
    
216 
 
Such education according to him would achieve seven aims: 
1. Disseminate education and broaden its base for participation. 
2. Provide an opportunity for students to complete their studies according 
to their wishes and to break the monopoly of science and knowledge. 
3. Involve scientifically and educationally qualified personnel to contribute to the 
development of the educational process and to open new job opportunities for 
newly qualified graduates in this area. 
4. Raise the level of educational attainment by encouraging a spirit of competition 
among institutions to provide the best educational services commensurate with the 
requirements of the times. 
5. Search for new methods, means and more sophisticated methods than those  
prevalent in the pattern of public education at this time. 
6. Improve the standard of entry-level teachers and staff in these institutions. 
7. Link the educational institutions with their social surroundings. 
 
These generalities could be used in Gaddafi’s later years as the basis of an attack upon a 
top-down public sector which helped him to justify the very sudden reversal of policy. In 
the case of Libya the idea of establishing private higher education institutions revolved 
around the argument that public higher education had become an inefficient and a 
bureaucratic system. The centralized system that had been adopted over the past three 
decades had created a system characterized by its inefficiency and lack of initiative. 
Bureaucratic reliance on central authority had not enabled higher education institutions to 
respond to external changes or receive timely support. In addition, a public university as 
part of public bureaucracy had no direct accountability to the public as it was accountable 
to its direct superior, i.e. a central government authority. The lack of institutional 
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autonomy had led to irrelevant course provision and slow institutional response to the 
needs of society. In contrast it began to be argued that private higher education could be 
seen as being more efficient and more responsive to the needs of society and its 
development plans. Privatization was also seen as a flexible model that offered freedom in 
diverse study disciplines. There was seen to be less bureaucracy in private higher education 
than in public higher education. Gaddafi then turned to the view that the establishment of 
private higher education would provide unlimited freedom for students to finish their 
studies. He was able to justify this by reference to the following remark in his earlier book: 
 
“...society should provide the young with all kinds of educational activities and allow them 
to choose freely the discipline they wish to study....”. (Gaddafi, M (b),1975, p44).  
 
In a meeting with the secretaries of the People’s Congresses, with co-ordinators of people’s 
and social leadership groups and with others who supported him, Gaddafi stated in April 
2009 that: 
 
“.....it is not right at all to force a student to study anything in which he isn’t interested.....it 
is not a good idea to force him or her to spend years in study to the age of fifteen....and the 
state funds him or her and then he or she fails...it is a waste of hundreds of 
thousands....and look at the loss in education... public education and forced learning is a 
failed programme and a failed theory...all countries, especially the developing ones that 
have such a model were unsuccessful whereas countries with free education were 
successful....”. (Belal, A, Al-Shames Newspaper, Monday, 16th of April 2009, P2). 
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Some authors explain that privatization and quasi-marketing when introduced into the 
running of the public services and when concerned with the transfer of responsibility 
originally shouldered by the state to the non-state sector or a change in the nature of 
government involvement, significantly alters the status quo. (Walsh & Mok Johnson & 
Foster in MOK1 and WAT, 1998, p 256). In Libya, privatization, specifically in higher 
education had not been presented in the ‘Third Universal Theory’ of the ‘Green Book’. In 
the three last decades of the past century entire state control as a policy was dominant. The 
Libyan government preferred to adopt ‘socialism’ as it was seen to be the best way to 
achieve happiness for citizens and the ultimate solution to world problems. From 1977 to 
1995 the Libyan economy started to practise this philosophy which included many socialist 
principles. However, there remained a place for private sector in the economy.   
 
6.3 From state dominance to the privatization of higher education. 
Gaddafi’s shift in theoretical approach was in reality reflecting developments at the grass 
roots level. As has been mentioned, the Libyan government had already started to reform 
its policy for higher education as a result of the unsuccessful centralized state-run model. 
Many economic sectors had been transferred from the government to the Libyan people 
who had accepted the responsibility for these enterprises, including that of higher 
education. In reality the fundamental changes in Libyan’s higher education sector since the 
late 1990s can be conceptualized through the processes of denationalization, 
decentralization and autonomization and marketization.32 Universities adopted a variety of 
                                                 
32
 By `denationalization’, I mean that the state had begun to some extent to forsake its monopoly on higher 
education, hence allowing the non-state sector and even the market to engage in higher education provision. 
By `decentralization’, I refer to the shift from the `state control model’ to the `state supervision model’, 
whereby educational governance is decentralized from educational bureaucracies to create in their place 
devolved systems of schooling or universities, entailing significant degrees of institutional autonomy and a 
variety of forms of school-based/university-based management and administration. As for `autonomization’, 
I mean that university academics now have more academic autonomy and they are empowered to undertake 
research projects of any kind and have far more discretion to manage and operate their institutions. As for 
marketization, private universities in Libya now have to search for additional financing resources. 
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revenue-generation activities, such as offering courses that could appeal to emerging 
market needs, strengthening alumni associations to raise funds and renting out facilities or 
amenities for profit-making purposes. Not surprisingly, academic departments able to offer 
market-oriented programmes and courses had been allocated additional resources while 
less market-competitive units had to face cuts in financial resources. Private university 
presidents were thus increasingly concerned about whether their programmes and courses 
were ‘marketable’. Similar to global practices, Libyan’s higher education has experienced 
transformations along the line of decentralization and marketization and under a far more 
socio-politically liberated climate; the Libyan Government allowed higher education 
institutions more autonomy to run their institutions. In order to reduce the state’s 
increasing burden, different market-related strategies have been adopted such as 
privatizing the public universities under what is called ‘self-control management’ and the 
establishment of private higher education institutions.   
 
Three different types of institutions arose during the latter years of the Gaddafi regime: 
those that are purely private, those that were state run but have become privatized and 
those that are a mixture of public and private education institutions (see figure 13). The 
main focus of this thesis is an examination of private universities and below is a brief 
explanation about the privatization models that have been practised in Libya.  
 
Figure (13). Methods of privatizing higher education institutions in Libya.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the researcher. 
 
Private and public 
education institutions. 
Private education 
institutions.  
 
Privatised public 
education institutions.  
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In the first one, the institutions are run by individuals and the government’s role is 
supervision with limited control. These are fully dependent on the tuition fees to cover the 
cost of the education provided and their aim is to make a profit. The idea of privatization 
had started in the late 1980s under several different names, ‘Free Education’, ‘Al-
Tasharoky Education’ and ‘Al-Ahli Education’. It was practised first in primary education 
and eleven official resolutions and a law were formulated to organize this type of education 
(see Appendix 6). In 1999 the Libyan government allowed the private sector to play its role 
at the higher education level.  
 
The second method of practising private education was to privatize the public education 
establishments which covered primary education.33 It was called ‘Al-Tasharoki 
Education’.34  
 
The third system is a mix of both the public and private sectors. The best example of this is 
the Higher Studies and Economic Research Academy which offers study programmes at 
post- graduate level in both MSc and PhD. Its manager Dr. Salah Ebrahim described it as a 
third sector by which he meant neither public nor private and that the infrastructure is 
owned by the government while its budget is financed independently. (An interview in Al-
                                                 
33
 In 2007, Law No. 79 was issued to establish schools that were to be managed by a new system. This 
system has two elements (GPCESR, 2009):  
1. The State has the responsibility for paying tuition fees and for supervision. The amount of money 
payable is according to the number of students in each school. Through the General People’s 
Committee for Education (GPCE), the State monitors the schools’ facilities by providing books, 
equipment and other supplies as well as supervising examinations.          
2. Teachers who work in these institutions receive their salaries from the government and are entirely 
responsible for managing these schools.       
34
 I think I translated it to ‘Participated Education’. The experiment started in 2007/2008 with twelve schools 
in two provinces, Tripoli and Sahel Al-Gfara. The number of students and schools grew from 11 schools 
which absorbed 5,781 students in 2007/2008 to 537 schools that absorbed 347,733 students in 2010/2011. 
(GPCESR, 2009). 
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shwary, A, Al-Fajer Al-Jadid Newspaper, 5th of April 2010, p11). In addition, it has other 
financial resources such as unconditional donations, contributions from charities and 
revenues that come from publications and consultations. (Academy for Higher Studies and 
Economic Research, 1999, p10). The table 25 summarise the differences between these 
three types of institutions.  
 
Table (25).The differences between methods of privatising higher education: 
Status  Private education 
institutions. 
Privatised public 
education institutions. 
Private and public 
education institutions. 
Finance  Tuition fees  By the State Tuition fees 
The owner Individuals  The government The government 
State support No  Yes  Yes  
Education level Pre- university and 
undergraduate 
level  
Pre- university (primary 
and secondary 
education) 
Post-graduate level 
only. 
Evaluation  Unsuccessful  Successful  Successful to some 
extent. 
Source: the researcher. 
 
The Libyan government has established the Academy to achieve several goals: 
1. To provide the national universities with highly qualified people in different areas 
to teach at these universities and thereby reduce the reliance on foreign academic 
staff. This would also achieve the important goal of saving foreign currency in the 
Libyan economy. 
2. To decrease the size of the expenditure on post-graduate studies from the state 
budget. 
3. To encourage post graduate students to study in their home instead of sending them 
abroad. So, this helps to save the foreign currencies. 
 
 
6.4 Policy solutions on privatization of public higher education. 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, privatization encompasses both partial privatization 
within public universities and the growth of separate private higher education institutions. 
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Many countries, Libya included, experience both forms of privatization. The privatization 
of public higher education in Libya, though, seems to be different from that of other 
countries. Many countries privatize higher education by charging students for their study at 
public universities. However, in Libya the government has implemented two different 
policies. The first is called ‘Self Management’ or ‘The Self Control Administration 
Policy’.35  It is a type of privatization which was seen by Al-Gaddafi as a unique model for 
Libya. The secretary of the GPCE (Minister of Education) himself stated that: “…the idea 
is exclusive to the leader, Mummer Al-Gaddafi...it is his idea and it comes from the 
‘Theory of the Masses’ which means that the power, the wealth and the weapons are in the 
people’s hand...”. (Al-Ahwel, M, Al-Fajer Al-Jadeed Newspaper, Friday 29th of February 
2008, p2). According to him the idea was different from private or public universities. 
Through this policy the government devoted financial allocations directly to some faculties 
according to the number of enrolled students and given more autonomy to manage these 
resources. It was seen by the government as more effective and would allow faculties to 
employ resources economically and thereby achieve ‘efficiency’ and ‘productivity’. 
 
In January 2010 a resolution from the GPC was issued to give permission to the GPCESR 
36
 to implement the idea of the policy in certain faculties in seven public universities as 
shown in Table 26 below: 
   
                                                 
35
 Called in Libya ‘Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoke’.  
36
 In 2010 the title of the GPCE changed to the General People’s Committee for Education and Scientific 
Research (GPCESR). 
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Table (26). A number of faculties in public universities that are privatized by the 
Government.   
University The faculty The yearly allocations per student 
The Seventh of October 
University, Musrata 
The Pharmacy 2,300 D.L 
The Seventh of April 
University, Alzawia 
Economics 1,500 D.L 
Al-Jabal Al-Gharby 
University, Gharian 
The Sciences 3,000 D.L 
Al-Fatah University, Tripoli Engineering 2,300 D.L 
Sabha University The Sciences 2,300 D.L 
Omar Al-Muktar University, 
Al-Bayda 
Literature 2,000 D.L 
Qaruonis University, Benghazi The Sciences 2,000 D.L 
Resource : Media Office, Al-Ealm, Newspaper, No.2, 23rd of January 2010, p6.  
 
Unlike in many other countries, in Libya it seemed very difficult to introduce the idea of 
tuition fees for the public universities because the notion of free public higher education 
had been prevalent for a long time. After four decades of a state controlled policy, people 
were accustomed to depend on the government and the public sector for almost everything 
such as free education, health care, jobs and other social services. It is considered as a vital 
right which is guaranteed by law. In 2009, Resolution No. 45 was issued by the GPCE to 
ensure that those students who failed their examinations repeat their studies and achieve 
examination success. The aims of this resolution are:  
1. to put pressure on students to study hard and to be more responsible,  
2. to push students to study in private higher education, 
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3.to make those students who have repeat a year because they had failed their final year 
examinations to cover the cost of their places in the universities so that new students may 
still admitted and overcrowding can be avoided, 
4. to start to practise austerity  
5. and to generate financial revenues for the benefit of the state.  
 
Under this resolution students who failed in their studies were required to pay tuition fees 
ranging between 2,500 and 4,500 Libyan Dinars for subsequent study. However, the policy 
made many students angry and interviews with a number of them revealed that the decision 
made many unhappy and dissatisfied. The students criticised not only the decision but also 
the GPCE policies (Dango, E, Al-Shames Newspaper, 08th of July 2009, p10). This forced 
the GPCE to change its mind by cancelling the decision.  
 
Another element in the cost aspect of the policy is the student-teacher ratio. The number of 
students per faculty member increased which reduced the unit cost of higher education. 
This, though, resulted in a lowering of the quality of the provision.     
 
6.5 Policy solutions on the revenue side (cost covering). 
In Libya the notion of cost-sharing revolves around two arguments. First, public funds are 
limited. As a result, higher education increasingly must compete for scarce public 
resources with other important public services, such as health care and primary and 
secondary education. Second, some believe that if students pay part of their educational 
costs they will make better-informed choices when deciding which discipline to study.  
 
It should be noted that the policy solutions on the revenue side could be for public and/or 
private higher education. In many countries (e.g. Australia, Russia, Mexico, Portugal and 
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the United States) their policies mean that tuition fees in public universities are paid by 
students in different ways. (Vossensteyn, H. 2004). They are charged according to the 
different criteria of each government. In the case of Libya the idea of cost covering has 
only emerged in the private universities related to tuition fees which are completely paid 
for by students and their families.  
 
When the Libyan government allowed the private sector to play its role in higher education 
as from 1999, its policy was not well organized. It suffered from several inconsistencies 
and imperfections, one of which is the role of the policy in the matter of students and their 
ability to pay their tuition fees. In many countries cost-sharing can be accomplished by 
means of student loans in place of grants and scholarships. However, in Libya, neither 
grants nor scholarships were available to support Libyan students in private higher 
education. For example, the government did not determine the level of fees that should be 
paid by students in the private universities which were left without any intervention from 
state authorities. This is why the fees varied from one university to another. Students at the 
Al-Takdom University pointed out that there was a wide range of different tuition fees 
between private universities. It reached 420 L.D in Al-Takdom University whereas in other 
universities it ranged from 150 to 200 D.L. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspapers, 2nd of 
July 2003, p8). Such a situation proved to be an excellent opportunity for private 
universities to charge high fees and make profits. 
   
Generally in the international literature the phenomenon of profit in the education sector 
has been seen as a disfigurement of the education sector. Commercialisation in higher 
education is seen to have led to erosion in quality, the loss of important academic 
disciplines (in favour of marketable disciplines), a change in attitudes and erosion in 
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national, social and educational values. In Libya in the past, the concept of profit itself 
under the umbrella of socialist transformation had been entirely rejected in all sectors and 
services. However, today, in Libya as in many countries, the very concept of profit which 
had not been respectable for a long time has become acceptable and even fashionable. 
Though there are ethical and, more importantly, legal barriers in many countries to 
formally recognising profit as acceptable, the classification of private higher education 
institutions as ‘for‐profit’ and ‘not‐for‐profit’ institutions has become common. The 
presence of private investors seeking profits in education has become normal. As a result, 
all kinds of businessmen – small to large, with little knowledge of the nature of higher 
education – entered the education markets and began setting up institutions. For many of 
them there is no difference between setting up an institution of higher education and 
establishing a manufacturing firm, a poultry farm or a shopping mall. They are ready to 
offer any programme or conduct any activity, academic or not, in their institutions that is 
likely to yield quick profits. 
 
The commercialisation of higher education is nothing new. Today, it is taking place at a 
rapid pace. However, although public policy in many countries favours the contribution of 
the private sector in higher education, it does not favour commercialisation of higher 
education. Privatisation of education is acceptable for many governments, but not 
commercialisation. But it is seems to be difficult to distinguish between private higher 
education involvement and commercialisation in education, either theoretically or in 
practice. Both are characterised by profit. The definition of ‘commercialisation’ is given as 
a method designed to “manage or exploit in a way designed to make a profit, with ‘profit’ 
as ‘a financial gain, recognizing especially the difference between an initial outlay and the 
subsequent amount earned.” (Bok, D. 2003). These are exactly the same features of private 
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higher education, which also involves management of resources so as to make a profit. 
Thus, it could be said, that it seems there is little difference between privatising and 
commercialisation. Both are based on the same principles and considerations, the most 
important of which being profit maximisation.  
 
The profitability of these institutions depends on the savings they make on expenditure. 
They save on salaries by employing teaching staff on a part-time basis or by relying on 
teachers from nearby public universities. The reduction in the hours of teaching and 
lectures is another policy used in private universities to increase their profits. In addition, 
in certain universities there are some subjects on the timetable which lack faculty members 
to teach them. Such universities gain more revenue with fewer, if any, costs. The profits of 
private universities depend on two important variables: the costs and the revenues. The 
former includes several elements, such as the number of faculty members and their 
qualifications, the number of teaching hours, non-teaching employees and the costs of 
electricity, telephone and other service expenses. The revenues are generated from tuition 
fees, the number of students on roll and according to the number of humanities and science 
departments. 
 
6.6 Strategic responses of private higher education across regions. 
 
6.6.1 Emergence of the private sector in higher education: universities, polytechnics 
and post-graduate courses. 
The privatization movement started in the 1990s although the programme was limited to 
nursery education, primary education and other related services. Higher education sector 
228 
 
was not included. Universities and higher education institutions were controlled by the 
state. 
 
One academic study refers to the fact that privatization in Libya emerged during the third 
stage of the political, economic and social development movement (Al-Teer, A, etl, 1998, 
p115).37 Since 1969 all laws and legislation which come from the ‘Green Book’ confirmed 
the role of the state at the expense of the private sector. As a result, the vast majority of the 
investments according to this strategy have been toward public sector rather than private 
sector as follows: 
1. The public’s share in the total investment during the period of 1973-1990 
was 85% while the private sector’s was less than 10%.  
2. The public agriculture sector received 93.7%, and the private sector had 
3.6%. The public industrial and transport sectors got 98% and 95% and the 
private sector just, 2% and 5% respectively 
3. In other sectors such as finance, insurance and constructions, the public 
sector received a large share of the investments.        
  
The Libyan government adopted the strategy of developing private higher education since 
1999 in responding to the challenges and the difficulties of higher education. A number of 
other privatization strategies were not addressed or considered, such as tuition fees in 
public higher education institutions.  
  
Private higher education in Libya is a relatively recent movement but expanding quite 
rapidly. Public sector failures have forced the policy makers in Libya to reconsider the 
                                                 
37
 It is entitled ‘The Political, Economic and Social Movements, 1969-1994’ and has been edited by a group 
of Libyan scholars and specialists. 
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previous policy. In the period from 1969 (the year of the Al-Fatah Revolution) to 1985 the 
private sector was very limited. Then, the Libyan government decided to practise a new 
policy called ‘the movement stage to production’. In this stage a number of decrees were 
issued which confirmed the role of the private sector in economic activities. In 1985 and 
1988 Laws No. 9 and No. 8 were issued to establish institutions named ‘Tashrokiat’ where 
Libyan individuals in groups were allowed to practise their economic activities. 
 
In 1988 the GPC issued Decision No. 427 concerning the practice of ‘collectivism 
property’. According to the second article of the decision, the properties of the economic 
units or institutions were transformed to the Libyan people with the total contribution as a 
share in these units to be no more than 10,000 Libyan Dinars. In 1992, Law No. 9 was 
issued regarding the practice of economic activities. The Law gave the private sector more 
opportunities to be more active in economic activities. In the context of programmes to 
privatize national economies, higher education was no exception.  
 
During this period of renaissance (1970 to 2010), investment in basic education (pre-
tertiary) took precedence. Consequently, free basic education was made available to all 
Libyan nationals under a programme of continuous and rapid expansion across the whole 
country. However, the Libyan government recognised the current predicament in higher 
education and the need to meet the demands of the public for post-secondary education. 
This was made clear by the Secretary of Higher Education in noting that: 
 
“The greatest challenge faced by the government in human resource development in the 
past decade has been the widening gap between the increasing number of graduates from 
the secondary school system and the limited number of places available at institutions of 
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higher education in Libya.”. (Interview with Abd-Alkbeer Alfakhery, the Secretary of 
Higher Education, November 2010) 
 
This rapid expansion was fuelled by a strong social demand for higher education. One of 
the reasons for this was that universities were seen as the main avenue for social mobility 
and promotion, and this was facilitated by generous government policies of open 
admission, free admission and, to some extent, grants for students and guaranteed 
employment for all graduates. As has been said earlier, the Libyan government kept higher 
education essentially free but government funding did not increase to match enrolment 
growth. The result was overcrowding in the universities and deterioration in the conditions 
of study, a crucial matter not only in the government’s agenda but also in Libyan society as 
a whole.  At a meeting with members of both the General People’s Committee and the 
General People’s Congress, Gaddafi required them to abolish the role of the state in higher 
education and in other economic sectors and to distribute the oil revenues among Libyans 
who would then be free to spend their money according to their interests and their benefits. 
In his meeting he stated that:  
 
“....this is yours n.b. he meant the oil revenues... now it is up to you… parents have their 
share from the oil and are free to teach their children or not....the current policy means 
that it’s the government’s responsibility to provide everything for the education 
institutions: desks, blackboards, rubbers, chairs and chalks and when the state does not 
bring the rubbers for example, then the education operation would not happen at all, and 
maybe the state one day didn’t bring the rubbers and people would start to complain 
saying that schools are without equipment.....without chalks....without books....and this has 
happened many times...in universities the lecture theatres were broken and students stand 
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on the walls and sit on the floor....this is a huge administrative system...it’s an octopus... 
it’s a very huge expense...today people will receive the money and will be free to spend it 
however they like....people, they complain because their money is with the Libyan 
government which takes the responsibility...so, take your money and manage yourself by 
yourself.. and in this situation the people can’t argue about any failure of the state..” And 
then he added: “...at present the education operation has failed....if you examined any 
student in Libya he or she would fail.....one day a number of people sent a complaint to me 
saying that the Army Institution a faculty had refused them to enrol them in the institution 
because they failed to meet entry requirements....when I investigated the problem I found 
that those students didn’t know how to write, they were illiterate ...it is a disappointing 
situation...”. (Speech on local TV, Al-Jamahiriya Channel, 2005)      
 
Responding to this predicament, which included a disparity between basic and post-
secondary education, coupled with financial austerity in the wake of competing demands 
from other public needs, Gaddafi called for control of higher education institutions by 
individuals instead of by the public sector. The watershed in the development of private 
higher education in Libya can be traced to the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act, 
1999, which further liberalized the educational sector and provided the legal framework for 
the establishment of private higher education institutions and, later, the beginning of the 
privatization of some colleges in the public universities. It also provided for the upgrading 
to university status of existing private institutions of higher education. This liberalization 
was considered necessary to satisfy the increasing demand for higher education and to 
respond to the call for more accountability of the public universities, but, most importantly, 
to compensate for the public sector’s failure to achieve the development plan’s goals in 
higher education.  
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In practice, the start of the establishment of private higher education came in 1999 when 
Private Education Law No. 6 (Al-Taleem Al-Tasharoki Law) was passed by the General 
People’s Committee (GPC).  But before that, two other related resolutions were also 
enacted by the GPC; these were No. 540 1992 and No. 624 1993 for free education. The 
1999 law was the green light to establish private higher education in Libya. The idea of 
privatization has been defined in two different ways: the concept of private higher 
education itself and the privatization of higher education. It occurred on two fronts, with 
the first being the actual establishment of private institutions of higher education run by 
individuals and independent groups. Second, was the privatization of academic activities 
within public institutions. Both were significant in that they indicated the growing 
ascendancy of an ethos in academe which hitherto had been regarded as a totally public 
domain. Basically, the first wave of privatization in Libyan higher education had emerged 
by the establishment of private institutions and only later, through the GPCE, did the 
government introduce private practice – known as ‘self-management’ or ‘self-steering’ - 
within public universities.  
 
Before this emergence the system could be classed as a single sector with the large public 
higher education institutions dependent entirely on the state. After 1999, though, it 
developed into a dual sector with a small private sector funded privately and a larger, 
public sector receiving subsidies from the state. Private enrolments were usually around 
ten to twenty per cent of the total with funds coming entirely from tuition fees paid by 
students. There were three types of institutions of higher education: the large public 
universities depending entirely on the state; small, public universities aspiring to introduce 
the idea of privatization but still reliant on government funding; and small private higher 
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education institutions which included accredited private universities and non-accredited 
private universities (See figure 14).  
 
Figure (14).  The Higher Education System in Libya.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the writer. 
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The table 27 highlights the main differences between public and private universities.  
 
Table (27). The differences between public universities and private ones: 
Subject  Public universities Private universities 
Profit making No Yes 
Government intervention plays a direct role plays indirect role 
Regulation of academic 
Conditions, curriculums, and 
university rules 
 
                      Strict 
 
Absolutely flexible 
Tuition fees  Free Not free 
State support38 Support No support 
The quality of graduates High Low 
Size (e.g. the budget, 
administration, the number of 
students). 
Big Small 
The owner.   The government Individuals 
Salaries of the staff members Paid by the government Paid by the owners 
The number of universities 
See figure (15) below. 
Small (12) Big (50) 
The number of students See 
figure (16) below. 
Big  (300,000) Small  (40,000) 
Source: Own analysis. The numbers based on GPCHE(b), 2007, p1 and General Authority for Information, 
Statistics Book, 2009. 
 
 
In addition to that, the administrative structure in public universities is not similar to the 
private university. While the public universities are instructed according to Articles No.5 
and No.7 in the Resolution No. 22, 2008 to be as following: 
                                                 
38For example, the state would allocate some of its financial resources yearly to public universities whereas 
private universities would have to generate their own financial resources.  
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1. The University Council to consist of: 
• Representative(s) from the Social People’s Leadership in the province where the 
university is located. 
• Representative(s) from the Planning Council in the province where the university is 
located. 
• The Secretary of Ascendancy of University’s Faculty Members. 
•  Representative from the Student’s Union in the university. 
• Representative from the administrative employees in the university. 
• 5 scientific and theoretic people who are interested in higher education issues. 
Those people are chosen by the GPCHE, and the Secretary of People’s Committee 
of the University must be among them. (GPC, 2008, Article 5, Resolution No. 22, 
p3) 
2. The Administrative Structure includes seventeen offices and administrations as 
following: 
• The Committee Matters Office. 
• The Legal Matters Office. 
• The Documentation and Information Office. 
• The Following Up and Planning Office.  
• The Office of the Development of the Dependence Resources. 
• The Technical Consultations Office. 
• The Cultural Assistance Office. 
• The Internal Revision Office. 
• The Evaluation and Quality Office. 
• The Security Lodge. 
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• The Libraries Administrations. 
• The Training and Higher Studies Administration. 
• The Faculty Members Matters Administration. 
• The Technical and Projects Administration. 
• The Student Activities Administration. 
• The Management and Financial Matters Administration. 
• The Registration. (GPC, Article 5, Resolution No. 22, 2008 ,p4 & p5)  
 
The majority of the private universities, if any, were not endowed with such administrative 
structures and it meant that private higher education in Libya could not be compared with 
public higher education.  
 
All these private universities were of low quality. Many Libyan scholars, lecturers at 
public universities and academic writers criticised the quality of these universities in terms 
of facilities, faculty members, students, academic reputation and curricula. This led the 
Libyan government to establish what is called the ‘Quality Assurance and Accreditation 
Centre’ (QAA) which was founded in 2006, eight years after the establishment of private 
higher education. In the early days (from 1999 to 2006) private higher education was 
controlled by ‘higher education offices’. There was a sort of decentralization where these 
offices were founded in provinces and had been given authority to manage private 
universities. It was hoped by the Libyan policy makers through this policy to achieve some 
goals, such as the reduction of bureaucracy in state universities, the reduction of the 
dependence of higher education institutions on the government and to strengthen the role 
of the higher education sector in the country economically, socially and politically. 
Unfortunately none of these goals were achieved and the government had to intervene. So 
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the QAA was established to control the mass growth of private universities and to 
supervise very strictly each university to ensure that it had ample resources and observed 
the same minimum admission requirements as the public universities. According to the 
science section in the magazine, Al-Elem (Media Office, November 2009 No.15 and 
November 2010, No.16) only four private universities were accredited by QAA.39  
 
Private universities are small in size but not in number and, in fact, outnumber the public 
universities by 50 to 12. In terms of enrolled students, however, private higher education 
has absorbed only a small fraction, 40,000 students, whereas there are 300,000 students at 
the public universities, the figures 15 and 16 illustrate the difference between public and 
private higher education in terms of the number of students and universities. (GPCHE (a), 
2007, p1 and General Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2009, The general 
consensus for many Libyans that a number of students are registered at private universities 
to buy their degrees and not to study; these students are seen by the universities to be ‘good 
clients’ that generate income without any costs to themselves. Private colleges and 
universities typically operate on the basis of fee-for-service with no donations or grants. 
Competing with each other in their appeal to a mass clientele, they offer only those courses 
and subjects whose price will cover their costs because they must keep their costs low in 
order to survive.  
In this pattern we may see the wide differences that exist between private institutions with 
some better than others and attracting good students. But even so, they are not able to 
compete successfully with public institutions. Well-to-do families are willing to pay 
whatever tuition fees are necessary in order to help their children finish their university 
                                                 
39
 However, it is interesting that the manager of the QAA, in interview (October.2010), said that the number 
was six private universities. 
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courses, especially those who failed in public sector institutions and those with special 
circumstances. 
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6.6.2 The story of the development of private higher education in Libya. 
Globally, private universities have grown rapidly and Levy, D (2007, p200) has 
characterized this development as ‘‘unanticipated and surprising.’’ And so it has been for 
Libya which had no private university between independence in 1952 and 1999, the year 
private higher education was introduced.  In 2006 the number of private universities stands 
at around 50, in contrast to only 12 public universities. Even so, enrolment in private 
universities stands at about 40,000 students which pale in comparison with over 300,000 
students in public universities. In the case of Latin America and in other regions of the 
developing world, the ‘first wave’ of private higher education comprised religious 
institutions (Teixeira, P. and Amaral, A. 2001, p366 and p367; and Levy, D. 2007, p205). 
In Libya, however, the first private higher education institutions were not religion-
affiliated. An important characteristic feature of Libyan private universities is that they 
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tend to mirror public universities in curricula even with the hard sciences, though the 
facilities in these universities are very poor.  
 
Altbach, P (b) (1999, p1) states that private higher education was one of the most dynamic 
and fastest growing areas of post–secondary education at the turn of the 21st century. And 
this is what happened in Libya where there has been an upsurge in the number of these 
institutions in recent years.40 This has been caused largely by an increasing demand for 
tertiary education as a result of high population growth and consequent expanded 
enrolment at the basic and secondary levels, and this far exceeds the capacity of the public 
institutions.   
 
The reasons behind the growth of the number of private institutions of higher education 
could be categorized as follows:  
First, the establishment of Quality Assurance and Accreditation (QAA) was founded in 
2006, eight years after the establishment of private higher education. Since then, private 
higher education has grown enormously. Second, private universities have been established 
in un-congenial environments. Neither Law No. 6, 1999, nor Law No. 21, 2001, has 
outlined specific rules and clear instructions for their control. Third, there were many 
regions that had given licences to people who were eager to establish private universities, 
such as the Basic People’s Congress, the Education People’s Committee of the province 
and the Higher Education Offices. Fourth, to establish private universities was not difficult: 
                                                 
40
 I refer here to rapid growth but the Manager of the Assurance Centre (Dr.Mohammed Al-Kabir) stated that 
it was not true. In the interview with him (October, 2010) he said that the number was not 50 universities and 
indicated that the number was quite small. It could be argued that Dr. Al-Kabir was not objective in his 
statement because in his speech he appeared satisfied with private universities and did not criticise the 
privatization policy in Libya. One could make the observation that some officials in the Gaddafi regime only 
showed ‘good’ things. Indeed as is clear in statistics, in just the five years from 1999 to 2005, the number of 
these universities reached about fifty and in other source figures, even more than fifty. According to the 
General People’s Committee for Higher Education (GPCHE, 2007) report, the number reached 56 with 255 
university-level institutions ‘deemed to be universities ‘. 
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during the period from 1999 to 2006.  The circumstances were very attractive and this 
encouraged people to invest their money in such establishments and make a profit.   
 
The courses available in private higher education in Libya range from two-year College 
diploma courses to four-year College and university courses offering Bachelor’s Degrees. 
The courses in the non-university sector institutions are mostly in the humanities and are of 
shorter duration. In the early days these institutions were perceived as ‘colleges offering 
diplomas’. At the time it was difficult to know how many such institutions had been 
established and the number continued to increase rapidly for a couple of years. Three years 
later most of these institutions were upgraded to university status. Although they were 
small in size they offered an alternative solution for access to higher education without 
adding significantly to government costs.  
 
The Libyan government allowed adult students to use primary and secondary education 
public schools which in the mornings were used for primary and secondary education and 
in the evenings would be transformed into higher education institutions. At the beginning 
there were no places for the private higher education institutions to run their activities. In 
addition to that the Libyan government itself had not planned properly for this change. It 
had not provided suitable buildings for private higher education nor adequate facilities. 
People who had established higher education institutions rented primary and secondary 
education buildings from the state. However, these schools were not in a good enough 
condition for teaching at the higher education level or even at pre-university levels. The 
general inspector of education Dr. Al-Ghlaly himself described it disappointedly: 
 
“...it was hoped by the Libyan government that the higher education sectors, both public 
and private, would be parallel, ......  unfortunately, some people used private higher 
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education incorrectly, some private universities were more concerned with financial profit 
than scientific matters....some schools are used to teach primary education in the morning. 
In the evening it is used for university education. These schools do not have academic 
standards suitable for a university.... there is no library... there are not well qualified 
faculty members and it does not have a time schedule..... they are called universities but in 
fact they are not, they have no administration, facilities or curriculums and unfortunately 
some parents register their children in these universities without any evaluation ........in the 
absence of a good system of follow-up and control many illegal actions are created in 
registration, timetabling, academic planning, facilities, examinations and then 
degrees...we have heard that there are many deceitful operations when awarding 
qualifications….and the majority of them have been in private education........”. (Jwhar, A, 
Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 22nd of June 2009, p7).           
 
It is very interesting that, on the one hand, the Libyan government had a genuine desire to 
encourage the private sector to be more active in higher education sector, but equally, on 
the other hand, the government’s attitude seemed to remain sceptical about the merits of 
private higher education. There were many people from different classes (teachers, 
employees, university staff members, and those who work at high positions....ets) who 
disagreed with Gaddafi’s ideas and principles.  
 
One aspect of this is that the Libyan government, through the GPC had issued resolution 
No. 22, 2008, for the organisation of the universities and higher education institutions. It 
included 63 articles concerned only with the organisation of the structure of universities 
and higher education institutions in the public sector and thereby private higher education 
had been neglected by the government. As far as can be seen, a proper related resolution or 
243 
 
decision to recognize private higher education had not been formulated within the public 
higher education resolution and consequently there was no control over private higher 
education. As a result it had developed in unsatisfactory circumstances in terms of the 
establishment of the private universities and their facilities. 
 
Another aspect is that the Libyan government included in its privatization policy, 
opportunities for owners to get financial grants and other assistance to cover the costs and 
the expenses related to their universities, although the owners, in fact, found it very hard to 
benefit from these advantages. All the presidents of the private universities when 
interviewed in November, 2011, commented that the Libyan government had not provided 
any assistance, grants or donations: no private higher educational institutions had received 
any funding at all. Private educational institutions were supposed to generate their own 
money to fund their own programmes and the owners of private universities had to pay 
rent for using the state’s properties when they started their activities. It was quite expensive 
according to the presidents of the two Universities Al-Refak and Trables (Tripoli).41 The 
Libyan government seemed to have had a desire to commercialize these institutions to 
achieve two objectives: to offer locations for private universities which is very important 
for the introduction of the idea of privatization of higher education in Libya especially at 
its beginning; and to gain income from the rent of state buildings. However, when Dr. 
Shokri Ghanem was prime minister he issued a resolution warning these universities to 
                                                 
41
 In fact, the phenomenon of rent of state facilities, like public schools, has not been known since 
independence especially in the light of the Al-Fatah Revolution of 1969. The philosophy of the revolution 
which comes from the ‘Third Universal Theory’ does not accept such a concept. It was even against the law 
for somebody to rent a property, specifically between the period from 1977 to 1993 when the Libyan 
economy was designed to promote a large social, redistributive and economic role for the state under the flag 
of socialism or nationalism. It was the first time for Libya since the publication of the ‘Green Book’ to rent 
out public education institutions. 
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move out of the state schools and required them to find their own buildings.42  According 
to interviews with the owners of some private universities they complained that the state 
did not support us. Dr. Almehdy, the President of Trables (Tripoli) University said that:  
 
 “...in the first instance and at the start of private universities in 1999, the Libyan 
government offered its buildings to Libyans to establish universities, but then five years 
later the Libyan government required the universities to leave state properties and to find 
their own buildings.....at the same time the Libyan government did not provide enough time 
to allow these universities to move, and as a result, only ten survive from 36 
universities.......”. (Interview with Dr. Almehdy, the President of Trables (Tripoli) 
University, November 2011)          
 
Another aspect of this is that these universities were required to pay a tax. It is interesting 
to note that the government of Libya solicited the participation of the private sector to 
assume an active role in the development of higher education in the country and had 
encouraged the private sector to play its role in higher education which was seen as a way 
of supplementing public universities.  However, private universities are classified 
according to the Libyan Tax Law as Musahima companies.43 In the legislative law issued 
by the General People’s Congress, unlike the public universities, the private universities 
were charged an amount of money every year according to that law. (General People’s 
Congress, 2010, Legislative Law.No.4). This situation made it difficult for private higher 
education to compete with public higher education. The costs of private universities are 
covered by individuals who invest in the projects, while the public universities are financed 
                                                 
42
 I could not find the number of the resolution; however, I was a lecturer at the Afriqya University in Tripoli 
that rented a state school. It was closed by the local authorities to prevent workers, staff members and 
students using the facilities and this resulted in unrest associated with the school. 
43
 It means that it is a company that makes a profit and is similar to any commercial enterprise.     
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from the government budget. This implies that investments in higher education involve 
risks for the private sector because there is uncertainty about its abilities and future 
circumstances. However, there has been a significant investment of private sector in higher 
education which it is seen a good project for making profits. The result had been to a fast 
growth of private universities for few years.  
 
There are several factors that helped private universities to spread in large numbers in an 
unplanned manner without regard to geographic dispersion policy: 
1. The private universities had been established in a hit-or-miss or poorly organized 
environment. Neither Law No. 6. 1999, nor Law No. 21. 2001, formulated specific rules or 
clear instructions for their control.  
2. There were many places and organizations which had given licences to people who 
aspired to establish private universities, such as the Basic People’s Congress, the Education 
People’s Committee in the province and Higher Education Offices. This led to a rapid 
increase in the number of universities. It also created chaos because it negatively affected 
the institutions’ procedures and the government’s ability to control them.          
3. A private university was seen as an excellent, profit making business that could attracted 
many people from different social classes to invest their money. What is worse is that, 
although one of the pre-requisites for running a university is that its founder has to hold at 
least an MSc. Some did not hold this qualification, and indeed, in the Al-Jamahiriya 
Newspaper it was reported that the president of Kortoba University is a wealthy taxi driver 
with enough money to establish a university. (Embark, S, Al-Jamahiriya Newspaper, 9th of 
March, 2003. p10). 
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Since private higher educational institutions started to emerge in late 1990s, there have 
been a number of problems in the sector. The incomplete legal system in Libya has led to 
confusion in policy, practice, and capital distribution. Although teaching programmes are 
more flexible than that in the state-run universities, they are still not consistent with the 
practical needs of the society. No private higher educational institutions receive any 
funding from the government. Private educational institutions are supposed to develop 
their own programmes, but in reality, compulsory curriculums that have excessive theory 
are still imposed by the government. And the teaching methods currently used in Libya are 
exactly the same as before the reform, and these are traditionally teacher-centred. Students 
are required to sit through a class listening to the lecturers and do not have an opportunity 
to do their own research because research is often teacher directed. Moreover, there is a 
crucial shortage of teaching staff; private universities still have to hire lecturers from the 
state-run universities and many experienced lecturers are at retiring age and come from 
foreign countries, especially Iraq and the Sudan, two unstable countries. There are also 
problems with student evaluation, and the acceptance of educational credentials of students 
from private universities on graduation. Furthermore, private universities are relatively 
small in size and more importantly, less peaceful, so that the general assumption is that the 
quality of education given is of a very low standard. It is assumed that the students have 
limited use of facilities such as libraries, laboratories and information and communication 
technologies that are vital for academic excellence and research. But even some of the 
private universities like Afriqya University and Tripoli University do not have any such 
facilities. These universities, in the first instance, rented primary and secondary schools. 
Then, when these universities were required by the Libyan government to find their own 
buildings they rented houses from Libyan people.  
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The Afriqya University rented a house in Tripoli that was situated on a site that covered an 
area of 500 m² and the building itself had a floor area of only 200 m². This building 
contains eight faculties. These are Engineering, Law, Languages, Economics, Political 
Sciences, Management, Accounting and Computing Sciences. All these departments are 
deteriorating and lack facilities and decent conditions for study. The photos in the appendix 
were taken during the period of field study in November, 2010, and show the worsening 
situation in Libya. (see appendix 5).  This university opened a medical study programme in 
spite of the fact that the Libyan government had specifically banned such programmes 
from being introduced in the private sector. There are many stories that show the extent to 
which the private universities operate illegally. First and foremost, they work without any 
legal justification or permission. Second, they open scientific departments, for instance 
Medical and Engineering sciences, which are impossible to implement in such conditions. 
The following is narrated by a student: 
 
“I studied at Al-Fatah University in the Faculty of Dentistry. Because I failed in the second 
year...I lost two years in this university because of poorly organized administration and the 
corruption. Some faculty members were put in prison. Therefore, I went to Afriqia 
University and I asked the president, Dr. Mabrouk Abo Shiba, about the accreditation. He 
said: yes it is accredited even from Satesbirg University in Austria. I started my course in 
the third year. During that time I investigated to see if Satesbirg University had any 
relationship with Afriqya University - I found nothing. So, I went back to Dr. Abo Shipa to 
ask him again. He sent me a fax which said: How are you? I hope we will be friends and 
know more about each other........I paid 1,250 L.D in year three and the same amount in 
year four. In year four I went to the Higher Education Ministry and I asked Dr. Soliman 
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Khoga, who is in charge of higher education, about the university and he told me it is not 
accredited....then I collected my receipt and other documents and went back to Dr. Khoga 
to complain about this issue. Dr. Khoga reported this matter to the People’s Board for 
Control and Follow-up.44.....unfortunately the latter was useless. It did not take any action 
against the President of the university because, as I knew, the President had a good 
relationship with some powerful people who work at the institution....” (Interview with a 
student Mohammed Haman, October 2010) (see appendix 3).                
 
Many members of the public were very eager to use the new universities to improve 
employment prospect; but soon the reputation of the private higher education sector began 
to fall especially among many parents of students. They considered the sector as 
commercial enterprise whose proprietors used their clientele primarily as a means of 
earning income rather than as institutions making a contribution to education and training. 
Private universities have poorly developed internal quality control mechanisms. This is 
evident on three fronts: they do not have a system for internal self-evaluation on a yearly 
basis; there is no internal evaluation of teaching staff by teachers or students (and an 
absence of this measure makes teachers underperform because there is a total lack of 
accountability and therefore no censure), and none of these private universities is a 
research or teaching institution. They simply sell degrees. Al-Teer (2005) criticized those 
private universities and compared them to shops, established to only to sell degrees and to 
make a profit. He concluded that the increasing number of higher education institutions 
does not mean that Libyan higher education is in a healthy state because higher education 
institutions, both public and private, do not achieve the necessary standards to be at the 
                                                 
44
 It is a state institution and its function is to pursue the various public bodies and record any contravention 
of rules and regulations notified to its administrative body. 
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level of a university and have very poor facilities, especially in practical departments and 
laboratories. 
 
The Libyan government, through the QAA, sought to compel the private higher education 
institutions to achieve minimum standards nationwide. The reality, though, was very 
different. Private universities were not concerned about the rules and constructions. I went 
to a number of these universities and I found that all of them, whether they were accredited 
or not, lacked adequate staffing standards, physical facilities, financing of programmes, 
enough books, journals or other resource materials for programmes. And it has to be added 
that, compared with public institutions, these establishments do not offer the social services 
of accommodation, cafeteria facilities or medical cover. 
     
Despite these weaknesses in private higher education in the country, many sources (e.g. 
Shernana, F45, 2001 and Al-Falani, M, 2003) point out that private higher education has 
provided access to higher education for 40,000 students without any expenditure from the 
government budget. It has also opened up opportunities for more students to access higher 
education especially for those who do not have opportunities to study in the state-run 
educational institutions. Not everyone, however, shares this view.  The argument does not 
have a strong foundation, because, in reality, most students from the urban areas with more 
resources often get the top studentships in the public higher educational institutions. They 
receive more financial support from their families which helps them to access better 
educational resources even before entering higher education, while children from rural 
areas and poor families do not have these opportunities. This leaves poor students no 
choice but to choose the private universities if they would like to pursue higher education, 
                                                 
45
  Shernana, F and Al-Falani, M both are professors at Tripoli University (Al-Fatah University before 
February Revolution).   
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although the cost can be prohibitive. Students graduating from state-run universities are 
more highly regarded in the job market, which means the loss of social and economic 
equity and indicates that the gap between rich and poor in Libyan society is getting wider. 
 
Because all of these private institutions were active in the evenings from almost 15:00 to 
20:00, they attract many students to study, some of whom are employees who work in 
banks, in health care, public telecommunication companies and in other social services. 
Other students have special circumstances that force them to study at these institutions. 
This was illustrated by in interviews with some employees who work at state institutions 
the Libyan Al-Gehad Centre, Tax Administration and People’s Solicitor Administration:  
 
“.....I studied at a public higher education institution, the Al-Shomokh Institute for 
Computing Science for four semesters but because I had problems with them, I went to a 
Two March private institute to complete my study ....”. (Interview with an employee, Hager 
Al-Fergani, the Libyan Al-Gehad Centre, October 2010) 
 
“I studied at the Al-Fatah University in its Law Faculty. I could not attend final exams at 
the Faculty for two years because of personal circumstances. So I decided to study in a 
private university which is called the Al-Taqadom University. I registered in a ‘100 
system’, which meant that I did not have to attend lectures.....and in 2004 I graduated from 
the university...” (Interview with an employee, Sabah Algdeery, Tax Administration, 
October/2010) 
 
“...I spent three years in the Faculty of Law in Al-Fatah University. I failed in the third 
year and repeated it. The study was so very difficult that I decided to go to a private 
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university. It is called the Dar Al-Ealem University and I completed the fourth year.....”. 
(Interview with an employee, Fateme Al-Abani, People’s Solicitor Administration, January 
2011). 
 
As these quotations illustrate, some students who have studied in private higher education 
have come from public universities and other state higher education institutions. Many 
have, in fact, failed to pass their exams in a public institution and private ones are seen by 
such students not only as an excellent opportunity to finish their studies but as an easy 
option because academic expectations in the private sector are much lower. The most 
important thing in these universities is that tuition fees are charged according to the 
conditions. As an example, a student is called Al-Arbi, A live in Janzor (west Tripoli) had 
studied in a public university, the National Institution for Management, but had failed in 
his exams. Then he decided to go to a private university. He applied to Africa University; 
he met the rector and told him that he would like to study in his university. He saw this 
private university as a good chance to guarantee his graduation and to rescue himself 
(Author’s private information).  In Libya a degree is seen as the most important 
achievement for a student, basically because it serves them socially and economically. 
Many Libyan students do not care about the quality of private universities and prefer to 
study at such institutions because they are academically undemanding.            
 
 
6.6.3 The state intervention in the control of private higher education: 
 The HCPHE and QAA from the end of the 1990s, Gaddafi’s Libyan government, in line 
with its desire to reform the policy of higher education, embarked on programme of 
privatization of higher education but soon became aware of the fact that the new private 
universities were in trouble. Reporters started to talk about the real problems of private 
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universities such as the deterioration in quality, illegal activities and corruption within.  
Accordingly, the Libyan government decided to take steps to strengthen the sector: 
1. The GPC issued a resolution, No.9 in 2006, to establish the High Committee for 
Private Higher Education (HCPHE). The Committee, in its first meeting in May 
2006 agreed on the necessity to implement a set of procedures and decisions to 
regulate private education laws.  
2. The Secretary of GPCHE announced resolutions No.4 and No.5, in 2006, the first 
to prevent the current institutions of private higher education registering new 
students or those who wished to transfer from other institutions according to Article 
76 of the Private Higher Education Law. The second to prevent study in these 
institutions during the summer term 2005/2006 to give a chance for the private 
higher education committees in the areas to collect documents, data and results 
about the institutions.   
 
 
In 2006 the GPC issued resolution No. 164 to establish the QAA. The Libyan government 
considered it important to follow a national strategy to strengthen the education sector and 
to improve the quality of its educational institutions. It is not certain why the QAA was 
founded so late but the problems within private higher education required the government 
to act. Its functions may be listed as follows: 
1. Advising and making recommendations to the government on matters relating to higher 
education research; 
2. Receiving and considering applications from institutions or organizations seeking to 
establish private higher education in Libya, and making recommendations thereon to the 
government; 
3. Promotion of co-operation among the institutions of higher education in Libya; 
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4. Co-ordinating long-term planning; 
5. Examination and approval of proposals for courses of study and course regulations 
submitted by institutions of higher education; 
6. Accreditation of higher education institutions; 
7. Advising the government on the establishment of higher education institutions;  
8. Ensuring the maintenance of the standards of programmes and examinations in higher 
education institutions; 
9. Making regulations appropriate to enrolment in state institutions of higher education and 
to provide a central admission service for higher education institutions;  
10. Visiting and inspecting higher education institutions;  
11. Making regulations on the standardization, recognition and the equality of degrees, 
diplomas and certificates conferred or awarded by foreign institutions and local 
institutions. 
 
The QAA formulated rules regarding the operation of private universities: 
 
1. A university may not be established and operated without the relevant provisional 
licence, charter or certificate granted by QAA. 
2. Teaching should include practical solutions to social and economic problems in the 
community and therefore should be problem-solving based. 
3. The language of instruction shall be Arabic, although other languages may be used as a 
medium of instruction under certain conditions. 
4. Universities should recruit academic and administrative staff that meets the standards 
and qualifications stipulated by the QAA. 
5. The finances of universities irrespective of their sources should be soundly managed. 
6. Any university that wishes to change its name or part of it must apply in writing to the 
QAA. 
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7. Universities shall submit annual reports to the QAA and the GPCE in a prescribed form 
setting out their activities and achievements towards their objectives and shall set 
institutional standards for each year. 
8. Private universities shall be free to become constituent colleges of other institutions as 
long as they meet with the approval of the QAA according to its set rules and conditions. 
9. Admission, training and assessment of students in universities shall be based on merit.  
10. Private universities shall be required to conform to the legal and relevant regulations 
required of them by the QAA and the GPCE. 
  
The QAA was a Libyan state authority which acted according to the guidelines of the 
General People’s Committee for Education (GPCE, Education Ministry).  It was 
responsible for accreditation and quality assurance and both private and public higher 
education institutions had to have their programmes accredited by the QAA; so before 
private higher education institutions were considered for registration, the Department of 
Education required that their programmes be accredited by the QAA. In fact, in terms of 
the Regulations for the Registration of Private Higher Education Institutions, over and 
above accreditation of learning programmes, an applicant applying to operate as a higher 
education institution had to provide a written declaration that it would maintain the 
necessary academic and support staff, with appropriate academic or professional 
qualifications and experience to achieve the objectives of each programme; would 
maintain a quality management system including assessment policies and procedures 
appropriate to each programme; would maintain sufficient space, equipment and 
instructional material to provide education and training of a sufficient standard to achieve 
the objectives of each programme; would not exceed the enrolment numbers that the 
facilities and equipment can reasonably accommodate and would maintain full records of 
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each student’s admission, academic progress and assessment of learning in respect of each 
programme.         
 
To this extent, the Ministry of Education concurred with the QAA that the sector was 
inadequately regulated. The QAA statements infer that private higher education institutions 
were not regulated in such a way as to fulfil the role of being complementary to public 
higher education institutions, as well as of contributing to social development. Indeed, 
whilst private institutions on a limited scale provide access to higher education, the 
establishment of the new body indicated that the existing policy of Gaddafi regime was 
inadequate in terms of improving this aspect of their functioning.  
 
The QAA promulgated a set of regulations for the registration of private higher education 
institutions in 2006. These regulations outlined the eligibility criteria used for applicants 
who want to operate private higher education institutions; guidelines for compliance with 
registration requirements; and responsibility criteria for the maintenance of registration, 
among others. They required private institutions to offer only programmes leading to 
qualifications that were registered on the QAA, to maintain the necessary academic and 
support staff with appropriate academic or professional qualifications and experience to 
achieve the objectives of each programme, to maintain quality management systems, 
sufficient space, equipment and instructional material, to not exceed the enrolments that 
the facilities and equipment can reasonably accommodate, and to maintain full records of 
each programme.    
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However, despite the above-stated requirements, Private Higher Education Administration 
(GPCHE, 2003, Private Higher Education Report, Scientific Committee46) in its report 
painted a bleak picture of the quality of private higher education provision. The general 
consensus is that the majority of private universities are set up as small for-profit 
businesses, a trend also to be found internationally (Levy, D, 2003, p5). As such, they 
survive by investing little and can simply pull out if they do not yield the required returns. 
Thus, the PHEA provision in Libya found that many universities do not have the structure 
and strategies to deal with quality assurance and that: “…students articulated complaints 
about access, very poor libraries, and totally inadequate facilities that made assignments 
and other tasks very difficult to accomplish.” (Interview with Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife, the 
Director of PHEA, November 2010). 
 
This negative picture is compounded by reports that the sector largely depended on 
inexperienced, under-qualified and mainly part-time employed staff, much against the 
requirements for the registration of private higher education institutions. It has been 
observed that “…some institutions consisted entirely of part-time staff while in others there 
is a lack of adequately qualified and experienced staff and some faculty members do not 
have even post- graduate qualifications.” The report implied that these discrepancies led to 
poor quality of teaching and learning at private universities. Even worse, there seemed to 
be no effort to improve these conditions. To this end, the report concluded that “…poor 
quality programmes, despite being financially accessible to low-income families, do a 
disservice to their students and the country in general because they inject poorly prepared 
graduates into the labour market. (GPCHE, 2003). In the following example the effects on 
higher education are revealed. It occurred at Afriqiya University, where the faculty of 
                                                 
46
 PHEA was required by the HCPHE to form a committee to evaluate the private higher education process,  
it is consist of five professors and they were asked to provide a report to be submit to the Secretary of 
GPCHE.      
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engineering faced with an upcoming evaluation of its facilities by the national regulatory 
authority and well aware that its level of engineering infrastructure was inadequate, 
adopted a strategy designed to circumvent the problem. Unwilling to accept the 
consequences of a poor rating, the faculty approached local engineering firms to borrow 
numerous items of major equipment. The day after the successful inspection, which 
ultimately yielded a satisfactory rate, all equipment was returned to local industry, leaving 
students just as bereft of necessary equipment as they were before. Such stories are not 
uncommon: Many private universities without sufficient equipment to support the practical 
curriculum end up compromising the quality of their students.  The need for a more 
effective regulatory regime is now widely accepted although this is against a backdrop of 
corruption that has the capacity to undermine the effectiveness of quality assurance 
procedures. 
       
In 2010, there were more than 50 private universities registered with the National 
Committee for Private Universities (NCPU). Only four of them fulfilled some of the 
requirements for registration. They also met some academic conditions that have been 
listed by the QAA, so were given an accreditation certificate which covered some of the 
departments of science as can be seen from Table 28. The remainder of the private 
universities were issued with letters of intent to cancel their registration because of their 
continued failure to comply with the requirements for registration. Despite this there were 
some universities that continued to operate illegally. In October 2010, the Director of 
Private Higher Education Administration issued a letter giving these universities a 
maximum of three months to comply with the legal and technical regulations if they 
aspired to accreditation from the QAA. It should be noted that the emergence of the QAA 
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has reduced to some extent the number of private universities alongside with other reasons, 
they are: 
1. The private universities were required by the GPC (the Cabinet) in Dr. Ghanem’s 
time at the beginning of the 21st century to vacate public properties and to find 
other buildings and facilities to run their educational activities. 
2. Some of the private universities were closed down because of illegal activities.  
3. The General People’s Committee’s decision that insisted that the private 
universities to resolve their legal situation. This Act came into effect in 2010 and 
required that all private higher education institutions be registered with the QAA. 
This became a serious threat for those who have not already met the requirements 
of the regulatory framework. 
4. The public became aware of the issue and approached unregistered institutions with 
great caution. 
Table (28). The accredited programmes and the year of accreditation in private 
universities. 
University  Accredited departments  Year 
Afriqya (Benghazi) Law, English Language & Business Management  2006 
International and Libyan 
University for Medical 
Sciences (Benghazi) 
Medical Sciences  2007 
Al-Refaq University (Tripoli) Business Management, Computing science, 
Construction Planning, Law & Accountancy.   
2007 
United Afriqya University 
(Al-Zawia) 
Law, English Language & History 2006 
Source: General People’s Committee, A Report of the Higher Education Sector. (N.D):  
259 
 
 
Yet there remained a number of them working without any permission and, in addition, 
there was also the rapidly growing menace of unrecognised institutions of higher education 
which did not qualify to be recognised by the government as educational institutions. 
Moreover, the institutions themselves did not seek recognition because recognition by the 
QAA restricted the freedom of such institutions to adopt undesirable and questionable 
methods of management, relating to admission, student fees, teacher recruitment, etc. 
These ‘fake’ institutions can be regarded as ‘black’ or ‘illegal’ in the education market. 
They varied widely in nature and include ‘teaching shops’ or shop-like institutions, 
coaching centres, cramming schools, etc. Consequently, the QAA warned these 
‘universities’ that it was an infringement of the University Act and University Rules to 
advertise and/or mount university level programmes without obtaining a letter of interim 
authority from the QAA and that if established, according to an Act of the GPC they are 
committing an offence punishable by law. They were required to submit their documents to 
the QAA for accreditation.  To date, there have been many cases of prospective 
universities having been found to have infringed the Universities Act or the Universities 
Rules by either advertising or mounting university-level programmes. A deadline of three 
months was given, according to a letter dated in 3rd of October, 2010, for these universities 
to conform to the legal requirements otherwise they would suffer the consequences.47       
 
The situation that arose caused a serious problem: this was the number of students 
graduating from the private universities during the previous years 1999 to 2006. So the 
QAA made a decision to accredit the degrees given to those students during those years 
through what was labelled the ‘Comprehensive Exam Policy’. 
                                                 
47
 After this date I have no idea if the private universities considered this deadline because Libya became 
almost immediately involved in the uprising of the 17th of February, 2011.   
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Actually, before the establishment of the QAA the policy of accreditation in Libya was the 
responsibility of the local authorities. Each city had its own committee called the General 
Committee of Education which had the right to accredit universities located in its area. At 
that time the number of accredited private higher education institutions in Tripoli itself 
reached 32. (General Committee for Higher Education, 2007). It seems to be believed, 
though, that the majority of these institutions did not meet the minimum requirements in 
academic standards. Sen Sad Higher Education Institute, at which I was teaching, is an 
excellent example: this institution was given accreditation in 2001. It was in very bad 
condition with very poor classes, no library and with a lack of other facilities. At the end of 
the term I handed the final results of the course to the president who was extremely upset 
because most of students had failed. She asked me to change the results but I refused and 
resigned from my post. The spread of corruption enabled the owners of these institutions to 
avoid the legal requirements and obtain their certificates of accreditation. Corruption was 
widespread and very clear in the case of the Al-Ahleya Tripoli University which had been 
established in 2000 through resolution No. 621 issued by the Private Education Office in 
Tripoli. After some six years the university was closed because its degree certificates were 
pronounced deceptive. Large numbers of students went to the Higher Education 
Committee (Ministry) and to court to complain but with no success whatsoever. When 
graduates approached the president, Muhsen Ramadan Ahmed, for help in solving their 
problem he did not show any interest or concern at all. (Al.Gharyani, E, 2011, p10).        
 
6.6.4 Comprehensive Exam Policy (CEP): 
 
The CEP had been adopted by the state since 2006 to solve the problem of non-accredited 
qualifications that were given by private universities. It was seen by the government as a 
good policy towards achieving: first, the political stability that it might stimulate and, 
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secondly, to rescue the reputation of the government because of the questionable degrees 
given by the private universities. The Libyan policy makers did not want the idea of the 
privatization of higher education to fail, especially when it was proposed essentially by 
Gaddafi himself.       
 
On the 20th of June 2010, a meeting was held by a supervisory committee to discuss the 
first comprehensive examination for students at private higher education institutions. The 
committee aimed to organize and discus the procedures of the comprehensive examination, 
such as places and timetables. At this meeting the secretary of the National Committee of 
Private Education (NCPE) stated that steps were to be taken to solve the problem of non-
accredited degrees through comprehensive examination by evaluating the level of 
understanding of the graduates of private universities and then to accredit their 
qualifications if satisfactory. 5,000 students sat the first examination. (Media Office, Al-
Elm Magazine, 24th of June, 2010, No.11, p6).  Some private universities and their 
graduates did not welcome this move and complained that the QAA compelled them to 
meet the QAA conditions if they wanted to have their degrees accredited. 
 
Resolution No. 82, 2010 was issued by the General People’s Committee through its cabinet 
regarding the comprehensive examination. In this, students were to be charged 100 D.L to 
cover part of the cost of the examination. (Media Office, Al-Elm Magazine, 31th of May 
2010, No.10, p9). On the 15th of May, 2010, the NCPE advertised the introduction of the 
comprehensive examination on the 26th of June 2010. It called for all graduates from 
private higher education (universities and institutions) who hold qualifications in the areas 
of business management, accountancy, law, computing, the English Language, dentistry, 
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chemistry and other diploma holders. The examination was administered by the following 
five committees: 
1. Tripoli Committee located in private higher education administration. 
2. Benghazi Committee located in Garyounise University. 
3. Sabha Committee located in Sabha University. 
4. Musrata Committee located in the Industrial Technical Faculty. 
5. Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar Committee located in the Higher Institute for Vocational 
Education in Derna. (Media Office, Al-Elm Magazine, 15th of May, 2010, No.9,  
p5). 
 
The NCPE required students to fill in an application form with six documents attached: a 
certificate, a transcript, a secondary education certificate, the receipt for the examination 
fees, identification, and four recent photos. Students were allowed only two chances to sit 
the examination otherwise they would lose their opportunity to accredit their qualifications. 
To get accreditation a student’s qualifications have to have been awarded from one of the 
seven universities or from one of the 31 institutions that were accredited. The 
administration announced four conditions that have to be met by those who wanted to 
accredit their degrees. They were: 
1. fill in a new form that has been prepared by the administration; 
2. submit an  original and a copy of the degree and the transcript that were issued by 
the private institution; 
3. produce and submit an original certificate of secondary education; 
4. each applicant has to submit two photographs of himself/herself.  
This announcement did not cover graduates after the year 2008 except for institutions that 
had gained permeations.     
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6.6.5 Programmes of study and courses offered by the private institutions of higher 
education. 
The public universities are large organizations offering courses in a variety of subject 
areas. The academic interest and advances in frontiers of knowledge decide programmes of 
study and courses offered in public universities in general. The purpose of the operation of 
private universities is different from that of public universities since many of them are self-
financing and concerned with profit making.  They have to offer courses that have a 
premium both in the education market and in the labour market. The demand for particular 
courses and the fees levied in the education market are decided by the employability of the 
graduates. In this sense, the education market and the labour market give out signals to the 
private institutions, and their ultimate success depends upon their ability to respond 
quickly to such stimuli.  
 
It should be recognised that all private providers were required to register their institutions 
and apply for accreditation for their programmes with the QAA. Private universities were 
required to teach only programmes and study subjects that were accredited by the Centre. 
In the only four accredited private universities eight study subjects were accredited, but 
private universities whether they were accredited or not, did not always follow the QAA’s 
rules and recommendations, and some operated programmes and subjects that were not 
accredited. Although resolutions were formulated by the government in 2001 and in 2010 
cautioning these universities for using public media (e.g. magazines, newspapers and TV) 
the owners of private universities continued to use them, ignoring the state directive. 
Private universities also distributed leaflets inviting students to study at their universities 
saying that their programmes were accredited as an attempt to attract those students and 
their families who were unconvinced of their validity. It is interesting, too, to note that the 
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leaflets have misleading photos and pictures of very nice buildings and modern facilities 
that were not of their own shabby universities. Even more interesting is that these same 
pictures were used in a magazine issued by the Al-Fateh University. Evidence supporting 
this observation consists of comparing photos taken on site with a leaflet from the Afriqya 
University illustrating the difference between the pictures in the leaflet and the photos of 
the actual buildings. (See Appendix 5). 
 
There were also instances where a good number of institutions were not registered and 
recognized, yet still operated and attracted students. Many of the private universities were 
not authorized to do so, as they did not meet the requirements regarding infrastructure, 
equipment, and staffing stipulated by the government; many of them were therefore 
operating illegally. A number of the recent private institutions established in response to 
the market-driven forces were unplanned in many ways. Often, for-profit institutions 
operate in legally ambiguous settings. They admitted students and taught courses without 
the right to offer degrees or certificates recognized by the government or the accreditation 
agencies.    
 
Two factors contributed significantly to this state of affairs first, inadequacies in the legal 
provisions for the establishment of private higher education institutions. This led to a lack 
of clearly defined operational principles and regulatory mechanisms for opening and 
operating private universities, and such situations provided fertile ground for the 
mushrooming of private higher education institutions. Second, the employment market 
recognizes the training provided and the certificates issued by private higher education 
institutions, even when they are not formally recognized by the public authorities. This 
happens especially when employment is generated increasingly in the private sector.     
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The courses offered in private universities in Libya reflect commercial needs. It seems the 
primary objective of establishing a university were reflected in the curriculum offered. The 
for-profit institutions cater for private enterprises and the private institutions of higher 
education within the for-profit category offered courses that are market-friendly. Courses 
in business administration, computer sciences, accounting and marketing, economics, 
communication, etc., were very common in these for-profit universities.  Their profitability 
depended on the savings they made on expenditure. Salaries (especially staff salaries) form 
a dominant part of the expenditure of educational institutions in the public domain and 
many private universities made savings by employing teaching staff on a part-time basis. 
These universities operated as commercial enterprises and their tuition fees formed their 
financial backbone. The total income of private institutions was determined, therefore, by 
the number of students and the rate of tuition levied. These institutions attempted to attract 
a larger number of students in order to maximize profitability by setting an appropriate 
level of fees. 
  
Unlike many countries of the world, such as in some African countries where the non-
university sector is one of the characteristics of private higher education, in Libya 
professional and vocational education were completely absent. The private universities did 
not offer the professional and vocational courses which were very popular in the private 
institutions of higher education in other countries in the world. In its development plans 
and in its policy for education, the Libyan government concerned itself more with this type 
of education than with classical university education with the aim of fulfilling the needs of 
the social and economic development plans. Fundamentally, vocational education was seen 
by the Libyan policy makers as an important sector that would serve the Libyan economy 
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well and they argued that professional and vocational courses were important for the 
economic development plan. It became apparent that classical university education 
presents problems.  First and foremost, of course, was academic unemployment which has 
been outlined in the previous chapter and in 1985, the GPC called for a ‘‘…further 
expansion of vocational and professional training centres and for measures to compel 
technically trained students to work in their fields of specialization”. (Metz, H, 1989, 
p113). 
 
The Libyan government had hoped that private higher education would conform to the 
public policy and its wish to offer vocational courses. Unfortunately, private higher 
education has been a copy of the public higher education system where most studies 
concentrate on the humanities and social sciences and the private universities have been 
similarly concentrated with its provision slanted towards low-cost disciplines that require 
little investment in equipment. Consequently, private universities mostly offer courses in 
subject areas which require low levels of investment in infrastructure facilities. This is in 
contrast with some of the private initiatives in other countries, such as India, where 
colleges of engineering and colleges of medicine, which require a high level of investment 
in infrastructure and other facilities, are common in the private sector. As a result, private 
higher education in Libya has produced more graduates from fields and areas that are not 
needed by the labour market and have contributed significantly to the number of the 
educated unemployed.       
 
6.6.6 Admission policy and level of tuition fees in the private sector. 
The private sector is the fastest-growing segment in higher education in many countries 
like Asia and Africa, and this includes Libya, where private universities outnumber public 
universities. But in Libya, private universities continue to be small and account for a 
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relatively low share of the total enrolment in higher education. The private tertiary 
institutions, understandably, tend to have far smaller numbers than the public institutions. 
The number enrolled in the public universities during the period 2000 – 2004 was 222,976. 
(National Committee for Private Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya. 
N.D. PHEA, pps 4&5). In 2006 the number of private university students grew to 40,000 
and in public universities to 300,000 students. (GPCHE (b), 2007, p1 and General 
Authority for Information, Statistics Book, 2009,).   
 
The admission policy in most private universities, especially non-accredited ones, is 
farcical and academic standards and conditions are simply not provided. There is no 
specific time for the registration of students and they can come and go as they please and 
choose to study at any time before the final exam.  Procedures of enrolment are lax and 
mathematical statistics are not used for the evaluation of whether a student has been 
studying at the university or not. 
 
High public demand and limited supply have led to the growth of many for-profit private 
universities with their focus on the supply of student places and on absorbing student 
applications, but not on the quality of education provided. It is odd that although the 
private universities are not accredited, students still apply to study at these establishments. 
There are several reasons that might explain this situation:   
1. Many students are worried about their future especially those who lost an opportunity to 
study at public universities. Private higher education provides an opportunity for them to 
guarantee their future.  
2. The failure of the Libyan government to monitor and control the development of private 
universities.   
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3. The presidents of private universities and their assistants do not follow the legal rules 
that are issued by the QAA. Most of them are not accredited but still function. When 
students come to register and ask staff about accreditation they are told that, yes, the 
university is accredited and approved by the QAA. On one occasion during my field study, 
a student came to Afriqya University to register and asked the president if the university 
was accredited. He was told that it was. 
 
It is very important that students pay tuition fees before the start of a course, although 
institutions may be divided into two categories. Some universities are very strict in terms 
of the payment of tuition fees and students are compelled to pay in advance otherwise they 
would be barred from lectures. Other universities are more flexible and under certain 
circumstances allow their clients to delay payment, the aim being to help the poorer 
students but also to increase the number of students as an attempt to maximize the 
revenues.  
 
Tuition fees from the financial backbone of many private institutions. For-profit private 
universities operate, as has been said, as commercial enterprises. The total income of 
private institutions is determined, therefore, by the number of students and the rate of 
tuition fees charged. But employment oriented and market-friendly courses are not the only 
factors that attract a large number of students to these institutions: private universities are 
very easy places in which to obtain higher degrees and many students are confident that 
they will graduate simply because they have registered and paid their fees.    
 
Generally, fees in the majority of private universities term are higher than in public 
universities. In India, China, and Pakistan and in many other developing countries, the fees 
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in private institutions cover 100 % of the costs of the education provided. In many 
developed countries fees are less than 100 %. In the USA, for example, the corresponding 
proportion was only 25% and in Japan 59%. Accordingly, Libya would be placed in the 
former where the fees in private institutions cover 100%, if not more. However, it is not as 
high as in India, for example, where students seem to prefer going abroad to countries like 
China for medical and even engineering education rather than study within their own 
country. (Futao & Hata in Tilak.J, 2008, p129). The largest proportion of the financial 
resources in private higher education establishments comes from the tuition fees paid by 
enrolled students and, despite the lack of available data on tuition fees paid per term, these 
can be estimated at 250 L.D for subjects in the humanities and 500 D.L for scientific 
subjects. There are, of course, variations and differences among establishments and 
demand for places will vary: some are more expensive and it is to these establishments that 
students from wealthy homes will apply. (Al-Refak University, Indicators and Numbers, 
2010) 
 
The management of financial resources is far worse in the private sector than in public 
institutions because these universities operate in an unstable environment. There are no 
clear policy guidelines or state procedures to regulate and control the level of tuition fees 
in private higher education and tuition fees vary considerably between institutions, but all 
are concerned principally with making a profit and levy fees accordingly.   
  
In March 2010 the PHEA made a decision insisting that private universities organize the 
rate of their tuition fees according to the circumstances of students, but again, because of 
the corruption that seems to be the main feature of private higher education in Libya, there 
was little response, as fees, of course, are vital to the survival of these establishments. 
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6.6.7 Employment prospects of graduates from private institutions: 
So far, there has been no study of the employability of graduates from private higher 
education institutions in Libya. Studies that have been done have been related to their 
development and their evaluation. One of the major concerns of the government since 1999 
has been on how to ensure that the increasing numbers of private establishments were 
offering quality programmes and that their graduates were adequately prepared for the 
existing job market.     
   
The employment prospect of graduates of private institutions can be said to be currently 
considerably lower than that of public institutions because, for the first time, employers 
prefer to employ graduates from public higher education institutions because they feel that 
graduates from private universities are not well prepared and are of a low academic 
standard. The governmental institutions and Libyan society as a whole have complained 
that private higher education students tend to finish courses earlier than those from public 
institutions and that many do not attend lectures or lessons.  They are held in low esteem. 
Every private higher educational institution is expected to inculcate other skills apart from 
their study skills, to help the graduates to be job creators rather than just job seekers.         
 
Private universities, then, have not helped to solve the problem of the educated 
unemployed, as was hoped by Gaddafi’s government. They have produced graduates 
inappropriately qualified for the job market due to their focus and emphasis on offering 
courses in the humanities. A cursory glance at the course structure of these institutions 
reveals that all private universities offer accounting, business studies, management, and 
law, which are already well covered by public universities. Before the establishment of the 
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QAA the number of private higher education institutions had increased rapidly, producing 
a large number of graduates from different areas especially in the social sciences. Those 
graduates had not been examined adequately and their degrees were seen by state 
institutions, market employers and the Libyan society as a whole as of little worth. Private 
universities had a bad reputation and, as the data from my field study shows, the Libyan 
government was dissatisfied with the graduates from private higher education because the 
quality of these universities in terms of their staff, students, programmes and facilities were 
well below an acceptable standard. Notwithstanding, many of privately educated graduates 
have been employed by the state, many of whom studied in unlicensed universities. In 
Libya, it was impossible to obtain such data. There are no published statistics that provide 
such information about how many of state institution employees who holding private 
universities qualifications. However visits to a number of state institutions (as displayed in 
the table 29) during the field study helped me to gain related data. They are not 
comprehensive, but they are adequate for explaining the related purposes. The numbers 
given represent just a small fraction of the total and do not give a complete picture of the 
total numbers employed in the Libyan government, but are significant in their own right. 
Some employees, having worked in state jobs for nine years were told by the QAA to 
justify their qualifications. This led to a conflict on three fronts: graduates and their 
families, the private universities, and between employers and the government. 
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Table (29). The number of private university graduates who work in some of the state 
institutions.   
Name of institution Number 
The Administration of Tax (Tripoli). 39 
The Council of Planning in Tripoli Province 10 
The Libyan Al-Jehad Centre 5 
The National Institution of Oil 19 
The General Authority of Telecommunication 40 
The People’s Court 5 
The General Authority of Press 5 
Al-Jomhorya Bank (South Tripoli)  5 
The Health Care Authority 3 
General Authority of Al-Aoukaf 2 
The Food Follow-up Centre   2 
Source: Researcher’s data collected during the field study from the Workforce Administration, Employees 
Affairs Department in each institution above.   
 
Graduates and their families argued that it was not fair if they were prevented from 
working or from continuing with their studies because they held or were studying for 
private university degrees. The situation is complex. It seems unfair that students having 
studied at these universities for three or four years and having paid their fees should find 
their qualifications unacceptable to the government. In August, 2002, a decision was taken 
by the General People’s Committee to stop any further appointments of graduates from 
private universities unless their degrees were accredited. Again, though, there was no 
cooperation and the policy makers were placed in a difficult position; and it was hard to 
implement the decision in the public institutes because this would mean a further 
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emergence of the educated unemployed and such a result would have a serious 
destabilising effect on the country as a whole. This is why, I think, the decision was not 
implemented and policy makers were very cautious in dealing with the decision. Many 
graduates, however, in some way, have been employed, but others have faced problems in 
finding a job in the public sector. In Libya many people in public or private institutions, 
schools, universities and other social services establishments are having doubt about 
private universities to provide quality education because they are not of an acceptable 
academic standard. Interviews with managers and directors of some state institutions have 
said that they do not trust or accept private higher education qualifications (e.g. the 
Manager of the Tax administration, .Mohammed Al-Tomi, Tripoli, October, 2010, the 
Head Master of the Secondary School, Farj Al-Hmadi, Tripoli, November, 2010 and the 
Departmental Chief of Administrative Affairs in the National Authority of Information, 
Moftah Othman, Tripoli, November, 2010). Yet neither the state employers nor the policy 
makers in Libya have the ability to ensure that private university graduates are barred from 
working in state institutions.  
 
Most private universities were judged to be illegal but still operated. Interviews with 
presidents of three of the private universities have given an indication as to why these 
universities survive (Mrs. Mohiba Franka the president of Al-Refak University, Tripoli, 
December, 2010, Dr. Al-Mabrouk Abo Shena the president of Afriqya University, Tripoli, 
November, 2010 and  Dr. Al-Mehdi Mohammed the president of Tripoli University, 
Tripoli, November, 2010). The private universities have students from powerful families, 
some of whom were close to Gaddafi’s family. In three private universities (Al-Refak, 
Afriqya and Tripoli) there were students related to Gaddafi’s wife (Safeia) and to some 
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senior leaders in political and military positions.48 The students and their parents found 
private universities easy places to guarantee the graduation. Private universities for them 
were less complicated than public ones. Those people have everything and they go to 
private universities because they found them suitable for their purposes and to get 
qualifications just for social satisfactions. Those in charge of higher education including 
the Secretary (the Minister) would be in trouble if they had closed a private university that 
enrolled such students. The rich owners of these universities had strong relationships with 
powerful Libyan leaders. These universities operated in a corrupt system which helped 
owners avoid any official action or punishment.   
           
After the establishment of the QAA in 2006 and as the situation has deteriorated 
dramatically where most private universities have solely become business enterprises, a 
decision, No. 82, 2010, was taken as an attempt to strengthen the operation of private 
higher education. One of its aims is to re-accredit the qualifications. The QAA adopted a 
comprehensive examination policy which was announced in the Al-Elm Magazine and its 
first examination took place in June 2010. 
 
A large number of graduates from private universities could not find jobs or were unable to 
continue with their post graduate studies because of the accreditation problem. They said 
that their degrees were not accredited. The situation has created a serious challenge for the 
decision makers because the government sometimes accredits illegal private university 
qualifications but at the same time has not controlled these universities from the beginning.  
                                                 
48
 1) In Tripoli University, for example, there was a student who was Ebrahim Ali’s son. The latter was 
Gaddafi’s cousin. Ebrahim is the Secretary (Minister) of Planning. 2) It also had Abdoullah Al-Sanossi’s 
daughter who is brother-in-law of Gaddafi. He was the most important person for Gaddafi. 3) The daughter 
of Safeya’s brother studied at this university. Safeya is Gaddafi’s wife. 4) The son of Gaddafi’s sister had a 
daughter who studied in the university. All these, although they studied in a non-accredited university, would 
have made it not only very difficult but also very dangerous to close the university. At the same time the 
university would be in a safe position from any action taken against it.        
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In the first examination of the 26th of June, 2010, 5,052 students were examined from 
different areas (see Table 30) and only 1,425 passed.  3,627 failed and will have to sit the 
examination again as a last chance. Failure has had a negative psychological effect on 
students.  
 
Table (30). The number of students, who attended the comprehensive examination in June, 
2010.   
Department Attendance Pass Fail 
Business Management 1,257 73 1,184 
Accountancy 488 38 450 
Computing 1,534 699 835 
Law 136 11 125 
English. Language 94 40 54 
Chemistry 571 311 260 
Maintenance & 
Networks 
23 17 6 
Banks Management 1 0 1 
Insurance & Banks 4 0 4 
Architecture 65 34 31 
Petrol Engineering 276 9 267 
Civil Engineering 133 12 121 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
34 11 23 
Electrical Engineering 149 22 127 
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Telecommunications & 
Electronic Engineering 
21 7 14 
Chemical Engineering 16 0 16 
Air Condition 
Engineering 
4 2 2 
Vocational safety 37 37 0 
Nursing 95 38 57 
X-ray 12 7 5 
Medical Laboratory 76 46 30 
Physiotherapy 2 0 2 
Arabic Language 9 1 8 
Social Services 5 3 2 
Geography 3 1 2 
History 1 1 0 
Biology 2 1 1 
Arts 2 2 0 
Tourism 2 2 0 
Source: GPCESR, 2007. 
It should be noted that not all graduates attended the examination and these are as follows: 
1. Some of the more fortunate graduates have already got a job. 
2. Some of them are working but have to pass the examination if they want to accredit their 
degrees.  
3. Others are still seeking jobs.     
Interviews were held with some employees who work at state institutions. They narrated 
stories that described the complexity of the situation: 
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“...we applied for a job in many places since we graduated from the Private Higher 
Education Institution..... then we got jobs in a public institution .....we have worked for 
three years but unfortunately the employers do not accept our private university 
certificates as valid....we are paid salaries  based on secondary education qualifications 
and these are lower than the salaries based at graduate level.....it is not fair ....”. 
(Interview with employee, Nisreen Ashor, The Libyan Al-Jehad Centre, November, 2010). 
 
Because of this those employees have lost at least three years’ salaries. According to the 
law salaries are divided according to the level of education: secondary education 
qualification gets 130 L.D. and graduate level gets 200 L.D. It means that 70 L.D is the 
loss every month for each of those workers. Those who have worked for three years have 
lost about 840 L.D per year. They had hoped to achieve a secure future and to improve 
their lifestyle by studying at these universities - unfortunately, they invested their money 
(tuition fees) of about 2,000 D.L that covered their courses but they also experienced other 
non-monetary anxieties, time and uncertainty.     
 
The Al-Shames Newspaper published a very critical article in 2004 in which many private 
university graduates in public jobs state that their state employers accredit their secondary 
education certificates but not their university qualifications: 
 
 “..it is not a simple problem that is seen surfacing from time to time. The problem has 
seriously affected many students who go to private education institutions to get university 
certificates but they obtain useless qualifications and now are very worried about 
it......because there is no right state policy to guide secondary education students onto the 
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right path and there are no special institutions to advise the students where to go and 
study; the students have been trapped by these institutions by their advertisements 
distributed everywhere. These advertisements confirmed the legitimacy of their degrees... 
suddenly the graduates, whether they are working or not, find themselves in painful 
situations where their degrees are not accepted by the employers....” (Bellagti, K, Al-
Shames Newspaper, 8th of May 2004, p6).  
 
6.6.8 Distribution of private higher education providers across regions. 
The inability of the Gaddafi government to organize private higher education properly is 
further revealed by the failure of the regional policy. Libyan policy makers’ plans were 
very concerned to achieve the balanced distribution of public universities since the 
1980s.49 The notion of this distribution revolved around the argument that higher education 
opportunities should be available for all Libyans whether they lived in rural areas or in 
urban zones. This was seen as an important goal in the current political system agenda. 
After 1969 the Al-Fatah Revolution had aimed to achieve equality in Libyan society and to 
achieve this balance in the distribution of social services across the regions, public 
universities had been established by the government in urban and rural areas. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of public universities on the map of Libya. As can be seen from the 
map there are 12 public universities, the two largest being located in the two main cities, 
Tripoli and Benghazi. In the former there is Al-Fatah University in west Libya and in the 
east, in Benghazi, there is Garyounise University.    
 
So how has the distribution of private universities fitted into this aspiration for wider 
dispersion? Basically and according to the above analysis, the distribution of private 
                                                 
49
 Before that time from 1955, the year of the establishment of the first university, to 1979, higher education 
was very limited and comprised only two public universities both in the main cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. 
12 universities were added later and were distributed between urban and rural areas.       
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universities has to be in the line with the government goal of achieving a balanced 
distribution of public universities. Unfortunately, private universities have been spread 
randomly without considering the equity aim.  
 
Table 31 demonstrates that provision of higher education study places by the private sector 
is very unevenly distributed. These places are mostly concentrated in the wealthiest and 
most populated region, with a very heavy concentration of 75% in the principal city of 
Tripoli. They are based in the capital city where the student pool is large and where the 
infrastructure is relatively good. The private institutions’ profit-oriented strategy overlooks 
most of the central area of the country, despite the existence there of several centres of 
dynamic economic growth. This uneven distribution is also reflected by the private sub-
sector’s low provision of higher education study places in the most peripheral regions of 
the country, and none at all in one region, Gharian, where it is completely absent. 
((National Committee for Private Universities, A Report about Higher Education in Libya. 
N.D. PHEA, p6-7).  
 
Table (31). The geographical distribution of public and private institutions of higher 
education, Libya, 2004/2003. 
 Tripoli Benghazi Gharian  Almerghep Musrata 
Public 2 1 1 1 1 
Private 25 4 0 1 1 
Source: Al-Aowar, M. (2006). A Conference for Higher Education and the Development in Al-Jamahiriya, 
Part 2. The Internatonal Centre for the Researches and Studies of the ‘Green Book’.   
 
The geographical dispersion problems thus provided another problem for the authorities. 
The geographical and disciplinary distribution, the balance between teaching and research 
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and the quality of the degrees provided, have been quite different from political 
expectations; and this has provoked severe tensions within the system. Furthermore, 
private institutions did not prove to be more responsive to economic needs than the public 
sector, because their provision of study programmes tended to be concentrated in areas 
with low employment expectations and which did not always correspond to priorities 
defined by the Government or to the demands of the economy. 
 
6.6.9 The ownership of institutions of private higher education. 
Generally the ownership of private universities in the world may be categorized as follows: 
those owned by foreign bodies and operating like multinationals; private universities 
operating in collaboration with foreign institutions; those collaborating with institutions 
within the same country; and those that are religiously-supported institutions. Unlike in 
many countries where the above patterns of ownership exist, in Libya they do not. Private 
tertiary education in Libya is divided and encompasses many tutorial colleges that offer 
two year degrees running alongside the other institutions that offer bachelor degrees.   
 
The actual owners of private higher education institutions in Libya are difficult to 
recognize and to identify because the ownership patterns in private higher education 
include private corporate bodies, groups of individuals and family-owned businesses. The 
religious organizational bodies are absolutely absent, while nearly 100 per cent of private 
universities are run individually, by families and by corporations. 
 
Individuals who manage private universities are divided into two different types. First, a 
person with an MSc or PhD qualification who can afford to establish a university, 
examples of which are the Afriqya University in Tripoli and the United Afriqya University 
in Al-Zawia where the owners have got doctorates. While the former is not accredited by 
the QAA, the latter has been accredited since 2006. Secondly, those who do not have post-
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graduate certificates but have a desire to found a business. These individuals link with 
academically qualified people to open a university and some of these owners are often rich 
people with strong connections with powerful members of society. These private 
universities can be said to have been established entirely for profit-making purposes and 
not for academic excellence although none would openly declare such an intention. 
Kortoba University is a good example.    
 
In the family-ownership pattern there are a number of universities that are run by a family 
cohort. Some are accredited by QAA, such as the Al-Refak University whereas others are 
not accredited, for instance, the Trables (Tripoli) University and the Al-Shomokh 
University.  
 
In the third pattern is a group of people who have MSc and PhD qualifications and join 
each other to establish a university. Most of them are already faculty members at public 
universities and they make a type of corporation which amounts to between two to five 
people to run their new university. Their aim is not to stop teaching at their public 
universities but to create an extra income to improve their life style.  This is the case at the 
Al-Taqadom University. Interestingly, although the owners of these private universities are 
members of public universities, they work at the first university, Al-Fatah University, and 
these private universities had not been among the four accredited private universities as has 
been mentioned. 
  
One of the negative features of the Libyan private higher education system is that the 
owners see the universities only as a business activity. Since 1999, the beginning of Libyan 
private higher education, a university has presented a good opportunity for many people to 
invest their money, especially the rich. All these private universities can be said to have 
been established for profit-making purposes, but none of these institutions openly declare 
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such an intention. They have always claimed to have been established for the professional 
development of their clientele.  
 
6.6.10 Academic faculties in private higher education.  
The Gaddafi government, through the QAA, in theory compelled the private higher 
education institutions to achieve minimum standards with regard to the faculty members 
and professors. The reality was very different. As far as the human resources base of these 
institutions is concerned, only a few satisfied the requirements of the stipulated regulations 
regarding the teaching and management of such establishments.  
 
In each institution, the conditions and procedures undertaken for the employment of 
lecturers varied according to the owner (the Director) of the institution, who had ultimate 
power when appointing staff. Certainly, there were qualified staff members amongst these 
teachers, but there were also teachers who had yet to complete their own courses at the 
university. 
 
In the majority of cases, the teachers who took up headships and deanships in the private 
institutions had retired from the public universities and some of them were from foreign 
countries. One unusual aspect that deserves to be recognized is that some universities 
appointed members of staff who lacked developed leadership qualities but came from 
‘disadvantaged backgrounds’ which, according to the owners equipped them with the skills 
to control the university. In fact, as they often worked in illegal circumstances, private 
universities preferred to employ such people to avoid disruption and to maintain order and 
control.  
 
In terms of staff-student ratios, although the number of students in private universities is 
smaller than in the public universities, it is impossible to determine whether the standards 
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have been better in the private than in the public because in the private universities there 
had been no clear policy for their control. The administration in these universities is weak 
and inefficient: there were a number of students who register in the university but did not 
attend classes, the university does not keep a record of registered students and there was no 
deadline for registration anyway. Most private universities even allow students to enrol in 
examination time. It is, therefore, impossible to calculate the staff-student ratio.        
 
It is not easy to obtain data on staff in these universities. The institutions are averse to 
giving the names of their staff, most of whom are part-time employed in public 
universities. During my investigations during the field study I found that staff members at 
the private universities varied considerably; some employ professors with PhD or MSc 
qualifications with or without experience. Some, though, appoint lecturers with only a first 
degree, the purpose being to minimize operating costs and thus gain more profits.   
    
In terms of pay structures, private institutions offer additional salaries and incentives. A 
major concern is that many of the lecturers in the public tertiary institutions have been the 
same people offering part-time service in the private sector and this can have serious 
implications for the quality of education given. A similar pattern may be observed with 
regard to the non-academic staff. One of the features of private tertiary institutions is the 
large number of non-academic staff. Generally the number of non-academic staff 
employed in private institutions has been high but few have degrees or professional 
qualifications.  
 
In fact private institutions very often operate with a limited number of staff members and 
one of the unique features is that they have few permanent regular staff; they have a large 
number of part-time teachers, on which they rely heavily, and only a limited number of 
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full-time teachers. Often, the private universities in Libya have principals who are also the 
owners. 
 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion: 
 
During the period following a country’s independence, the establishment of a public 
university was often seen as a sign of national pride and a symbol of self-reliance. In 
Libya, however, the monopoly of the public sector institutions in higher education came to 
an end during the 2000s. Gaddafi’s government did not want this change but local and 
global pressures had forced it to accede and the privatization of higher education was seen 
as a viable alternative. It can be argued that the de-regulation policies under the structural 
adjustment programs, the fiscal incapacity of the state to expand higher education through 
public universities and the inability of public universities to respond immediately to the 
popular demand for employment-oriented courses created an environment conducive to the 
emergence and expansion of private higher education in Libya.  
 
It was not expected in a political system like Libya’s that a policy of privatisation would 
emerge. Indeed, idea of the privatization as a concept had been criticized by Gaddafi in the 
volumes of his ‘Green Book’ because he perceived it as an aspect of capitalism. However, 
the private sector became a fast-expanding segment of higher education and the shift in 
policy was justified by some elements in Gaddafi’s earlier teaching of self-determination.  
 
In Libya, for-profit private universities rely on fees. They are small in size and offer 
courses in subject areas that are similar to those offered by public universities. This gave 
the policy makers a dilemma because they had hoped, through this policy, to offer 
alternative subject areas that would realize the goals of their economic and social 
development plans and thereby reduce the rate of unemployment. In the end, private higher 
285 
 
education created many problems and became a constant headache to the Libyan 
government. 
 
Private higher education in Libya has been practised inefficiently with the only aim that of 
making a profit for the owners and with no regard for the quality of education provided. 
Their operational survival depends on increasing the gap between the fees collected and 
the actual operational costs of the institution. Staffing costs being the major item of 
expenditure, they try to minimize their spending on this with an obvious effect on 
academic standards. Several reasons may be identified to explain the failure of private 
universities to play their role in the Libyan economy and for the failure of state 
mechanisms and regulations to assert control more effectively: the lack of institutional or 
administrative structures; the confused and different objectives of the policy; the 
complexities of different bureaucratic structures and the popular pressures and political 
interference or corruption.   
 
The private higher education sector does exist in Libya. Its growth and expansion indicate 
absorption of both excessive social demand and the differentiated demand for higher 
education. So, in one sense, they do not really compete with public higher education. The 
growth of private higher education institutions has not had the intended effect on public 
universities because they have not created competition for students and lecturers nor have 
they succeeded in producing graduates with market-oriented and in-demand skills. Private 
universities levy a high rate of fees, making it difficult for students from the lower socio-
economic backgrounds to participate. 
 
Although the total undergraduate enrolment of Libyan private universities, both chartered 
and non-chartered, was about 40,000 compared to 300,000 in public universities for the 
2006/2007 academic year, the institutions have provided alternative access to higher 
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education for those who would otherwise have missed the opportunity. However, it should 
be noted that many Libyans have yet to access private university education, mainly due to 
the high cost of the education it provides. This is compounded by the fact that students in 
private universities are expected to pay 100% of the fees, whereas those in public 
universities study without cost to themselves. And normally, students in private 
establishments are prevented from attending lectures until they have paid their fees in full 
although in unusual circumstances students are sometimes allowed to delay their payments. 
It can therefore be said that there is no parity for students in financial terms and that there 
should be a recommendation that some form of grant be awarded to assist students in 
private universities so that the equity gap can be reduced to a minimum.   
 
It might appear rather too early to conduct an in-depth assessment of the operation of 
Libyan private higher education institutions, particularly universities, in view of their 
relatively short history, but it is becoming very clear that the unusual rush of parents to the 
many private higher education institutions is a demonstration that private institutions 
are perceived as much less organized than public ones and therefore unlikely to be so 
stringent in the application of rules and regulations. And the fact that, since 1999, when the 
first set of private higher education institutions was established, and until the present, there 
have been many cases of closure within these institutions as it happened in Afriqya 
University in 200550, this indicates that they are generally less stable establishments. My 
visits to some of these institutions during my field study research revealed that many of 
them lacked a well-designed structure and existed in poor physical surroundings and 
lacked any clear philosophies.  This serves to convince observers that, over a period of 
time, private universities in Libya will not compare favourably with older public higher 
                                                 
50
 The university was obliged in 2005 when Shokri Ghanem was the prime minister of Libya 2003-2006, by 
authorities to leave public school and find its own place.   
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education institutions. So it could be said that the Libyan government has allowed the 
private sector to play its role in higher education, but it is also true that the government 
does obstruct to some extent anyway, many illegal private universities from operating . It is 
contradictory to come across a private university which is not accredited and illegal but 
which is advertised in an official booklet. For example, the General Ascendancy of Faculty 
Members has published a ‘Higher Education Leaflet for 2005’ which includes some private 
universities (e,g Al-Hadera University and Afriqya University) that are not accredited and 
that are illegal and which are portrayed in the leaflet with attractive pictures of different 
institutions.     
 
The issued legislation on private higher education was not designed to ensure that the 
sector makes a positive contribution to the higher education system nor to the social 
developmental needs of the country. It neglected many aspects that could contribute 
positively, such as making access to higher education easier and improving the quality and 
breadth of programs so that they would include relevant and useful fields of study. And, 
significantly, private higher education does not provide even a partial solution to the 
problem of unemployment.  
 
The quality of learning at private higher education institutions has been reported as being 
of a very low standard indeed. All aspects that contribute to a high quality learning 
environment, such as the condition of classrooms and training centres, the quality of the 
teaching provided, the qualifications of teaching staff, ill equipped libraries and teaching 
materials and equipment are generally said to be in a seriously poor state. Of course, it has 
to be said that the standard is not the same for all private institutions. The desire to close 
many private universities that do not meet with the requirements of the QAA seems 
unlikely to be realised because of the spread of corruption on a massive scale in the 
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country and, even more importantly, because these universities have enrolled students from 
the country’s powerful leaders and families.  
 
As public universities in Libya had nearly collapsed due to a myriad of problems 
(corruption, politics and lack of purpose) private universities was seen by the Gaddafi’s 
government an alternative solution to improve higher education policy. However, the 
government did not produce a sound policy to establish private universities. The policy 
lacked several things. For example, the policy makers did not find all bodies to regulate 
private universities (e.g. QAA was founded 6 years after the establishment of private 
higher education in 1999). The policy was confused. Its objectives were not clear and the 
private universities founders, students, lecturers and people were unable to understand 
what it is happening in the ground. The policy lacked effective mechanisms to control 
private universities. The QAA itself had a lot of problems (e.g. lack of skills, facilities and 
government support).           
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Chapter seven: A Case Study of Al-Refak University: 
 
 
7.1 The Purpose of this field Study: 
 
Despite the immense growth in private sector enrolments in Libya, the private sector is 
poorly understood and equally poorly analyzed: reliable data are very scarce and the public 
policy for private higher education has been subjected to very little research. In order to 
remedy this absence as part of the study, an in-depth analysis of a private university was 
made. This case study analyzed details pertaining to ownership, admission, teacher 
profiles, sources of financing and the management of a private university. It was difficult 
to obtain research information on private sector institutions in Libya, but the field study on 
private higher education has provided the research with worthwhile information and data. 
  
There are several reasons that have led me to undertake a field study that examines a 
functioning private university.  In my view it was not adequate to make just a generalized 
study of private higher education in Libya. I decided that it would be essential to analyse 
the privatization of higher education by dealing with a private university as a case study. 
The previous chapter discussed several issues which need to have more light shed upon 
them. The figure 17 (below shows private higher education and its relationship with related 
state institutions: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     
 
      
 
 
The Ministry of Higher Education.  
 
The Administration of Private 
Higher Education (APHE). 
 
 The Quality Assurance and 
Accreditation Centre (QAA).  
 
PrivateUniversities 
(e.g. Al-Refak) 
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The figure illustrates the apparent simplicity of private higher education. Private 
universities are controlled by the QAA and the APHE, but for some reason they are not 
well organised and have become a headache to the government. It is essentially a question 
of monitoring and checking the quality of these private institutions. This case study will 
provide an opportunity to look in more detail at the relationship between the administrative 
bodies and the reality of the situation and will highlight some of the important issues that 
face private higher education in Libya.   
   
This thesis, then, will also focus on the behaviour of individual higher education 
institutions because its aim is not restricted to an analysis of the overall system but will 
also encompass an examination of the operation of individual providers. The empirical 
work focuses on a private university and the type of programmes it offers, on the fees 
charged, and the characteristics of its student population, and by so doing provides a 
wealth of informative and relevant material on the Libyan higher education system.  
  
7.2 The Choice of Al-Refak university: 
I had a chance to undertake two field studies in Gaddafi’s stage and after the February 
Revolution visiting Al-Refak University. There are several reasons for the selection of this 
university. Firstly, this university started functioning immediately after the enactment of 
the Private University Law of 1999; secondly, it is located in Tripoli, the capital city, 
which means that this university will reflect the nature of the majority of private 
universities in Libya; thirdly, it is the first and the only university that has gained 
accreditation from QAA in Tripoli; the fourth reason is that, because privatization in Libya 
is a very recent phenomenon with therefore limited data, it has been possible to get data 
and useful research information from this university; and the fifth reason is that this 
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university has proven to be financially viable: by 2010 it had completed almost a decade of 
its existence and there were visible signs showing that this institution was expanding. Its 
degrees and its graduates were being accredited at home but not abroad. Hence, I am 
examining what purported to be of the best of the private universities. It may not be 
entirely typical of all the private universities, most of which were markedly inferior. 
However, by examining one of the better ones we can analyse the private sector in the 
most favourable circumstances. Data for the case study was collected from interviews with 
the president of the university and the official records of the institution. A number of 
important administrative personnel of this institution were also consulted on different 
matters related to management, financing, and so on.      
 
7.3 Al-Refak University in an historical context: 
This institution first appeared in 1990 as a small institution with a computing laboratory 
and it trained a few students who paid for the cost of their training. In 1999 when the 
private law was issued the institution was upgraded to an institution of higher education 
and became known first as ‘Emad Al-Mustakbil’ and then after discussion, to the ‘Al-
Refak Institute for Middle and Higher Education’. The name ‘Al-Refak’ was used to 
describe the friendship between the owner “Mohiba Franka” and her friends. At first the 
institution had two levels: secondary education and higher education, the latter of which 
included departments of Engineering and Languages. It depended on tuition fees from its 
students. The number of students in this institution, in both levels, grew to 800 students in 
2000 and then to 2000 in 2004/2005. From 1999 to 2004 the institution offered a three-year 
diploma. From then on the Libyan government forbade the institution to continue with its 
engineering and language courses because these subjects require four years of study. It was 
determined by the government that these fields should be considered at Al-Refak 
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University degree level. In the early days, higher education level teaching started with 
many departments, in both vocational and theoretical areas and had five laboratories in 
different settings. However, only two of them were open: Business Management and 
Computing Sciences, the former with three male students and the latter with four female 
students. Other departments, such as Fashion Design, Banks and Accountancy, Tourism 
and Hotels and Mechanical Engineering were closed because of a complete lack of 
students. All departments were located in a building of five floors of 250 m². The 
institution was licensed to operate in 1999 with available teachers from the province of 
Tripoli. 
 
As the number of students grew, the original building became seriously overcrowded and 
no longer able to cope. Therefore, the owner of the institution, Mrs. Mohiba, 
commissioned a new building in 2004. Three years later, in 2007, Al-Refak University was 
opened. Before the establishment of the university, Resolution No. 1330, 2003, had been 
issued by the General People’s Committee for the Province of Tripoli and this permitted 
the establishment of the Al-Refak Company for free education. And a year later, in 2004, 
Resolution No. 1 was issued to establish the university. It is officially named the ‘Al-Refak 
University for Humanitarian and Empirical Sciences’. The old building continued to 
operate and provides courses at pre-university and diploma levels in information 
technology, management studies and computer studies. 
 
The university by 2011 had nine departments as follows: 
First:    Human Sciences: 
• Business Management. 
• Accountancy. 
293 
 
• English Language. 
• Law. 
Second: Empirical Sciences: 
• Computing Science. 
• Petrol Engineering. 
•  Architecture and Construction Planning. 
• Civil Engineering. 
• Electronic-Electrical Engineering. 
 
The university profile: 
The university occupied seven floors with the following facilities:  
1. Twenty eight classrooms of various sizes. 
2. Lecture theatre with a capacity for approximately 300 students. 
3. Two libraries, one for hard copy resources, such as books, journals and scientific 
magazines. It occupied an area of 130 m². The second one housed 40 computers and 
covers an area of about 90 m².  
4. The university had ten laboratories: four for computing sciences, two for civil 
engineering, one for electronic engineering, one for chemical sciences, one for 
geology, one for English Language studies and one is for Physics. 
5. In addition the university had other service facilities, e.g. photocopying, and a 
cafeteria.    
 
7.4 Conditions of acceptance for study at the university: 
Four conditions had to be met by students before entering the university.  These were: 
1. He/she had to hold a certificate of secondary education or an equivalent qualification. 
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2. He/she had to be interested in the theoretical and practical principles of the Al-Fatah 
Revolution. 
3. The registration of students was divided according to the number of full-time students 
and part-time students. 
4.  The student had to pass a test to determine whether or not he/she was capable of 
studying at university level. 
 
These conditions were not always taken seriously by the university administrators since 
the aim of the university was to enrol as many students as possible. 
 
The university also had two bills: the Bill of Registration, Study and Examination and the 
Bill of Faculty Members of Al-Refak University. The latter had eight sections each with a 
number of articles. The former had twenty articles that regulate the faculty members at the 
university. Table 32  (below) shows details of both bills:  
Table (32). The legal bills in Al-Refak University and their articles.   
The Bill of Registration, Study and Examination  
The first chapter (general decisions).  Two articles  
The second chapter (the study system). Three articles 
The third chapter (the acceptance system). Seven articles 
The fourth chapter (the registration system). Four articles 
The fifth chapter (the absence policy). Two articles 
The sixth chapter (the evaluation and the examination). Ten articles 
The seventh chapter (disciplinary regulations). Nineteen articles  
The Bill of Faculty Members of Al-Refak University. Twenty nine articles  
Source: taken by the researcher from the university catalogue/prospectus. 
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7.5 The objectives of the university: 
 
The objectives of establishing the university include: 
1. To contribute in the development of Libyan society;  
2. To provide adequate resources for quality university education, training and research 
based on Islamic concepts and values reflecting the heritage of Arab culture;  
3. To guide students towards an understanding and an acceptance of themselves, their 
individual needs and talents, and to develop their potential for a productive life and service 
to society;  
4. To provide students with a balanced educational programme that helps them to develop 
and broaden their perception of the inherent relationship between physical and spiritual 
needs, and to develop a holistic approach to life; 
5. To supply Libyan society with a suitable educational environment and to provide an 
excellent educational service.  
6. To create a suitable climate for faculty teachers and administrators, according to their 
responsibilities, to participate in the developmental aims and objectives of the university. 
      
7.6 Management and governance: 
The management of the university was vested in four bodies: 
Founder: the owner ‘Mrs. Mohiba Franka’, is considered the founder and sponsor. She had 
four basic functions, namely: 
1. Overseeing the mission of the university; 
2. Appointing the Chancellor; 
3. Electing members to serve on the council of the university;  
4. Receiving reports on the functioning and progress of the university.  
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The Chancellor: the Chancellor was appointed by the founder and was Chairman of the 
Council.  There was no specific period of time for a person to hold this position. He/she 
held office for a period according to university circumstances and the desire of the sponsor. 
Other than chairing the Council, he/she was the head of the university and officially 
confers university degrees and grants diplomas, certificates and awards. 
 
The Council: this was the governing body with full responsibility over the university. It 
comprised the Chancellor (Chairperson), the Vice-Chairman and members elected by 
founder.   
 
Senate: The Senate comprised the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 
principals, directors, deans of faculties, chairpersons of departments, a librarian, a registrar, 
two academic staff representatives, two other representatives and other members as may be 
provided for in the statutes co-opted by the Senate.  
  
It had the following functions: 
1. Proposing short and long-term academic plans and their modifications for approval 
by the council; 
2. Developing evaluation structures and proposing modifications in proposing 
modifications in programs of instruction, research and field services consistent with 
its objectives. 
3. Developing criteria and policies for student admission, retention, progression and 
the awarding of degrees, diplomas and certificates; 
4. Approving the academic calendar and programs of studies; 
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5. Discussing and approving annual academic reports presented by the deans and 
principals;  
6. Receiving and approving examination results. 
 
Day-to-day management of the university was the responsibility of the University 
Management Board. The latter was composed of the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, principals, directors and deans of faculties. 
 
the management board had the following functions: 
1. Ensuring efficient and effective management of the personnel, facilities and 
finances of the university; 
2. Implementing plans for the development and needs of the university; 
3. In consultation with the Senate, preparing annual plans and budgets for submission 
to the council for approval; 
4. Developing strategies for revenue generation and fundraising; 
5. Implementing rules and regulations for the conduct and behaviour of students and 
staff; 
6. Recommending policies and strategies to achieve the objectives of the university; 
7. Undertaking any other functions and duties as may be provided for in the statutes. 
 
All these functions were carried out under the authority of the Vice-Chancellor, who was 
the Chief Executive Officer of the university. However, in reality all decisions and the 
university matters we at this period controlled by the founder, Mrs. Mohiba Franka, who 
has the ultimate responsibility for the university. 
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7.6 The financing policy of the university: 
Al-Refak University depends largely on tuition fees. All its income has been self generated 
and it has not received any external financial assistance (e.g. government assistance, 
endowments, gifts, grants, charities and donations). The fees policies vary between 
universities. Fees were kept comparatively high at Al-Refak University. Table 33 shows 
the variations in tuition fees between selected private universities in Libya in 2010.  
Table (33). the level of tuition fees in selected private universities in Libya 2010: 
The university  Tuition fees per course (Libyan Dinars) 
Al-Refak               400-640  
Afriqya University               300-500 
Tripoli University                250-450 
Hannibal University                350-400 
 Source: analysis based on the writer’s data resulting from the field study. 
  
In some universities students pay tuition fees for the course as a whole, whereas in Al-
Refak University students had to pay the cost of their courses according to the number of 
disciplines undertaken, with some subjects being more expensive than others. For example, 
medicine or engineering studies cost much more than management or law subjects. But in 
general, each of the disciplines would cost a student 80 D.L. A student would be required 
to study a minimum of five subjects and allowed a maximum of eight subjects in any given 
term. So the cost of a course could be between 400 D.L and 640 D.L. According to data 
about the number of students enrolled, the university had raised revenues ranging from a 
million-and-a-quarter to a million-and-a-half D.L. Over the period 2008 to 2010 its 
revenue ranged from 1,250,000 D.L to 1,500,000 D.L. see the Table 3 below.  
 
299 
 
Despite this income the ownership claimed that sometimes the university could sometimes 
not cover the costs of providing educational facilities which meant that the university 
expenditure as shown in the Table 34 below, was more than its income (Accounting 
Department, 2011, The Financial Report). But, the expenditure incurred by the university 
seems to be less than had been declared on the university accounts. In some instances bills 
and demands were not met. For example, the university did not pay its taxes for two 
reasons: the first was because the university’s financial administration did not declare its 
true financial situation to the Tax Authority and, second, because the Libyan government 
did not have an efficient or proper Tax system, taxes were more expensive to collect and 
easier to evade.   
 
Table (34). An estimated of the total income for Al-Refak University from tuition fees in 
D.L. 2008-2010.   
The year (includes 3 terms). The number of students. Total revenue for the year*. 
2008 2500 1,250,000.00 
2009 2700 1,350,000.00 
2010 3000 1,500,000.00 
Source: It has been compiled by the author Data from Al-Refak University, 2010, documents and accounts 
report, 2010. 
*the numbers were founded: the number of students× 500 D.L. the later is an average of how much do 
students pay each term.   
 
The academic year in the university was divided into three terms: the Autumn term which 
started at the beginning of October, the Spring term which started at the beginning of 
February and the Summer term which started at the beginning of June.   
 
In addition to the tuition fees the university has other self-generated resources as follows:  
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• Income gained from university auxiliary enterprises and investments. The 
university has several projects that help to generate income for the university (e.g. 
photocopying facilities, the cafeteria and other services).  
•  Other charges are made for services, such as a fee for campus cards and the fees 
that are paid by students for their graduation.  
• Recurrent costs, such as annual operating expenditure and staff salaries were 
mainly financed by income from tuition fees. In terms of sustainability, this was 
the only regular source of income, unlike the other resources that have varied over 
the years and reflect an absence of donations and government assistance. This, of 
course, made it extremely difficult for the university to cover the cost of its 
educational commitments. So students’ fees represented a large portion of the cost 
and, as a result, those students from disadvantaged backgrounds could suffer. In an 
interview with the president and owner of the university, she made the following 
observation “.....the university has not received any donations and the Libyan 
government has not supported us...there is no way to cover the costs of the 
university but from tuition fees...” She continued: “...sometimes we cover the costs 
from our financial resources and could not make any profits....”. (Interview with 
Mrs. Franka, M, the owner of Al-Refak University. December 2010). Table 35 
below shows the details of the approximate variable costs that were paid by the 
university over a year. In fairness, though, the university had a policy that allows 
some, but not all, students who are very poor or disabled to study with half cost 
and, at the time of my research interview in October, 2010, there were about ten 
poor students and five disabled in the university who were studying with half cost 
to themselves. 
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Table (35). An estimated variable costs for Al-Refak University, 2010. 
                                Variable costs  
Salaries for employees 100,000 
Faculty members 210,000 
Chairpersons of departments 30,000 
Electricity 8,000 
Water 3,100 
Stationery 60,000 
Cleaning 6,000 
Maintenance 15,000 
Updating of computing programmes 30,000 
Taxes 15,000 
Scientific Committees 10,000 
Examination 15,000 
Library 20,000 
Internet and websites costs 10,000 
The designer of the Websites 1,000 
Scientific activities 20,000 
Graduation ceremony 20,000 
External and cultural corporation visitors from outside Libya. 10,000 
Media and advertisements. 10,000 
Security 7,500 
Safe system 10,000 
Source: researcher’s data accessed from Al-Refak University, The General Budget, 2010 and the university’s 
Financial Report, 2010. 
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If we take 2010 as a simple comparison between table 34 and table 35 we will see the 
profits equivalent to 889, 400 thousands Libyan Dinars a year for the university (1,500,000 
- 610,60051 = 889,400 Libyan Dinars). The university as well as others are able to return 
their capital and to make money in a very short time period. It should bear in mind that 
these calculations are estimated and they are not precise. However profits in private 
universities are significant and this supports an argument being made about the commercial 
attractiveness of private universities as an excellent business in Libya.    
    
7.7 Courses offered and trends in enrolment: 
The university offered courses that were similar to the courses in the public university. 
There were nine departments which offered only first degrees, at bachelor’s level, because 
the GPCHE did not allow private universities to offer postgraduate studies. The faculties in 
Al-Refak University included Architecture, Accountancy, Law, Business Management, 
Computer Sciences, Communication Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Civil 
Engineering, Petrol Engineering, and Languages, of which the first five were not 
accredited and although the English Department had been accredited by the QAA, the 
university had opened other languages which were not.  
 
This university had yet to gain general recognition for the education it had been providing, 
even though it had been in operation for a long time in the private sector and it was also 
offering undergraduate courses in the natural sciences such as physics, chemistry and 
biology, and in most of the other social sciences.   
                                                 
51
 1,500,000 is an estimated of the total income for Al-Refak University in 2010. 610,600 is an estimated 
variable costs for the university in 2010. 
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It should be noted that the major trend for many private universities in the world has been 
to offer courses that require little investment in terms of infrastructure facilities and 
equipment as is the case in some African and Asian countries and even in the other private 
universities in Libya, such as Afriqya and the Tripoli universities. This was not the case in 
Al-Refak University, though, where there were relatively good facilities compared with 
other private establishments in Libya, although this could be attributed to the advantaged 
background of the owner.   
 
An analysis of trends in the administration of the university revealed some clear patterns in 
enrolment as well as in other aspects, with the number of enrolled students up since its 
establishment in 2003. The available statistics show that the number had increased from 
2500 students in 2008 to 3000 students at the time of this study in 2010-2011. The number 
accounted for about 1.2% of the total number of students in public higher education and 
7.5% of the total number of students in the private higher education in the country in 2010 
and indicated the favourable position of Al-Refak University compared with the other 
private universities in Tripoli specifically and in Libya generally. For example, in Tripoli 
University the percentages were 0.38% and 2.35%, in Afriqya University 34.0% and 2.1%, 
in Hannibal University 0.16% and 1.0% and in Al-Hadera University 0.19% and 1.17%.  
The reasons for this may be attributed to the fact that: 
1. The university was considered to be the oldest private university in the private 
university sector. 
2. It was located in the capital city of Libya where the greatest number of Libyan 
people lives and this more easily provides a supporting infrastructure and, of 
course, a large pool of potential students.   
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3. It was, significantly, the only private university in the capital that had gained 
accreditation from the QAA. 
Consequently, the university, compared with the other accredited private universities, had 
the largest number of enrolments in its accredited departments. As can be seen from Table 
36 below, the number of students in Al-Refak University was more than the number in the 
other three private universities, Union Afriqya, Afriqya and the International Libyan 
University for Medical Sciences. In Al-Refak the number was 3,000 students for the year 
2009/2010 while in the others the numbers were 668, 360 and 499 students respectively. 
However, the numbers were considerably lower compared with a public university, such as 
the Al-Fatah University which had 43,258 students. The figure (37) (below illustrates the 
wide gap in the number of students enrolled at Al-Refak University compared with that of 
Al-Fatah University.         
Table (36). The number of students in the accredited private universities in Libya. 
2009/2010. 
The university The number of students % 
Al-Refak University 3,000 66 
Union Afriqya University 668 15 
Afriqya University 360 8 
International Libyan University for Medical 
Sciences 
499 11 
Total 4,527 100 % 
Source: the National Committee for Private Universities; The Administration of Private Higher Education 
documents, 2010. 
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Table (37). Comparison in the number of students between Al-Refak Univesity and Al-
Fatah university 2009/2010. 
Al-Fatah University 43,258  
Al-Refak University  3,000 
Source: researcher’s statistics based on:  
- General Authority for Information, Statistics book, 2009,.  
- The National Committee for the Private Universities. The Administration of Private Higher Education, 
Document 2010. 
 
This number of students was distributed between nine departments. It was difficult to 
obtain information on the number of students in different years. However, Table 38 shows 
the distribution of students amongst the departments both accredited and non-accredited. 
Table (38). The distribution of students between the departments at Al-Refak University, 
2010. 
Teaching department. The number of students. The percent of the total 
Architecture 371 12 
Accounting 378 13 
Law 329 11 
Business Management 875 29 
Computing Science 338 11 
Telecommunication Engineering   71    2 
Electrical Engineering   23     1 
Civil Engineering 152      5 
Petrol Engineering 315     11 
Languages 148       5 
Total                  3,000 100% 
Source: through the researcher’s personal consultations with the Administrative Office, Al-Refak Univesity, 
on October 2010, Tripoli. 
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Table 38 clearly shows that there were 3,000 students in the year 2010. Of this total, 29% 
(875 students), studied Business Management, after which came the Department of 
Accounting with 13% of the total. Whereas other departments, such as, Civil Engineering, 
Telecommunication Engineering, and Electrical Engineering had 5%, 2% and 1% 
respectively. The table shows that the distribution of students was more in human sciences 
than in practical sciences and this was similar to that of the public universities - Al-Fatah 
University, for example. Despite the Libyan Gaddafi Government’s policy and its efforts to 
increase the number of students in certain fields, for instance electrical engineering, for 
which there were a number of opportunities for employment, the number of students 
studying the humanities was still far more than in the practical sciences, and this is true of 
both the public and private sectors. This is substantiated by the case study research 
undertaken at Al-Refak University. The figures 18 and 19 below show that in the public 
university (Al-Fatah) the number of enrolments in the humanity areas was more than the 
number in the science departments. Similarly, in Al-Refak University (as a private 
university) the number of students enrolled in the humanities was higher than were 
enrolled in the practical sciences: in the former the number was 1730 students and in the 
latter 1270 students. 
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Source: researcher’s analysis based on Al-Magory, 2005. 
 
 
Source: researcher’s analysis based on Al-Refak University, official document, 2010. 
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In the accredited departments in the academic year 2010, the number reached 2,212 
students, while in non-accredited departments the number was 651 students. This means 
that although these departments were not accredited by the QAA, students still applied to 
study in these departments and the likely reasons for this are:  
1. The university did not tell students at the outset that certain departments were not 
accredited. In fact, private universities, in the absence of tight control from the 
government gave untruthful profiles of their establishments in an attempt to recruit 
as many students as possible. One of their methods was to use the media whose 
agencies were well paid by the universities’ founders to advertise their courses 
whether these were accredited or not, thus making it very difficult for students to 
acquire the facts about particular departments. For example, in both official 
newspapers, Al-Daleel and Al-Ealan, Al-Refak University had announced that the 
university had opened more accredited departments. In Al-Daleel Newspaper in 
2009, the university announced that: 
 
“...... Al-Refak University for Human and Scientific Sciences announces for students and 
their parents that there are new academic departments opening and that these have 
already been accredited by the QAA. The university has already opened the door for 
applications and registration for the academic year 2009-2010 in the following 
disciplines: English Language, Accountancy, Business Management, Computing Sciences, 
Architecture, Civil Engineering, Petroleum Engineering and Electronic Engineering ......”  
 
The University announces its need for highly qualified academics to sign teaching 
contracts and to take up lecturing positions in the departments and disciplines mentioned 
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above  ............”. (Al-Rweeme, M, Al-Daleel Newspaper; the eightieth Year, 15th of 
December, 2009”.    
2. Some students had failed to gain places to study at public universities.  
3. The QAA had not openly and clearly published relevant information for the benefit 
of potential students and their parents and many students were totally unaware of 
the need for accreditation to validate their degrees later. Al-Elm Magazine, issued 
by the Media Office in the Ministry for Higher Education was the only journal to 
publish truthful information for the benefit of potential applicants. 
 
In the university the number of graduates reached 895 in 2009 and 2010, and these were 
distributed over nine fields of study as shown Table 39. Again, Business Management 
represents the most popular department with 169 graduates, and then Architecture with 107 
graduates; the law department had 104 graduates. The departments with less than 100 
graduates can be identified from the table below. The average graduation index included in 
this survey is 90 per cent; and the table clearly shows that there were more graduates from 
the humanities with 470, than from the sciences with 425 graduates.    
 
 
310 
 
Table (39). The number of graduates from Al-Refak University, 2009/2010. 
Department  The number of graduates. 
Business Management 169 
Accounting     99 
Law    104 
Computing Science      95 
Languages       98 
Architecture      107 
Electronic Engineering          71 
Civil Engineering        66 
Petrol Engineering         86 
Source: data from Al-Refak University, the Statistic Book, 2011,. 
 
There is a generally held belief that many of the private universities attract more male 
students than female students. In Al-Refak University male students made up more than 50 
per cent of the total students in the university. The increasing number of males attending 
the university arguably reflected the small number attaining the minimum cut-off points for 
admission into a public university. More males than females fail to qualify so they turned 
to private universities generally and to Al-Refak University in particular. At the same time 
the students preferred to follow courses with low tuition fees such as accounting, business 
management and law. The reasons that could be attributed to this are:   
1. Some students came from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Therefore, it was 
sensible, indeed necessary, for them to study on courses with low tuition fees.52 
                                                 
52
 On the one hand the university enrolled disadvantaged family backgrounds students. Although the cost of 
study was high in the university, students from this class had no option but to study at private universities. 
They wanted to secure their future by joining private university after they had failed in their study at public 
university. Those were struggling for the study cost and life expenses. On the other hand, there were students 
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2. Students believed that the academic expectations in these departments were much 
less demanding than those of the science courses. 
3. Many students expected to be employed soon after graduation from these ‘easier’ 
courses and that therefore, investment in a degree course in a private institution of 
higher education improved the chances of avoiding unemployment. 
4. The accreditation of these departments could be one of the reasons that have 
encouraged students to study these subject disciplines.     
 
The university had a small number of foreign students from other Arab countries, 
particularly from Egypt and the Sudan, although this amounted to only about 2% of the 
entire student body.  
 
Another feature of Al-Refak University was that the students were from high class and rich 
families in society and others came from powerful families who were close to Al-Gaddafi. 
This, clearly, had been an important advantage for the university and placed it in a very 
strong position with no fear of it being closed down. Such students studied at private 
universities to get qualifications for social reasons and social satisfactions. They had 
everything and they went to private universities because they found these universities easy 
and suitable for their desires. Private universities were less complicated than public ones. 
For example, it was easy for the student parents to guarantee the graduation for their 
children who often do not like to go to study. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
who came from rich family and from political power figures. They studied at private universities to get 
qualifications for social reasons and social satisfactions. They have everything and they go to private 
universities because they found these universities easy and suitable for their desires. Private universities were 
less complicated than public ones. For example, it is easy for the student parents to guarantee the graduation 
for their children who often do not like to go to study. 
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7.8 The quality of education provided by Al-Refak University: 
It is very difficult to generalize on the quality of education provided by private institutions 
of higher education. It varies widely and depends upon the agency responsible for 
establishing the university and the legislative requirements for its infrastructure. An 
assessment of a particular educational institution could be based on various factors, such as 
the standard of its facilities, the quality of programs offered, the qualification levels of its 
teachers, an evaluation of the performance of its students while at the university and their 
success once on the labour market. 
 
To improve their quality of education, private universities were required by the Libyan 
QAA to provide the necessary facilities and conditions for accreditation. Among the fifty 
private universities the Al-Refak University had relatively good facilities, such as decent 
lecture theatres, laboratories and offices. What it lacked, however, was efficient 
administrative skills, and the quality of its programs and the qualification levels of its 
teachers were below the standards required at university level. My observations during 
visits to the university were: 
1. The university had administrative staff, some of whom hold only pre-undergraduate 
qualifications. These represented about 10% of the 30 members of the 
administrative staff.  Some 50% had worked in this area for the first time and had 
only very limited experience and some employees had two jobs; they worked in a 
public institution in the mornings and in the university in the afternoons and this 
made it difficult for them to fulfil their responsibilities. 
2. The quality of the courses offered by the university was not as high as was 
expected by the policy makers for higher education in Libya. The course programs 
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in Al-Refak University, as in all private universities in Libya, had been copied from 
the curricula of the public universities but were no better and quite often inferior.  
3. The academic qualification of teachers is an important area affecting the quality of 
education offered. The qualification levels of a number of teachers in Al-Refak 
University were below those stipulated by the QAA. There were three reasons for 
this: firstly, the university depended heavily on teachers holding MSc degrees and 
these comprised about 80% of the total number of faculty members; only 20% of 
faculty members hold doctoral qualifications. In addition to that the university 
relied on a number of teachers who had not completed their post-graduate studies. 
Secondly, the university depended on a small number of part-time staff drawn 
mainly from public universities. Thirdly, the university lacked any academic 
connection with other institutions locally or internationally, the only recorded 
collaboration being in 2010 with the Al-Fatah University. This collaboration had 
several aspects, one of which was to allow the business management, civil 
engineering and petrol engineering departments in Al-Fatah University to supervise 
the same departments at Al-Refak University. Another was to allow Al-Fatah 
University to benefit from the other university’s facilities (e.g. classrooms and 
laboratories) and then to grant access to its petrol laboratories for use by students 
from Al-Refak. Thirdly, an agreement had been made to provide faculty members 
from the Al-Fatah University to teach at Al-Refak University. 
 
It is interesting to note that although many of the students in Al-Refak University had a 
lower academic profile than those in the public universities, their academic performance, in 
general, was better. The dropout rates were low and the graduation rates are high. This may 
be partly due to the fact that having accepted students’ fees, the university has found it 
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difficult to fail its clients and this applies to other universities as well. The university 
administrators also believed that it was a good idea to allow students to pass their 
examinations as a way to help the university attract more students and consequently make 
a greater profit.53 The feeling in Libyan society at this time was that the quality of 
education provided by the private universities, including that of Al-Refak, was 
questionable and that not many students openly demand quality; they felt that many just 
wanted to get a degree or a diploma as a ticket to enter the job market. This was resulting 
in the emergence of ‘diploma mills’ where students could get degrees and diplomas over a 
short period of time without attending classes or taking examinations.  
 
7.9 Academic faculties in Al-Refak University in comparison with other private 
universities: 
The academic faculties govern the proper and efficient functioning of higher education 
provision. The number of academic faculties and their structures and the qualification 
levels achieved by their students are the most important aspects in the long term 
development of higher education. At the beginning of the transformation process, newly- 
established private higher education providers suffered from a lack of academic staff. In 
particular, there was a scarcity of highly ranked academics, such as professors and those 
holding doctorates. As the analysis of the number of academic staff has already been 
provided in this study, it will be useful to focus on the development of academic staff 
employed in Al-Refak University. Table 40 below gives a comprehensive view of the 
development of staff in a private and a public university, specifically Al-Fatah University. 
The increase in student numbers was not reflected in a comparable increase in the number 
of academic staff, which remained stable until the late 2000s, and then increased slightly 
                                                 
53
 I was a lecturer at a private university and I experienced this situation at first hand.   
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between 2007 and 2010. In total, the number of academic faculty members at Al-Refak 
University increased from 220 in 2008 to 228 in 2010, while at Al-Fatah University the 
number decreased from 1658 to 1349 and then increased to 1400. So, the student / staff 
ratio in the private sector, as can be seen, is better in Al-Refak University than in Al-Fatah 
University. In the former the ratio is about 0.11% while in the latter it is 0.03%.      
 
Many faculty members in Al-Refak University came from the public sector. A small 
number of them had already taught at public universities and others had jobs in public 
institutions. Most, if not all, academics in the university were involved mainly in teaching, 
and their engagement in research and related academic activities appeared minimal. 
Because of the dearth of available and qualified faculty members even at state universities, 
private universities faced a major hurdle in this area. Al-Refak University as well as other 
private universities was finding it extremely difficult to compete with each other as well as 
with public ones due to generally poor facilities, weak support from the government and 
the state’s decision to prevent professors from having two jobs - it was illegal to work in 
both public and private universities. This decision did not help private university to attract 
the best qualified academics. 
 
 
Table (40): Academic staff in a private and in a public higher education institution 
Year Al-Fatah Al-Refak 
2007-2008 1658 220 
2008-2009 1349 223 
2009-2010 1400 228 
Source: researcher’s own analysis based on: General Authority for Information Statistical Book, 2008 and 
2009, and Al-Refak University, Official  Documents. (2009 and 2011) 
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Since none of the private providers during the 1990s had the right to confer PhD degrees, 
and only a few offered master’s degrees, an important way to develop their own faculties 
was to offer academics better working conditions and financial incentives. In general, the 
salaries in the private sector were higher than in the public universities. In addition, 
professors’ contracts were usually negotiated individually and allowed private institutions 
to offer higher salaries in the most successful departments.  
 
It is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of the level of salaries in the university. For 
instance, in the academic year 2007/2008, the salaries offered were in general higher than 
those in the public sector. The contracts for professors varied from 1500 L.D to 2000 L.D 
per month, while in public universities professors’ earnings were about 1200 L.D. 
Assistant lecturers with exclusivity contracts received 1000 L.D.54  
 
In addition, Al-Refak University has solved the problem of the scarcity of academics by 
employing foreign professors and lecturers especially in its languages department. 
However, the university administrators have preferred to appoint Libyan nationals as 
teachers in an attempt to achieve Libyan national identity.  
 
Based on theoretical considerations we may assume that, during the development of the 
private higher education sector, the focus of many private higher education providers in 
many countries would be on the appointment of high ranking academics to be employed 
full-time. This would mean that private providers would first of all concentrate their efforts 
                                                 
54
 In Summer holiday months July, August and September when there are no lessons the lecturers get salary 
for about 450 L.D. because lecturers do not give lessons and lectures, so the government reduce salaries.     
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on attracting a group of academics that would fulfil the Ministry’s requirement for 
adequate staffing when offering degree courses. In addition, it is worth emphasizing the 
influence the QAA had on the number of full-time academics appointed in the private 
sector since the Committee looked carefully to see whether the institutions were meeting 
the minimum staff requirements. At Al-Refak University as in the other private universities 
in Libya, the academic staff had failed to meet these requirements.  
 
Table (41). The distribution of faculty members between departments according to their 
degree status, 2010.   
Department. The number of faculty 
members. 
BSc MSc
. 
PhD 
Business Management 45  35 10 
Accountancy. 28  23 5 
Architecture & 
Construction Planning 
11 2 8 1 
Computing Science 31 1 26 4 
Languages 25 2 18 5 
Law 39 0 24 15 
Political Science 5 0 0 5 
Petrol Engineering 14 1 13 0 
Source: researcher’s findings based on Al-Refak University, Official Document. (2010). 
 
Table (41) above summarizes the distribution of academic staff in the departments at the 
university according to their degrees. From the table we can identify several points: 
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1. About 80% of the total numbers of faculty members in the university had MSc 
degrees, and this amounted to 147 teachesr.  The establishment of the Postgraduate 
Academy in 1990, and later the beginning of the postgraduate programmes in the 
public universities, had provided professors for both the public and private sectors. 
A large number have graduated from the Academy since its establishment and have 
found the private universities a good source of employment. 
2. The percentage of faculty members who held PhD degrees is estimated to be 
around 20% of the total number. Most of them were already lecturers at public 
universities and worked in the private universities to supplement their incomes.    
3. It is worth mentioning that according to Article No.6 of the Higher Education 
Resolution No.120, 2004, issued by the GPC (Cabinet) and according to Article 
No.5 of the Faculty Members’ Regulation for Al-Refak University, faculty 
members must hold at least an MSc to teach at a higher education institution 
whether public or private.  There are six members of the teaching staff at Al-Refak 
University who hold only BSc degrees. 
4. In addition to that there were a number of teaching staff who held MSc and PhD 
degrees but did not teach in relevant departments and according to this researcher’s 
findings, there were five departments deploying lecturers who hold qualifications in 
inappropriate areas. In the Department of Business Management there were ten 
lecturers who held MSc qualifications, six in Economics, one in Industrial 
Planning, one in Mathematics, one in Civil Engineering and one in Languages. 
Also in the department there are four lecturers with PhD qualifications: one in 
economics, one in Library Sciences, one in Information Technology and one in 
Literature. Table 42 below summarizes the number of teachers who hold degrees in 
disciplines outside the specialist requirements of a department.  
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5. Business Management had the largest number of faculty members with a total of 45 
professors and lecturers. In contrast, the Department of Political Sciences had the 
lowest number with only five. This was clearly because the number of students 
enrolling on Business Management courses was far greater than that of any of the 
other degree courses offered.   
 
Table (42). The number of departments that had teaching staff from different disciplines, 
2010. 
Department  MSc PhD 
Business Management Economics, Industrial 
Planning,  Mathematics, 
Civil Engineering,  
Languages Studies 
Economics,  Library 
Sciences,  Information 
Technology, Literature  
Accountancy 2 in Financial Planning  
Architecture & 
Construction Planning 
2 Project Management  
Computing Science 1 Mechanic Engineering   
Law 5 Arabic Language & 
Islamic Studies 
1 International Studies, 1 
Islamic Faith 
Source: researcher’s data based on Al-Refak University Document. (2010). 
 
The favourable developments in the academic staff employed in the university private 
sector were diminished by the fact that for many of these people working in Al-Refak 
University it was a second job. This additional source of income meant that the teachers 
often worked at several higher education institutions simultaneously. It is therefore 
difficult to evaluate the real number of faculty members. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
320 
 
about 60 % of academics in the private sector held multiple teaching posts both in public 
and private universities but stated that their first commitment was to public providers. 
Those academic teachers who were employed permanently in public higher education 
institutions often had additional hours in more than one private institution. This situation 
had implications for the quality of education provided at Al-Refak University.  Members of 
the academic staff who took multiple teaching posts were less likely to devote much time 
to the needs of students in the university, despite the fact that the courses were paid for. 
Usually, the non-paying students on full-time courses in public institutions received 
priority as they were the best students, selected through competitive admission procedures 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 
In the academic year 2008/09 the academics in the university numbered nearly 228 people, 
constituting about 3% of total academic staff in the entire country, while student numbers 
amounted to 1.2 % of all students. Therefore, despite the relative growth in the number of 
academics appointed to the university, the student / staff ratio was considerable less than in 
the public sector and in the academic year 2008/09 amounted to nearly 30 students per 
single faculty member in Al-Refak University55. In the public sector it was about 50. 
However, this relatively low ratio contributed to the notion that rapid expansion of public 
higher education providers with a sufficient number of academic staff had some favourable 
outcomes in terms of quality. The preceding growth in student numbers accompanied by 
the increase in the number of academic staff had resulted in drastic workload decreases. 
Despite this there was a negative aspect to the academic staff in Al-Refak University where 
many did not have ongoing scientific or research activities and, to some extent, their 
experience in the teaching field appeared limited.  
                                                 
55
  There is a low staff student ratio in Al-Refak University, however this it does not always mean  a good 
thing. For example, in the case of Libya private universities do not have good facilities and they work in 
confused policy that make the staff student ratio mean nothing .....    
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As mentioned, the common features were the limited number of teaching courses at 
undergraduate level, usually in low cost/ high-demand study programmes, such as 
economics, management and pedagogy. Clearly, those institutions followed the so-called 
low cost strategy, and reduced costs in all aspects of their activities, such as academic 
appointments, equipment, and infrastructure.  
 
The overall picture of academic staff in Al-Refak University improved during the period 
analyzed, but it was still unsatisfactory, with an inadequate number of academics and the 
development was in the quantity rather than in the quality. Yet there was a discernible 
possibility of a positive trend in the structure of academic employment in the university 
with the growing number of high ranked academics appointed on full-time contracts. 
 
7.10 The relationship between Al-Refak University and Quality Assurance and 
Accreditation (QAA): 
An important element in private higher education in Libya is the role of the QAA in 
controlling the private universities. It was hoped by the government through this institution 
to strengthen the function of the private higher education sector and create excellent 
private universities. However, the QAA had been unable to enforce its regulations because 
of several factors as was observed during the field study in the last three months of 2010. 
These factors could be summarized as: 
1. The University's founder, Al-Refak, was simply too powerful and sought to enrol a 
number of students who were politically powerful as will be explained later. Those 
students were ‘used’ by the founder as a way of ignoring the QAA’s regulations 
and rules. In fact the strength of the university was not in its management structure 
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or in the professors and scholars it employed, but in the power and extreme wealth 
of its owner and founder and her corresponding relationships with important people 
in high status positions in government.  Consequently the university was able to 
create a wide net of relationships with many important people that added to its 
reputation.  Departments at the university did not have decision-making powers and 
departmental autonomy was very low; they were simply operational units that 
performed the tasks assigned by higher levels.        
2. The QAA lacked the resources, specialist skills and experience that would have 
enabled it to undertake its role efficiently. And, it has to be said, such a role was 
beyond the experience of any educational organization in Libya.        
3. The government faced corruption in trying to achieve its aims through the QAA, 
although no evidence was available to substantiate this observation.  But it became 
clear during the field work that the social relationships and the shared interests 
between people working in the institution found the role of the QAA and its 
objectives a serious obstacle. For example, the important offices at the university 
were held by people from the same family and all letters and reports had to be 
shown to the owner before being sent to QAA or anywhere else for that matter. So, 
it was almost impossible for the QAA to know the truth.  Even those who were not 
related to the founder did not submit information to the QAA or to the 
Administration of Private Higher Education (APHE) because they were well paid 
by the university. As an example I would like to refer to an interview with the 
owner of the university in December 2011 when I did my field work at the 
university. During the interview in her office her son came in and gave her some 
papers and said: “These letters should not be sent to the QAA...be careful ....if  they 
were sent we would be in trouble and it might cause the university considerable 
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harm...why did you do that...?” She replied: “Oh...thank you my son so much....well 
done ....”.  I was very curious to know the content of the letters. She took the letters 
and threw them in the bin under her table. Later I retrieved them and found that 
these letters included some important information criticizing the university. It was 
very difficult for the government to control private universities, at least the ones I 
had visited in 2010 and 2012. The staff members of Al-Refak University included 
five people from the same family. the owner (the family) of the university preferred 
to appoint people who have relationships (e.g. cousin, in-laws and friends) with the 
family.  
 
It is worth noting that even the APHE was not able to control the private higher education 
for the same reasons. The APHE has several offices and employers where files, statistics 
and documents are archived. In fact, its role was administrative and consisted of storing the 
files of private universities, collecting the students’ results from the universities and in 
making simple decisions limited to straightforward matters such as organizing the work in 
the offices and meeting students and parents who might visit the administrative section to 
discuss a problem. The expected role of APHE in controlling private universities had not 
been fulfilled and had become absolutely absent since the Revolution of the 17th February, 
201156.  
 
A more detailed examination of the relationship between the QAA and Al-Refak 
University is of use. As mentioned before, the establishment of the QAA in 2006 came 
seven years after the birth of the Al-Refak University. Before that the institution, during 
                                                 
56
 The epilogue at the end of thesis has covered the February Revolution issues.  
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the period from 1999 to 2006, had been controlled by the Education Office in Tripoli57 
where the university is located. The first connection between the university and the QAA 
was through Resolution No. 28, 2007, issued by the GPCHE (Ministry of Higher 
Education). The resolution had included three articles.  In the first article the university had 
been afforded two important accreditations: first and foremost was the institutional 
accreditation which was considered a great achievement for the institution and constituted 
the first accreditation in the capital city of Tripoli, and secondly, the university had been 
given accreditation only for its Department of Business Management, although the 
university taught other subjects, such as Accountancy, Computing Sciences and Law. In 
the second article the resolution had put the university under the technical supervision of 
the GPCHE. In the third article the resolution had required the QAA to monitor the 
university to make sure that it had met the academic conditions and the required standards. 
However, it was not easy for the QAA to accept this responsibility for two reasons. Firstly, 
since the QAA had been established only recently it did not have enough experience to run 
an organization in order to control private higher education. Secondly, the organization 
lacked the skills and specialists to deal effectively with the accreditation of private higher 
education institutions. Although it included professors from different subject areas and 
study fields, most of them, if not all, were involved in the job for first time. An interview 
with Dr. Adb-Almaged Hussen58 who was in charge of the department dealing with the 
quality of education, including the private sector stated that: 
 
“I have only been doing this job at the QAA for a short time....I have not done this work 
before and my experience in this regard is limited.... we have been to several conferences 
                                                 
57
 From the administrative aspect, the country was divided into 20 areas with each area responsible for its 
own private higher education administration. This division, though, had caused many problems as has 
already been noted. This accounted for the establishment of the QAA by the GPCHE. 
58
 He has a PhD in Software  Engineering and had graduated two years previously.    
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and workshops locally and outside Libya related to this issue.... however, we still need 
more knowledge and experience to be able to achieve the QAA aims .....” (Interview with 
Dr. Adb-Almaged Hussen, Director at Assurance Administration. October, 2010).    
 
Even the director of QAA himself had been in his position for less than a year. He was 
appointed by the General People’s Committee (GPC) according to Resolution No. 84, 
2010.     
 
The third point hampering the QAA control is that the establishment of Al-Refak 
University had taken place seven years before the emergence of QAA. The former had 
been founded in 1999 while the latter was not established until 2006. It meant that the 
QAA found it hard to evaluate and assess the previous effectiveness of the university in 
terms of its departments and graduates. The university had run six departments since 1999. 
When the QAA was founded in 2006 only one department achieved accreditation and this 
made the university dissatisfied and unhappy and gave rise to a form of instability. The 
relationship became affected because the university, as with other private universities, did 
not follow QAA instructions and its recommendations as had been hoped. This is 
noticeable from the official letters and other communications between the university and 
the QAA that display some conflict. The QAA had required the university to close any 
department that had not been accredited, but the university continued to operate all 
departments whether or not they had been accredited. It was seen by the university’s owner 
that these departments provided essential sources of income and decisions were taken to 
ignore the QAA rules because the QAA was administratively and politically weak and 
lacked political support from Gaddafi. Another factor was the establishment of a large 
number of unaccredited private universities which helped Al-Refak University to continue 
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to run all its departments ignoring the QAA’s regulations. In addition the university had 
significant relationships with some important state institutions, such as advertisement 
centres, that helped the founder to develop the institution rapidly. 
 
In 2008 the QAA through the instructions of the Department of Administrative and 
Financial Matters had required the university to have its academic departments accredited. 
The accreditation procedure cost the university 27,000 L.D which was paid by cheque to 
the QAA. This amount was divided between the institutional accreditation and nine 
departments as is shown in the Table 43 below.    
 
Table (43). The distribution of the accreditation costs in Al-Refak University, 2008. 
Title  The amount. (L.D) 
The institutional accreditation procedure  11,250 
The accreditation for the Department of Business 
Management.   
1,750 
The accreditation for Department of Architecture.  1,750 
The accreditation for the Department of Petrol 
Engineering.   
1,750 
The accreditation for the Department of Engineering. 1,750 
The accreditation for the Department of Computing.  1,750 
The accreditation for the Department of Civil 
Engineering.  
1,750 
The accreditation for the Department of Law. 1,750 
The accreditation for the Department English 
Language. 
1,750 
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The accreditation for the Department of Electronics. 1,750 
Total  27,000 
Source: Al-Refak University, Official letter, 2008. 
 
In July 2009 the Secretary of the Administrative Committee for the QAA issued 
Resolution No. 33, 2009, to give the university accreditation for four departments: 
Accounting, Computing Science, Architecture and Law. With the Department of Business 
Management, this gave the university a total of five accredited departments. The university 
by achieving this goal had become the first and only private institution with such a status in 
Tripoli and only the third university in Libya after Afriqya University and the Union 
Afriqya University as table 44 below illustrates. 
 
 
 
Table (44). The date of accredited departments in private universities in Libya.  
The private university and 
its location 
The departments The date of 
accreditation 
 Law   
Afriqya University/ 
Benghazi. 
English Language  4th of Dec., 2006 
 Business 
Management  
 
   
 Law  
 
 
Union Afriqya University/ 
Al-Zawia. 
English Language  4th of Dec., 2006 
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 Business 
Management  
 
   
 Business 
Management 
29th of Nov., 2007 
 Accounting 14th of July 2009 
Al-Refak University/ 
Tripoli. 
Computing Science  
 Law  
 Architecture   
   
 The Basic Medical 
Sciences   
 
 Medicine   
The International Libyan 
University for Medical 
sciences/Benghazi. 
Dentistry  3rd of June 2008 
 Pharmacy  
 Medical 
Technician   
 
 Nursing  
Source: QAA document consulted during the field study. (N.D).  
 
In addition to the above five departments Al-Refak University has three other departments, 
although they have not been accredited by QAA. They are Civil Engineering, Electronic 
Engineering and Petrol Engineering. 
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The university, in the newspapers both Al-Daleel and Al-Ealan, has advertised these 
departments as being accredited by the QAA in order to attract students to study at the 
university. However, the QAA, through the Director of the Administration of Private 
Higher Education has cautioned the university to stop the registration of students in these 
departments. In a letter issued by the director in April 2010, it states that: 
 
“....... to draw your attention to the advertisements which were publicized in the 
Declaration Newspaper on open admissions and registration for departments…that these 
are not accredited is a clear violation of all rules and regulations and instructions that 
were issued by QAA.......... these are English Language, Civil Engineering, Electronic 
Engineering and Petroleum Engineering ......... It's very important that the recruitment and 
involvement of students in these unaccredited departments has to cease because this will 
undoubtedly cause serious problems of accountability and incur the anger of the public, 
especially of the parents of the enrolled students......Therefore we hold you fully 
responsible for the need to address the students admitted to these departments quickly and 
to pledge in writing not to repeat such violations ........” (Al-Refak University, Official 
letter,  University archives, April, 2010)59. 
 
Despite this strong stricture, the university continued to enrol new students in the 
departments. Visits to the university during the field study revealed that it was difficult for 
the QAA to force not only Al-Refak University, but the other universities to follow the 
QAA’s rules and instructions. The weaknesses of the QAA already discussed were 
undoubtedly factor here. Even so, it became clear through visits to other private 
                                                 
59
 It an official letter was sent by the director of APHE to warn Al-Refak University for opening unaccredited 
departments. The letter asked the university to close these departments as soon as possible.   
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universities and from several interviews with the director of Al-Refak University, that the 
most important factor was that the private sector had gained strong political support from 
the Libyan regime, and in particular from Gaddafi himself, to play its role in the higher 
education sector. This, in fact, was enough to make Al-Refak University, as well as some 
other private universities, more powerful, especially in the case where there were a number 
of students who were members of Gaddafi’s family and who were politically very valuable 
for the university. These students were enrolled in the university and in these unaccredited 
departments as a way of protecting the university from any decisions made against it. The 
university had about five students who were related to Gaddafi and there would have been 
serious consequences for the university had the administrators of QAA closed down a 
department which included any those students. The QAA had to find a diplomatic way to 
satisfy them but which at the same time would not break the QAA’s rules.  
 
Many senior people with high positions in Libyan society were not happy with this 
situation and Dr. Suleiman Al-Khoja was one of them. He had been the director of the 
office of private higher education since the beginning of the 21st century and decided to 
resign from the post in 2004. Another example was the Inspector General for the education 
sector in Libya, Dr. Al-Gelaly, and he, too, decided to give up his responsibilities. This 
gave a clear message that the task given to the QAA to control private higher education, 
including that of Al-Refak University is a complicated and difficult one.   
 
An important aspect of this situation was the attitude of government institutions towards 
graduates from the unaccredited departments of Al-Refak University. According to QAA 
requirements the government work agencies and state institutions were not allowed to 
employ graduates who hold degrees from unaccredited departments. However, an 
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important official document from the National Oil Corporation NOC60 provides data show 
that there were a number of students who had graduated from the Department of Petroleum 
Engineering at Al-Refak University and had already obtained employment at the NOC. 
The director of NOC, Dr. Shokri Ghanem,61 issued Resolution No. 37, in August, 2010, 
allowing seventeen graduates to take up employment, all of whom held degrees in Drilling 
Engineering awarded by the Department of Petroleum Engineering, which had not been 
accredited by the QAA, at Al-Refak University. These engineers were distributed amongst 
the eight petroleum companies as shown in Table 45 below.               
 
Table 45. The distribution of the Al-Refak University graduates between petroleum 
institutions in Libya. (2010) 
The name of the institution The number 
The Arabian Gulf Oil Company 7 
Al-Waha for Oil 2 
Al-Zweteena 1 
Melita for Gas and Oil 1 
Occidental Libya of Oil 1 
Al-Jof for Petroleum Operations 1 
Libya Mobile Exxon Limited 1 
The National Company for Digging and Maintaining the Petroleum Well. 3 
Source:Al-Refak University,  Official document: Resolution No. 37., 2010. The NOC, 2010.      
 
These examples clearly show the absence of co-operation and co-ordination between the 
corporation, the QAA, the private universities and the other institutions in the government 
                                                 
60
 The National Oil Corporation NOC is the main institution responsible for all the petroleum companies in 
Libya. 
61
 Dr. Shokri Ghanem is the general director of the NOC. Before that he was the Secretary of the General 
People’s Committee (GPC, Prime Minister) in Libya during the early years of the 21st century.    
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sector. This did not help the government’s policy for private higher education in general 
and made the role of the QAA inefficient and ineffective. This has led Al-Refak University 
to ignore to some extent the QAA instructions and requirements.   
 
7.11 Graduates from Al-Refak University and the world of work: 
In 2009 and 2010 the number of graduates from the university reached a total of 895 from 
its nine fields of study, the largest number of whom graduated from the Department of 
Business Studies.  
 
A major performance indicator of any private university was the marketability of its 
graduates, i.e. how far are those graduates being absorbed productively in the job market or 
in the ranks of the self-employed. Libyan state agencies and government institutions do not 
publish any comprehensive or regular data on the deployment of graduates from the private 
universities. From Al-Refak University the following pattern emerged:    
1. In recent years (2008-2009), about 20 per cent of the graduates were appointed to 
salaried jobs. Another 15 per cent were involved in self-employed activities 
(Interview with Mr. Sheleeg, M, Administrative staff, Al-Refak University, 2010). 
Those graduates tried very hard to get jobs in both public and private sector and, 
of course, the social relationships played an important role to help job seekers. 
There was no further information whether or not they show good or poor relative 
employment prospects for Al-Refak University graduates. However, according to 
my field work in 2010 I revealed that the graduates have to do mostly an interview 
exam in state institution before they were employed. As it has been mentioned that 
there is a consensus that in the Libyan society that private universities are in very 
poor quality and they do not have academic standards.         
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2. The majority of its graduates who entered the job market found employment in the 
private sector, that is, the private firms that had merged with public sectors, 
financing institutions and other service sectors (e.g. educational institutions, 
software, multinational/multilateral agencies). 
3. According to data obtained in the field study a number of graduates from the 
university had found work in some of the state institutions.        
 
7.12 Lessons learned from the restructuring process: 
The lessons learned from Al-Refak University are as follows: 
First lessons learned come from courses offered and trends in enrolment: there were more 
academic departments than the capacity of the university to properly provide for them.  So 
it is very important to reduce the number of these departments and keep running only the 
ones that were accredited by QAA. This policy would help the university reduce the cost 
and improve the quality of education in the university. Also, the university did not include 
in its staff members proper experts that would be able to give advices helping the owner to 
invest in fields that responded effectively to the market demands of skilled manpower. Al-
Refak had failed to grasp the opportunity of properly assessing the needs of the 
employment market and economy with a view to providing high-class education to meet 
the needs of the government in vocational and technical subjects. There was no real 
attempt to relate the teaching to the employment requirements of students who were 
hoping to use higher education as a means of securing advancement. 
The second lesson learned was the unsatisfactory the quality of education provided by Al-
Refak University. The university management and its academic departments needed to 
have employed efficient administrative skills and qualified teachers. The management and 
334 
 
the departments needed to have worked together to coordinate policy on the university 
success. Heads of departments’ rights should have reflected their responsibilities and duties 
and they should have been able to recruit staff, evaluate students, and manage their own 
budgets within their units. Meetings should have been held with staff at various stages of 
development to set up several task forces and to study the management of academic 
matters, university personnel and financial matters that involved large groups of staff. 
Participation in working groups can make staff thoroughly understand the concept of 
university autonomy. The staff should be informed of subsidiary regulations and guidelines 
on academic matters and personnel management together with access to the draft of the 
University Act. Al-Refak during the period of this study notably failed to establish such 
sustainable participation that would have strengthened the workings and academic quality 
of the university. 
 
The third lesson that should be learned by the government from this case study concerns 
the issue of autonomy given to private universities including Al-Refak University. Private 
universities in Libya did not follow the rules and instructions issued by the QAA and 
APHE. They often attempted to operate unaccredited courses and departments. In addition, 
they engaged in illegal activities and all this happened in the absence of government 
control. The government should have provided more regular intervention through its 
regulatory bodies. It is interesting to note that even when people criticize public 
intervention, no one prefers a situation with a total absence of state intervention and 
support.  
 
The fourth lesson is related to academic faculties in Al-Refak University in comparison 
with other private universities. The current system needs to learn from the case study in 
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that compared with standards in other universities in the region, there is still a great  
diversity within teaching staffs of Libyan higher education institutions in terms of quality, 
quantity, and qualifications. In Al-Refak University most of the teaching staff had master’s 
degrees or only first degrees. 
 
The fifth lesson was from the study programmes offered by the university. There is a risk 
that allowed people to open universities and who do not meet the academic conditions and 
requirements. Universities could be used by people especially from a rich family to make 
money in the expense of academic proposes. As it was noted from the field studies and a 
number of visits to some private universities, the owners were dominant and they had the 
power to make any decision whenever they liked. This would lead to centralized 
institutions affecting the quality of education weakening the whole system. 
 
7.13 Conclusion: 
Since its establishment Al-Refak university had, over a period of time, outlined several 
aims and objectives. But it has not been easy for the university to meet these goals and this 
field study has defined some of the problems encountered by the university that has 
prevented it from achieving complete success.   
 
The study case exposes several issues and problems related to the privatization of higher 
education in Libya during the Gaddafi period, and indeed, beyond. Although the private 
sector is a fast-expanding segment of higher education, it represents only a fragment of the 
higher education sector. Even though Al-Refak University is the best private university in 
Libya in terms of the number of students, the number of departments and its good 
facilities, it is still an inferior university compared with state funded institutions. The 
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faculty members in Al-Fatah University, for instance, are more highly qualified than those 
in Al-Refak University. In the former most of them hold PhD degrees while in the latter, as 
in the other private universities, the majority have MSc qualifications only. This, to some 
extent has affected the quality of the education provided for its students even though, as 
has been pointed out, the teaching departments in Al-Refak University provide similar 
courses to those offered by the public universities. But these departments concentrate on 
the arts and humanities and do not follow the strategies advocated on the government’s 
agenda to reduce the rate of unemployment in the Libyan economy.  
 
Al-Refak University illustrated the downward pressures on quality associated with the cost 
of providing high quality education. From the experience gained in private educational 
institutions around the world, operational efficiency for the for-profit private university is 
the crucial issue and, of course, Al-Refak University is no exception. This university 
ensured its operational efficiency primarily by increasing the gap between the fees 
collected and the operational cost of the institution. Staffing costs being the major item of 
expenditure, it tried to minimize its spending on this major component and this was done 
by relying heavily on part-time teachers and by employing faculty members who hold only 
MSc degrees. This was at the expense of the quality of education given.  
      
It is worth noting that some of the problems encountered during the Gaddafi phase were 
due to the paradoxical situation in Libya in which the government had the power and the 
instruments to regulate the system, but frequently abstained from using them. Indeed, 
Libyan society at this period can be considered rather soft, gentle and permissive and any 
conflicts seldom lead to violent action until the 2011 revolution and harsh measures were 
very rarely enforced and a lot of sympathy was frequently directed towards the weak and 
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the fallen. Although it is also true that there were many laws of a strong regulatory 
character at the time, they were not always taken very seriously. There was a major 
problem of implementation stemming from a combination of institutional and 
organisational weakness and the extreme authoritarianism of the Gaddafi regime, where 
the relatives and friends of those in high places enjoyed a privileged position. 
 
As noted earlier, the quality of the teaching courses offered at Al-Refak University was 
inferior to that offered at Al-Fatah University. Students successfully graduated but this can 
easily be explained by recognising that the university’s prime concern was to attract as 
many students as possible and a demonstrable high success rate would certainly help to 
achieve this objective. This meant that students having paid their tuition fees would be 
guaranteed to graduate simply by attending lectures at the university. This accounts for the 
fact that many students simply attended courses in the knowledge that they would be 
awarded a degree at the end of a specified period of study, rather than to develop their 
academic and intellectual abilities62. Students at this university may be divided into three 
categories:  
1. Those who had failed to complete their studies at public universities. Interviews 
with some students revealed that they had studied at Al-Fateh University. Khowther 
Ali, For example, said “I was in Al-Fatah University. I failed in my study. The study 
conditions are difficult, I came to Afriqya University to complete my study.....”. 
(interview with Khowther Ali, a student at Faculty of Engineering, Al-Fatah 
University. November, 2010)           
                                                 
62
 As I had been a lecturer at some of the private universities (e.g. Trables and Afriqya)  I was able to get 
some important evidences to support the claim is mentioned above. I know a number of private university 
students (some of them are my relatives) who had not been to the class but they obtained degrees from the 
university.      
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2. those who came from high class families and did not really need to study to 
improve themselves but sought to obtain degrees to satisfy a social need,  
3. Those who were already employees in state institutions but had enrolled to obtain 
higher education qualifications and thus increase their earning powers.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to examine the role of the QAA in the functioning of Al-Refak 
University. The setting up of the QAA had been a real challenge to the institution because 
it knew that it was bound to comply with its requirements, rules and regulations but at the 
same time it was practising a contradictory policy with a disregard for the principles laid 
down by the QAA.: the university had allowed holders of BSc degrees to teach on its 
courses in spite of the QAA’s directive that all members of the teaching staff were required 
to hold higher degrees.  It seems that the task given to the QAA of controlling private 
universities is an impossible one to fulfil because it does not have enough professional 
experience and therefore lacks the essential skills and the specialists to discharge its 
responsibilities effectively. Nor in the past has it enjoyed sufficient political support to 
enable it to make headway. The implementation of the policy to privatise higher education 
in Libya had several imperfections. Gaddafi’s government had not built a proper or 
practicable infrastructure and had not provided adequate facilities for founders of standard 
private universities to build and establish their institutions. From my experience as a 
lecturer at the first private higher education institution established in 2000 and from the 
two field studies I undertook, one pre-revolution and the other post-revolution, it is my 
considered opinion that the procedural steps for what was an absolutely essential private 
higher education policy were not put in any useful sequence for its effective 
implementation. The lesson is that both resources and political will are needed to ensure 
proper regulation by the government of the day.      
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Chapter eight: summary, conclusions and recommendations. 
8.1 Introduction: 
The growth of private higher education worldwide has been one of the most remarkable 
developments of the past several decades. This thesis contributes to an explanation and a 
discussion on its growth and its characteristics. The anatomy of private higher education 
displays a great variety in terms of its size and functions. While it has existed in many 
countries - and has traditionally been the dominant force in some countries, such as Japan, 
Colombia, and the Philippines -it has formed only a small proportion of higher education 
in most countries. It is interesting to note that policies to privatize higher education have 
come into existence in socialist and communist countries as a result of the failure of 
socialism and communism. This appears to be the case for Libya where private higher 
education emergence would have to break what was generally public monopoly. In Libya, 
the subject of this thesis, before 1999 the financing of higher education was completely 
dependent on public sector. However, the population growth, increasing secondary school 
graduates and graduate unemployment were pressures that forced Gaddafi’s government to 
allow the private sector to establish private universities. These pressures were accompanied 
by recognition in the political leadership of the poor performance of the existing large 
public universities. Private expansion began at the end of the 1990s, when new regulations 
allowed private higher education institutions to enter the market and this represented a 
sudden shift in policy. In 2010, the private higher education sector enrolment figures 
accounted for about 15 percent of total enrolment, with more than 50 private higher 
education institutions having been established. Such a rapid growth in Libya raised 
questions about the role and functions of the private providers and about government 
policies on the private higher education sector. Questions also arose about the behaviour of 
private higher education institutions in terms of the types of programmes they offered, the 
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level of tuition fees levied, their admission policies, the actual quality of the programmes 
on offer and their importance to the economy and culture of the nation.   
 
Private higher education is an important topic within higher education policy. It has been 
widely studied and much research exists on the subject generally, especially after the 1980s 
(Levy, D, 1980, Geiger, R, 1986, and Altbach, P, 1999). However, very little research has 
taken place and there are no recent related studies that explore the situation in Libya. This 
study, then, has sought to contribute to the existing literature by tracing the development of 
the study of that country’s financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of 
the privatization of higher education and the attempts to reform it. This chapter reflects on 
the usefulness of an examination charting the developments of the private and public 
sectors in the Libyan higher education system from 1969 to 2011. The thesis demonstrates 
how important the particular circumstances of any given country are in helping us to 
understand the development of private education. The example of Libya shows how unique 
political, economic and social circumstances have interacted to produce a significant 
private higher educational sector in a country that had previously provided as a matter of 
principle only state-run tertiary education. 
 
8.2 Summary of research findings: 
The study has showed that the financing policy for higher education has been shaped as a 
result of several pressures  and Gaddafi in many times in his public speeches was very 
disappointed that his regime policy over three decades did not produce success in this 
sphere. The political situation had become very sensitive63 since the 1990s and the 
adoption of the private higher education policy was considered to be one of the possible 
                                                 
63
 Libya had not seen any improvement at any level, in education, health care, and in other social services for 
four decades, so people were dissatisfied.    
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solutions in reducing pressure on the Gaddafi government and avoiding any risk of turmoil 
and political instability. The financing policy for higher education in Libya was reformed 
after 1999 and the private sector became a significant player in the higher education arena. 
One remarkable development, not widely recognized outside specialized academic circles, 
is the rapid emergence of institutions of higher education in the private sector in a country 
like Libya that had been wedded to a culture of ‘socialism’ for decades. During the 
Gaddafi regime, it was clear that his government was initially not interested in the idea of 
the private sector playing a role in the Libyan economy. However, his regime found it 
impossible to ban privatization so the higher education policy was reformed to allow the 
establishment of private institutions. After Private Education Law No. 6 (the Al-Taleem 
Al-Tasharoki Law), issued in 1999, a rapid expansion of private higher education began 
and the institutions steadily became more autonomous with the right to create fields of 
study, to set their own admission procedures, to determine the number of student places, to 
decide on curricula and study plans, obtain funds from outside the state budget and to 
appoint new faculty members and elect their rectors. And, significantly, private higher 
education institutions were permitted to charge tuition fees to students. This shift of 
responsibilities represented an increased autonomy of higher education providers and 
reflected the main characteristics of a new market-oriented legislation concerning higher 
education in Libya by the end of 1990s. 
 
But according to the experience I have gained since the beginning of my research and 
during my field study,  caution is required in making an evaluation of its development as to 
whether it has been positive or negative, an assessment made all the more difficult on 
account of the turmoil following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The question is: are private 
universities the solution to the higher education crisis in Libya? It is difficult to give a 
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specific answer, but some facts may help to provide an insight and clarify the situation. It 
is necessary, therefore, to point out that private higher education institutions were founded 
in a damaged political environment where corruption was rife. A decision to establish a 
private higher education sector was made by the Gaddafi government on an ad hoc basis. 
The policy since 1999 (the year of the establishment of private higher education), revealed 
a lack of the mechanisms needed to implement its objectives. Clearly there was a gap 
between the implementing of the policy to privatize and the defined operational principles 
and regulatory mechanisms required to open and operate private higher education 
institutions. 
 
By the early part of the twenty first century, the number of private universities had reached 
50 with about 40,000 students. For the first few years under the 1999 Higher Education 
Act, due to the limited number of adequately qualified teaching academics available, 
private institutions offered mostly bachelor’s degree courses and did not have the right or 
the staffing facilities to offer courses at postgraduate level. Being deprived of any 
substantial state support, they developed mainly high demand, ‘low-cost’ study 
programmes (as was the case in most of the Central and Eastern European regions and in a 
number of other countries), and appealed to as many potential students as possible, 
especially part-time students. The expansion of private higher education brought with it, of 
course, a need for an increase in teaching staff and academics were recruited from public 
institutions, although a resolution had been issued to prevent public staff members from 
taking employment in the private sector. For many of these, their work in a private higher 
education institution was a second job but the effect it had was to improve the student/staff 
ratio in the private sector. Despite this, though, the actual quality of the education provided 
showed few signs of improvement. It was found, too, that the demanding workload of a 
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large staff resulted in a decline in research activity for most academics in the private 
establishments. 
 
The implementation of the policy reflects three different views. From the government’s 
point of view it was important to follow this policy even at the expense of Gaddafi’s 
beliefs, because this was a means, as seen by Gaddafi’s regime, to help reduce pressure on 
the government. The founders of private universities for their part were delighted with the 
opportunity to invest in private universities and to generate a great deal of money over a 
short period of time. And for the students and their parents the private universities 
guaranteed the awarding of a degree and offered a secure future. 
 
The empirical study confirmed that the implementation process had so far followed the 
market-oriented approach creating profit-making institutions. They act as for-profit 
organizations and they are non-vocationally and commercially oriented colleges. What it 
was observed from field study that private universities try to succeed primarily in the 
marketplace rather than trying to enhance the wider public good. These institutions face a 
problem that if they seek to supply services that contain public goods, such as basic 
research, or high-cost study programmes in low demand areas that are socially important in 
the absence of state or any provider of financial assistance, they will not be able to cover 
the cost of these services. Otherwise, if they provided such services they would decrease 
their profits. Therefore the subjects they offer are oriented towards low-cost study 
programmes in high-demand disciplines.  
 
The quality assurance and other regulatory bodies had (and still have) a lack of experience 
in terms of knowledge of the theories of education, ideas and information on private higher 
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education as presented by world specialists and educational philosophers. Such a weak 
background provided fertile ground for the mushrooming of fallible and questionable 
private universities. The prompt massification of higher education and the emergence of 50 
private universities confronting 12 public universities naturally gave rise to concerns about 
the quality of Libya’s higher education system, leading to a considerable criticism of 
private higher education. Has the system created healthy competition or was it bedevilled 
by many ethical and quality problems? Some observers of the process (e.g. Al-Teer64, M. 
2005) emphasized that most of the private universities were not established according to 
proper educational and managerial concepts, but emerged mostly for financial reasons. Al-
Teer argued that most of the academic faculty in the private sector is employed part-time, 
and does not have formal employee status but teaches on commission, and that the great 
majority was simultaneously employed permanently in public higher education as the first 
job. Moreover, they do not recognize the diversification of study offered in the private 
sector, both in terms of disciplines and types of study programmes. To simplify their 
arguments, all private institutions were single discipline, profit oriented, with courses 
leading only to the bachelor degree in the most popular study departments, such as 
management, finance, Law and accountancy, etc. 
 
A feature of the Libyan experience was that the private universities were established before 
any regulatory bodies (e.g. QAA and PHEA) were established. This was, of course, a 
crucial factor and a big mistake because no thought initially seemed to have been given to 
the issue of auditing or controlling the new private universities before they were 
sanctioned. In retrospect this seems extraordinary and was surely a great error. 
 
                                                 
64
 Ali Al-Teer is a professor in business management. He is a lecturer at Al-Fatah University.    
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The field study has revealed that the QAA was not founded with reference to the 
establishment of private higher education. Indeed an assessment by the QAA on private 
universities exposes many critical points against these institutions and their processes but 
the body was unable to force private universities to conform to the regulations set out or to 
follow rules, instructions and obligations. This is another key finding, that the policy for 
private higher education has limited scope in its legal framework and in the QAA’s 
administrative and procedural strength. For example, the director of the PHEA stated that 
letters of criticism had been sent to a number of private universities that were breaking the 
rules. These formal letters of authority, he said, were being totally disregarded as if such a 
legal body as the QAA did not exist. (Interview with Dr. Abdullatif M. Latife, the Director 
of PHEA, November 2010). 
 
All these difficulties were made worse by the self-imposed isolation of the Gaddafi regime. 
Here a serious aspect was the lack of access to the English Language and the very poor 
English linguistic skills amongst not only staff members and students of private 
universities but also most Libyans. This was a direct result of the policy adopted during 
Gaddafi regime that had abolished the teaching of foreign languages, including English, 
since the 1980s when the secretary of the General People’s Committee for Education, 
Ahmed Ibrahim65, Minister of Education, was in charge of the education sector. For Libya 
this has been a complete disaster and has set back Libya by at least a generation66 in terms 
of educational quality. It is one of the consequences of that misguided decision that many 
                                                 
65
 Ahmed Ibrahim was arrested after the revolution and has been charged by the court in Musrata. The judge 
has issued the death penalty for his crimes including his decision about the English Language. (National 
Libya channel, 2013). 
 
66
 It is difficult to be know how quickly the system can take to recover; however, the government had started 
to implement policies and programmes helping to improve the quality of education and reduce the negative 
consequences of Ahmed Ibrahim policy. In the late 20th century when Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-Esalam was a 
significant player in Libyan political system the country became open to outside influences. Many centres 
had been opened to teach English language since 1990s. 
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Libyans have been unable to use modern technological facilities such as computers and 
access to the Internet, especially with the English Language having been accepted as the 
main international language. The result has been that many Libyans had very limited 
knowledge of the outside world and the country found itself isolated from the world and 
from international communities. Moreover, the private universities themselves did very 
little to redress this situation: they did not provide rich and vibrating intellectual 
surroundings nor did they provide adequate academic infrastructures.  
 
Private higher education institutions were allowed to enter the education market, and they 
were asked to meet some state requirements set by the Libyan government through the 
QAA, addressing issues such as academic standards, curricula design and their 
implementation and the necessary infrastructures to support and operate an educational 
institution.    
 
In terms of institutional arrangements, it may be argued that, despite Libya having a huge 
number of private higher education institutions, it can claim only four as being  accredited 
and the country is still far removed from creating a truly competitive higher education 
system. Although recognized private higher education institutions were eligible for state 
subsidies, they did not, in fact, receive any support. Students in these institutions were 
excluded from state scholarships, and the laws and regulations affecting the transparency 
of the system made in order to ensure high quality provision and the dissemination of 
information, were largely absent. Towards the end of the 1990s, the priority of 
policymakers was to allow the private universities more autonomy and to increase the 
number of higher education institutions to meet the rapidly growing demand without 
committing the state to their funding. 
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Most of the private universities were established in the large cities particularly in Tripoli 
and Benghazi. In general, the regional distribution of private higher education institutions 
across Libya was in accordance with the distribution of economic prosperity and these 
institutions were established in areas with large, concentrated populations and not in the 
rural areas. These were the ‘demand absorbing’ institutions and offered low-cost study 
courses in popular subjects, especially economics and management. Most were non-
selective and imposed no entry requirements.  
 
An analysis of the interviews conducted with graduates in the case study university reveal 
that those graduates failed to obtain employment because their qualifications, which were 
predominantly in law, science and business management were not in great demand in the 
market. Those who did get job opportunities in state institutions such as banks, state 
companies, hospitals and other social services were successful not because of their degrees 
and qualifications but because  they had good relationships with employers67. In fact, 
students who enroll and graduate from this university are not of the highest quality and the 
consensus is that the best students mainly enroll in the public universities. My impression 
is that the state institutions, the public companies and the banks are dismissive of graduates 
from the private sector because of the low standards of training, the poorly designed 
courses and low student motivation, all of which do not compare favorably with that of the 
public universities. The parents and potential students are not fully clear in their minds 
about the relative strengths and the efficiency of private universities when compared with 
                                                 
67
 My evidence to this is that, I have relationships with some of those people (e.g. Ala Al-Alrbi, Ahmed Al-
Tomy who  are my cousin’s sons and Akrem Amar who is my friend’s brother). They all got jobs because 
they know the employer. In addition to that I would say that this is well known in Libyan society that most 
private university graduates who get jobs in state institutions  had relationships with the employers.      
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public universities and this is due to the lack of transparency and the money-making 
motivation of private university managers and organizers.      
 
Slowly the attention of the policymakers shifted towards creating a more open and 
therefore accessible system and to issues of quality. The QAA had been established in 
2006 with the purpose of evaluating the quality of education in all higher education 
institutions and it was charged with the responsibility for disseminating information about 
the outcomes of the evaluations to students and academics so that students could make 
better-informed choices about which public or private university to attend. 
 
It became obvious during the field study that for the Libyan government to intervene in the 
private higher education to restrict its process would be problematical. There were several 
factors that made the control of private higher education extremely difficult or even 
impossible:  
1. the spread of corruption in the state institutions; 
2.  the lack of expertise and experience in administrative staff; 
3. The government had shown its desire to organize the private higher education 
sector by establishing the QAA and by introducing resolutions but there seemed to 
be little sustained enthusiasm on the part of political leaders to restrict private 
higher education. The influence of a number of students from powerful political 
families study at private universities and they benefit from a system that does not 
exercise control and refuses to be accountable situation. Even after the toppling of 
Gaddafi’s regime, it became more difficult for the QAA and for the other 
regulatory bodies, to assert control over these universities and force them to abide 
by the academic and scientific regulations as laid down.    
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As in some countries, in Libya the state treats private higher education differently from 
public higher education. The problem faced by the private universities was that the absence 
of a marketing policy which would have made state subsidies available to recognized and 
accredited private higher education institutions. The policy did not explicitly advocate the 
development of a private sector and did not establish an equal treatment bases for both 
sectors, because accredited and recognized private universities are deprived of state 
subsidies for their basic operations. They are not allowed to compete for many sources of 
state funding, so a true market for higher education still does not exist. This gave public 
institutions a clear advantage in terms of tuition-free, full-time study courses whereas 
private institutions had to charge their students full fees and the table (46) below outlines 
aspects of the problems that still confront them.  
 
Table (46). Areas of concern in private universities in Libya. 
Title   
Access Access is limited in private universities compared with that 
of public ones. 
Equity Higher education participation in private universities is low. 
High tuition fees might prevent poor people from studying 
at private universities. However, equity in the Libyan 
society is not a big issue.      
Quality Private institutions in general are of low quality and this is 
because the quality assurance and accreditation system has 
found it difficult to assert itself and its impact has been 
limited. 
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Relevance Overall enrolment and its expansion in private institutions, 
mainly in the liberal arts and humanities had produced 
graduates with unemployable skills; there are weak links 
between higher education and industry and a lack of 
information on graduate employment. 
Financing There is no public funding or financial support for private 
universities. Their income comes largely from tuition fees.  
Management Overall weak administrative structure with a lack of 
accountability in higher education institutions. Inefficient 
internal management with poor quality administrative staff 
and ineffectual external accountability. 
Use of new 
technologies 
Poor ICT infrastructure with very limited access to global 
text books and knowledge resources. 
 
Given the fact that the Libyan higher education sector is going to face some important 
future challenges, there is a need to rethink the policy stance to – in particular – the private 
higher education sector. If this private sector is to keep playing its important role in the 
system, the government will have to adjust its current policy stance to the sector. Only in 
this way can the Libyan higher education miracle really come true. 
We will end our reflections on the outcomes of this study by giving a few 
recommendations for policy improvement: 
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A. Better Regulation: 
If the Libyan government is determined to continue with the policy of having private 
universities, it must introduce as a matter of urgency, strong measures and regulations to 
close down those universities that do not conform to the required standards and allow only 
those which can demonstrate that they are able to function efficiently to remain open.  And 
there must be stringent and transparent procedures adopted that reinforce such decisions 
and that ensure that they are implemented effectively. The use of the public media to 
broadcast and disseminate information is one way of publicizing the institutions that meet 
the required criteria and, of course, to identify those that do not.  The fact remains, though, 
that, in spite of the government founding it, the QAA clearly has lacked the authority and 
expertise to control private universities. More effort has to be made by the QAA and by the 
government if worthwhile improvements are to be realized:   
1. Employ people who have specific and specialized skills. 
 2. Give more practicable power to the QAA that would make it able to coerce the 
universities to follow its obligations, rules and instructions.  
 
B. Ensure international influences and standards are brought to bear 
The QAA should be required to expand its engagement internationally and to create 
relationships with other centres outside Libya in order to benefit from their experiences.  
The chance of getting Libya back to the international community to expand its 
communication and engagement with the rest of the world, to examine the experiences of 
other governments, to create liaisons with internationally well known and reputable 
universities would enable Libyan educationalists and administrators to gain an insight into 
the philosophies and the logistics of successful private institutions elsewhere.  
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Moreover, another important aspect should be considered: colleges and universities are 
becoming global players in a globalized world, the movement of an educated and skilled 
labour force is becoming increasingly common, and internationally certified and valid 
qualifications are a great advantage for individuals who wish to find employment abroad. 
There is no private university in Libya that has been founded by international organizations 
nor are there any branches of foreign educational establishments, which mean that Libyan 
private universities are lagging far behind the academic standards displayed by the many 
successful private universities in the world. This state of affairs has to be addressed by the 
new government if such a disadvantage is to be rectified. It is of great importance that the 
country’s private universities are open to global trends in private higher education and that 
they establish a wide network of international academic partners, invite experts from 
abroad in all disciplines as visiting lecturers at Libyan universities, cooperate in research 
projects and conferences with foreign university faculties and above all very carefully 
analyse the reasons behind the success of private higher education in other countries.          
 
C. Encouragement of Proper Competition:  
It has been argued by Vossensteyn that “Providing higher education institutions with 
greater autonomy give them an incentive to make choices and compete for 
students……….private institutions create more competition and increase differentiation 
.......” (Vossensteyn, H, 2004, p43) Private universities do not actually constitute 
competition and there is no real threat between private universities themselves or with state 
higher education institutions. This is a good reason for rethinking and changing the general 
approach to the system and a number of steps should be taken to adapt to the new market 
conditions. There is weak competition between higher education institutions, so policy 
makers and education planners should be made aware of the severe competition from the 
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new tertiary education providers, such as virtual universities, corporate universities and 
franchise universities. In the light of these innovations and advances in education, a reform 
of higher education in Libya would encourage both public and private higher education 
institutions to strive for higher overall standards. Alongside that as the coordination is 
absent, it is absolutely essential to build effective links and to coordinate the strategies 
between private higher education and the regulatory bodies. 
 
D. Intersectoral Approaches  
Gaddafi’s political system had not built a sound infrastructure in adult training and the 
policy makers had not make decisions to deal with this weakness. The system of higher 
education in Libya should be adapted to the new social and economic realities of an 
emergent democracy and an intersectional approach seems to be the most effective one if 
social disorder is to be avoided. Interaction and cooperation between higher education 
institutions and the labour market should be re-established and this would be more easily 
accomplished if a demonstrable, higher quality of education were to be aspired to in both 
state and private higher education institutions. The generally low quality of private higher 
education institutions has resulted in a negative perception of their worth and even the best 
private universities that I visited in the capital city, Tripoli, were not enough to change this 
general picture. Subsequent to my experience of studying the private higher education 
debate and in particular the argument that the private sector needs to be encouraged but 
with a strong regulatory mechanism, I find the notion untenable, particularly in Libya with 
its weak government working in unstable circumstances. Countries with strong 
governments, like China, Thailand and South Africa would be more able to instigate such 
fundamental improvements. 
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A reform of higher education in Libya has to follow the general pattern of development 
accepted worldwide: there is no doubt that it is difficult to decrease public funding and to 
increase private finance but it is possible and important to consider this trend. Despite the 
disadvantages and weaknesses of private higher education in Libya already identified, a 
policy that encourages the privatization of the sector in the general higher education 
system has to take place as long as it participates in and conforms to, the standardized 
academic requirements and fulfils a scientific assessment of its efficiency. In order to 
create an environment of genuine competition state and private higher education 
institutions should be brought to the same starting position, regardless of ownership. It has 
to be borne in mind that present day attitudes and previous education resolutions and laws 
discriminate against private higher education institutions and hinder their development.  In 
the context of Libya, if the government has a desire to go ahead in this direction it should 
work with private universities together. The state should try to put in place a ‘healthy 
degree of competition’ between private and public providers, allowing them to co-exist, 
interact and compete. With help of the Libyan government it may be possible for private 
universities to introduce targeted subsidization schemes for low-income qualified students 
through loan subsidy, grants and various kinds of scholarships. Also, it may be possible for 
the government to encourage donation/gifts, grants, direct financial assistance, and private 
scholarships awards. 
              
An important factor in the modernization of the universities, whether public or private is 
the encouragement of a regular exchange of students and teaching staff between 
universities and firms and public institutions. Running parallel with this should be a more 
direct involvement of the representatives from the economic environment and public 
institutions in various university activities. The public institutions can facilitate this 
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happening by developing a forum with the participation of the representatives of 
universities and their partner institutions that produces useful mechanisms by defining 
uniform criteria to measure the quality of the university/business interaction and the 
performance of the universities. 
 
E. Better Geographical Balance: 
The geographic location of institutions that was based on ideological and political 
considerations rather than rational and coherent planning has resulted in the fragmentation 
of the system and unnecessary duplication of programmes. This study has shown that the 
geographic distribution of the private universities throughout the country is unbalanced and 
that most are concentrated in the wealthiest and most populated cities, with a very heavy 
concentration in the two principal cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.  If private higher 
education improves and meets required conditions it will become important to distribute 
private universities more evenly and thereby achieve a more acceptable geographical 
balance. There is no doubt that the balanced distribution will help to achieve nation goals, 
for example, access to higher education would be available to all aspiring academics 
according to their needs and motivation. 
 
F. Better Subject Mix: 
The demand for sciences and technological programmes at tertiary level is high in Libya. It 
ranges from medicine to pharmacy, and engineering to architecture. The drawback is, of 
course, that these are capital-intensive courses demanding heavy investment. As they are 
time-demanding, expensive to set up and require qualified personnel who are often in short 
supply and who can demand high salaries, private universities have shied away from 
mounting those programmes. What they have done is to provide a middle ground between 
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programmes in very high demand and those that are just about viable taking into account 
the cost considerations. This explains the proliferation of market courses such as 
accounting, marketing, business and law. For the new government it is a big challenge. 
Under current conditions and in an unstable society, private universities are not able to run 
courses in disciplines that require substantial funding.  Yet courses on communications 
skills, ICT and entrepreneurship are important to ensure excellent teaching and learning. 
The question is how should the government encourage private higher education to fund 
capital intensive courses while these universities do not have adequate facilities even for 
studies in the arts and humanities? Any shift here is likely to be difficult since it would 
require considerable attitudinal change on the part of participants. 
 
G. The Importance of Political Leadership: 
Any elaboration of a general strategy of development for the Libyan higher education 
system should address the challenges that were outlined earlier, clarify the sequential and 
practicable procedures to advance the policy and determine the mechanisms of its 
financing. The role of Libyan leaders, especially in the current uneasy political situation, is 
hard to overestimate. There is a clear need for the help and support of the Libyan 
government in establishing a team of policy makers and education planners, together with 
international experts, to work on the fundamental issues related to the future development 
of the country’s higher education system. It is crucial that Libya develops an educational 
policy that would build a structured, balanced system of higher education and ensure the 
availability of the programmes in high demand. But society generally should take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by higher education institutions and so 
consideration should be given to maintaining institutional and programme diversity.   
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Below is a proposal for the Libyan Government for a reappraisal of Libyan higher 
education in which the following objectives were put forward:  
1. Regulate the structure of levels and systems of higher education institutions so that it is 
appropriate to the socio-economic development of the country and current global trends. 
2. Set up a flexible and inter-related training process that stipulates effective learning 
objectives, content, and teaching methods. 
3. Develop programmes for teaching staff so that they become politically responsible with 
high morals, so that they demonstrate a professional conscience and high professional 
standards, and so that they encompass advanced, modern styles of teaching. 
4. Strengthen pure research and applied research activities that aim to improve the quality 
of training, that directly solve problems raised by the realities of socioeconomic 
development and that improve the financial rewards for employees of its institutions. 
5. Deploy effective financial mechanisms in higher education in order to diversify 
resources and enhance the effectiveness of investments. 
6. Re-orientate higher education management by enhancing their autonomy and by 
ensuring the accountability of higher education institutions and their competitiveness. 
7. Enhance the competitive capacity of Libyan higher education through international 
communication and through integration with foreign academic and commercial 
institutions. 
8. The notion of public‐private partnership means that the public and private sectors work 
as a corporate body with no financial competition. It contains different types that exist in 
many countries. Lee (Lee, M. 2008, p9 - p11) refers to a number of models of 
public‐private partnership, and gives as examples state/provincial governments and private 
companies, public universities and private companies, public universities and private 
colleges and non-profit making private universities. In Libya, the private universities work 
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independently from the public ones and Libyan higher education has never experienced 
any kind of private-public partnership. I think it is more likely to improve the financing 
policy of the post-Gaddafi government if it were to seek out corporations nationally and/or 
internationally that are willing to fund public higher education and private higher education 
as is the case in a number of countries, such as Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, and 
Malaysia. But this it will be a challenge and a difficult task for the Libyan government and 
decision makers.        
 
H. Improvement for Public Higher Education: 
The current higher education situation in Libya is, then, in disarray. Libya is a rich country 
with a small population but the problems confronting the government are immense. The 
immediate problems like rising graduate unemployment, the declining quality of graduates 
(in relation to the current needs of industry) and the rising unit cost of higher education in a 
society where there is a scarcity of financial resources and where universities have to 
compete for public resources are components in the overall list of governmental concerns. 
Clearly, if public funds continue to support higher education, higher education institutions 
should be more accountable and able to demonstrate their impact to the tax payers. 
Universities should improve their facilities and should be able to prove that they are of 
benefit to the wider population, ensuring the effective use of public resources to enhance 
the nation’s competitiveness. It is towards these ends that Libyan university reform is 
directed. Increasingly, Libyan public universities are being assessed in terms of the 
employability of their undergraduates because it has been argued that public universities 
are responsible for the current number of unemployed graduates. The real challenge is for 
the government to design and adopt a strong strategy for higher education with the aim that 
its graduates should be employable in the context of the global job market and not just that 
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of Libya. It is inevitable that the rapidly changing employment situation for graduates and 
for society at large will have major implications for Libyan universities and how they 
conduct their business in the future. The government, post-revolution, has to establish 
Libya in a regional and international centre of excellence in certain educational fields, 
especially that of technology.  
 
To conclude, all of the above aspirations require policy makers in Libya to consider 
equipping its administrators with the necessary facilities to provide prior training for 
students and faculty members so that they could accommodate the extensive adoption of 
technologies that require special abilities adaptive to change.  It is going to be a very 
difficult and long term goal if it is to be achieved. The period from 1985 to 1990 was an 
extremely hard time for Libya when it was isolated politically and economically from most 
of the rest of the world with the result that the entire Libyan economy deteriorated and this 
included higher education programmes, policies and strategies.  
 
If private participation in higher education is the trend, greater coordination at the policy 
and implementation levels is needed to ensure that the outcome is not just wide access to 
higher education, but also better higher education. Only then would Libya take its rightful 
place amongst the emerging countries of the world.  
 
8.3. Recommendations for future research: 
The thesis has triangulated various sources of data to explain the interaction between 
economic and political elements that shape the financing policy for higher education. 
There have been some insuperable problems in assembling statistical data, though, because 
there is no databank dealing with the phenomenon of private higher education in Libya.  
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The task was also obviously made much more difficult by the recent political turmoil in the 
country.     
 
The information provided by some institutions through their annual reports, records and 
documents sometimes appears unreliable as some gave contradictory figures. 
Methodologically, this study triangulated some qualitative methods and, while each has its 
own advantages, such as giving detailed insights, overall the results were limited due to the 
lack of representative models that could have given a general overview of the financing 
policy process in higher education in Libya.  
 
More available data would help to further empirical research that could determine the 
reforming of the financing policy for higher education and the phenomenon of 
privatization in Libyan higher education. Generally there has been very little data made 
available from state institutions and from private sector participants and this has reduced 
the scope for triangulating claims and, in certain instances, limited authoritative analyses. 
The fact that so little data is publicly available is in itself significant because it reveals that 
there is a deliberate effort to avoid giving truthful information and displays a complete lack 
of transparency. At the same time, however, this research may have a useful outcome 
insofar as it may make Libyan society more aware of the serious problems facing higher 
education in the country.  
 
The literature on higher education is increasing but is overly focused on the impact of 
higher education on the economy, or on an analysis of issues and matters related to its 
social and cultural aspects. This study has introduced another dimension to the debate by 
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shifting attention to the importance of the financing policy for higher education by 
analyzing its development in order to find mechanisms that could improve it.  
 
Another important debate that deserves to be researched in the future may be termed ‘the 
higher education returns’. Higher education imparts substantial monetary and non-
monetary benefits for both society and students. The major difficulty, however, is 
measuring precisely the extent of these benefits. Not all can be measured according to a 
single scale, that is, if they can be measured at all. Nevertheless, an analysis of the rates of 
return can provide a baseline estimate of the pure economic value of education, although in 
Libya the studies in this respect seem to be extremely limited especially those related to 
private returns. It is difficult, therefore, to decide whether the cost of higher education 
should be paid by Libyan students and their families or whether to justify the continued use 
of full public subsidies and this issue needs to be very carefully considered because it will 
have immense relevance to the design of any future policy. This study set out to determine 
how the financing policy for higher education has been shaped in Libya by different forces 
and to what extent the higher education sector has responded. Given the problems of 
availability and non-existence of data noted above, it is not possible yet to offer a definitive 
answer to the question. It can be strongly affirmed, though, that the evaluation of the 
financing policy, the case study findings and the educational practice examined provide us 
with the information and therefore the ability to determine a reforming policy for higher 
education and for its implementation.  
 
Internationalization and globalization have been important subject matter both in higher 
education policy debates and in research on higher education, and many countries have 
expressed their related concerns. But in Libya, the previous government under Gaddafi and 
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the political authorities post-Gaddafi did not and have not constructed clear strategies and 
the appropriate means to create a favourable environment for internationalization nor have 
universities been encouraged to be more innovative and responsive. 
 
Unfortunately the institutions themselves are not fully aware of the new challenges 
presented by globalization and its market forces, nor are they aware of the greater role of 
internationalization. This is true not only of the private universities but also of the largest 
national universities in Libya which have not developed plans of action for 
internationalization and have not allocated sufficient time and resources to accommodate 
its demands. This compounded by the fact that the universities lack the fundamental 
applicable knowledge, the ability and the skills to pursue a relevant policy. There is clearly 
a need for a comprehensive study on the liberalization of trading links by the government, 
this to be in line with the country’s socio-economic policy and its impact on future higher 
education development. The feasibility of achieving international recognition and the 
aspiration of achieving full integration into global scientific and academic communities, 
together with the competitiveness of national higher education institutions must be 
conscientiously examined. The framework of such a feasibility study should be set around 
main state universities and within representative private institutions.  
 
Finally, the experience and information I have gained during this research has made it clear 
that, in the modern, scientific and technological world a country such as Libya will find it 
progressively more difficult to achieve parity of esteem with other developing countries 
and eventually with already developed countries, unless it takes the decision to invest in an 
educational programme that addresses the urgent need for the acquisition of the 
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rudimentary and ultimately, the sophisticated skills essential for a technologically equipped 
nation.  Immediate research and action are required.    
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Chapter  Nine. Epilogue: The Revolution of the 17th of February, 2011 and its 
aftermath.  
 9.1   A quick view of the 17th February Revolution: 
After 42 years of a dictatorship, Libya became free since the 17th February Revolution 
2011. Gaddafi was no longer in control of the country.  The revolution started in the west, 
in Benghazi, the second city in Libya, on 17th of February 2011 and Gaddafi quickly lost 
all cities in east Libya in just four days of the revolution. The forces opposing Gaddafi 
established a government based in Benghazi on the 20th of February named the National 
Transitional Council (NTC), whose stated goal was to overthrow the Gaddafi government 
and hold democratic elections. Libya had been in a very difficult political situation for 
eight months. NATO forces had played a very important role in protecting civilians and 
helped Libyans to destroy Gaddafi’s dictatorship. Gaddafi was captured and killed by 
rebels on the 20th of October, 2011, in his home town of Sirt.  During the subsequent three 
years both the political and security situation in Libya has remained unstable.  
9.2    The thesis and the revolution: 
At the beginning, the research was targeted to cover the subject “Financing Policy for 
Higher Education and the Role of the Private Sector in Libya” in Gaddafi’s stage. It was 
not expected that a revolution would occur in the middle of this research. This event has 
created new circumstances that doubtless will have very significant effects on the nature of 
the previous financing policy for higher education.  
All this raises a number of questions: to what extent will the revolutionary changes affect 
private higher education? Is the new political system going to allow the private sector to 
play its role in higher education, and if so, how will private higher education be improved 
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in terms of its quality and its role in research? And how will the new political system 
address the problems associated with unaccredited private universities, their tuition fees 
and their graduates? Also, it is an important to ask about those private universities students 
who are relative to Gaddafi’s family.    
 
To highlight the issues related to private higher education after the 17th of February, 2011, 
the writer had an opportunity to undertake another field study in January, 2012, and 
conducted interviews from which important information was gained from a number of 
significant people. The field study was conducted under difficult circumstances because 
the country was still in a state of chaos and very unstable.  
The difficult circumstances were:  
1. The bureaucratic system was still in existence. 
2. The length of the field study was limited to one month only.  Another field study 
had not been planned, but the advent of the revolution made it important to do so. It 
was started on the 27 December 2011 but it became necessary for the writer to 
return to the UK before his visa expired on the 30th of January, 2012.   
3. The situation in the country was still to some extent chaotic and indeed during the 
field study the country witnessed several protests from different groups. 
4. Some interviewees did not understand the aim and the purpose of the interview and 
it proved difficult to explain the importance of the research. This was 
understandable because people still retained a fear of freely expressing an opinion 
or of giving information that might be used against them, a legacy from the Gaddafi 
regime. 
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9.3   The reopening of the whole debate about privatization.  
A decision had been taken in 1999, when Gaddafi was in power, to allow people to open 
private universities. The policy had been put in practice by the regime just for twelve 
years. The new political system has not made a significant change on the previous policy 
of Gaddafi’s government, at least in the short term. Previously it was difficult to criticize 
the policy of Gaddafi in inaugurating the private higher education policy but afterwards 
people felt free to do so. It should be noted that some people who were interviewed in 
Gaddafi’s time were no longer in their positions. Those people have been accused of 
supporting Gaddafi. They are the secretaries of General People Committee for Higher 
Education, National Committee for public universities and National committee for Private 
Universities. In the post revolution period interviews were conducted with significant 
people who were appointed by the new political system.  
 
The consensus among the members of the Libyan government, that was appointed by the 
NTC, was against the idea of privatization and private higher education in Libya. In an 
interview with the Deputy Minister of Higher Education and with others who share the 
same notion with him, it was said that:  
 
“....it is not our fault.....students and the owners of the private universities are responsible 
for that...the students, they knew from the beginning that it was the wrong decision to study 
at these universities.....” (Interview, January 2012).   
 
The unaccredited universities were still open at the time this research was conducted, and 
even universities which had already gained accreditation (e.g. Alrefak University) from 
QAA still have unaccredited academic departments which continue to accept students. 
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These universities do not declare or publish any information about their students.  
Evidence of this comes from my second field study in January, 2012, when Alrefak 
University refused to provide me with details of the numbers of students in the civil 
engineering department with the excuse that this was confidential information belonging to 
the University and could not be given because the department had not yet been awarded 
accreditation from QAA.   
 
The deputy was not satisfied with private universities describing them thus: “..they are not 
universities....they are shops to sell degrees....” According to his view the financing policy 
for higher education in Libya was to be heavily dependent on the state and the Libyan 
government had a desire to reform the financing policy for higher education. In a speech 
on Libyan radio the deputy minister described the future policy: 
 
“ ....the government will play a major role in financing higher education institutions and 
the role of the private sector in higher education will be tightened by the government. The 
latter will establish a sort of partnership and collaborate with excellent foreign universities 
if a private university is to open in the country….”  
Some argue that the problems of private higher education in Libya did not stem from 
Gaddafi’s ideas but rather from how people had put them in to operation and that the 
policy had been implemented incompetently. Universities had been founded that did not 
conform to the required conditions and stipulations, such as qualifications and experience, 
and parents sent their children to study at these universities without establishing whether or 
not they had been accredited.  
 
368 
 
Not everyone, however, shares this view. Some argue that this was the responsibility of the 
government. They claim that if the government had not wanted to accredit private 
university degrees then why had it allowed these universities to open their doors and enroll 
students in the first place? They asked, too, why the government had not played its role 
earlier by publishing information on those universities that had been accredited and on 
those that had not.  
 
It has also been argued that the government should not be so restrictive on matters of 
accreditation and that private higher education whatever its disadvantages is a reality in 
Libya. Many countries have private universities, but the establishment of private higher 
education in Libya was random and disorganized. It is surprising that the Gaddafi 
government acknowledged the deficiencies of the private establishments but did not take 
serious steps to strengthen them. In fact, it had no intention whatsoever to improve the 
private universities which had operated, and still do so, in a random and haphazard way. A 
Director of Financial Affairs who works for the National Committee for Private Education 
stated in interview that the people responsible for private higher education did not and do 
not want private universities to be successful. He said that when Dr. Abd-Alkabeer Al-
Fakhri was appointed a Minister of Education he did not provide any support for this 
committee. The Committee has poor facilities and its staff members lack essential skills. 
Its building compared with that of the QAA which has modern facilities and employs 
highly qualified people, has poor equipment, no Internet or email access and its employees 
lack computing skills.  
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In spite of these serious drawbacks, and although private universities have a poor 
reputation students are able to make successful careers by acquiring a qualification from a 
private establishment. The Deputy Minister of Higher Education points out that: 
“...it does not matter whether students study at private or public universities...the 
important thing is how to make a good career even if a student has attended a private 
university.......” (Interview, January 2012)     
 
Those responsible for the higher education sector argue that it is the responsibility of 
students to decide where to study and if they decide to attend a private university with the 
knowledge that many of these institutions have unaccredited status, then that is their 
choice. An employee who works in the Administration of Private higher Education said 
that the Director, Dr. Abdlatife, told some graduates from a private university who had 
come to him with their problem of unaccredited certificates:  
“....this is not our problem...I did not tell you to go to study at these universities...this was 
your choice and your decision....” (Interview, January 2012). 
I asked the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Professor Fathi, in January, 2012, in an 
arranged interview with him: “How will your government address the problem of 
graduates from unaccredited universities?”  He replied: “I am not responsible for what 
those students have already decided and this is their choice and the decision of their 
families ....the Minister of Higher Education will not accredit their degrees...and it isn’t 
responsible for these illegal universities.....” (Interview, January 2012).  
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9.4 A brief look at the situation of the post-revolution with reference to the 
difficulties facing the QAA and the new administration.  
The debate on private higher education in the post-Gaddafi stage has raised issues within 
this new context. Here I will present some observations on the long term character of 
Libyan higher education and concerning the difficulties facing the QAA.  
 
The authorities continued to implement the previous policy and procedures until the 
country could established a credible government, a situation that had been absent since 
1969. This situation after the revolution makes difficult for the researcher to analysis in 
depth  the subject for some reasons: the situation in Libya was chaotic and unstable, most 
important people had been replaced by people with little or no experience of the previous 
educational policy, particularly of the private higher education policy.  
 
The previous system had left private higher education in a state of total chaos, one of 
which was widespread corruption that also, at times, permeated through to higher 
education. While most university staff, both academic and administrative (sometimes the 
same individuals) throughout the region had worked hard under challenging conditions, 
including the aforementioned poor remuneration rates and very limited resources, there 
were some who performed less honorably. Data from the People’s Board for Follow-up 
cite reports showing that a significant percentage of Libya’s public investment expenditure 
in 1998 was lost to fraud and corruption, and the situation “…hasn’t improved since then.” 
(Al-Gaddafi, S. 2002, p.150).  
 
There were more important matters, such as security that had to be addressed immediately. 
The first task of decision makers after the revolution was to identify political leaders able 
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to guide the country in the early and very difficult post-revolution phase because Libya 
found itself totally lacking in civil organization. No reliable state institutions existed that 
were able to guide the country’s citizens who had never experienced a democratic election 
system before and there were no feasible political parties. During the revolution most of 
the ammunition and weapon stores had been opened and guns and weapons had been taken 
by the people.  There was no improvement on the country’s infrastructure since Gaddafi’s 
fall from power.  In these circumstances higher education policy could not be a priority.  
 
In November 2011 the NTC decided to appoint a temporary government which includes 
twenty ministries. In June, 2012, Libya held its first election in which a number of political 
parties participated and Libyans voted at the polling centres that had been set up in all 
cities and towns in the country. The aim of the election was to establish the National 
Conference (NC) so that all Libyan cities and towns could be represented and each of them 
allocated a number of seats according to the size of its population. The NC comprised 
independent members and parties that had been elected by the people. The nominated 
president of the NC was Dr Mohammed Al-Mgharyif.  
 
However, the situation in Libya remained unstable even after the establishment of the NC. 
An example of this is illustrated by a serious incident that took place in a city called Bani 
Waleed in east Tripoli in September, 2012 when there were, according to the Libyan 
government, a number of people who supported Gaddafi and who had been involved in the 
killing of protesters during the revolution. The city wanted to hand them over to the 
government. A person called ‘Omran’ from Misurata arrested Gaddafi. Omran was 
kidnapped and killed in Bani Waleed by Gaddafi’s supporters. This forced the temporary 
government to make the decision to enter the city using force. It should be realized that at 
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this time there was no organized army in Libya and the government depended on 
independent forces that had been fighting during the revolution to enter the city. Several 
people were killed, a large number were injured and thousands of families in the city left 
their homes in a serious clash. The fighting ended in October, 2012, when government 
forces have freed the city. However, this event demonstrated that the temporary 
government was still unable to control the country and achieve security and stability. In 
October the NC chose Mr. Ali Zidan to become the Prime Minister of the Libyan 
government and he appointed new ministers to the ministries who would be responsible for 
overall control of the country. At this stage the political body in Libya consisted of two 
significant bodies: the NC headed by Dr. Al-Mgharyif and the Cabinet headed by Mr. 
Zidan. Several meetings were held with the ministers and a number of speeches were given 
by Mr. Zidan. The new government took a number of decisions mostly concerned with 
security matter and stability. Under these circumstances it was difficult to project how 
private higher education would develop post-Gaddafi because the main priorities of the 
Libyan government at this stage were to achieve stability, set up the constitution and 
establish a democratic system.  
 
In private higher education accreditation is obviously of fundamental importance. There 
was a large number of unaccredited private higher education institutions and for several 
reasons, as already noted, the QAA is powerless to close them down. The private 
institutions include universities and higher education institutions that offer two year 
degrees. It is estimated that there are more than thirty of the former. The Director of QAA, 
in interview in January, 2012, estimated that there are two hundred private institutions all 
told and that they have become a real headache because so many students graduate from 
them. At the time of writing no decisions have been taken to solve the problem and further 
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delay will make the situation even worse in the future. The QAA, the APHE along with the 
Ministry of Higher Education are responsible for implementing and monitoring the private 
higher education policy but are too weak to control private higher education institutions, 
especially after the revolution. The new Ministry of Higher Education’s  first priority was 
to achieve stability in order to address the problems it had inherited.  The APHE had 
experienced difficulties when dealing with private higher education institutions during 
Gaddafi's era. Its director said: “...I sent official letters to ten private universities that are 
not accredited, to stop their activities until they produce their documents to QAA for 
accreditation. ....none of them have responded to us and they are still open...’   He was 
very disappointed and he continued “....we cannot do more than that...." It is not the 
responsibility of the QAA to force these universities to close down. The role of the QAA is 
only to assess the quality of the private universities and to award them the accreditation 
certificate if they are successfully assessed. 
 
In the Gaddafi era it had been difficult for the APHE to curtail unaccredited private 
institutions of higher education since they had gained strong political support from Gaddafi 
himself and some private universities such as Tripoli, Afriqyia and Al-Refak had enrolled a 
number of students from politically powerful families. Those clients have no longer to be 
enrolled in these universities since the revolution. However, the specific difficulties in 
private higher education post-revolution may be categorized as follows: 
1. The administration of private higher education has been faced with instability and 
inconvenience. An example of this is that during the field study in January, 2012, 
the main building of the National Committee for Private Higher Education which 
had been used by the administration in the previous regime was occupied by a 
battalion, meaning that members of the administration, including the director, were 
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unable to use the facilities. All files and records of private education remained still 
inside the building and no access was allowed. 
2. The administration has no official representative since the toppling of Gaddafi. This 
means that it is not able to fulfill its role until it gets recognition from the Ministry 
of Higher Education. In interview, the director stated that “....we cannot do our 
work as before....the administration has no legal framework or official 
representative... an official letter has been sent to the Ministry of Higher Education 
to address the matter but there has been no response for over a week...”  
(Interview, January 2012). 
3. There is a lack of regularity and compatibility in the related state policies. It seems 
that there is no coordination between private universities, the Ministry of Higher 
Education and other relevant institutions (e.g. QAA and the APHE). 
4. Facilities are very poor.  
 
At the time this field study was being conducted there appeared to be no intention by the 
government to address the matter of unaccredited universities and this situation may 
continue for the foreseeable future because the current government has real problems in 
drawing up a policy of higher education that could be put into practice quickly. The current 
higher education sector is damaged and this damage will have to be repaired by the policy 
makers. The Minister of Higher Education stated that:  
".....the previous policy of higher education had been designed in a way that served the 
political system for the Gaddafi regime.....that government did not pay enough attention to 
universities and higher education institutions......" (Interview, January 2012). 
After the first election the Minister of Higher Education moved from Alnaser Street in the 
centre of Tripoli to Qasser Ben Ghesheer. It is about 20 k.m south of Tripoli. The Ministry 
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has established an administration specializing only in private higher education institutions: 
universities and two-to-three-year diploma institutes. The organization is concerned with 
the issues, matters and problems of private higher education such as the unaccredited 
private higher education institutions and their graduates.  
 
A significant change in Zidan’s government was that the QAA relinquished its control over 
higher education and a new administration was founded in the body of the Ministry of 
Higher Education, the Administration of Private Higher Education (APHE). The previous 
manager Dr. Abd Alateef Kheshlaf was replaced by Dr. Ali Kheer Allah. The latter handed 
in his resignation because of the incompatibility between him and the inspector responsible 
for monitoring the activities of the ministry, which included inspecting the administration 
and operation of the private higher education sector. The Ministry has appointed Mr. Naser 
Al-Khelany68 to replace him. APHE’s responsibility was to accredit the degrees of private 
higher education institutions and universities and to control and monitor private higher 
education institutions. The APHE established a new system and all private higher 
education institutions are now compelled to register in that system. They are required to 
bring their documents and files including students’ results and their transcripts, and these 
are used by the APHE’s members to ensure the efficiency of the administration.     Seven 
private universities have been partly accredited and thirty one private higher education 
institutions awarding diplomas have been given temporary permission to continue. Ten 
institutions have been closed down as is illustrated on the poster by APHE.     
      
I have visited the Ministry of Higher Education many times and I have had the chance to 
arrange a number of interviews with responsible administrators and with graduates from 
                                                 
68
 He has MSc degree in tourism and he is doing PhD in the same subject. He has not enough experience in 
the area of higher education and his knowledge is limited.              
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private higher education institutions. A number of students who had graduated from 
unaccredited private higher education establishments have visited the APHE to have their 
degrees accredited, some of whom could not provide the necessary details and information 
required by the APHE because their institutions had been closed down. It was difficult to 
obtain information on how many private higher education institutions have vanished and 
five of the students I interviewed claimed that their institution had closed down and that 
they could not find the founders. In fact, after the February Revolution some of the 
institutions disappeared because owners supported the Gaddafi regime and some of them 
were members of what were called the ‘Revolution Committees’ and ‘The Communication 
Office to the Revolution Committees’69. This has made the situation for those who had 
graduated from such institutions extremely problematical if they wish to validate their 
degrees, although the Ministry of Higher Education may decide to accredit all 
qualifications to avoid any serious repercussions. 
 
It is a considerable challenge for the government to be confronted by those who had 
graduated from these universities. There are reasons that could be factors in this situation: 
first, some of those graduates were revolutionaries who fought to overthrow Gaddafi's 
forces and the government would not want to be embarrassed by them; second, the present 
political situation remains unstable - it is sensitive and the government has to be very 
cautious with any decision making related to these matters. In January, 2012, a group of 
graduates from private universities organized a protest in front of the cabinet asking the 
government to recognize their degrees. A large number of them had visited the APHE to 
get their certificates validated. A reliable source who works at APHE told me that he 
                                                 
69
 I spoke to a student who had come to have her degree accredited at the APHE and she told me that the 
institution at which she had studied was closed. The owner had been a supporter of Gaddafi and all student 
files, profiles and documents were stored at her home so that all ex-students would have to go to her house 
for the information they needed.      
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estimated the number of visitors to be 30 per week. Some of them had come from cities 
and towns far from the capital city, Tripoli, and their problems were more complicated 
than for those from Tripoli itself.           
 
In January, 2012, these graduate students organized their protest in front of the Cabinet in 
Tripoli asking the government to recognize their degrees and the government, under the 
circumstances related to the revolution realized that it would be diplomatic and sensible to 
accept their requests and thereby avoid any clash with those who had supported the 
revolution. The comprehensive examination70 has been the only way to sort out this 
problem since 2010. But the question that remains is to what extent is this policy going to 
continue?  
 
In October 2011 when Gaddafi was killed, most economic activities in the capital were 
closed down including the higher education institutions. At the beginning of 2012 Tripoli 
University was very slowly coming back into operation. One of the issues that it has faced 
since then is the decision that had been taken previously to privatize the faculties of 
Engineering and Pharmacy.  
 
9.5 Al-Refak University after the Revolution: 
This section sets out to analyze the role of Al-Refak University at the time of the February 
Revolution, how it responded to the event and then tries to shed some light on issues 
related to the university raised as a result of the revolution. It is effectively an extension of 
Chapter Seven that analyzed the university through the methodology of a case study. It is 
necessary to define the university’s attitudes toward the revolution and to what extent it has 
                                                 
70
  An examination is operated by QAA for students who graduate from unaccredited private universities. 
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been affected as a result.  It has to be emphasized that the availability of hard evidence in 
the form of documents and substantive data has been seriously limited and the writer has 
depended on personal observations and interpretations essentially through interviews to 
form the analyses.                 
    
During the revolution the university was under pressure from those who supported Gaddafi 
and from his opponents. The owner of the university and some staff members provided 
assistance to the protesters secretly inside the capital. The daughter of the owner in an 
interview in January, 2012, said: 
 “ ...it was a very difficult time ....we were very worried about Gaddafi’s security forces - if 
they knew what we were doing ....unfortunately the security forces identified us therefore 
we decided that it was important to leave the country...me and the rest of my family made a 
plan of how we can take our wealth with us and which country is the best for us... My 
mother, the owner, went to Tunisia but unfortunately she was arrested by Gaddafi's 
security forces who detained her and then investigated her....fortunately one of the security 
guards was a student at the university who helped her to escape...this was just ten days 
before the killing of Gaddafi.... 
........the university was not closed for very long… in November we opened again but there 
were still problems that we had to face. In December a group of students organized a 
protest against the university’s policy towards tuition fees. They complained about the high 
level of the fees and they asked the university to lower them........but the protest failed to 
achieve the aim...and she, my mother, said that our fees are not high........a second problem 
was from a battalion in Tripoli that came to seize the university as they thought that the 
university belonged to the previous government....we had been arrested many times by the 
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members of the battalion who investigated us to see whether we were with Gaddafi in 
suppression of the protesters or not .. " (Interview, January 2012). 
 
Like most private universities, Al-Refaq University is still as it was. Only five departments 
have been accredited by the QAA: Business Management, Architecture, Accounting, 
Computer and Law. The other departments that have not yet been accredited, for instance, 
Civil Engineering, Petroleum Engineering and English Language continue to enroll 
students.  It was thought that private higher education in Libya after the revolution was 
going to be more organized and have greater integrity but this has not happened. The 
example from the second field study in January, 2012, when, during a visit to the 
university, the writer asked for data on the number of students in the Department of Civil 
Engineering, illustrates the lack of change. The request was refused because, said Miss 
Saeeda, who is in charge of the quality assurance of the department, such information was 
confidential to the university: “I cannot provide you with this information because the 
department has not been accredited yet and I am worried that you might use the data to 
harm the university.....". (Chatting through Yahoo Messenger, January, 2012). 
 
9.6 Conclusion: 
An attempt has been made in this section to describe some of the important trends in 
private higher education in Libya in the immediate period after the revolution. In fact, the 
government seems to be confused about the role of the private sector and about the dangers 
involved in choosing between state and private education, especially as far as the job 
market is concerned. Attitudes generally towards private education are confused. There is 
strong support for the public sector and there are attitudes that are anti‐private as well as 
380 
 
those that are pro‐private; and there are some that intend to regulate the growth of the 
private sector. 
 
If the government is determined to give the private sector an opportunity to play its role in 
higher education then the government needs to reconsider the current policy and to be 
more restrictive with the private universities. It is clear that the QAA has little or no idea of 
what happens in some private universities. In an interview with the director of QAA and 
with a member of a delegation for the evaluation of private universities it was stated that 
the institutions visited were transparent and open but in reality they contradict themselves 
because they continue to operate illegal activities. 
 
The situation now displays a lack of vision on the part of the government that makes the 
public policy ineffective for private higher education in Libya. This very lack of vision has 
created the situation of a policy vacuum relating to the private sector and not only is there 
is no clear policy on private education but the overall policy for higher education 
throughout the country suffers from governmental neglect. The result is the growth in 
private higher education which may be attributed to changing domestic conditions, a lack 
of government resources, weak government mechanisms and the absence of effective 
regulatory bodies. 
 
An analysis of the development of privatization in higher education post-revolution 
indicates that the policy for privatizing higher education is going to need reforming if it is 
to operate effectively. A field study of just a month, even in an unstable country  like Libya 
shortly after its revolution has provided reasonable coverage on some really important 
educational issues associated with the privatization of public higher education, 
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unaccredited private universities and the problems their graduates face as well as the 
attitude of the new government towards private higher education. 
 
It is clear that the transitional government is confronted with a difficult problem if it is to 
form a financing policy for higher education in the current circumstances and this has been 
made more difficult by the protests made by different sectors in society, including the 
graduates from unaccredited private universities.       
   
After the revolution private higher education is now coming under sustained criticism but 
not as heavy as during Gaddafi’s rule because since then an uncontrollable situation has 
been created and private universities have become free to do whatever they want. Libya 
now, after the first three years of the new regime is a country where the authorities, state 
powers and other government bodies seem to be absolutely absent. Take a very simple 
example: there is a complete absence of traffic wardens on the roads in Tripoli. Education 
planners and decision makers are dealing with the alarming situation of uncontrolled 
private higher education which will undoubtedly lead to an even greater decline in the 
quality of education and add to the rising problem of graduate unemployment. 
 
There is a general feeling that the deterioration in quality is a result of inadequate staffing, 
rapidly deteriorating physical facilities, poor library resources and insufficient scientific 
equipment. In many cases, internal efficiency is very low and a significant proportion of a 
number of universities’ budgets is wasted. The second field study undertaken in January 
2012, a year after the revolution revealed that the authorities and the policy planners had 
put higher education in jeopardy by their lack of planning and by their ineffectual 
organization.  
382 
 
 
A similar line of reasoning applies to the emergence of graduate unemployment. The lack 
of relevance of many university programmes contributes to the mismatch between 
graduates and the occupations for which they apply or, in some cases, to which they are 
appointed.  It is obvious that graduate unemployment in the country has become a 
structural problem reflecting a fundamental arithmetical imbalance between the number of 
university graduates and the number of new jobs available in many sectors of the economy.  
 
Equally worrying is the lack of access to global knowledge and the international academic 
environment; this is a growing issue. In Libya poor command of foreign languages among 
staff and students is a serious obstacle that complicates access to the Internet and to 
essential textbooks. Gaddafi’s government, since the 1980s, had opted for the use of the 
national language at the expense of foreign languages, including the English Language. 
Now, post-Gaddafi, officials, authorities and decision makers are seriously challenged by a 
situation that exposes their disturbingly high rate of illiteracy in English. 
 
The collapse of Gaddafi’s system has created a very delicate situation where decision 
makers find themselves caught between conflicting objectives. From a social and political 
point of view, policy makers are committed to allowing any secondary school graduate to 
enter higher education. As a consequence, higher education has become increasingly 
supply-driven without trying to improve existing institutions or creating new institutions 
and by disregarding the standard and quality of the education provided as well as the needs 
of the labour market.  If this trend were to continue, it is very likely that the unchecked 
expansion of higher education in response to demographic and social pressures would 
exacerbate the problems of poor quality and difficult access to employment. 
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Obviously, neither option is politically or socially feasible. Appealing as 
The recurrent questions confronting educational planners intent on reforms are: How is it 
possible to learn from the previous experience in privatizing higher education which has 
taken place over the last ten years and which has resulted in a deteriorating situation 
characterized by a pattern of unmanageable and poorly planned private higher education 
practices? What kinds of reform are feasible and likely to prove effective in overcoming 
the present challenges? And how will the presently available higher education institutions 
be able to absorb the rising number of students?  
 
In the ultimate analysis, the private sector alone should not be entrusted with the 
responsibility of deciding on their participation in higher education with aim of creating a 
system designed for the good of society. It is the responsibility of the public authorities to 
clearly define the public-private role in the sector so the state must intervene to provide 
regulation and to develop a framework for the operation of private universities. 
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Appendixes: 
Appendix (1). A list of questions for the interviewees in the pre-revolutionary 
Gaddafi’s stage: 
Q1:- Higher education in Libya has experienced huge expansion in the last few decades, 
and there have been many changes: what are your thoughts on this? 
 
Q2:- What do you think are the main forces that led to the introduction and practice of the 
privatisation of higher education in Libya? 
 
Q3:- To what extent do you think the privatisation has worked? 
 
Q4:- As you have been the Director General of the Academy of Post-graduate Studies and 
Economic Research for twenty years, how do you evaluate such this experience? 
 
Q5:- As the Academy of Post-graduate Studies and Economic Research has developed 
rapidly for two decades, what do you think are the factors that have led the institution to be 
a successful model? 
 
Q6:- The Academy has been the first institution to depend largely on students’ 
contributions (tuition fees), How has this idea been addressed in Libya which is a socialist 
country? 
 
Q7:- What has the Academy gained and achieved? 
 
Q8:- What difficulties and challenges have arisen through the Academy experience? 
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Q9:- What do you think public universities will look like in the future, in light of the 
current trend towards privatisation? What role do you think they will play in the Libyan 
higher education sector?” 
 
Q10:-What will the decision makers in Libya expect from higher education institutions 
(public and private) after the reform of the financing policy for higher education? 
 
Q11:- As you know there are 14 state universities, seven public institutions of higher 
education and 50 private universities in Libya. Two of the seven public institutions have 
not yet been given a preliminary licence by QAA and just four out of the 50 private 
universities have been awarded a preliminary licence in some of their departments. So, in 
the light of this, can you explain why this should be? And how will the QAA address these 
problems?  
 
Q12:- Ten years from the beginning of private higher education in Libya in 1990, the 
government founded the Centre to assess the private universities. Why did the 
establishment of the Libyan Centre for Quality Assurance in Higher Education come so 
late? 
 
Q13:- Why do you think why there is such a rapid growth in private higher education in 
Libya?  
 
Q14:- To what extent do you think this policy will fit with socioeconomic classes in Libya 
society? Could this possibly lead to inequality in terms of access to education between the 
poor and the rich? 
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Q15:- On the one hand, the higher education policy in Libya has been geared towards the 
encouragement of the private sector to be more active in the tertiary education and on the 
other hand, the Libyan government has passed a law to prevent faculty members from 
engaging with private institutions of higher education. Do you think that there is a sort of 
contradiction and disorder in the state policy?     
 
Q16:- Can you say something about the thinking behind the move to privatisation: how, 
theoretically, does it fit with the traditional principles of the government?  
 
Q17:- How much private higher education should be supported by external funding? 
 
Q18:- To what extent do you think the private sector will contribute in solving some of the 
problems, such as unemployment and overcrowded state universities? 
 
Q19:- To what extent is the private sector making a significant contribution in plugging the 
gap between the demand for and the supply of higher education by the state?  
 
Q20:- Do you think that public finance for higher education as a policy, as has been the 
case in Libya for a long time, is to be withdrawn? 
 
Q21:- To what extent do these changes fit with the ideology of the third universal theory of 
the “Green Book” by Colonel Mummer Gaddafi? And do you think that the privatization 
of higher education in Libya differs when compared with other countries? 
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Appendix (2). A list of questions for the interviewees in post Gaddafi’s stage, after 
17th of February 2011 revolution: 
Q1:- Higher education in Libya has experienced huge expansion in the last few decades, 
and there have been many changes: what are your thoughts on this?” 
 
Q2:- What do you think are the main forces that led to the introduction and practice the 
privatisation of higher education in Libya? 
 
Q3:- What are the differences between public and private universities? 
 
Q4:- how does Libya differ from other countries in terms of its policy to privatise higher 
education institutions? 
 
Q5:- What do universities (public and private) in Libya need to learn from the experience 
of privatisation of higher education?  
 
Q6:- To what extent do you think the privatisation has worked? 
 
Q7:- What are your thoughts on the previous financing policy for higher education? Do 
you think the current changes were necessary, or could we have continued with the old 
system? 
 
Q8:- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the reforming of the higher education 
policy? 
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Q9:- There are number of unaccepted universities and they have not been given a permit to 
engage in activities according to the Centre for Quality Assurance’s Assessment. However 
they are still open. So, how will the Centre has dealt with their graduates who are not able 
to decide whether to continue their study or to find a job in the public sector? 
 
Q10:- Why was the decision (to operate private universities) taken?    
 
Q11:- What difficulties and challenges has the Centre faced? 
 
Q12:- It has been noted that degrees from some private universities have been rejected by 
state institutions which claim that these universities are of doubtful quality because of the 
expansion in teaching alongside the detriment and almost complete neglect of research 
activities. What does this mean do you think? 
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Appendix (3). The list of interviewees in Gaddafi’s stage (the first field study): 
Name The position Place of work Date of interview Notices 
Professor 
Farhat 
Shernana. 
Lecturer Academy for 
Higher Studies. 
November, 2010. My MSc supervisor. He was a 
rector of Garyounis University 
(the second largest university in 
Libya) from 1980-1985 and then 
an economic minister from 1968-
1990. 
Dr. Suleiman 
Ghoja. 
 
Director. The National 
Centre for 
Researches. 
December, 2010. He was in charge of private higher 
education in Libya. Then he 
worked at the National Centre for 
Education Planning (NCEP). 
Eng. 
Mohammed 
Shafter. 
General 
Secretary 
the Syndicate of 
Faculty 
Members of Al-
Fatah University 
(today is 
Tripoli) 
November, 2010 He was arrested because he 
supported Gaddafi during the 
revolution. 
Dr. Elhadi 
Al-Swayh. 
 
the General 
Secretary. 
Naser 
University. 
October, 2010 He was a lecturer at Alfatah 
University (today is Tripoli) 
Dr. 
Mohammed 
Al-Kaber. 
General 
Secretary 
QAA. January, 2011 He has been in this position for 
four years. 
Dr. Hussin Director QAA of Higher December, 2010  
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Margen. Education 
Institutes 
Dr. Abd-Al 
Majid 
Hussain. 
Director Assurance 
Administration. 
December, 2010 He worked in this place just a 
year. Recently, he has moved to 
work in the cabinet. 
Dr. 
Abdullatif M. 
Latife 
Director The 
Administration 
of Private 
Higher 
Education 
(PHEA). 
November, 2010 He has moved to work at the 
Ministry of Education. 
Al-Ferjani 
Eyad. 
 
Manager Administration 
Matters in the 
General 
Authority 
Information 
department 
January, 2011 He studied management at Tripoli 
university 
Abd-Alkbeer 
Alfakhery. 
 
General 
Secretary 
GPCHE November 2010 He studied at Al-Feker Al-
Jamahiry Academy. it is  an 
institution specialised in teaching 
the Green Book ideas. 
Salah Salem 
 
Manager Planning 
Council in 
Tripoli. 
December, 2010 He has been in this job for 7 
years. 
Nisreen 
Ashor. 
Employee The Libyan Al- November, 2010 She studied Law at Al-Shomokh 
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 Jehad Centre. University. 
Student X, 
Mohammed 
Haman. 
Dentist (he was 
a student) 
Dentistry Clinic 
(private). 
October, 2010 His age 25 and he lives in Gasser 
Ben Ghesheer, he studied at the 
Faculty of Dentistry. 
Hager Al-
Fergani.. 
 
Employee The Libyan Al-
Gehad Centre 
October, 2010 She studied accounting at Two 
March Institute 
Sabah 
Algdeery . 
 
Employee Tax 
Administration 
October, 2010 She studied Management at Al-
Taqadom University 
Fatema Al-
Abani 
 
Employee People’s 
Solicitor 
Administration. 
January 2011. She studied Law at Dar Al-Ealem 
University. 
Mohammed 
Al-Tomi. 
General Director Tax 
administration 
October, 2010. He has been as manager for 10 
years 
Fraj Al-
Hmadi 
Head Master. Secondary 
School, Tripoli. 
November, 2010. He has worked as a headmaster 
for more than 14 years. 
Moftah 
Othman, 
Departmental 
Chief. 
Administrative 
Affairs in the 
National 
Authority of 
Information, 
Tripoli. 
November, 2010 He has a Bachelor Degree in 
Management from Benghazi 
University 
Mrs. Mohiba 
Franka 
The president Al-Refak 
University 
December, 2010 She has a diploma in Arabic 
Language. 
 
Dr. Al- The president Afriqya November, 2010. PhD in Law. 
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Mabrouk 
Abo Shena 
University 
Dr. Al-Mehdi 
Mohammed 
The president Tripoli 
University 
(Trables 
University). 
November, 2010. PhD in Management. 
Mr. 
Mohammed 
Sheleeg. 
Administrative 
staff, 2010). 
Al-Refak 
University, 
December, 2010 BSc/ Accounting. 
Khwother Ali Student Al-Fatah 
University. 
November, 2010 She had studied at Faculty of 
Engineering for two years. 
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Appendix (4). A list of the interviewees in the post Gaddafi’s phase in 2012 (the 
second field study): 
Name The position Place of work Date of 
interview  
Notices 
Prof. Fathi R. 
Akkari 
The Deputy 
Minister of 
Higher 
Education 
Ministry of 
Higher 
Education 
January 2012 PH. d in Law 
Dr. Naeem Al-
Ghariani.  
The Minister of 
Higher 
Education. 
Ministry of 
Higher 
Education 
January 2012 PH. D in 
Education. 
Mr. Suleiman 
Al-Sweahli.  
The Minister of 
Education. 
The Ministry 
of Education. 
January 2012  
Dr. Suleiman 
M. Khoja.   
the Deputy 
Minister of 
Education 
The Ministry 
of Education. 
January 2012 PH. D in 
Engineering  
Dr. Abdullatif 
M. Latif.   
Director of the 
Private Higher 
Education 
Administration. 
The Private 
Higher 
Education 
Administration. 
January 2012 PH. D in 
Management. 
Dr. 
Mohammed 
Alkaber. 
The General 
Director of the 
QAA. 
QAA January 2012 N.A   
Mr. Mustafa 
Al-Kheshr 
The Director of 
QAA of Higher 
QAA January 2012 BCs in 
Management 
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Education 
Institutes. 
Mr. Aref Al-
Alawe 
The Director of 
the Management 
of 
Administrational 
and Financial 
Affairs at QAA.  
QAA January 2012 N.A 
Mrs. Basma 
Al-Madani 
the Director of 
the Managerial 
and Financial 
Affairs in Al-
Rfak University. 
Al-Rfak 
University. 
January 2012 N.A 
Mrs. Saeda The QAA 
department of 
Al-Refak 
University 
Al-Refak 
University 
January 2012. MS. c in Law. 
N.A: Not available  
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